SmartLedger — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

0x1args/SmartLedger carries serious risk (40%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Code Health (89%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (18%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (54%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Make retry-prone mutations idempotent (Idempotency).

For scale: Medium (~52,229 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~2.2 person-years (~1–5 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (89%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 89% Adequate · gated by D18 Architecture 73% Strong Maturity 56% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 18% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, P5, P7 Security 54% Adequate · gated by D28, C1 Event-Driven 72% Strong Accessibility 58% Adequate Performance 70% Strong

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 18% · 45% weightSecurity 54% · 25% weightMaturity 56% · 14% weightAccessibility 58% · 8% weightPerformance 70% · 4% weightEvent-Driven 72% · 2% weightArchitecture 73% · 1% weightCode Health 89% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 18 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 40 → ~58.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 53%Plumbing 44%Generated 3%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €100,000–€530,000

Cost to rebuild	€100,000–€530,000 (1.0–3.3 person-years (1,704–5,594 h), ~1–5 engineers)
Domain complexity	Very high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 40% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Medium · 35% boilerplate · 11% straight-line · 54% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~2.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€320,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 18% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.

+18.0 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

+18.0 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+18.6 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage

The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS0115: 'InitialCreate.BuildTargetModel(ModelBuilder)': no suitable method found to override.

Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS0115: 'InitialCreate.BuildTargetModel(ModelBuilder)': no suitable method found to override.

→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Medium asset (~2.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 18%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~2.2 person-years rebuild (52,229 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 18%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory

The headline is improving steadily (+9.3 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.

Evidence: trajectory: +9.3 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

At a glance — Event-Driven · 72% · Strong

The Good

ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0

The Bad

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 5.9 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 7.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 58% · Adequate

The Good

AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0

The Bad

AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.0

The Ugly

AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Strong

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

The Bad

PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.2

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	11	High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	5	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	1	Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery; Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.	+18.0 pts	Low	Code Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.	+18.0 pts	Low	Test Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+18.6 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+18.6 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.	+18.5 pts	Medium	Idempotency
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.	+18.5 pts	Medium	Outbound HTTP resilience
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.	+18.0 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.	+9.5 pts	Medium	Observability

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 8 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 62% mixed · 38% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Development.json	4.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Docker.json	5.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Hosts/Public/appsettings.Development.json	5.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Hosts/Public/appsettings.Docker.json	5.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Hosts/Public/Features/ExceptionHandler/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs	7.3	Mixed	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/KeycloakUserApiClient.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: UpdateUserAsync
src/Modules/Reports/Contracts/Helpers/CustomHandlebarsHelper.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
src/Hosts/Public/Dockerfile	9.3	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 62 of 62 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 62 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D23D26D27D28D29D30D31D35AC3AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX9C1C2C5ED1ED2ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3P1P2P3P4P5P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 61 of 101 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	—	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019ee67f-8b10-7d7b-8b08-8713c6456648.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — only literal inline colours and in-repo <style>-block CSS are read; external stylesheets, CSS-in-JS, computed/runtime/theme colour, and image contrast are all out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the markup itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C5 Data-Subject Rights: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — absence of evidence here means the scan found no in-repo trace, not that the control does not exist.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (1): ED5. For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)src/Modules/Reports/Contracts/Helpers/CustomHandlebarsHelper.cs:56

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

46 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 2 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Domain · ×10

Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices

Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs

What to do

Resolve the 10 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJ… finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 128 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — the solution has no test code.

No automated tests

What to do

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 48 packages use a banned license.

Licenses scanned

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 51034 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

CommentedOutCode · ×2src/Hosts/Public/Features/ExceptionHandler/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:59

Dead code: UpdateUserAsyncsrc/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/KeycloakUserApiClient.cs:56

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

46 projects, 443 .cs files, 51034 hand-written lines of code (51034 production / 0 test), plus 1873 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 274 inter-project edges (build failed).

Build failed

SmartLedger.Common.Domain (Production)src/Common/Domain/SmartLedger.Common.Domain.csproj

SmartLedger.Common.Contracts (Production)src/Common/Contracts/SmartLedger.Common.Contracts.csproj

SmartLedger.Common.Cqrs (Production)src/Common/Cqrs/SmartLedger.Common.Cqrs.csproj

SmartLedger.Common.Host.Migrations (Production)src/Common/Hosts/Migrations/SmartLedger.Common.Host.Migrations.csproj

+ 42 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 domain type(s) cross context boundaries across 8 contexts.

Cross-context type TransactionCreatedEvent (BankAccounts → Budgets)

Cross-context type TransactionDeletedEvent (BankAccounts → Budgets)

BankAccounts: 5 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums

Budgets: 4 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums

Common: 1 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 46 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Large project: SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

94 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: large — vertical-slice locality expected.

What to do

Improve Navigability — currently 8.5/10. — 94 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: large — vertical-slice locality expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×10src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Development.json:101detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 10 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.Development.json (6), appsettings.Docker.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Medium CVE: MailKit 4.13.0 · ×4detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

Low IaC: DS-0026src/Hosts/Public/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC3 · Page structure5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language and title, expose a main landmark and a sane heading order, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — limit.exceeded.html:2

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible, never computed or runtime colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

`SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.AppServices` is a Application project but references `SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Infrastructures.DataAccess`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices` is a Application project but references `SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices` is a Application project but references `SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices` is a Application project but references `SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.DataAccess`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.AppServices` is a Application project but references `SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Infrastructures.DataAccess`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.AppServices` is a Application project but references `SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.

What to do

Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

`IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient` declares 374 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:29

What to do

Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C5 · Data-Subject Rights4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether GDPR data-subject requests are supported in code — erasure, export/portability, consent.

Method: Roslyn scan: GDPR data-subject-rights corroboration (erasure/export/consent vocabulary co-occurring with subject-id store crossing or explicit GDPR pattern). Deterministic, gated by PII.

Corroborated rights: erasure ✓ · export ✗ · consent ✗. The missing right(s) would have to be fulfilled manually.

What to do

Implement data export/portability for a data subject (a machine-readable export of their personal data).
Track GDPR consent (lawful basis) alongside the personal data it authorises.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

`WebhookTriggeredEventConsumer.ConsumeAsync` makes a synchronous remote call (an HTTP call) while handling an event. The handler now depends, in real time, on another service being up and fast — the opposite of why you went event-driven. Publish a follow-up message (or use the outbox) instead of calling out and awaiting a response inside the handler. — WebhookTriggeredEventConsumer.cs:23

What to do

Remove synchronous remote calls from message handlers — react by publishing further messages, so services stay temporally decoupled.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write7.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

`CommandHandler` writes to the database while `CreateBudgetCommandHandler` publishes to the message bus in the same command-handling flow, with no outbox referenced on either path. Splitting the persist and the publish across sibling methods (or two collaborating actors) doesn't make them atomic — a crash between the two either loses the message or emits a phantom event. Use the transactional outbox pattern so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — TransactionDecorator.cs:16

What to do

Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED5 · Idempotency3.0 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

`Decorators.CommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) (×2) — TransactionDecorator.cs:21, TransactionDecorator.cs:47
`CreateBudget.CreateBudgetCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateBudgetCommandHandler.cs:19
`CreateBudgetCategory.CreateBudgetCategoryCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateBudgetCategoryCommandHandler.cs:19
`DeleteBudget.DeleteBudgetCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — DeleteBudgetCommandHandler.cs:17
`DeleteBudgetCategory.RemoveCategoryCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — RemoveCategoryCommandHandler.cs:17
`CreateAccount.CreateAccountCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateAccountCommandHandler.cs:19
`CreateTransaction.CreateTransactionCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateTransactionCommandHandler.cs:19
`DeleteAccount.DeleteAccountCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — DeleteAccountCommandHandler.cs:17
`DeleteTransaction.DeleteTransactionCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — DeleteTransactionCommandHandler.cs:19
`Consumers.WebhookDispatchedEventConsumer.ConsumeAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — WebhookDispatchedEventConsumer.cs:18

What to do

Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UserInfo.cs:76

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`GetEqualityComponents` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UserInfo.cs:74
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:61, GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:62

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 46 of 46 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 22/34 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 19 use(s) across 53,920 production line(s) (~0.4/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — ApiExtensions.cs:127
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 544/547 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×3) — AuthorizationMiddleware.cs:36, RateLimitingMiddleware.cs:29, IEventConsumer.cs:21

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

45/46 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
~2.7 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 8 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria — partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	89%	Adequate — gated by D18	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	73%	Strong	Strongest area.
Maturity	56%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	18%	Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, P5, P7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	54%	Adequate — gated by D28, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	72%	Strong	Solid.
Accessibility	58%	Adequate	Acceptable, with room to improve.
Performance	70%	Strong	Solid.

Not included — 27 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — Not applicable
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D39 IL Efficiency — IL metrics not applicable
D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 5 strongly-typed id(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM not available — accuracy is the Tier-2 layer and needs a reachable model.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 12 finding(s)

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×10

Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Development.json:101 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Development.json:105 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Docker.json:95 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Docker.json:99 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Development.json:95 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Api/appsettings.Development.json:99 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Public/appsettings.Development.json:101 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Public/appsettings.Development.json:105 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Public/appsettings.Docker.json:95 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Hosts/Public/appsettings.Docker.json:99 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1

High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1

No automated tests — No automated tests — the solution has no test code. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.

Warning — 23 finding(s)

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×10

Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Domain — SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.06, distance 0.94 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Domain — SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.07, distance 0.93 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Contracts — SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Contracts: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.09, distance 0.91 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Contracts — SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Contracts: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.10, distance 0.90 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Contracts — SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Contracts: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.11, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Common.Domain — SmartLedger.Common.Domain: abstractness 0.20, instability 0.00, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients — SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.20, distance 0.78 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Common.Contracts — SmartLedger.Common.Contracts: abstractness 0.26, instability 0.00, distance 0.74 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess — SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.27, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: SmartLedger.Common.Applications.AppServices — SmartLedger.Common.Applications.AppServices: abstractness 0.29, instability 0.00, distance 0.71 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×4

Medium CVE: MailKit 4.13.0 — MailKit 4.13.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MimeKit 4.13.0 — MimeKit 4.13.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.12.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.12.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.12.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.12.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×2

CommentedOutCode src/Hosts/Public/Features/ExceptionHandler/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:59 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode src/Hosts/Public/Features/ExceptionHandler/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:65 — 13 consecutive commented-code lines

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1

Dead code: UpdateUserAsync src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/KeycloakUserApiClient.cs:56 — Method UpdateUserAsync — no references found in solution.

D18 · Solution Shape · Build failed · ×1

Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 1), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS0115: 'InitialCreate.BuildTargetModel(ModelBuilder)': no suitable method found to override.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type TransactionCreatedEvent (BankAccounts → Budgets) · ×1

Cross-context type TransactionCreatedEvent (BankAccounts → Budgets) — TransactionCreatedEvent (context BankAccounts) is exposed in Budgets's public surface via TransactionCreatedEventConsumer.ConsumeAsync — couples the contexts.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type TransactionDeletedEvent (BankAccounts → Budgets) · ×1

Cross-context type TransactionDeletedEvent (BankAccounts → Budgets) — TransactionDeletedEvent (context BankAccounts) is exposed in Budgets's public surface via TransactionDeletedEventConsumer.ConsumeAsync — couples the contexts.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Modules/Reports/Contracts/Helpers/CustomHandlebarsHelper.cs:56 — src/Modules/Reports/Contracts/Helpers/CustomHandlebarsHelper.cs:56-67 | src/Modules/Reports/Contracts/Helpers/CustomHandlebarsHelper.cs:84-95

D5 · Coupling · Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices · ×1

Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices — SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices has instability 0.91 with 2 dependents.

D5 · Coupling · Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs · ×1

Unstable project SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs — SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs has instability 0.83 with 3 dependents.

Recommendation — 14 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.

D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 49 commit(s) sampled).

D26 · Project Cohesion · Large project · ×1

Large project: SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients — 38694 LoC, 133 public types across 5 namespaces — review for cohesion.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Hosts/Public/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined

D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (49 commit(s) sampled).

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL metrics not applicable · ×1

IL metrics not applicable — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.

D7 · Architectural Integrity · No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1

No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.

D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1

No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.

Info — 52 finding(s)

D14 · License Compliance · Licenses scanned · ×1

Licenses scanned — 48 packages scanned; 3 distinct SPDX licenses.

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Domain (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Domain (Production) src/Common/Domain/SmartLedger.Common.Domain.csproj — 8 .cs files, 306 LoC (138 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Contracts (Production) src/Common/Contracts/SmartLedger.Common.Contracts.csproj — 18 .cs files, 314 LoC (143 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Cqrs (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Cqrs (Production) src/Common/Cqrs/SmartLedger.Common.Cqrs.csproj — 6 .cs files, 306 LoC (204 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Host.Migrations (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Host.Migrations (Production) src/Common/Hosts/Migrations/SmartLedger.Common.Host.Migrations.csproj — 2 .cs files, 60 LoC (37 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Common/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Common.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 7 .cs files, 186 LoC (89 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Applications.Handlers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Applications.Handlers (Production) src/Common/Applications/Handlers/SmartLedger.Common.Applications.Handlers.csproj — 6 .cs files, 284 LoC (145 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Domain (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Domain (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Domain/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Domain.csproj — 9 .cs files, 548 LoC (273 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 31 .cs files, 1187 LoC (720 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.Handlers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.Handlers (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Applications/Handlers/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Applications.Handlers.csproj — 23 .cs files, 497 LoC (311 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Contracts (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Contracts/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Contracts.csproj — 14 .cs files, 287 LoC (140 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Host.Migrations (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Host.Migrations (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Hosts/Migrations/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Host.Migrations.csproj — 8 .cs files, 738 LoC (575 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Modules/Security/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 9 .cs files, 222 LoC (116 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Applications.Handlers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Applications.Handlers (Production) src/Modules/Security/Applications/Handlers/SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Applications.Handlers.csproj — 15 .cs files, 271 LoC (166 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Contracts (Production) src/Modules/Security/Contracts/SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Contracts.csproj — 10 .cs files, 186 LoC (76 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients (Production) src/Modules/Security/Clients/SmartLedger.Modules.Security.Clients.csproj — 13 .cs files, 45494 LoC (32723 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Domain (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Domain (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Domain/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Domain.csproj — 6 .cs files, 622 LoC (387 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 3 .cs files, 106 LoC (67 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.Handlers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.Handlers (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Applications/Handlers/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Applications.Handlers.csproj — 4 .cs files, 69 LoC (40 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Contracts (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Contracts/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Contracts.csproj — 3 .cs files, 134 LoC (93 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Infrastructures.FileStorage (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Infrastructures.FileStorage (Production) src/Common/Infrastructures/FileStorage/SmartLedger.Common.Infrastructures.FileStorage.csproj — 2 .cs files, 140 LoC (93 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) src/Common/Infrastructures/DataAccess/SmartLedger.Common.Infrastructures.DataAccess.csproj — 16 .cs files, 641 LoC (343 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Infrastructures/DataAccess/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Infrastructures.DataAccess.csproj — 12 .cs files, 479 LoC (312 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Infrastructures/DataAccess/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.DataAccess.csproj — 5 .cs files, 129 LoC (79 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Infrastructures/BackgroundJobs/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Infrastructures.BackgroundJobs.csproj — 12 .cs files, 382 LoC (252 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Host.Migrations (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Host.Migrations (Production) src/Modules/Reports/Hosts/Migrations/SmartLedger.Modules.Reports.Host.Migrations.csproj — 5 .cs files, 229 LoC (176 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 25 .cs files, 872 LoC (531 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.Handlers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.Handlers (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Applications/Handlers/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Applications.Handlers.csproj — 24 .cs files, 559 LoC (358 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Contracts (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Contracts/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Contracts.csproj — 14 .cs files, 292 LoC (141 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Domain (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Domain (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Domain/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Domain.csproj — 8 .cs files, 462 LoC (232 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Infrastructures/DataAccess/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Infrastructures.DataAccess.csproj — 12 .cs files, 459 LoC (301 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Host.Migrations (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Host.Migrations (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Hosts/Migrations/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Host.Migrations.csproj — 8 .cs files, 752 LoC (588 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Modules/Webhooks/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 4 .cs files, 137 LoC (81 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.Handlers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.Handlers (Production) src/Modules/Webhooks/Applications/Handlers/SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Applications.Handlers.csproj — 3 .cs files, 76 LoC (49 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Contracts (Production) src/Modules/Webhooks/Contracts/SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Contracts.csproj — 6 .cs files, 80 LoC (35 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Infrastructures.DataAccess (Production) src/Modules/Webhooks/Infrastructures/DataAccess/SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Infrastructures.DataAccess.csproj — 9 .cs files, 236 LoC (143 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Host.Migrations (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Host.Migrations (Production) src/Modules/Webhooks/Hosts/Migrations/SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Host.Migrations.csproj — 5 .cs files, 295 LoC (226 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Applications.AppServices (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Applications.AppServices (Production) src/Modules/Notifications/Applications/AppServices/SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Applications.AppServices.csproj — 11 .cs files, 321 LoC (198 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Contracts (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Contracts (Production) src/Modules/Notifications/Contracts/SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Contracts.csproj — 7 .cs files, 112 LoC (48 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Host.Public (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Host.Public (Production) src/Hosts/Public/SmartLedger.Host.Public.csproj — 28 .cs files, 2078 LoC (1423 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Host.Consumers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Host.Consumers (Production) src/Modules/BankAccounts/Hosts/Consumers/SmartLedger.Modules.BankAccounts.Host.Consumers.csproj — 6 .cs files, 197 LoC (137 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Host.Consumers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Host.Consumers (Production) src/Modules/Budgets/Hosts/Consumers/SmartLedger.Modules.Budgets.Host.Consumers.csproj — 8 .cs files, 262 LoC (187 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Host.Consumers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Host.Consumers (Production) src/Modules/Webhooks/Hosts/Consumers/SmartLedger.Modules.Webhooks.Host.Consumers.csproj — 4 .cs files, 212 LoC (156 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Host.Consumers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Host.Consumers (Production) src/Modules/Notifications/Hosts/Consumers/SmartLedger.Modules.Notifications.Host.Consumers.csproj — 3 .cs files, 143 LoC (101 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Host (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Host (Production) src/Common/Hosts/Common/SmartLedger.Common.Host.csproj — 5 .cs files, 203 LoC (120 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Common.Host.Consumers (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Common.Host.Consumers (Production) src/Common/Hosts/Consumers/SmartLedger.Common.Host.Consumers.csproj — 1 .cs files, 25 LoC (12 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · SmartLedger.Hosts.Outbox.Migrations (Production) · ×1

SmartLedger.Hosts.Outbox.Migrations (Production) src/Hosts/Outbox/Migrations/SmartLedger.Hosts.Outbox.Migrations.csproj — 5 .cs files, 637 LoC (481 significant)

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · BankAccounts · ×1

BankAccounts: 5 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In BankAccounts, 5 contract type(s) (AccountCreatedEvent, AccountDeletedEvent, CreateAccountRequest, TransactionCreatedEvent, TransactionDeletedEvent) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (AccountDeletedEvent, CreateAccountRequest, Event); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Budgets · ×1

Budgets: 4 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In Budgets, 4 contract type(s) (BudgetCategoryCreatedEvent, BudgetCategoryDeletedEvent, BudgetCreatedEvent, BudgetDeletedEvent) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (BudgetCategoryDeletedEvent, BudgetDeletedEvent, Event); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Common · ×1

Common: 1 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In Common, 1 contract type(s) (Event) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (Event); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Notifications · ×1

Notifications: 1 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In Notifications, 1 contract type(s) (NotificationSentEvent) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (Event); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Webhooks · ×1

Webhooks: 2 contract type(s) expose producer-owned ids/enums — In Webhooks, 2 contract type(s) (WebhookDispatchedEvent, WebhookTriggeredEvent) expose strong-typed ids/value objects (Event); a serialized contract could expose the underlying primitive instead. Advisory — a deliberate strong-ID style is fine.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	14	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list src/SmartLedger.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	5	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	1	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.	0	—

Run 019ee67f-8b10-7d7b-8b08-8713c6456648 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 61 field(s) across 5 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 28 field(s)

EmailSendingModel.Email src/Modules/Notifications/Applications/AppServices/Contexts/Emails/Strategies/Models/EmailSendingModel.cs:12
TemplatePaths.EmailConfirmationPath src/Modules/Notifications/Contracts/Common/Templates/TemplatePaths.cs:9
TemplateSubjects.EmailConfirmed src/Modules/Notifications/Contracts/Common/Templates/TemplateSubjects.cs:9
EmailSendingOptions.Email src/Modules/Notifications/Contracts/Options/EmailSendingOptions.cs:18
UserRegistrationModel.Email src/Modules/Security/Applications/AppServices/Contexts/Identify/Models/UserRegistrationModel.cs:13
EmailOnlyModel.Email src/Modules/Security/Applications/AppServices/Contexts/Users/Models/EmailOnlyModel.cs:8
RegisterCommand.Email src/Modules/Security/Applications/Handlers/Contexts/Identify/Commands/Register/RegisterCommand.cs:15
AccessToken.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3701
AccessToken.Email_verified src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3704
ClaimRepresentation.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:4595
IDToken.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6198
IDToken.Email_verified src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6201
IdentityProviderRepresentation.TrustEmail src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6382
MemberRepresentation.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6790
MemberRepresentation.EmailVerified src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6793
RealmRepresentation.RegistrationEmailAsUsername src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:8060
RealmRepresentation.VerifyEmail src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:8066
RealmRepresentation.LoginWithEmailAllowed src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:8069
RealmRepresentation.DuplicateEmailsAllowed src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:8072
RealmRepresentation.EmailTheme src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:8309
UserRepresentation.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9636
UserRepresentation.EmailVerified src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9639
Body2.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9833
KeycloakAuthorizationApiClient.VerificationEmailLifespan src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/KeycloakAuthorizationApiClient.cs:37
UserCreationModel.Email src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Models/UserCreationModel.cs:13
RegistrationRequest.Email src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Requests/Identify/RegistrationRequest.cs:13
UserResponse.Email src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Responses/Users/UserResponse.cs:18
UserResponse.IsEmailVerified src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Responses/Users/UserResponse.cs:19

Name — 24 field(s)

UserInfo.FirstName src/Modules/Reports/Domain/ValueObjects/UserInfo.cs:18
UserInfo.LastName src/Modules/Reports/Domain/ValueObjects/UserInfo.cs:21
UserRegistrationModel.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Applications/AppServices/Contexts/Identify/Models/UserRegistrationModel.cs:14
UserRegistrationModel.LastName src/Modules/Security/Applications/AppServices/Contexts/Identify/Models/UserRegistrationModel.cs:15
RegisterCommand.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Applications/Handlers/Contexts/Identify/Commands/Register/RegisterCommand.cs:16
RegisterCommand.LastName src/Modules/Security/Applications/Handlers/Contexts/Identify/Commands/Register/RegisterCommand.cs:17
AccessToken.Given_name src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3677
AccessToken.Family_name src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3680
IDToken.Given_name src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6174
IDToken.Family_name src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6177
MemberRepresentation.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6784
MemberRepresentation.LastName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6787
UserRepresentation.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9630
UserRepresentation.LastName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9633
Body2.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9836
Body2.LastName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:9839
UserCreationModel.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Models/UserCreationModel.cs:14
UserCreationModel.LastName src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Models/UserCreationModel.cs:15
ValidationConstants.FirstNameMinLength src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Common/ValidationConstants.cs:21
ValidationConstants.FirstNameMaxLength src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Common/ValidationConstants.cs:24
RegistrationRequest.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Requests/Identify/RegistrationRequest.cs:14
RegistrationRequest.LastName src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Requests/Identify/RegistrationRequest.cs:15
UserResponse.FirstName src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Responses/Users/UserResponse.cs:16
UserResponse.LastName src/Modules/Security/Contracts/Responses/Users/UserResponse.cs:17

Phone — 5 field(s)

AccessToken.Phone_number src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3719
AccessToken.Phone_number_verified src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3722
ClaimRepresentation.Phone src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:4607
IDToken.Phone_number src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6216
IDToken.Phone_number_verified src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6219

Address — 2 field(s)

AddressClaimSet.Street_address src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3796
AddressClaimSet.Postal_code src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3805

Date of birth — 2 field(s)

AccessToken.Birthdate src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:3710
IDToken.Birthdate src/Modules/Security/Clients/Keycloak/Generated/IKeycloakGeneratedApiClient.cs:6207

0X1args/SmartLedger

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Trajectory

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

At a glance — Code Health · 89% · Adequate · gated by D18

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 56% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 18% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, P5, P7

At a glance — Security · 54% · Adequate · gated by D28, C1

At a glance — Event-Driven · 72% · Strong

At a glance — Accessibility · 58% · Adequate

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts