Public report of 0xb4lamx/nestjs-boilerplate-microservice, published 22 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 13:20 UTC · Survey ID cd_c6af0ad856c04650a830aa616e5f13f8

0xb4lamx/nestjs-boilerplate-microservice

Measured 22 October 2026, 13:17 UTC, at code version bda7af7

Code coverage: not measuredSupply-chain provenance & signing: not measured

Code coverage is not measured: Tests deferred to the consumer.

Supply-chain provenance & signing is not measured: Supply-chain provenance is not scored (this pipeline releases no artifact), but its build steps or GitHub Actions workflows have integrity defects, or nothing watches its dependency set for published advisories.

CAI score 38out of 100 At risk No change since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Performance 100 Exemplary Maturity 88 Exemplary Architecture 69 Strong Code Health 60 Adequate Production Readiness 53 Adequate Domain Modelling 43 Adequate Security and Compliance 19 Critical

A very small codebase: 1,364 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 19

Findings by how serious they are

37 critical 61 serious 58 minor

8 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
22 October 2026, 13:17 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

71of 74 dimensions measured by tools. The other 3 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
124of 156 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 32 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
74dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 1,364 lines of product code in 1 project.
Chapters

Executive summary

0xb4lamx/nestjs-boilerplate-microservice scores 38 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged. Watchdog judged it as a template, sample or demo, meant to be read or copied, so the dimensions about building, releasing and running a product don't apply, and its lenses are rated against a lower bar. The score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Security and Compliance, which scores 19 and is rated Critical. Its Dependency Vulnerabilities dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Security and Compliance can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault) and to protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do, and if Security and Compliance rose to 70, the score would rise from 38 to about 53.

37 findings are critical: 33 in Dependency Vulnerabilities, one in Dependency Hygiene, one in Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary, one in IaC & Container Security and one in Static Analysis (SAST).

Watchdog couldn't measure 4 dimensions in this code, among them Navigability, Web-Security Posture and Cancellation propagation, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 1,364 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €1,400, to rebuild.

Code Health 60 Adequate, capped by Nullable reference types Architecture 69 Strong Maturity 88 ★ Exemplary Production Readiness 53 Adequate, capped by Test Distribution and Security & performance tooling Security and Compliance 19 ⚠ Critical, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities, Data Protection and Access Controls Domain Modelling 43 Adequate Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 19 · counts for 46%Domain Modelling 43 · counts for 25%Production Readiness 53 · counts for 14%Code Health 60 · counts for 8%Architecture 69 · counts for 4%Maturity 88 · counts for 2%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Security and Compliance rose from 19 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 38 to about 53.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 100%
New since the last survey: 18 findings

These 18 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 11 findings

These 11 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €1,400 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€460 to €2,300, for 8 to 24 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 38. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeVery small: 1,364 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault).
Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Raises the score by about 13 points · Medium effort · Data Protection
2
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
Raises the score by about 13 points · Medium effort · Access Controls
3
Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + mapper; leave the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

If you do one thing first · First action
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault). Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 13 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

57 modules, with 50 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 17 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 app_service2 common.abstract_entity3 common.dto.abstract_dto4 filters.rpc-exception_filter5 interfaces.IFile6 interfaces.aws-config_interface7 interfaces.swagger-config_interface8 modules.users.commands.impl.welcome-user_command9 modules.users.dtos.user-id-request-params_dto10 modules.users.dtos.user-register_dto11 modules.users.commands.impl.create-user_command12 modules.users.commands.impl.delete-user_command13 modules.users.dtos.user_dto14 modules.users.entities.user_entity15 modules.users.repository.user_repository16 shared.services.config_service17 modules.users.commands.handlers.create-user_handler18 modules.users.commands.handlers.delete-user_handler19 modules.users.commands.handlers.welcome-user_handler20 modules.users.commands.impl.update-user_command21 modules.users.events.impl.abstract_event22 modules.users.queries.impl.get-user_query23 modules.users.services.users_service24 shared.services.aws-s3_service25 shared.services.logger_service26 app_controller27 filters.http-exception_filter28 modules.users.commands.handlers.update-user_handler29 modules.users.controllers.users_controller30 modules.users.events.impl.user-created_event31 modules.users.events.impl.user-deleted_event32 modules.users.events.impl.user-updated_event33 modules.users.events.impl.user-welcomed_event34 modules.users.graphql.users_resolver35 modules.users.queries.handlers.get-user_handler36 modules.users.queries.handlers.get-users_handler37 modules.users.events.handlers.user-created_handler38 modules.users.events.handlers.user-deleted_handler39 modules.users.events.handlers.user-updated_handler40 modules.users.events.handlers.user-welcomed_handler
1 app_service
2 common.abstract_entity
3 common.dto.abstract_dto
4 filters.rpc-exception_filter
5 interfaces.IFile
6 interfaces.aws-config_interface
7 interfaces.swagger-config_interface
8 modules.users.commands.impl.welcome-user_command
9 modules.users.dtos.user-id-request-params_dto
10 modules.users.dtos.user-register_dto
11 modules.users.commands.impl.create-user_command1
12 modules.users.commands.impl.delete-user_command1
13 modules.users.dtos.user_dto1
14 modules.users.entities.user_entity1
15 modules.users.repository.user_repository1
16 shared.services.config_service11
17 modules.users.commands.handlers.create-user_handler11
18 modules.users.commands.handlers.delete-user_handler11
19 modules.users.commands.handlers.welcome-user_handler11
20 modules.users.commands.impl.update-user_command1
21 modules.users.events.impl.abstract_event1
22 modules.users.queries.impl.get-user_query1
23 modules.users.services.users_service111
24 shared.services.aws-s3_service11
25 shared.services.logger_service1
26 app_controller111
27 filters.http-exception_filter11
28 modules.users.commands.handlers.update-user_handler11
29 modules.users.controllers.users_controller1111
30 modules.users.events.impl.user-created_event1
31 modules.users.events.impl.user-deleted_event1
32 modules.users.events.impl.user-updated_event1
33 modules.users.events.impl.user-welcomed_event1
34 modules.users.graphql.users_resolver1
35 modules.users.queries.handlers.get-user_handler1111
36 modules.users.queries.handlers.get-users_handler11
37 modules.users.events.handlers.user-created_handler1
38 modules.users.events.handlers.user-deleted_handler1
39 modules.users.events.handlers.user-updated_handler1
40 modules.users.events.handlers.user-welcomed_handler1
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 app_service2 common.abstract_entity3 common.dto.abstract_dto4 filters.rpc-exception_filter5 interfaces.IFile6 interfaces.aws-config_interface7 interfaces.swagger-config_interface8 modules.users.commands.impl.welcome-user_command9 modules.users.dtos.user-id-request-params_dto10 modules.users.dtos.user-register_dto11 modules.users.commands.impl.create-user_command12 modules.users.commands.impl.delete-user_command13 modules.users.dtos.user_dto14 modules.users.entities.user_entity15 modules.users.repository.user_repository16 shared.services.config_service17 modules.users.commands.handlers.create-user_handler18 modules.users.commands.handlers.delete-user_handler19 modules.users.commands.handlers.welcome-user_handler20 modules.users.commands.impl.update-user_command21 modules.users.events.impl.abstract_event22 modules.users.queries.impl.get-user_query23 modules.users.services.users_service24 shared.services.aws-s3_service25 shared.services.logger_service26 app_controller27 filters.http-exception_filter28 modules.users.commands.handlers.update-user_handler29 modules.users.controllers.users_controller30 modules.users.events.impl.user-created_event31 modules.users.events.impl.user-deleted_event32 modules.users.events.impl.user-updated_event33 modules.users.events.impl.user-welcomed_event34 modules.users.graphql.users_resolver35 modules.users.queries.handlers.get-user_handler36 modules.users.queries.handlers.get-users_handler37 modules.users.events.handlers.user-created_handler38 modules.users.events.handlers.user-deleted_handler39 modules.users.events.handlers.user-updated_handler40 modules.users.events.handlers.user-welcomed_handlerapp_service1common.abstract_entity2common.dto.abstract_dto3filters.rpc-exception_filter4interfaces.IFile5interfaces.aws-config_interface6interfaces.swagger-config_interface7modules.users.commands.impl.welcome-user_command8modules.users.dtos.user-id-request-params_dto9modules.users.dtos.user-register_dto10modules.users.commands.impl.create-user_command11modules.users.commands.impl.delete-user_command12modules.users.dtos.user_dto13modules.users.entities.user_entity14modules.users.repository.user_repository15shared.services.config_service16modules.users.commands.handlers.create-user_handler17modules.users.commands.handlers.delete-user_handler18modules.users.commands.handlers.welcome-user_handler19modules.users.commands.impl.update-user_command20modules.users.events.impl.abstract_event21modules.users.queries.impl.get-user_query22modules.users.services.users_service23shared.services.aws-s3_service24shared.services.logger_service25app_controller26filters.http-exception_filter27modules.users.commands.handlers.update-user_handler28modules.users.controllers.users_controller29modules.users.events.impl.user-created_event30modules.users.events.impl.user-deleted_event31modules.users.events.impl.user-updated_event32modules.users.events.impl.user-welcomed_event33modules.users.graphql.users_resolver34modules.users.queries.handlers.get-user_handler35modules.users.queries.handlers.get-users_handler36modules.users.events.handlers.user-created_handler37modules.users.events.handlers.user-deleted_handler38modules.users.events.handlers.user-updated_handler39modules.users.events.handlers.user-welcomed_handler40111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111+17 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·

The Good
D1 · TypeScript Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · TypeScript Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · TypeScript God Classes 10.0 D17 · TypeScript Explicit Debt 9.4 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 6.9 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 6.4 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0
The Bad
X4 · Repo Structured logging 4.9
The Ugly
X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 1.7

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Strong ·

The Good
D6 · TypeScript Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · TypeScript Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · TypeScript Change Coupling 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 8.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 88% · Exemplary ·

The Good
D15 · TypeScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · TypeScript Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · TypeScript Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · TypeScript Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0

At a glance — Readiness · 53% · Adequate · gated by D9, P3 ·

The Good
D10 · TypeScript Test Quality 10.0 D11 · TypeScript Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · TypeScript Dependency Hygiene 6.0 D13 · TypeScript Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · TypeScript License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 7.0 P2 · Repo Observability 8.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 8.2 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 5.5
The Bad
D9 · TypeScript Test Distribution 3.5 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 4.9
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 3.0

At a glance — Security · 19% · Critical · gated by D30, C1, C2 ·

The Good
D28 · TypeScript Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · TypeScript Static Analysis (SAST) 8.4 D31 · TypeScript IaC & Container Security 9.4 D43 · TypeScript Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · TypeScript Platform End-of-Life 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0
The Ugly
D30 · TypeScript Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 43% · Adequate ·

The Good
DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0
The Bad
DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 4.3

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures55High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration4High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, secure sensitive data by implementing encryption at rest and managing keys in a dedicated vault, while enforcing strict default-deny access controls with global authentication and explicit role-based permissions. Next, enforce a clear boundary between domain logic and infrastructure by isolating ORM mappings in a dedicated layer to prevent framework coupling. Finally, immediately resolve the identified high-severity and deprecated dependency vulnerabilities to stabilize the codebase.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+12.7 ptsMediumData Protection
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.+12.7 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + mapper; leave the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).+5.1 ptsMediumDomain ↔ infrastructure boundary
Resolve the 26 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (26).+3.6 ptsMediumDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED.+1.5 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED.+1.5 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6).+1.5 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED.+1.5 ptsLowIaC & Container Security

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 13 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 8% slop · 7% mixed · 85% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
package.json6.1Near-cleanDependency Hygiene: Deprecated: @apollo/federation
src/providers/event-bus.provider.ts6.9Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED6.9Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
src/modules/users/repository/user.repository.ts7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main.ts8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/app.controller.ts8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/modules/users/entities/user.entity.ts8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/shared/services/config.service.ts8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/shared/services/aws-s3.service.ts8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Documentation: no project overview

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 37

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 61

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 58

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 8

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 71 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D19D21D26D28D29D30D31D34D35D43D44AX10AX3AX5AX6AX9C1C2DM6DM9GD1IC1M1M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P8PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X21X22X23X24X25X28X29X3X30X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 124 of 156 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a163c2-beba-736d-bc9b-0ca2c8b6521a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (4 contributor(s) across 448 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 90% of the history; the other 3 hold 3.3% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped.
  • DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm two tells a construction that PRODUCES a measurement from one that merely passes it along, and this repository's frontend does not compute that fact. A measurement built independently in two places would not appear above.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 62 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations: 8 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 2 `it`/`test` case(s) across 2 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.

What to do

  1. Improve Test Distribution — currently 3.5/10. — 2 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 2 `it`/`test` case(s) across 2 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 2 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). JavaScript/TypeScript (jest via `npm ci --ignore-scripts` in the repository root (1 tests)): measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

25 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 34 graded, 1 pinning defect(s), across 1 package.json (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded for currency: that grade is about what SHIPS. 5 direct dependency(ies) — production, development or optional — are marked DEPRECATED by their publisher (the registry's per-version mark, or the lockfile's copy of it when the registry could not be asked); deprecated transitive packages are listed but not charged. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — the registry publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.

Deprecated: @apollo/federation · ×5package.json:43
Floating npm dependency: nestjs-eventstore
Deprecated: uuid · ×17REDACTED:159
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/axios · ×5package.json:47
Outdated (npm): @apollo/gateway · ×20

What to do

  1. Resolve the 17 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (17). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Floating npm dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 34 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 34 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 1 product package.json manifest(s). Its 31 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.4 / 10Stronggated by 10 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 deducted task-comment markers across 1292 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.4. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×10src/main.ts:54

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with event-bus.provider.ts (3), user.repository.ts (2), main.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a single cohesive document covering installation, setup (Docker prerequisites, build script, container deployment), usage (App home page, EventStore Admin UI, Adminer UI, evVAr.sh config change), and access with a clipped Access section. It also links to guidelines.md for broader project guidance, which is ideal for an overview. The document is well-structured and clear.

Documentation: no project overviewREADME.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)8.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

55 finding(s): 6 critical, 27 high, 18 medium, 4 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 26 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (26). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 2 of the 63 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 34 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No encryption usage (node:crypto createCipheriv, Web Crypto subtle.encrypt, crypto-js AES, tweetnacl/libsodium secretbox, a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted, prisma-field-encryption or mongoose-field-encryption, or MongoDB client-side field-level encryption) was found, and this repository persists personal data in the model cited here — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore. — src/modules/users/entities/user.entity.ts:14

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
  • Enforce HTTPS (serve through https.createServer / NestJS httpsOptions, or redirect plain HTTP with express-sslify behind your TLS terminator) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • This repository serves requests — NestFactory.create (src/main.ts:19) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected. — src/main.ts:19

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary4.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

  • User is a domain type carrying TypeORM (@Entity/@Column) persistence decorators fused ON ITS OWN DECLARATION in the domain layer (with domain behaviour, no separated infrastructure model) — a domain ↔ infrastructure leak: the domain entity IS the persistence row (an active-record fusion). Separate the persistence model from the domain aggregate with a mapper. — src/modules/users/entities/user.entity.ts:11

What to do

  • Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + mapper; leave the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions whose whole body still throws a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings and JSX of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions that only throw a "not implemented" error, functions that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, async functions that never await, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists but no test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was found — changes may merge without the suite running.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`npm test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `src/shared/services/config.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 21 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/shared/services/config.service.ts:21

What to do

  • Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.
  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (@opentelemetry/sdk-node) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7191 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

R1 · Type Safety6.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 60 typed · 1 plain JS — the untyped files are ormconfig.js. tsconfig.json switches off noImplicitAny, so the typed files are only partly type-checked.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage8.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×10) — src/main.ts:1, src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:1, src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:1, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness4.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

  • 51 outdated package(s); JS/npm CVEs scored in D30

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code6.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 2 application, 2 tooling and 2 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×6) — src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts, ormconfig.js, src/shared/grpc/setup.ts, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene5.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:8
  • Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging4.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

  • `error` at line 41 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.error('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way. — src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:41
  • `error` at line 47 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.error('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way. — src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:47
  • `log` at line 24 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.log({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.log('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way. — src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:24
  • `log` at line 40 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.log({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.log('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way. — src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:40
  • `error` at line 28 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.error('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way. — src/shared/services/logger.service.ts:28

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types1.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether strict null checking is enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` assertion — TypeScript's `strictNullChecks` (which `strict` turns on) is what makes `string` exclude `null` and `undefined`, and the postfix `!` is the operator that silences it.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/1 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
  • ~3.3 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 5 assertion(s) across the 1535 source line(s) of the 60 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: src/modules/users/dtos/user.dto.ts (3), src/common/dto/abstract.dto.ts (1), src/modules/users/dtos/user-id-request-params.dto.ts (1). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce.

What to do

  • The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health60%Adequate — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture69%StrongSolid.
Maturity88%ExemplarySolid.
Readiness53%Adequate — gated by D9, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security19%Critical — gated by D30, C1, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling43%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model, an ORM write hook that records changes — a TypeORM/MikroORM subscriber, a Sequelize or Mongoose hook, Prisma middleware — or a change-history plugin such as mongoose-history or sequelize-paper-trail) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: NestJS makes a provider that injects a request-scoped one request-scoped itself (scope bubbles up the injection chain), and gives every consumer its own transient instance by contract.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (users), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.ts), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.ts) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample; tests are deferred to the application built from it, so coverage is not scored here.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (6 CQRS handler(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — 4 mutating command handler(s)/consumer(s) detected and 4 handler method(s) walked, but no persistent write was recognised in any of them — idempotency not assessed
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: src/main.ts:19 (NestFactory.create))
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `jest --coverage --coverageReporters=lcovonly`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: 62 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 37 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×26
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • + 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×6
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain fused to persistence infrastructure · ×1
  • Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: User src/modules/users/entities/user.entity.ts:11 — User is a domain type carrying TypeORM (@Entity/@Column) persistence decorators fused ON ITS OWN DECLARATION in the domain layer (with domain behaviour, no separated infrastructure model) — a domain ↔ infrastructure leak: the domain entity IS the persistence row (an active-record fusion). Separate the persistence model from the domain aggregate with a mapper.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import 'express' · ×1
  • Unlisted import 'express' src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:8 — Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident.
Serious — 61 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×18
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×10
  • TodoComment src/main.ts:54 — // dismissDefaultMessages: true,//TODO: disable in prod (if required) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/app.controller.ts:41 — // TODO: design a custom EventStore healthIndicator — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/modules/users/entities/user.entity.ts:27 — // TODO improve the naming of those functions ( something related to Events, maybe sth like onUserCreated() ... ) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/modules/users/repository/user.repository.ts:26 — // Todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/modules/users/repository/user.repository.ts:34 — // Todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/providers/event-bus.provider.ts:20 — // TODO: read about subs in eventStore, how can they help us. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/providers/event-bus.provider.ts:21 — // TODO: dont forget to create a `Persistent Subscription` — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/providers/event-bus.provider.ts:22 — // TODO: and enable `resolveLinkTos` https://eventstore.org/docs/dotnet-api/reading-events/index.html
  • TodoComment src/shared/services/config.service.ts:102 — // log: console, // TODO: improve Eventstore logger (separate chanel) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/shared/services/aws-s3.service.ts:19 — // TODO: update those configs — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
R4 · Test Coverage · No test reaches this file · ×10
  • No test reaches this file src/main.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file ormconfig.js:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/migrations/1569232747766-CreateUsersTable.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/shared/grpc/setup.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/providers/utils.service.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/shared/swagger/setup.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/exceptions/file-not-image.exception.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/filters/rpc-exception.filter.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×5
  • Deprecated: @apollo/federation package.json:43 — @apollo/federation 0.38.1, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The @apollo/federation package is deprecated and will reach end-of-life September 22, 2023. It contains outdated utilities for both running subgraphs and composing supergraph schemas. Please migrate to the appropriate package for your use case (@apollo/subgraph or @apollo/composition). For more details, see our announcement blog post (https://www.apollographql.com/blog/announcement/backend/announcing-the-end-of-life-schedule-for-apollo-gateway-v0-x/) and documentation (https://www.apollographql.com/docs/federation/federation-2/backward-compatibility/#is-official-support-ending-for-apollogateway-v0x).". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
  • Deprecated: aws-sdk package.json:57 — aws-sdk 2.1693.0, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The AWS SDK for JavaScript (v2) has reached end-of-support, and no longer receives updates. Please migrate your code to use AWS SDK for JavaScript (v3). More info https://a.co/cUPnyil". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
  • Deprecated: @types/express-rate-limit package.json:84 — @types/express-rate-limit 6.0.2, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This is a stub types definition. express-rate-limit provides its own type definitions, so you do not need this installed.". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
  • Deprecated: @types/uuid package.json:91 — @types/uuid 11.0.0, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This is a stub types definition. uuid provides its own type definitions, so you do not need this installed.". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
  • Deprecated: eslint package.json:95 — eslint 8.57.1, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This version is no longer supported. Please see https://eslint.org/version-support for other options.". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1
  • No data-protection/encryption src/modules/users/entities/user.entity.ts:14 — No encryption usage (node:crypto createCipheriv, Web Crypto subtle.encrypt, crypto-js AES, tweetnacl/libsodium secretbox, a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted, prisma-field-encryption or mongoose-field-encryption, or MongoDB client-side field-level encryption) was found, and this repository persists personal data in the model cited here — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
C2 · Access Controls · No authorization · ×1
  • No authorization src/main.ts:19 — This repository serves requests — NestFactory.create (src/main.ts:19) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Floating npm dependency · ×1
  • Floating npm dependency: nestjs-eventstore — `nestjs-eventstore` is declared as `git+https://github.com/0xb4lamx/nestjs-eventstore.git` in package.json, which names no releasable version: a git source with no ref tracks whatever the default branch holds today. A production dependency that cannot be resolved to one immutable release makes the build non-reproducible — two installs a day apart can ship different code — and leaves nothing for a vulnerability scanner to match against.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
R1 · Type Safety · Type Safety · ×1
  • Type Safety — 60 typed · 1 plain JS — the untyped files are ormconfig.js. tsconfig.json switches off noImplicitAny, so the typed files are only partly type-checked.
R5 · Dependency Freshness · Dependency Freshness · ×1
  • Dependency Freshness — 51 outdated package(s); JS/npm CVEs scored in D30
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~50 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~50 LoC) src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~28 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~28 LoC) ormconfig.js — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~23 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~23 LoC) src/shared/grpc/setup.ts — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~21 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~21 LoC) src/providers/utils.service.ts — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~13 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~13 LoC) src/exceptions/file-not-image.exception.ts — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~10 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~10 LoC) src/filters/rpc-exception.filter.ts — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 2 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@apollo/federation' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@apollo/federation' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@commitlint/lint' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@commitlint/lint' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'cz-conventional-changelog' · ×1
  • Unused dependency 'cz-conventional-changelog' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Minor — 38 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×17
  • Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:159 — uuid 9.0.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: @apollo/subgraph REDACTED:173 — @apollo/subgraph 0.6.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "All v0.x versions of @apollo/subgraph are now deprecated with an end-of-life date of September 22, 2023. Apollo recommends upgrading to v2.x as soon as possible. For more details, see our announcement blog post (https://www.apollographql.com/blog/announcement/backend/announcing-the-end-of-life-schedule-for-apollo-gateway-v0-x/) and documentation (https://www.apollographql.com/docs/federation/federation-2/backward-compatibility/#is-official-support-ending-for-apollogateway-v0x).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:272 — uuid 9.0.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: @apollo/server REDACTED:306 — @apollo/server 4.13.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Apollo Server v4 is end-of-life since January 26, 2026. As long as you are already using a non-EOL version of Node.js, upgrading to v5 should take only a few minutes. See https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/previous-versions for details.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: @apollo/server-plugin-landing-page-graphql-playground REDACTED:361 — @apollo/server-plugin-landing-page-graphql-playground 4.0.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The use of GraphQL Playground in Apollo Server was supported in previous versions, but this is no longer the case as of December 31, 2022. This package exists for v4 migration purposes only. We do not intend to resolve security issues or other bugs with this package if they arise, so please migrate away from this to [Apollo Server's default Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/api/plugin/landing-pages) as soon as possible.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:426 — uuid 9.0.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:481 — uuid 9.0.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: @humanwhocodes/config-array REDACTED:1669 — @humanwhocodes/config-array 0.13.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Use @eslint/config-array instead". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: @humanwhocodes/object-schema REDACTED:1698 — @humanwhocodes/object-schema 2.0.3 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Use @eslint/object-schema instead". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:2744 — uuid 9.0.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: apollo-reporting-protobuf REDACTED:3824 — apollo-reporting-protobuf 3.4.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The `apollo-reporting-protobuf` package is part of Apollo Server v2 and v3, which are now end-of-life (as of October 22nd 2023 and October 22nd 2024, respectively). This package's functionality is now found in the `@apollo/usage-reporting-protobuf` package. See https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/previous-versions/ for more details.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: apollo-server-env REDACTED:3873 — apollo-server-env 4.2.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The `apollo-server-env` package is part of Apollo Server v2 and v3, which are now end-of-life (as of October 22nd 2023 and October 22nd 2024, respectively). This package's functionality is now found in the `@apollo/utils.fetcher` package. See https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/previous-versions/ for more details.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: apollo-server-types REDACTED:3885 — apollo-server-types 3.8.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The `apollo-server-types` package is part of Apollo Server v2 and v3, which are now end-of-life (as of October 22nd 2023 and October 22nd 2024, respectively). This package's functionality is now found in the `@apollo/server` package. See https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/previous-versions/ for more details.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:10607 — uuid 3.4.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: querystring REDACTED:11415 — querystring 0.2.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The querystring API is considered Legacy. new code should use the URLSearchParams API instead.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: subscriptions-transport-ws REDACTED:12784 — subscriptions-transport-ws 0.11.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "The `subscriptions-transport-ws` package is no longer maintained. We recommend you use `graphql-ws` instead. For help migrating Apollo software to `graphql-ws`, see https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/data/subscriptions/#switching-from-subscriptions-transport-ws For general help using `graphql-ws`, see https://github.com/enisdenjo/graphql-ws/blob/master/README.md". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
  • Deprecated: glob REDACTED:13623 — glob 10.5.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Old versions of glob are not supported, and contain widely publicized security vulnerabilities, which have been fixed in the current version. Please update. Support for old versions may be purchased (at exorbitant rates) by contacting i@izs.me". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×5
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/axios package.json:47 — @nestjs/axios is pinned at 3.1.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/swagger package.json:54 — @nestjs/swagger is pinned at 7.4.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): dotenv package.json:61 — dotenv is pinned at 8.6.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 18.0.8 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): helmet package.json:64 — helmet is pinned at 3.23.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.3.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): uuid package.json:74 — uuid is pinned at 11.1.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 14.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×5
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:41 — `error` at line 41 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.error('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way.
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/filters/http-exception.filter.ts:47 — `error` at line 47 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.error('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way.
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:24 — `log` at line 24 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.log({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.log('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way.
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:40 — `log` at line 40 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.log({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.log('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way.
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/shared/services/logger.service.ts:28 — `error` at line 28 is handed a template literal with `${…}` substitutions as its message, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass the values beside a constant message instead: `logger.error({ orderId, status }, 'order status updated')` for pino and bunyan, `logger.error('order status updated', { orderId, status })` for winston. If these calls go through a NestJS `Logger` routed into pino, nestjs-pino forwards an object first argument as fields in the same way.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×4
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×1
  • Documentation: no project overview README.md — The first paragraph describes the boilerplate framework (NestJS v10) but does not state what the project itself does or its main purpose. Add a one-line overview of the project's role beneath the first line, e.g. 'This is a containerized NestJS microservice boilerplate for development and testing.'
D8 · Code Coverage · No tests · ×1
  • No tests — template/sample — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample; tests are deferred to the application built from it, so coverage is not scored here.
P1 · CI/CD gates · CI test execution not evidenced · ×1
  • CI test execution not evidenced — A CI pipeline exists but no test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was found — changes may merge without the suite running.
P2 · Observability · Console output used as the logging channel · ×1
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/shared/services/config.service.ts:21 — `src/shared/services/config.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 21 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7191 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks · ×1
  • Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks — 0/1 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Null assertions (`!`) reduce the strict null checking score · ×1
  • Null assertions (`!`) reduce the strict null checking score — ~3.3 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 5 assertion(s) across the 1535 source line(s) of the 60 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: src/modules/users/dtos/user.dto.ts (3), src/common/dto/abstract.dto.ts (1), src/modules/users/dtos/user-id-request-params.dto.ts (1). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce.
Minor — 20 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×20
  • Outdated (npm): @apollo/gateway — @apollo/gateway is pinned at 2.13.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 2.14.4 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @apollo/subgraph — @apollo/subgraph is pinned at 2.13.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 2.15.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/apollo — @nestjs/apollo is pinned at 12.0.7; registry.npmjs.org publishes 14.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/common — @nestjs/common is pinned at 10.4.22; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/core — @nestjs/core is pinned at 10.4.22; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/cqrs — @nestjs/cqrs is pinned at 10.2.8; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.1.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/graphql — @nestjs/graphql is pinned at 12.0.8; registry.npmjs.org publishes 14.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/microservices — @nestjs/microservices is pinned at 10.4.22; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/platform-express — @nestjs/platform-express is pinned at 10.4.22; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/terminus — @nestjs/terminus is pinned at 10.3.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.1.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): @nestjs/typeorm — @nestjs/typeorm is pinned at 10.0.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): axios — axios is pinned at 1.15.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.20.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): express-rate-limit — express-rate-limit is pinned at 6.11.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.7.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): graphql — graphql is pinned at 16.12.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 17.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): mime-types — mime-types is pinned at 2.1.35; registry.npmjs.org publishes 3.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): morgan — morgan is pinned at 1.12.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.12.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): mysql2 — mysql2 is pinned at 3.20.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 3.24.6 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): rimraf — rimraf is pinned at 5.0.10; registry.npmjs.org publishes 6.1.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): typeorm — typeorm is pinned at 0.3.31; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.1.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): winston-daily-rotate-file — winston-daily-rotate-file is pinned at 3.10.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 5.0.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-f50d83f3569746628a2efda84b9b546c/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-f50d83f3569746628a2efda84b9b546c/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update55artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .4artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a163c2-beba-736d-bc9b-0ca2c8b6521a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 37 · Warnings: 61 · Recommendations: 38 · Info: 20 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 22-10-2026 @ 13:17 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md