Public report — warehousing-and-accounting-management-system, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 16:43 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Abdulrahman-Tayara/warehousing-And-Accounting-Management-System

53% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Weak

Small · 11,657 LoC · 7 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (46%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

59/63dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
19findings with an exact file:lineof 71 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
63/100dimensions across the health lenses11657 LoC · 7 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

Abdulrahman-Tayara/warehousing-and-accounting-management-system is in a workable but fragile state (53%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (87%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (46%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (47%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback); Extend structured logging across the projects you operate (Observability); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Small (~11,657 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 46% · 46% weightMaturity 47% · 25% weightSecurity 48% · 14% weightCode Health 84% · 8% weightArchitecture 87% · 4% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 2% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go Plumbing-heavy — business logic is 6% of hand-written app code; most lines are wiring, declarations and straight-line glue. Fine for an integration/CRUD service; worth a look if this is meant to be logic-rich.
Business logic 3%Plumbing 41%Tests 1%Generated 56%
New since the last scan (40+)

40 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: Domain
  • D6 · Low cohesion: ExceptionFilter (LCOM4 4) Presentation/Filters/ExceptionFilter.cs
  • D8 · Coverage not measured
  • D12 · Vulnerable: AutoMapper
  • D12 · Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
  • D12 · Vulnerable: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens
  • D12 · Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
  • D12 · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer.Design
  • D12 · Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens
  • D16 · dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D30 · High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.1
  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4
  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1
  • D30 · Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.16.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.2.3
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0
  • D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
  • D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 Presentation/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Presentation/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Presentation/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile
  • D35 · Change coupling: RepositoryCrud.cs ↔ UserRepository.cs Infrastructure/Repositories/RepositoryCrud.cs
  • C1 · No data-protection/encryption
  • S1 · Password hashing without a KDF Presentation/Dto/Users/UserViewModel.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs
  • AX9 · Query handler writes persistent state: Common.UpdateEntityCommandHandler Application/Commands/Common/UpdateEntityCommand.cs
  • ED5 · Non-idempotent mutation: Common.DeleteEntityCommandHandler.Handle Application/Commands/Common/DeleteEntityCommand.cs
  • SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Domain/Aggregations/InvoicePayments.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Domain/Entities/ProductMovement.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,300–€21,000
Cost to rebuild€4,300–€21,000 (0.1 person-years (72–223 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 53% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 49% boilerplate · 45% straight-line · 6% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€13,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 46% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.7) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
+5.9 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
2
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+5.2 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+5.2 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 46%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (11,657 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 46%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Application Application Domain Domain Application->Domain Authentication Authentication Authentication->Application Authorization Authorization Authorization->Application Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure->Application Infrastructure->Authorization Infrastructure->Domain Presentation Presentation Presentation->Application Presentation->Authentication Presentation->Authorization Presentation->Infrastructure

Architecture — module dependency matrix

121 modules, 327 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…ation.Commands.Common…ation.Common.Mappings…ication.Common.ModelsApplication.SettingsDomain.Eventswms.Dto.Pagination…cation.Queries.Common…ion.Services.SettingsDomain.Entitieswms.Dto.Common…plication.Common.Dtos…ation.Common.SecurityDomain.Aggregations…tence.Database.Modelswms.Dto.Accountswms.Dto.Currencieswms.Dto.Productswms.Dto.StoragePlaceswms.Dto.Userswms.Dto.Warehouses…lication.Repositories…ion.Services.Identity…ence.Database.Seederswms.Dto.Conversionswms.Dto.Invoiceswms.Dto.Journalswms.Dto.Notificationswms.Dto.Payments…on.Queries.Accounting…ion.Queries.Invoicing…Queries.StoragePlaces…on.Queries.Warehouses…positories.Aggregates….Persistence.Database…frastructure.Serviceswms.Controllers.Api…positories.UnitOfWork…tructure.Repositories…ers.Api.Authorization…positories.Aggregates…ation.Commands.Common1…ation.Common.Mappings2…ication.Common.Models3Application.Settings4Domain.Events5wms.Dto.Pagination6…cation.Queries.Common7…ion.Services.Settings8Domain.Entities9wms.Dto.Common10…plication.Common.Dtos11…ation.Common.Security12Domain.Aggregations13…tence.Database.Models14wms.Dto.Accounts15wms.Dto.Currencies16wms.Dto.Products17wms.Dto.StoragePlaces18wms.Dto.Users19wms.Dto.Warehouses20…lication.Repositories21…ion.Services.Identity22…ence.Database.Seeders23wms.Dto.Conversions24wms.Dto.Invoices25wms.Dto.Journals26wms.Dto.Notifications27wms.Dto.Payments28…on.Queries.Accounting29…ion.Queries.Invoicing30…Queries.StoragePlaces31…on.Queries.Warehouses32…positories.Aggregates33….Persistence.Database34…frastructure.Services35wms.Controllers.Api36…positories.UnitOfWork37…tructure.Repositories38…ers.Api.Authorization39…positories.Aggregates401121111101828411411625241114114112112112222111141821111132111212113161112114471713211313211311211171111313162244544412432316241121028171231123221+81 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 84% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 87% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 47% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 46% · Weak · gated by D12, P3

At a glance — Security · 48% · Weak · gated by D36, C1

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components11High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration7High / Critical

Roadmap

First, implement readiness and liveness probes with a rolling-update strategy to ensure bad releases are automatically rolled back. Next, extend structured logging across all projects and provide a diagnostics seam for library consumers, while also adding health checks. Then, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated ADR format to preserve context and consequences. Finally, resolve dormant codebase findings and encrypt sensitive data at rest using appropriate tools like ASP.NET Core Data Protection or a key vault.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+5.9 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+5.2 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+5.2 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+3.6 ptsLowADR Quality
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+6.6 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+6.3 ptsMediumObservability
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+6.0 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+5.8 ptsMediumData Protection

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 8 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 12% slop · 13% mixed · 75% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Presentation/Dockerfile3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfile4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)
Presentation/Filters/ExceptionFilter.cs8.5Near-cleanCohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: ExceptionFilter (LCOM4 4)
Infrastructure/Repositories/RepositoryCrud.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: RepositoryCrud.cs ↔ UserRepository.cs
Application/EventNotifications/Products/ProductMinLevelUpdated/ProductMinLevelUpdatedHandler.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
Presentation/Program.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductMovementRepository.cs9.5Near-cleanIL Efficiency: IL efficiency: 5 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 63 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2C3C5ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 19 of 71 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc882-58a3-7af5-8eb9-af834f049573.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — absence of evidence here means the scan found no in-repo trace, not that the control does not exist.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs:18

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Domain

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 29 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: ExceptionFilter (LCOM4 4)Presentation/Filters/ExceptionFilter.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 test methods: 16 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 16 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

21 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 3 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper · ×3
Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt · ×3
Outdated: AutoMapper · ×21

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 22 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 9296 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 projects, 369 source files, 9488 hand-written lines of code (9296 production / 192 test), plus 15173 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 15 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid project description with a clear feature list (warehousing, accounting, auth/authorization) and an outline of design topics to follow. It links to the commit history for features and begins documenting structure ('Clean Architecture', 'CQRS Design Pattern', ...) before being cut by the scanner. However, it shows no architecture or domain documentation at all, so the outlined Clean Architecture sections are present but unimplemented in text; this is a gap that would appear after the README ends.

XML-doc coverage: Presentation · ×6Presentation/Presentation.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The single README is a solid project description with a clear feature list (warehousing, accounting, auth/authorization) and an outline of design topics to follow. It links to the commit history for features and begins documenting structure ('Clean Architecture', 'CQRS Design Pattern', ...) before being cut by the scanner. However, it shows no architecture or domain documentation at all, so the outlined Clean Architecture sections are present but unimplemented in text; this is a gap that would appear after the README ends.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

While 'Id' is a common name, there is a potential confusion between the DTO property 'Id' and the Query object property 'Id' (e.g., in `GetInvoiceQuery`). More critically, looking at `wms.Dto.Invoices.InvoicesQueryParams.Type` vs `wms.Dto.Invoices.CreateInvoiceRequest.WarehouseId`, the query params use `Params` suffix while requests use `Request` suffix. This is a minor inconsistency in DTO suffixes.
Inconsistent suffixes for DTOs: some use `Request` (e.g., `CreateInvoiceRequest`), while others use `Params` (e.g., `CurrenciesQueryParams`). This indicates a lack of strict convention for query parameters vs. command requests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 22 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2Application/EventNotifications/Products/ProductMinLevelUpdated/ProductMinLevelUpdatedHandler.cs:48

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with ProductMinLevelUpdatedHandler.cs, Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 7 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split Application

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split Application finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 71 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.5/10. — 99 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 71 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.1 · ×6detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0 · ×5detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 4 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 · ×4Presentation/Dockerfile:17detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026Presentation/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

30 of 30 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs.

Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: RepositoryCrud.cs↔UserRepository.cs 69%

Change coupling: RepositoryCrud.cs ↔ UserRepository.csInfrastructure/Repositories/RepositoryCrud.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).

No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 of 828 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 5 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetInfrastructure/Repositories/ProductMovementRepository.cs:78

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IUnitOfWork` declares 20 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUnitOfWork.cs:5

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

  • `Common.UpdateEntityCommandHandler` is a read (query) handler but its body writes persistent state — a query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica. — UpdateEntityCommand.cs:12

What to do

  • Keep query handlers read-only — move the writes/event-publishes into a command handler so reads stay safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica.
C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
C5 · Data-Subject Rights4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether GDPR data-subject requests are supported in code — erasure, export/portability, consent.

Method: Roslyn scan: GDPR data-subject-rights corroboration (erasure/export/consent vocabulary co-occurring with subject-id store crossing or explicit GDPR pattern). Deterministic, gated by PII.

  • Corroborated rights: erasure ✓ · export ✗ · consent ✗. The missing right(s) would have to be fulfilled manually.

What to do

  • Implement data export/portability for a data subject (a machine-readable export of their personal data).
  • Track GDPR consent (lawful basis) alongside the personal data it authorises.
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency9.3 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `Common.DeleteEntityCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — DeleteEntityCommand.cs:25

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — UserRepository.cs:31, UserRepository.cs:66, InvoicePayments.cs:60, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `CreateAllAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UserRepository.cs:29
  • `FindIncludedByIdAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UserRepository.cs:64

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
  • Only 2/7 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 3/5 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 5, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • Identifier 'PasswordHash' looks like a password-hash field/property, but no KDF (PBKDF2 / Argon2 / BCrypt / PasswordHasher) was found anywhere in the source — so passwords aren't protected by a salted key-derivation function (whether a fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim). Password storage needs a salted KDF and a constant-time compare. — UserViewModel.cs:14
  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — DependencyInjection.cs:26
  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Presentation/Dto/Users/UserViewModel.cs:14`.
  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 40/131 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AccountController.cs:21, AccountController.cs:31, AccountController.cs:41, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 66 suppression(s) across the 149260 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health84%StrongSolid.
Architecture87%StrongSolid.
Maturity47%Weak — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness46%Weak — gated by D12, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security48%Weak — gated by D36, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not included — 37 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 3 domain event(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 11 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×6
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.1 — AutoMapper 11.0.1 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×3
  • Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 11.0.1 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.16.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Presentation/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Warning — 18 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.16.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.16.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.2.3 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.2.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Presentation/Dockerfile:17 — Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Presentation/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Dockerfile:19 — Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×3
  • Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer.Design 1.1.6 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.16.0 — Legacy
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 30 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: RepositoryCrud.cs ↔ UserRepository.cs Infrastructure/Repositories/RepositoryCrud.cs — `Infrastructure/Repositories/RepositoryCrud.cs` and `Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs` change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs:18 — Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs:18-28 | Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs:65-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductRepository.cs:18` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Domain — Domain: abstractness 0.11, instability 0.00, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 5 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: ExceptionFilter (LCOM4 4) Presentation/Filters/ExceptionFilter.cs:11 — ExceptionFilter's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 14 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment Application/EventNotifications/Products/ProductMinLevelUpdated/ProductMinLevelUpdatedHandler.cs:48 — "No need to do anything" — weak keep; borderline but mostly restates the no-op
  • redundant comment Presentation/Program.cs:34 — "Configure the HTTP request pipeline." — delete - file-level boilerplate comment
D11 · Test Reliability · Test runner surfaced no tests · ×1
  • Test runner surfaced no tests — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 16 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · While 'Id' is a common name, there is a potential confusion between the DTO property 'Id' and the Query object property 'Id' (e.g., in `GetInvoiceQuery`). More critically, looking at `wms.Dto.Invoices.InvoicesQueryParams.Type` vs `wms.Dto.Invoices.CreateInvoiceRequest.WarehouseId`, the query params use `Params` suffix while requests use `Request` suffix. This is a minor inconsistency in DTO suffixes. · ×1
  • While 'Id' is a common name, there is a potential confusion between the DTO property 'Id' and the Query object property 'Id' (e.g., in `GetInvoiceQuery`). More critically, looking at `wms.Dto.Invoices.InvoicesQueryParams.Type` vs `wms.Dto.Invoices.CreateInvoiceRequest.WarehouseId`, the query params use `Params` suffix while requests use `Request` suffix. This is a minor inconsistency in DTO suffixes. — Ensure all query parameter DTOs use the `Params` suffix and all command/request DTOs use the `Request` or `Command` suffix consistently. (symbols: wms.Dto.Invoices.InvoiceViewModel.Id, wms.Dto.Journals.JournalViewModel.Id, wms.Dto.Manufacturers.ManufacturerViewModel.Id, wms.Dto.Accounting.AccountStatementViewModel.Id, Application.Queries.Invoicing.GetInvoiceQuery.Id)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent suffixes for DTOs · ×1
  • Inconsistent suffixes for DTOs: some use `Request` (e.g., `CreateInvoiceRequest`), while others use `Params` (e.g., `CurrenciesQueryParams`). This indicates a lack of strict convention for query parameters vs. command requests. — Standardize on `Request` for all input DTOs or distinguish clearly between `Request` (commands) and `Params` (queries). (symbols: wms.Dto.Invoices.CreateInvoiceRequest, wms.Dto.Warehouses.CreateWarehouseRequest, wms.Dto.StoragePlaces.UpdateStoragePlaceRequest, wms.Dto.Currencies.CurrenciesQueryParams)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 9k LoC across 7 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split Application · ×1
  • Split Application — A generic catch-all name that is huge (4k LoC) and sprawls over 60 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: split the 59 namespaces into focused libraries
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Presentation/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 30 of 30 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 30 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. Emit one from whichever pipeline releases the artifact — `cosign attest` (keyless or with your release key) records the build inputs against the artifact digest and needs nothing forge-specific; publish the attestation as a release asset alongside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, cosign/sigstore for container images, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 5 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductMovementRepository.cs:78 — 5 of 828 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Infrastructure.Repositories.ProductMovementRepository.AggregateStoragePlacesQuantities @ Infrastructure/Repositories/ProductMovementRepository.cs:78, 741 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.9/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 28 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×21
  • Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 11.0.1 → 16.2.0 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 11.0.0 → 12.0.1 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 10.0.1 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.ApiAuthorization.IdentityServer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.ApiAuthorization.IdentityServer 6.0.3 → 7.0.20 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 6.0.3 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 6.0.3 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.2.3 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.16.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Presentation).
  • Outdated: EntityFrameworkCore.Triggered — EntityFrameworkCore.Triggered 3.0.0 → 3.2.2 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory 6.0.3 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 6.0.3 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Z.EntityFramework.Plus.EFCore — Z.EntityFramework.Plus.EFCore 6.13.18 → 10.105.7 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.0.1 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.0.1 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 10.0.1 → 11.1.0 available (referenced by Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.16.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Authentication).
  • Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 6.7.0 → 8.10.0 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.2.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
  • Outdated: NUnit — NUnit 3.13.3 → 4.6.1 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization 6.0.6 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Authorization).
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×6
  • XML-doc coverage: Presentation Presentation/Presentation.csproj — Presentation: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/529).
  • XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/372).
  • XML-doc coverage: Domain Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (1/239).
  • XML-doc coverage: Application Application/Application.csproj — Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (1/689).
  • XML-doc coverage: Authentication Authentication/Authentication.csproj — Authentication: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/22).
  • XML-doc coverage: Authorization Authorization/Authorization.csproj — Authorization: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/11).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list wms.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json11artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .7artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc882-58a3-7af5-8eb9-af834f049573 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 8 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Phone — 7 field(s)
  • CreateAccountCommand.Phone Application/Commands/Accounts/CreateAccountCommand.cs:15
  • UpdateAccountCommand.Phone Application/Commands/Accounts/UpdateAccountCommand.cs:17
  • Account.Phone Domain/Entities/Account.cs:9
  • AccountDb.Phone Infrastructure/Persistence/Database/Models/AccountDb.cs:20
  • AccountViewModel.Phone Presentation/Dto/Accounts/AccountViewModel.cs:15
  • CreateAccountRequest.Phone Presentation/Dto/Accounts/CreateAccountRequest.cs:13
  • UpdateAccountRequest.Phone Presentation/Dto/Accounts/UpdateAccountRequest.cs:13
Name — 1 field(s)
  • ProductJoinedViewModel.FullName Presentation/Dto/Products/ProductJoinedViewModel.cs:13

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md