Public report — reactive-interaction-gateway, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
108findings with an exact file:lineof 124 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
28/95dimensions across the health lenses11018 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Accenture/reactive-interaction-gateway is sound in substance but carries real gaps (52%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Code Health (99%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (98%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (39%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (44%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning).
For scale: Small (~11,018 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
D20 · Context and decision are both present but the body is largely boilerplate boilerplate with a one-line 'In a nutshell' summary plus a bulleted list of ADR rules (immutable decisions, numbered without reuse, new ADR replaces old) that gives no real context or consequences guides/architecture/decisions/0001-record-architecture-decisions.md
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 52% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€17,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 39% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with selfsigned_key.pem.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 39%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
44 modules, 23 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
40
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
25
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
17
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
9
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, integrate a security static analysis step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Next, document recovery time and recovery point objectives alongside a tested restore procedure to ensure true disaster recovery. Then, resolve the identified leaked secret and implement version stamping in the build manifest to ensure traceable releases. Finally, add an approval gate before promoting to production to enforce deployment controls.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with selfsigned_key.pem.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Resolve the 1 Context and decision are both present but the body is largely… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-record-architecture-decisions.md.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 108 of 124 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
Of 2 mechanizable ADRs, 1 are prevented by analyzers, 1 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with selfsigned_key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 5 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 6.8/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 1 flagged with a specific gap.
Context and decision are both present but the body is largely boilerplate boilerplate with a one-line 'In a nutshell' summary plus a bulleted list of ADR rules (immutable decisions, numbered without reuse, new ADR replaces old) that gives no real context or consequencesguides/architecture/decisions/0001-record-architecture-decisions.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 Context and decision are both present but the body is largely… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-record-architecture-decisions.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
28 finding(s): 0 critical, 28 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: jwt · ×23examples/lp-3-demo-jwt.html:86detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 23 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with config.exs (3), selfsigned_key.des3.pem (3), selfsigned_key.pem (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×14.github/workflows/on_change_elixir.yml:23detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontextdeployment/kubectl/rig.yaml:78detected by semgrep finding
Low: possible-nginx-h2c-smuggling · ×2examples/channels-example/frontend/nginx.conf:16detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with on_change_helm_charts.yaml (6), on_change_examples.yml (4), on_change_elixir.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nginx.conf (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with rig.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: KSV-0014 · ×3deployment/kubectl/rig.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×14deployment/kubectl/rig.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×23Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (2), rig.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 23 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (14), rig.yaml (7), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 14 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with rig.yaml (6), deployment.yaml (6), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
56 of 56 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/rig/event_filter.ex.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 2 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.5 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 67 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~7045 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Maven POM and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .java) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — none of 5 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Maven POM and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .java, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (2 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (2 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_elixir.yml:23— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_elixir.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-elixir@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-elixir@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-elixir/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_elixir.yml:31— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_examples.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: ryankurte/action-apt@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `ryankurte/action-apt@v0.2.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/ryankurte/action-apt/commits/v0.2.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v0.2.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_examples.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_examples.yml:26— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2.1.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2.1.3 --jq .sha`. Note that `v2.1.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_examples.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_helm_charts.yaml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_helm_charts.yaml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: helm/chart-testing-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `helm/chart-testing-action@v1.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/helm/chart-testing-action/commits/v1.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_helm_charts.yaml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: helm/kind-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `helm/kind-action@v1.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/helm/kind-action/commits/v1.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_helm_charts.yaml:33— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: helm/chart-testing-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `helm/chart-testing-action@v1.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/helm/chart-testing-action/commits/v1.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_helm_charts.yaml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_change_helm_charts.yaml:49— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: helm/chart-releaser-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `helm/chart-releaser-action@v1.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/helm/chart-releaser-action/commits/v1.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/on_release_published.yml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×6
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— cowboy 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.15.0. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.8.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— cowlib 2.9.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.9.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.9.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— hackney 1.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against hackney 1.16.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.24.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.24.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against hackney 1.16.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— phoenix 1.5.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.14. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against phoenix 1.5.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.6.14 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.6.14 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against phoenix 1.5.7: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— plug 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.4. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.11.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.11.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— plug_cowboy 2.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.8.1
Leaked secret: private-key priv/cert/selfsigned_key.pem:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Change coupling: kafka.ex ↔ kinesis.ex lib/rig_inbound_gateway/api_proxy/handler/kafka.ex— `lib/rig_inbound_gateway/api_proxy/handler/kafka.ex` and `lib/rig_inbound_gateway/api_proxy/handler/kinesis.ex` change together 76% of the time (19 of the 25 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: kafka_to_filter.ex ↔ kinesis_to_filter.ex lib/rig/event_stream/kafka_to_filter.ex— `lib/rig/event_stream/kafka_to_filter.ex` and `lib/rig/event_stream/kinesis_to_filter.ex` change together 70% of the time (7 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: sse.ex ↔ websocket.ex lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/sse.ex— `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/sse.ex` and `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/websocket.ex` change together 69% of the time (20 of the 29 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: sse.ex ↔ subscription_controller.ex lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/sse.ex— `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/sse.ex` and `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/subscription_controller.ex` change together 55% of the time (16 of the 29 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: router.ex ↔ event_controller.ex lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/router.ex— `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/router.ex` and `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/event_controller.ex` change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: event_controller.ex ↔ subscription_controller.ex lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/event_controller.ex— `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/event_controller.ex` and `lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/subscription_controller.ex` change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: health.ex ↔ router.ex lib/rig_api/health.ex— `lib/rig_api/health.ex` and `lib/rig_api/router.ex` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— jose 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.7
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] scripts/encode_jwt/mix.lock— jose 1.8.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.7
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— phoenix_html 2.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.4. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against phoenix_html 2.14.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/session_blacklist.ex:141— lib/rig_api/v2/session_blacklist.ex:141-149 | lib/rig_api/v3/session_blacklist.ex:141-149 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/rig_inbound_gateway/api_proxy/handler/kafka.ex:128— lib/rig_inbound_gateway/api_proxy/handler/kafka.ex:128-136 | lib/rig_inbound_gateway/api_proxy/handler/kinesis.ex:119-127 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:79— lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:79-86 | lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex:79-86 — `lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex` and `lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 48 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:144— lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:144-151 | lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex:144-151 — `lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex` and `lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 48 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 32 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1087.
D20 · ADR Quality· Context and decision are both present but the body is largely boilerplate boilerplate with a one-line 'In a nutshell' summary plus a bulleted list of ADR rules (immutable decisions, numbered without reuse, new ADR replaces old) that gives no real context or consequences · ×1
Context and decision are both present but the body is largely boilerplate boilerplate with a one-line 'In a nutshell' summary plus a bulleted list of ADR rules (immutable decisions, numbered without reuse, new ADR replaces old) that gives no real context or consequences guides/architecture/decisions/0001-record-architecture-decisions.md— Add an explicit Context section explaining why ADRs are needed and the problem they solve, then flesh out Consequences with trade-offs such as the cost of maintaining a growing collection of records versus the benefits of versioned decisions
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml:78— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 14 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (4 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (30 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/responses.ex:66— lib/rig_api/v2/responses.ex:66-95 | lib/rig_api/v3/responses.ex:64-93 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/messages.ex:45— lib/rig_api/v2/messages.ex:45-73 | lib/rig_api/v3/messages.ex:45-73 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:220— lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:220-244 | lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex:220-244 — `lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex` and `lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 48 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/sse.ex:29— lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/sse.ex:29-42 | lib/rig_inbound_gateway_web/v1/websocket.ex:40-53 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/session_blacklist.ex:97— lib/rig_api/v2/session_blacklist.ex:97-106 | lib/rig_api/v3/session_blacklist.ex:97-106 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:118— lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex:118-124 | lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex:118-124 — `lib/rig_api/v2/apis.ex` and `lib/rig_api/v3/apis.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 48 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 4000`, so a request to `localhost:4000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 aws.dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 4000`, so a request to `localhost:4000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— Memory not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0020 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— Runs with UID <= 10000 One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployment/kubectl/rig.yaml— Workloads in the default namespace
Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU not limited This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU requests not specified This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory requests not specified This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0018 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory not limited This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0020 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— Runs with UID <= 10000 One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway-helm-v2/templates/deployment.yaml— Workloads in the default namespace This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE: a template must not hard-code `namespace:` — the namespace comes from the install (`-n`) or from the release values, so writing one here overrides the choice every installation makes. Treat this as an install-time control: document (or default) the target namespace with the chart, rather than editing the manifest.
Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU not limited This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU requests not specified This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory requests not specified This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0018 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory not limited This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE and it already renders its `resources` from the chart's values (`.Values.resources`), so it is not the file to edit — writing the block in here would override whatever the chart's users pass in. The value that ships is the one in `deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/values.yaml`: set `resources` there and every installation gets it by default.
Low IaC: KSV-0020 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— Runs with UID <= 10000 One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployment/reactive-interaction-gateway/templates/deployment.yaml— Workloads in the default namespace This file is a Helm chart TEMPLATE: a template must not hard-code `namespace:` — the namespace comes from the install (`-n`) or from the release values, so writing one here overrides the choice every installation makes. Treat this as an install-time control: document (or default) the target namespace with the chart, rather than editing the manifest.
Low: possible-nginx-h2c-smuggling examples/channels-example/frontend/nginx.conf:16— Conditions for Nginx H2C smuggling identified. H2C smuggling allows upgrading HTTP/1.1 connections to lesser-known HTTP/2 over cleartext (h2c) connections which can allow a bypass of reverse proxy access controls, and lead to long-lived, unrestricted HTTP traffic directly to back-end servers. To mitigate: WebSocket support required: Allow only the value websocket for HTTP/1.1 upgrade headers (e.g., Upgrade: websocket). WebSocket support not required: Do not forward Upgrade headers. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
Low: possible-nginx-h2c-smuggling examples/channels-example/frontend/nginx.conf:23— Conditions for Nginx H2C smuggling identified. H2C smuggling allows upgrading HTTP/1.1 connections to lesser-known HTTP/2 over cleartext (h2c) connections which can allow a bypass of reverse proxy access controls, and lead to long-lived, unrestricted HTTP traffic directly to back-end servers. To mitigate: WebSocket support required: Allow only the value websocket for HTTP/1.1 upgrade headers (e.g., Upgrade: websocket). WebSocket support not required: Do not forward Upgrade headers. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 28 location(s) do not all need the same action: 12 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 16 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.
Dormant codebase — 56 of 56 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 56 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex, .js) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`), or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Maven POM and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
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Run 019fce6b-f3af-7ef3-b4fa-74850feb54c9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 47 · Warnings: 40 · Recommendations: 35 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 20:16 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.