Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
AleksandreJavakhishvili/DotNetCoreArchitecture carries serious risk (40%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (82%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (23%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (48%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Make retry-prone mutations idempotent (Idempotency).
For scale: Hobby (~1,936 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
50%
Adequate · gated by X4, X5
Architecture
82%
Strong
Maturity
48%
Weak · gated by M2
Readiness
23% ⚠
Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, ED5
Security
56%
Adequate · gated by C2
Domain Modelling
74%
Adequate · gated by DM4
Event-Driven
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 23% · 46% weightMaturity 48% · 25% weightCode Health 50% · 14% weightSecurity 56% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 74% · 4% weightArchitecture 82% · 2% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 23 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 40 → ~54.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 14%Plumbing 78%Generated 8%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €850–€4,200
| Cost to rebuild | €850–€4,200 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 40% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 49% boilerplate · 36% straight-line · 15% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 23% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
10.0
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
10.0
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X2 · Repo
Cancellation propagation
7.6
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
9.4
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
The Ugly
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Event-Driven
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a CI/CD pipeline that builds and tests every push to prevent regressions. Next, integrate automated security scanning into the build process to fail the build on security issues. Then, ensure all retry-prone mutations are idempotent to prevent duplicate writes. Finally, address the single gaps in code coverage and test distribution to ensure comprehensive testing.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +14.3 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +14.3 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +15.1 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +15.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply. | +15.0 pts | Medium | Idempotency |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +14.3 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production. | +13.5 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +2.6 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Controllers/BaseController.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization |
| DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Shared/JwtToken.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: jwt-tokenvalidationparameters-no-expiry-validation |
| DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Infrastructure/Filters/HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
| DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Program.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| DotNetCoreArchitecture.Domain/SeedWork/IntegrationalEntity.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 55 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D35AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6C2DM1DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 11 of 21 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
4 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 14 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
git history depth insufficient
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D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1823 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
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D18 · Solution Shape
4 projects, 58 source files, 1823 hand-written lines of code (1823 production / 0 test), plus 176 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 6 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).
Build status unknown
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D19 · Documentation Quality
This is a single README for an architecture template that claims to use .NET Core 3.0, Docker, EF Core, and MediatR but shows no actual documentation of the domain layer (the outline lists Domain/Services/Persistence with zero coverage), no API surface, no configuration guidance, and only one external link to a Medium article about CQRS rather than architecture docs.
XML-doc coverage: DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api.csproj
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 3.0/10. — This is a single README for an architecture template that claims to use .NET Core 3.0, Docker, EF Core, and MediatR but shows no actual documentation of the domain layer (the outline lists Domain/Services/Persistence with zero coverage), no API surface, no configuration guidance, and only one external link to a Medium article about CQRS rather than architecture docs.
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
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D24 · Comment Value
1 valuable / 1 redundant across 7 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.
misleading comment DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Infrastructure/Filters/HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs:48
redundant commentDotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Program.cs:23
What to do
- Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs, IntegrationalEntity.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 4 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
92 % of calls cross a namespace and 13 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Controllers/BaseController.cs:7
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
High IaC: DS-0002DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Dockerfile
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
git history depth insufficient
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.
What to do
- Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `Post` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Post.cs:9
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
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ED2 · Event/command shape
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ED3 · Event naming
- `Event` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Event.cs:8
What to do
- Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
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ED5 · Idempotency
- `Commands.CreatePostCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreatePostCommandHandler.cs:21
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
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M1 · Documentation (README)
- The root README is 72 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
- Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
- Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
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P2 · Observability
- Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P8 · Schema migrations
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S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 6/10 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×4) — PostController.cs:24, DomainEventRepositoryDecorator.cs:52, DomainEventRepositoryDecorator.cs:59, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
- `throw e;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack. — TransactionBehaviour.cs:55
What to do
- Rethrow loses stack trace (`throw ex;`)
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X4 · Structured logging
- Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×7) — IWebHostExtensions.cs:29, IWebHostExtensions.cs:48, LoggingBehavior.cs:18, …
What to do
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
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X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/4 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 50% | Adequate — gated by X4, X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 82% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 48% | Weak — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 23% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, ED5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 56% | Adequate — gated by C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 74% | Adequate — gated by DM4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 49 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 1823 LoC the codebase is trivially small despite four projects, so explicit boundaries are unnecessary.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 2 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Dockerfile
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Warning — 2 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Controllers/BaseController.cs:7
- Medium: jwt-tokenvalidationparameters-no-expiry-validation DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Shared/JwtToken.cs:74
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value
- misleading comment DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Infrastructure/Filters/HttpGlobalExceptionFilter.cs:48
- misleading comment DotNetCoreArchitecture.Domain/SeedWork/IntegrationalEntity.cs:33
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Program.cs:23
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/Dockerfile
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 8 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api/DotNetCoreArchitecture.Api.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DotNetCoreArchitecture.Application DotNetCoreArchitecture.Application/DotNetCoreArchitecture.Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DotNetCoreArchitecture.Domain DotNetCoreArchitecture.Domain/DotNetCoreArchitecture.Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DotNetCoreArchitecture.Persistence DotNetCoreArchitecture.Persistence/DotNetCoreArchitecture.Persistence.csproj
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- git history depth insufficient
D18 · Solution Shape
- Build status unknown
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
D35 · Change Coupling
- git history depth insufficient
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 2 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |