Public report — adnc, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
122findings with an exact file:lineof 167 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
68/104dimensions across the health lenses29044 LoC · 40 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
AlphaYu/adnc is in a workable but fragile state (55%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
The area that most needs attention is Domain Modelling (47%) — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change. Security (55%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: strongly-typed ids across the domain (Strongly-typed ids); Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern… (Rich vs anemic model); Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies (Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary).
For scale: Medium (~29,044 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Business logic 21%Plumbing 62%Tests 7%Generated 10%
New since the last scan (11+)
11 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.
D20 · No context/problem and no consequences; the title is informative but the body is a single heading with no content docs/architecture/adr/ADR-002-outbox-pattern.md
D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the title is informative but the body is a single decision with no framing docs/architecture/adr/ADR-003-no-distributed-transaction-coordinator.md
D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title 'ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation' is informative docs/architecture/adr/ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation.md
D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "opentelemetry" is informative docs/architecture/adr/ADR-006-opentelemetry-observability.md
D22 · Inconsistent naming for tree retrieval: 'GetTreelist' vs 'GetTreeList'. The pluralization and capitalization of 'Tree' vs 'Treelist' differs.
D22 · Inconsistent search parameter type for paged queries: Some services use a specific Search/Filter DTO (e.g., DictDataSearchPagedDto), while others use a generic SearchPagedDto or no specific input DTO.
D22 · Inconsistent naming for options/dropdown lists: 'GetMenuOptionsAsync', 'GetOrgOptionsAsync', 'GetOptionsAsync'. The verb and object naming vary significantly.
DM6 · Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderConfig src/Demo/Ord/Domain/EntityConfig/OrderConfig.cs
DM6 · Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderItemConfig src/Demo/Ord/Domain/EntityConfig/OrderItemConfig.cs
DM6 · Domain depends on infrastructure: ProductConfig src/Demo/Whse/Domain/EntityConfig/ProductConfig.cs
DM6 · Domain depends on infrastructure: WarehouseConfig src/Demo/Whse/Domain/EntityConfig/WarehouseConfig.cs
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€39,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 47% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, domain model × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 47%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Domain Modelling first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
14 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
109 modules, 83 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
20
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
6
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, adopt strongly-typed identifiers across the domain to prevent transposed-argument bugs and complete the migration. Next, move business rules onto aggregates and entities to enforce invariants at the source rather than in anemic services. Then, invert domain-to-infrastructure dependencies by declaring interfaces in the domain and implementing them in the infrastructure layer. Additionally, encapsulate entity state by making setters private or init-only to ensure all state changes pass through invariant-enforcing methods. Finally, strengthen data protection by vaulting keys and encrypting sensitive columns to eliminate coverage gaps.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 64 of 68 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 68 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 122 of 167 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D22, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 RSAKeyExtensions.FromLvccXmlString (cognitive 40) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with RsaKeyExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 LogConsumersHostedService.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 26) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with LogConsumersHostedService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 RsaProvider.FromPem (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with RsaProvider.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
No mechanizable ADR was identified, so enforcement is not measured (scan coverage 100 %). Cycles found: 0.
What to do
Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
111 test methods: 111 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Tests co-located / outside the solution
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
50 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/DateTime/DataTimeExtension.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Dead code: CahceConsts · ×6src/Demo/Whse/Application/Cache/CahceConsts.cs:3
What to do
Resolve the 3 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props (2), EasyCaching.Redis.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 40 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with EncryptExtensions.cs (10), BearerAuthenticationHandler.cs (6), DependencyRegistrar.cs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (40 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with DependencyRegistrarExtension.cs (3), AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs (2), OrderPaidEventSubscriber.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 6 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 4.4/10 (frequently incomplete). 5 flagged with a specific gap.
No context/problem and no consequences; the title is informative but the body is a single heading with no contentdocs/architecture/adr/ADR-002-outbox-pattern.md
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the title is informative but the body is a single decision with no framingdocs/architecture/adr/ADR-003-no-distributed-transaction-coordinator.md
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "ADR-004-event-bus-abstraction" is informativedocs/architecture/adr/ADR-004-event-bus-abstraction.md
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title 'ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation' is informativedocs/architecture/adr/ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation.md
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "opentelemetry" is informativedocs/architecture/adr/ADR-006-opentelemetry-observability.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences; the title is informative but the… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with ADR-002-outbox-pattern.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the title is… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with ADR-003-no-distributed-transaction-coordinator.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with ADR-004-event-bus-abstraction.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
The class name 'EncryptProivder' contains a typo ('Proivder' instead of 'Provider'). This typo is consistently present in all related methods, but the typo itself is an inconsistency with standard English spelling and likely a bug.
Inconsistent naming for creation DTOs. Some use 'CreationDto' suffix, while others might use 'CreateDto' or similar. Here, 'CreationDto' is used, which is fine, but ensure all creation DTOs follow the same pattern.
What to do
Resolve the 1 The class name 'EncryptProivder' contains a typo ('Proivder' instead of… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for creation DTOs. Some use 'CreationDto' suffix,… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.
Inconsistent naming for tree retrieval: 'GetTreelist' vs 'GetTreeList'. The pluralization and capitalization of 'Tree' vs 'Treelist' differs.
Inconsistent search parameter type for paged queries: Some services use a specific Search/Filter DTO (e.g., DictDataSearchPagedDto), while others use a generic SearchPagedDto or no specific input DTO.
Inconsistent naming for options/dropdown lists: 'GetMenuOptionsAsync', 'GetOrgOptionsAsync', 'GetOptionsAsync'. The verb and object naming vary significantly.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for tree retrieval finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent search parameter type for paged queries finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for options/dropdown lists finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
95 % of calls cross a namespace and 7 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×3src/Demo/Shared/resources/appsettings.shared.Development.json:125detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.shared.Development.json (2), appsettings.shared.development.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×20.github/workflows/deploy_all_demos.yml:28detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with DefaultBinarySerializer.cs (5), nuget_infra.yml (4), nuget_shared.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
`Adnc.Demo.Whse.Domain` is a Domain project but references `Adnc.Infra.Helper`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Adnc.Demo.Whse.Domain` is a Domain project but references `Adnc.Infra.IdGenerater`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Adnc.Demo.Whse.Application` is a Application project but references `Adnc.Infra.Repository`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Adnc.Demo.Whse.Application` is a Application project but references `Adnc.Infra.Repository.EfCore.SqlServer`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Adnc.Demo.Ord.Domain` is a Domain project but references `Adnc.Infra.Helper`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Adnc.Demo.Ord.Domain` is a Domain project but references `Adnc.Infra.IdGenerater`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Adnc.Demo.Ord.Application` is a Application project but references `Adnc.Infra.Repository`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IEventPublisher` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IEventPublisher.cs:3
`IAdoQuerierRepository` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IAdoQuerierRepository.cs:3
`IRedisProvider` declares 134 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRedisProvider.cs:12
`ICacheProvider` declares 23 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ICacheProvider.cs:7
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.
`LoginLog.UserId` is a raw `Int64` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int64`, in whatever form your language spells that. — LoginLog.cs:16
`OperationLog.UserId` is a raw `Int64` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int64`, in whatever form your language spells that. — OperationLog.cs:41
`EventTracker.EventId` is a raw `Int64` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int64`, in whatever form your language spells that. — EventTracker.cs:12
What to do
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
`LoginLog` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — LoginLog.cs:6
`OperationLog` is an aggregate/entity with 12 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OperationLog.cs:6
`EventTracker` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — EventTracker.cs:10
`AggregateRootWithBasicAuditInfo` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AggregateRootWithBasicAuditInfo.cs:3
What to do
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
`EfBasicAuditEntity` exposes publicly writable state (CreateBy, CreateTime). — EfBasicAuditEntity.cs:3
`EventTracker` exposes publicly writable state (EventId, TrackerName). — EventTracker.cs:10
`AggregateRoot` exposes publicly writable state (RowVersion). — AggregateRoot.cs:3
`AggregateRootWithBasicAuditInfo` exposes publicly writable state (CreateBy, CreateTime). — AggregateRootWithBasicAuditInfo.cs:3
What to do
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
`WarehouseManager` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — WarehouseManager.cs:6
What to do
Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×12) — HostExtension.cs:20, HostExtension.cs:26, DapperRepository.cs:23, …
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`LPushXAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:228
`RPushXAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:255
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×28) — ThreadPoolSettings.cs:17, RabbitMqProducer.cs:60, RabbitMqProducer.cs:62, …
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 40 of 40 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`dotnet test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability6.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 19/35 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 35, 6 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().
Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P9 · Domain vs controller coverage7.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.
Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.
What to do
Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes. — EncryptProvider.Des.cs:96
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Replace DES/3DES (and bare RijndaelManaged) with AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()`.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×11) — DefaultConsulConfigurationProvider.cs:15, ConnectionManager.cs:57, ConnectionManager.cs:63, …
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 45/242 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AccountController.cs:18, AccountController.cs:39, AccountController.cs:49, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 39 suppression(s) across the 148212 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 4 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy_all_demos.yml:28— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy_all_demos.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy_all_demos.yml:106— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: appleboy/ssh-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `appleboy/ssh-action@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/appleboy/ssh-action/commits/master --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy_gateway_ocelot.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy_gateway_ocelot.yml:21— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy_gateway_ocelot.yml:50— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: appleboy/ssh-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `appleboy/ssh-action@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/appleboy/ssh-action/commits/master --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_infra.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_infra.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_infra.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_infra.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_shared.yml:12— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_shared.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_shared.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget_shared.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: privileged-service deploy/staging/docker-compose.yml:82— Service 'consul_client_1' is running in privileged mode. This grants the container the equivalent of root capabilities on the host machine. This can lead to container escapes, privilege escalation, and other security concerns. Remove the 'privileged' key to disable this capability.
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization src/Infrastructures/Redis/Core/Serialization/DefaultBinarySerializer.cs:26— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization src/Infrastructures/Redis/Core/Serialization/DefaultBinarySerializer.cs:40— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization src/Infrastructures/Redis/Core/Serialization/DefaultBinarySerializer.cs:53— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization src/Infrastructures/Redis/Core/Serialization/DefaultBinarySerializer.cs:67— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization src/Infrastructures/Redis/Core/Serialization/DefaultBinarySerializer.cs:81— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 27 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 27 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
NoWarnInCsproj src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/EasyCaching.Redis.csproj:25— 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/Directory.Build.props:16— 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/Directory.Build.props:16— 0436 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
TodoComment src/Demo/Cust/Api/Application/Subscribers/OrderPaidEventSubscriber.cs:33— //TODO — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Infrastructures/Repository.EfCore.MongoDB/Transaction/MongoDbUnitOfWork.cs:3— //todo: implement MongoDbUnitOfWork — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/ServiceShared/Application/Extensions/DependencyRegistrarExtension.cs:60— //todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/ServiceShared/Application/Extensions/DependencyRegistrarExtension.cs:68— //todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/ServiceShared/Application/Extensions/DependencyRegistrarExtension.cs:74— //todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/ServiceShared/Application/Registrar/AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs:67— //todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/ServiceShared/Application/Registrar/AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs:123— //todo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Extensions/HostExtension.cs:25— // TODO — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Dead code: CahceConsts src/Demo/Whse/Application/Cache/CahceConsts.cs:3— NamedType CahceConsts — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CahceConsts src/Demo/Ord/Application/Cache/CahceConsts.cs:3— NamedType CahceConsts — no references found in solution.
Dead code: RemoveBlockedQty src/Demo/Whse/Domain/Aggregates/WarehouseAggregate/Warehouse.cs:52— Method RemoveBlockedQty — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Deliver src/Demo/Whse/Domain/Aggregates/WarehouseAggregate/Warehouse.cs:69— Method Deliver — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetKeyValues src/Infrastructures/Repository.EfCore/Extensions/EntityEntryExtension.cs:7— Method GetKeyValues — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CahceConsts src/Demo/Cust/Api/Application/Cache/CahceConsts.cs:3— NamedType CahceConsts — no references found in solution.
TooManyMethods: DefaultRedisProvider src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 800 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 139 methods, declared across 13 files: StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs (28), StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.Hash.cs (22), StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.SortedSet.cs (18), StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.Set.cs (14), +9 more file(s). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: EncryptProivder src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 540 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 63 methods, declared across 8 files: Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs (28), Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs (10), Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Sha.cs (8), Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs (7), +4 more file(s). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: AbstracCacheProvider src/Infrastructures/Redis.Caching/Provider/AbstracCacheProvider.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 383 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 60 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: DefaultCachingProvider src/Infrastructures/Redis.Caching/Provider/DefaultCachingProvider.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 352 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 33 methods, declared across 2 files: Provider/DefaultCachingProvider.cs (17), Provider/DefaultCachingProvider.Async.cs (16). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Change coupling: BasicTokenGenerator.cs ↔ BearerTokenGenerator.cs src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/BasicTokenGenerator.cs— `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/BasicTokenGenerator.cs` and `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/BearerTokenGenerator.cs` change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: BearerTokenGenerator.cs ↔ TokenFactory.cs src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/BearerTokenGenerator.cs— `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/BearerTokenGenerator.cs` and `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/TokenFactory.cs` change together 54% of the time (7 of the 13 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: CacheDelegatingHandler.cs ↔ TokenFactory.cs src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/CacheDelegatingHandler.cs— `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/CacheDelegatingHandler.cs` and `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/TokenFactory.cs` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ITokenGenerator.cs ↔ TokenDelegatingHandler.cs src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/ITokenGenerator.cs— `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/Token/ITokenGenerator.cs` and `src/ServiceShared/Remote/Handlers/TokenDelegatingHandler.cs` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:20— src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:20-29 | src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:70-80 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:20` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:45— src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:45-54 | src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:98-107 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/Expression/ExpressionLogicalOperatorsExtension .cs:45` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/ServiceShared/Application/Channels/LogConsumersHostedService.cs:23— src/ServiceShared/Application/Channels/LogConsumersHostedService.cs:23-32 | src/ServiceShared/Application/Channels/LogConsumersHostedService.cs:66-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/ServiceShared/Application/Channels/LogConsumersHostedService.cs:23` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Off the main sequence: Adnc.Infra.Core — Adnc.Infra.Core: abstractness 0.09, instability 0.00, distance 0.91 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 16 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Adnc.Shared — Adnc.Shared: abstractness 0.14, instability 0.00, distance 0.86 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
Off the main sequence: Adnc.Infra.Helper — Adnc.Infra.Helper: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Medium CVE: KubernetesClient 15.0.1 — KubernetesClient 15.0.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:259— src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:259-274 | src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:387-402 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:259` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:323— src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:323-338 | src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:444-459 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs:323` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:34— src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:34-45 | src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:125-136 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:34` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:172— src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:172-183 | src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:265-276 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Redis/Providers/StackExchange/DefaultRedisProvider.List.cs:172` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:32— src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:32-39 | src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:138-145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:32` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Demo/Admin/Application/Services/UserService.cs:265— src/Demo/Admin/Application/Services/UserService.cs:265-272 | src/Demo/Admin/Application/Services/UserService.cs:283-290 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Demo/Admin/Application/Services/UserService.cs:265` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:70— src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:70-75 | src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:170-175 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:70` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/ServiceShared/Application/Registrar/AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs:27— src/ServiceShared/Application/Registrar/AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs:27-32 | src/ServiceShared/Application/Registrar/AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs:85-90 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/ServiceShared/Application/Registrar/AbstractApplicationDependencyRegistrar.RpcClient.cs:27` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
RSAKeyExtensions.FromLvccXmlString (cyclomatic 20) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/Extensions/RsaKeyExtensions.cs:70— RSAKeyExtensions.FromLvccXmlString has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1166.
RSAKeyExtensions.FromLvccXmlString (cognitive 40) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/Extensions/RsaKeyExtensions.cs:70— RSAKeyExtensions.FromLvccXmlString has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
LogConsumersHostedService.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 26) src/ServiceShared/Application/Channels/LogConsumersHostedService.cs:5— LogConsumersHostedService.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 26 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 11, 54). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
RsaProvider.FromPem (cognitive 24) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/Shared/RsaProvider.cs:18— RsaProvider.FromPem has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
CachingAsyncInterceptor.InternalInterceptSynchronous (cognitive 23) src/Infrastructures/Redis.Caching/Core/Interceptor/Castle/CachingAsyncInterceptor.cs:62— CachingAsyncInterceptor.InternalInterceptSynchronous has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
CachingAsyncInterceptor.InternalInterceptAsynchronous (cognitive 23) src/Infrastructures/Redis.Caching/Core/Interceptor/Castle/CachingAsyncInterceptor.cs:184— CachingAsyncInterceptor.InternalInterceptAsynchronous has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AbstractPermissionHandler.HandleRequirementAsync (cognitive 23) src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Authorization/Handlers/AbstractPermissionHandler.cs:7— AbstractPermissionHandler.HandleRequirementAsync has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
WebApplicationBuilderExtension.ReplacePlaceholder (cognitive 16) src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Extensions/WebApplicationBuilderExtension.cs:73— WebApplicationBuilderExtension.ReplacePlaceholder has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D20 · ADR Quality· No context/problem and no consequences; the title is informative but the body is a single heading with no content · ×1
No context/problem and no consequences; the title is informative but the body is a single heading with no content docs/architecture/adr/ADR-002-outbox-pattern.md— Add a Context section explaining why an outbox pattern was chosen (e.g. decoupling events from messages) and a Consequences section on trade-offs such as memory usage and event duplication
D20 · ADR Quality· No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the title is informative but the body is a single decision with no framing · ×1
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the title is informative but the body is a single decision with no framing docs/architecture/adr/ADR-003-no-distributed-transaction-coordinator.md— Add a Context section explaining why distributed transaction coordination matters (e.g. ACID guarantees across services) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs like complexity, latency, and failure modes
D20 · ADR Quality· No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "ADR-004-event-bus-abstraction" is informative · ×1
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "ADR-004-event-bus-abstraction" is informative docs/architecture/adr/ADR-004-event-bus-abstraction.md— Add a Context section explaining why an event-bus abstraction was needed (e.g. decoupling services, handling asynchronous events) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs like coupling to external systems or operational complexity
D20 · ADR Quality· No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title 'ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation' is informative · ×1
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title 'ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation' is informative docs/architecture/adr/ADR-005-redis-as-distributed-foundation.md— Add a Context section explaining why Redis was chosen over alternatives (e.g. in-memory key-value store with persistence/cluster support) and a Consequences section covering operational complexity, latency under load, and dependency on Redis
D20 · ADR Quality· No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "opentelemetry" is informative · ×1
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "opentelemetry" is informative docs/architecture/adr/ADR-006-opentelemetry-observability.md— State why OpenTelemetry adoption is needed (e.g. distributed tracing/gRPC observability) and its trade-offs such as instrumentation effort vs operational complexity
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent naming for tree retrieval · ×1
Inconsistent naming for tree retrieval: 'GetTreelist' vs 'GetTreeList'. The pluralization and capitalization of 'Tree' vs 'Treelist' differs. — Standardize to 'GetTreeListAsync' across all services. (signatures: IMenuService.GetTreelistAsync | IOrganizationService.GetTreeListAsync)
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent search parameter type for paged queries · ×1
Inconsistent search parameter type for paged queries: Some services use a specific Search/Filter DTO (e.g., DictDataSearchPagedDto), while others use a generic SearchPagedDto or no specific input DTO. — Adopt a consistent pattern: either all services use a specific search DTO per entity, or all use a generic SearchPagedDto. Currently, IDictDataService uses a specific DTO, while IDictService and others use generic or minimal inputs. (signatures: IDictDataService.GetPagedAsync | IDictService.GetPagedAsync | IRoleService.GetPagedAsync | ISysConfigService.GetPagedAsync | IUserService.GetPagedAsync)
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent naming for options/dropdown lists · ×1
Inconsistent naming for options/dropdown lists: 'GetMenuOptionsAsync', 'GetOrgOptionsAsync', 'GetOptionsAsync'. The verb and object naming vary significantly. — Standardize to 'GetOptionsAsync' or 'GetDropdownListAsync' consistently across all services. (signatures: IMenuService.GetMenuOptionsAsync | IOrganizationService.GetOrgOptionsAsync | IRoleService.GetOptionsAsync)
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 946.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 14 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s), 2 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (4 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 2 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): nuget_shared.yml: dotnet nuget push $file --api-key ${{ secrets.NUGET_API_KEY }} --skip-duplicate --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json; nuget_infra.yml: dotnet nuget push $file --api-key ${{ secrets.NUGET_API_KEY }} --skip-duplicate --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Demo/Maint/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:13— src/Demo/Maint/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:13-29 | src/Demo/Ord/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:13-29 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Demo/Maint/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:13` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Authorization/Handlers/PermissionCacheHandler.cs:13— src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Authorization/Handlers/PermissionCacheHandler.cs:13-26 | src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Authorization/Handlers/PermissionRemoteHandler.cs:7-20 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/ServiceShared/WebApi/Authorization/Handlers/PermissionCacheHandler.cs:13` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:102— src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:102-112 | src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs:202-212 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/DateTime/DataTimeExtension.cs:342— src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/DateTime/DataTimeExtension.cs:342-351 | src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/DateTime/DataTimeExtension.cs:352-361 | src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/DateTime/DataTimeExtension.cs:367-376 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) src/Demo/Admin/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:12— src/Demo/Admin/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:12-20 | src/Demo/Maint/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:12-20 | src/Demo/Ord/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:12-20 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Demo/Admin/Api/DependencyRegistrar.cs:12` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:70— src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:70-78 | src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:178-187 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProivder.Aes.cs:70` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Low cohesion: EfRepository (LCOM4 5) src/Infrastructures/Repository.EfCore/Repositories/EfRepository.cs:10— EfRepository's methods form 5 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
Shell project: Adnc.Demo.Whse.Migrations src/Demo/Whse/Migrations/Adnc.Demo.Whse.Migrations.csproj— `Adnc.Demo.Whse.Migrations` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
Shell project: Adnc.Demo.Ord.Migrations src/Demo/Ord/Migrations/Adnc.Demo.Ord.Migrations.csproj— `Adnc.Demo.Ord.Migrations` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 50 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/Infrastructures/Core/Extensions/DateTime/DataTimeExtension.cs, src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Rsa.cs, src/Infrastructures/Redis.Caching/Provider/DefaultCachingProvider.cs, src/Infrastructures/Redis.Caching/Provider/DefaultCachingProvider.Async.cs, src/Infrastructures/Repository.Dapper/DapperRepository.cs, src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/Shared/RsaProvider.cs, src/Infrastructures/Repository.EfCore/Repositories/EfRepository.cs, src/Infrastructures/Helper/Internal/Encrypt/EncryptProvider.Des.cs (+42 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Adnc.Demo.Remote.Grpc` with 32 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 88 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.98 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D21 · Naming Consistency· The class name 'EncryptProivder' contains a typo ('Proivder' instead of 'Provider'). This typo is consistently present in all related methods, but the typo itself is an inconsistency with standard English spelling and likely a bug. · ×1
The class name 'EncryptProivder' contains a typo ('Proivder' instead of 'Provider'). This typo is consistently present in all related methods, but the typo itself is an inconsistency with standard English spelling and likely a bug. — Rename 'EncryptProivder' to 'EncryptProvider'. (symbols: Adnc.Infra.Helper.Internal.Encrypt.EncryptProivder.RSADecrypt, Adnc.Infra.Helper.Internal.Encrypt.EncryptProivder.DESDecrypt, Adnc.Infra.Helper.Internal.Encrypt.EncryptProivder.AESEncrypt, Adnc.Infra.Helper.Internal.Encrypt.EncryptProivder.RSAEncrypt, Adnc.Infra.Helper.Internal.Encrypt.EncryptProivder.AESDecrypt)
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent naming for creation DTOs. Some use 'CreationDto' suffix, while others might use 'CreateDto' or similar. Here, 'CreationDto' is used, which is fine, but ensure all creation DTOs follow the same pattern. · ×1
Inconsistent naming for creation DTOs. Some use 'CreationDto' suffix, while others might use 'CreateDto' or similar. Here, 'CreationDto' is used, which is fine, but ensure all creation DTOs follow the same pattern. — Ensure all creation DTOs use the 'CreationDto' suffix consistently. (symbols: Adnc.Demo.Admin.Application.Contracts.Dtos.Organization.OrganizationCreationDto, Adnc.Demo.Admin.Application.Contracts.Dtos.User.UserCreationDto, Adnc.Demo.Whse.Application.Contracts.Dtos.Product.ProductCreationDto)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 27k LoC across 40 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so its structure warrants explicit bounded-context boundaries. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 6 location(s) do not all need the same action: 3 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 3 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D9 · Test Distribution· Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
Tests co-located / outside the solution — 111 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fc7d5-07f2-71a6-88d6-d21d1986ad40 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 16 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 46 · Warnings: 108 · Recommendations: 12 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 13:34 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.