Andyhacool/HRM

Executive summary

Andyhacool/HRM scores 35 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 23 and is rated Critical. Its Secret Scanning dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning and to resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 35 to about 46.

26 findings are critical: nine in Dependency Vulnerabilities, four in Dependency Hygiene, four in Explicit Debt, two in Coupling, two in Dependency direction, two in Secret Scanning, one in Secrets (history), one in Test Quality and one in Web-Security Posture.

Watchdog couldn't measure Test Reliability and Runtime accessibility in this code, so those dimensions are left out of the score. The product code is 3,018 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €4,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 60 Adequate, capped by Structured logging Architecture 73 Strong Maturity 64 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 23 ⚠ Critical, capped by Dependency Hygiene, Secret Scanning, CI/CD gates and Security & performance tooling Security and Compliance 30 Weak, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities, Data Protection, Access Controls and Web-Security Posture Domain Modelling 49 Weak, capped by Strongly-typed ids, Repository granularity and Constructible invalid state Event-Driven 100 ★ Exemplary Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Production Readiness 23 · counts for 45%Security and Compliance 30 · counts for 25%Domain Modelling 49 · counts for 14%Code Health 60 · counts for 8%Maturity 64 · counts for 4%Architecture 73 · counts for 2%Event-Driven 100 · counts for 1%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 23 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 35 to about 46.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Business logic 4%Supporting code 70%Tests 9%Generated by tools 18%

New since the last survey: 48 findings

These 48 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit src/HRM.Infra.IdentityTest/HRM.Infra.IdentityUnitTests.csproj
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json REDACTED
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Explicit Debt · Dead code: UseCentralRoutePrefix src/HRM.WebApi/Configurations/RouteConvention.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: UpdateAddress src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: IHandler src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IHandler.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: IsAuthenticated src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUser.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: GetClaimsIdentity src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUser.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: SendCommand src/HRM.Domain.Core/Bus/IMediatorHandler.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: Request src/HRM.Domain.Core/Requests/Request.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: SendEmailAsync src/HRM.Domain.Core/Services/IEmailSender.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: SendSmsAsync src/HRM.Domain.Core/Services/ISmsSender.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: Error src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Dto/Error.cs
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Login src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: RefreshToken src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Register src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SendCommand src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/InMemoryBus.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: RaiseEvent src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/InMemoryBus.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/ExchangeRefreshTokenHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/LoginHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/RegisterUserHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: FindByName src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Repositories/UserRepository.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: AddAsync src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetByIdAsync src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetSingleBySpec src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SaveChangesAsync src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: HRM.Application (Application) → HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Infrastructure) src/HRM.Application/Interfaces/IAccountAppService.cs
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: HRM.Application (Application) → HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Infrastructure) src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 8 findings

These 8 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json
Repository granularity · Repository for a non-root entity: EmployeeRepository → Employee src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/EmployeeRepository.cs

Rebuild cost: about €4,000 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€1,400 to €6,700, for 23 to 71 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	Very high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 35. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 3,018 lines of product code, of which 54% is declarations and boilerplate, 40% straight logic and 6% logic with branches

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).

Raises the score by about 10 points · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

Raises the score by about 7 points · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 27 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (11), REDACTED (8), REDACTED (4).

Raises the score by about 10 points · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €4,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 23 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.

One cause behind 7 Domain Modelling findings · Common cause

7 findings in the Domain Modelling lens come from the same cause. The code models the business as objects, such as an order or a customer, and each object should guard its own rules: an order, for example, should refuse to be shipped before it has been paid. Here the objects don't do that. Other code can change an object's data directly, so it can put an order into a state the rules forbid. Some objects only hold data, while the rules that should keep that data valid sit elsewhere in the code. Identifiers, such as order numbers and customer numbers, are passed around as plain numbers or text, so nothing stops the code from using one kind where another belongs. Because all of these findings have the same cause, fixing it once, in the business objects themselves, deals with them together.

Based on: Encapsulated state (1 finding) · Rich vs anemic model (2 findings) · Strongly-typed ids (4 findings)

What to do: Give each business object the methods that enforce its rules, such as a method for shipping an order that first checks it has been paid, and let only those methods change its data. Give each kind of identifier a type of its own, so an order number can't be used where a customer number belongs.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 10 points for low effort, because it clears the 2 Secret Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

54 modules, with 88 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 14 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	1 Domain.Core.Bus	2 Domain.Core.Events	3 Domain.Core.Model	4 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Context	5 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Dto	6 Domain.Core.Commands	7 Domain.Core.Notifications	8 Domain.Events	9 Domain.Models	10 Domain.SharedKernel	12 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Events	13 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Interfaces.Services	14 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Models	15 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Responses	16 Application.ViewModels	17 Domain	18 Domain.Commands	20 Domain.Models.Identity	22 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Requests	23 Application.Interfaces	24 Domain.Interfaces	25 Infra.Data.Context	27 Domain.CommandHandlers	28 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Interfaces	29 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Presenters	30 Infra.Data.Repository	31 Infra.Data.Repository.EventSourcing
1 Domain.Core.Bus
2 Domain.Core.Events
3 Domain.Core.Model
4 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Context
5 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Dto
6 Domain.Core.Commands		1
7 Domain.Core.Notifications		1
8 Domain.Events		3
9 Domain.Models			2
10 Domain.SharedKernel			1
11 Infra.CrossCutting.Bus	1	1
12 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Events		1
13 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Interfaces.Services					1
14 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Models				1
15 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Responses					2
16 Application.ViewModels									1
17 Domain			1						2	1
18 Domain.Commands						1			2
19 Domain.EventHandlers								3
20 Domain.Models.Identity			1						1
21 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.EventHandlers											1
22 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Requests						1
23 Application.Interfaces														2	3
24 Domain.Interfaces																1		1
25 Infra.Data.Context		1														1
26 Infra.Data.Mappings		1														1
27 Domain.CommandHandlers	2					1	3										3				3
28 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Interfaces														2					3		2
29 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Presenters														2							2
30 Infra.Data.Repository																1					3	2
31 Infra.Data.Repository.EventSourcing		2																				1
32 Infra.Data.Specifications																					1
33 Infra.Data.UoW																					1	1
34 WebApi.Controllers	2						3								3					1
35 Application.Services														2	3					1				3	2
36 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Auth					1							3												3
37 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.AuthHandlers	1						1					2		1					1		3		1	1
38 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Repositories													1					1			1	1				1
39 Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.UseCaseHandlers	2						2					3	1	1					2		5		2	2
40 Infra.Data.EventSourcing		1																			1						1

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate · gated by X4 ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 7.4 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.9 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 9.9 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0

The Bad

IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 6.7

The Ugly

X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 4.5 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 3.5

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Strong ·

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.5 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

The Bad

AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 5.1

The Ugly

AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.1

At a glance — Maturity · 64% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Ugly

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 4.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 23% · Critical · gated by D12, D13, P1, P3 ·

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 8.2 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 6.4

The Ugly

D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 0.8 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 4.9 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 30% · Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2, S1 ·

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 9.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Bad

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 6.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 6.0

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 1.2 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 3.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 2.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 49% · Weak · gated by DM2, DM7, DM11 ·

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 9.7 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 9.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Bad

DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 5.3

The Ugly

DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 3.0 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 2.7

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 8.5 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	19	High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection	10	Medium
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures	4	High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the two leaked secrets in REDACTED and address the twenty-seven deprecated dependencies across the infrastructure and web API projects. Next, remediate the four vulnerable dependencies to strengthen the codebase's security posture. Establish a CI workflow that builds and tests every push to prevent regressions, and integrate a security analyzer like CodeQL or Semgrep into that pipeline to automatically fail builds on new security issues.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).	+10.3 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+6.5 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 27 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (11), REDACTED (8), REDACTED (4).	+10.1 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs.	+4.1 pts	Low	Test Quality
Resolve the 1 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality — start with LoginHandlerUnitTest.cs.	+2.7 pts	Low	Test Quality
Resolve the 1 Test project verifies nothing finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs.	+2.7 pts	Low	Test Quality
Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with REDACTED.	+2.5 pts	Low	Platform End-of-Life
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+4.7 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 29 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 17% slop · 38% mixed · 45% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.0	Slop	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.7	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.9	Slop	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED	4.0	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.0	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.2	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs	6.4	Mixed	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj	6.5	Mixed	Coupling: Unstable project HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC
src/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs	6.5	Mixed	Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1
src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUser.cs	7.3	Mixed	Explicit Debt: Dead code: IsAuthenticated
src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/HRM.WebApi/Configurations/RouteConvention.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: UseCentralRoutePrefix
src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: UpdateAddress
src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: IHandler
src/HRM.Domain.Core/Bus/IMediatorHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: SendCommand

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 26

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 109

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 59

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 8

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 83 of 88 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 88 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D35D39D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1C2DM1DM10DM11DM12DM2DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P8PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 168 of 194 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a16130-a70d-7987-8349-490b2e3be942.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 12 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 11 commit(s), too few for a reliable trend signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (11 commit(s) sampled, fewer than the 50 this dimension needs before a bus factor means anything).
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D28 Secrets (history) — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. D28's config-credential rule (REDACTED) parses each committed `.json` config as a document and reads credential-named values; `src/HRM.Infra.Data/appsettings.json`, `src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/appsettings.json` did not parse (JSON5, a template, several concatenated documents), so a credential bound there is UNMEASURED by that rule. gitleaks still scanned the same files as text.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (11 commit(s) sampled).
D35 Change Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 11 commit(s), too few for a reliable change-coupling signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via ToolchainServer (src/HRM.WebApi). the service exited before it opened a port — `ASPNETCORE_URLS=http://127.0.0.1:0 ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet run --no-build --no-launch-profile --project 'REDACTED'`: hare/dotnet/ The following frameworks were found: 6.0.36 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 7.0.20 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 8.0.27 at [/usr/sha…; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because REDACTED is a Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web project).

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)src/HRM.Domain/Validations/EmployeeValidation.cs:28

Duplicated block (8 lines × 3)src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AppIdentityDbContext.cs:17

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with EmployeeValidation.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with AppIdentityDbContext.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D5 · Coupling9.0 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 1 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure · ×2REDACTED:17

Unstable project HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoCsrc/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj:1

What to do

Resolve the 2 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Unstable project HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC finding(s) in Coupling — start with HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 14 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

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D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 test methods: 12 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

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D10 · Test Quality6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 14 tests.

No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1src/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs:8

Skipped test: Handle_GivenValidCredentials_ShouldSucceedsrc/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/Handlers/LoginHandlerUnitTest.cs:23

Test project verifies nothing: HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTestssrc/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs:8

Mock framework: Moq · ×2

What to do

Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality — start with LoginHandlerUnitTest.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Test project verifies nothing finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Test Quality in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D12 · Dependency Hygiene0.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

31 outdated, 4 vulnerable, 20 deprecated, 1 prerelease packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper · ×4

Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App · ×27REDACTED:13

Prerelease dependency: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design

Outdated: AutoMapper · ×23REDACTED:8

Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App · ×8

What to do

Resolve the 27 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (11), REDACTED (8), REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 265 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 34 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 216 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt7.4 / 10Adequategated by 4 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 deducted debt markers + 10 dead symbols across 3018 LoC in the .NET projects (1.3/KLoC) → score 7.4.

WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×4src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:23

Dead code: UseCentralRoutePrefix · ×10src/HRM.WebApi/Configurations/RouteConvention.cs:46

What to do

Resolve the 4 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with EmployeeCommandHandler.cs (2), AccountAppService.cs, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 10 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with IUser.cs (2), RouteConvention.cs, Employee.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 121 source files, 3369 hand-written lines of code (3018 production / 351 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 836 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 20 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityWeak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The HRM repository's README is a one-document overview of the system (setup, technologies implemented, and an architecture section) but it does not document any subdirectories. The six README files are each only two or three words long and describe their own directories rather than the root project: the root README gives no installation/usage guidance for the repository as a whole, so its overview is missing.

XML-doc coverage: HRM.Application · ×8REDACTED

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The HRM repository's README is a one-document overview of the system (setup, technologies implemented, and an architecture section) but it does not document any subdirectories. The six README files are each only two or three words long and describe their own directories rather than the root project: the root README gives no installation/usage guidance for the repository as a whole, so its overview is missing.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D24 · Comment ValueExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 valuable / 0 redundant across 89 sampled comments.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

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D27 · Navigability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

98 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 10 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities1.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 finding(s): 2 critical, 7 high, 10 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 10 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 228 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/HRM.Infra.Data/Mappings/EmployeeMap.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 11 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp2.2REDACTED:4

What to do

Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX10 · Code composition4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX4 · Dependency direction5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

`HRM.Application` is a Application project but references `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one. — REDACTED:17
This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity`: it names `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Requests`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Responses`, `LoginResponse`, `ExchangeRefreshTokenResponse`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 3, 14, 15. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — src/HRM.Application/Interfaces/IAccountAppService.cs:2
This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity`: it names `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Interfaces`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Presenters`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Requests`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Responses`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Settings`, `ILoginHandler`, `IExchangeRefreshTokenHandler`, `LoginPresenter`, …. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 4, 5, 6, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, …. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:3
`HRM.Application` is a Application project but references `HRM.Infra.Data`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one. — REDACTED:18

What to do

Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).

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AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

What to do

Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

`Employee`'s public constructor takes `firstName`, `lastName` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `Employee` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:27
`RefreshToken`'s public constructor takes `token`, `remoteIpAddress` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `RefreshToken` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/RefreshToken.cs:16
`User`'s public constructor takes `firstName`, `lastName`, `identityId`, `email`, … as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `User` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:24

What to do

Give each aggregate one way in that can refuse — a guarded constructor, value-object parameters that validate themselves, or a private constructor behind a factory that returns a failure.

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DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

`EmployeeValidation` reads `DateTime.Now` inside `HaveMinimumAge`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — src/HRM.Domain/Validations/EmployeeValidation.cs:42
`User` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `AddRefreshToken`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:39

What to do

Pass the instant into the domain method that needs it, or inject `TimeProvider` (BCL, .NET 8+) and read it there — then a test can choose the moment a rule is evaluated at.

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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`RefreshToken.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/RefreshToken.cs:12
`User.IdentityId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:14
`DomainNotification.DomainNotificationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/HRM.Domain.Core/Notifications/DomainNotification.cs:10
`DomainNotification.Key` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/HRM.Domain.Core/Notifications/DomainNotification.cs:11

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`RefreshToken` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/RefreshToken.cs:8
`User` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:10

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`Employee` exposes publicly writable state (Email). — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:8

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM7 · Repository granularity2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

`IUserRepository` is a repository over `User`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `User` through its owning aggregate instead. — src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs:10
`IRepository` returns `IQueryable` from `GetAll`. That hands the caller the persistence engine rather than an aggregate: query composition, and with it the shape of what gets loaded, moves out of the repository and out of the aggregate's reach — and the contract can no longer be implemented by anything that is not that ORM. Return the aggregate (or a list of them) from methods that name the question being asked. — src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IRepository.cs:7

What to do

Define repositories per aggregate root and keep the query handle inside them; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

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ED3 · Event naming8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

`DomainNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — src/HRM.Domain.Core/Notifications/DomainNotification.cs:8

What to do

Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.

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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED5 · Idempotency8.2 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

`UseCaseHandlers.RegisterUserHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/RegisterUserHandler.cs:40

What to do

Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:31, src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:36, src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:41, …

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`Handle` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×3) — src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:31, src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:36, src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:41
`IsValid` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — src/HRM.Domain/Commands/UpdateEmployeeCommand.cs:9

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 5 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

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P2 · Observability4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

Identifier 'PasswordHash' looks like a password-hash field/property, but no KDF (PBKDF2 / Argon2 / BCrypt / PasswordHasher) was found anywhere in the source — so passwords aren't protected by a salted key-derivation function (whether a fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim). Password storage needs a salted KDF and a constant-time compare. — src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:17
`ValidateAudience`, `ValidateIssuer`, `ValidateLifetime` are all set to `false`, which means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent. — REDACTED:22
None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. — src/HRM.WebApi/Program.cs:21

What to do

Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:17`.
Re-enable token validation — `ValidateAudience` is set to `false`. If it was switched off because the expected value was wrong or absent, supply that value instead (`ValidAudiences`/`ValidIssuers`, or `IssuerSigningKeys`/`IssuerSigningKeyResolver` for the signature) rather than skipping the check: a disabled check accepts every token, not just the one that was failing.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

`_context` is never created by `EventStoreRepository` — every assignment to it takes a constructor parameter — yet this type disposes it here (line 31). Its declared type `EventSourcingContext` is an interface, so the instance came from whoever resolved it, and that owner decides when it ends. Disposing it from here reaches outside this object's lifetime: a dependency shared with the rest of the process is torn down when THIS instance goes away, and the real owner's later `Dispose()` runs a second time on an object already disposed. Drop the call — a type disposes what it constructed, and only that. If this dependency genuinely is exclusive to this instance, construct it here (or take an owned factory) so the ownership is stated in the code rather than assumed. — src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/EventSourcing/EventStoreRepository.cs:31
`DbContext` is never created by `Repository` — every assignment to it takes a constructor parameter — yet this type disposes it here (line 83). Its declared type `HRMContext` is an interface, so the instance came from whoever resolved it, and that owner decides when it ends. Disposing it from here reaches outside this object's lifetime: a dependency shared with the rest of the process is torn down when THIS instance goes away, and the real owner's later `Dispose()` runs a second time on an object already disposed. Drop the call — a type disposes what it constructed, and only that. If this dependency genuinely is exclusive to this instance, construct it here (or take an owned factory) so the ownership is stated in the code rather than assumed. — src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:83
`_context` is never created by `UnitOfWork` — every assignment to it takes a constructor parameter — yet this type disposes it here (line 22). Its declared type `HRMContext` is an interface, so the instance came from whoever resolved it, and that owner decides when it ends. Disposing it from here reaches outside this object's lifetime: a dependency shared with the rest of the process is torn down when THIS instance goes away, and the real owner's later `Dispose()` runs a second time on an object already disposed. Drop the call — a type disposes what it constructed, and only that. If this dependency genuinely is exclusive to this instance, construct it here (or take an owned factory) so the ownership is stated in the code rather than assumed. — src/HRM.Infra.Data/UoW/UnitOfWork.cs:22

What to do

Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/17 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×17) — src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:41, src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:47, src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:53, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X4 · Structured logging3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Auth/JwtTokenHandler.cs:41

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	60%	Adequate — gated by X4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	73%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	64%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	23%	Critical — gated by D12, D13, P1, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	30%	Weak — gated by D30, C1, C2, S1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	49%	Weak — gated by DM2, DM7, DM11	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Performance	100%	Exemplary	Solid.

Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.

Not evidenced — 6 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo

Not included — 38 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the service exited before it opened a port — `ASPNETCORE_URLS=http://127.0.0.1:0 ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet run --no-build --no-launch-profile --project 'REDACTED'`: hare/dotnet/ The following frameworks were found: 6.0.36 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 7.0.20 at [/usr/share/dotnet/shared/Microsoft.AspNetCore.App] 8.0.27 at [/usr/sha…; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because REDACTED is a Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web project) This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
D16 Bus Factor — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (3,018 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (HRM.Domain), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HttpClient/IHttpClientFactory/AddHttpClient in source, and no Refit/RestSharp/Flurl.Http namespace or package reference
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 26 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×7

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×4

Vulnerable: AutoMapper — REDACTED — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.2.0, — ) severity. 2.2.0
Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — REDACTED — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×4

WriteOnlyPrivateField src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:23 — private AuthSettings _authSettings — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:19 — private IEmployeeRepository _employeeRepository — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:20 — private IMediatorHandler Bus — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField REDACTED:21 — private ILogger _logger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.

AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×2

Dependency-rule violation: HRM.Application (Application) → HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Infrastructure) REDACTED:17 — `HRM.Application` is a Application project but references `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
Dependency-rule violation: HRM.Application (Application) → HRM.Infra.Data (Infrastructure) REDACTED:18 — `HRM.Application` is a Application project but references `HRM.Infra.Data`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×2

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure REDACTED:17 — HRM.Application (Application) references HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure REDACTED:18 — HRM.Application (Application) references HRM.Infra.Data (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).

D10 · Test Quality · No assertions (empty test) · ×1

No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1 src/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs:8 — Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.

D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×1

REDACTED

S1 · Web-Security Posture · Password hashing without a KDF · ×1

Password hashing without a KDF src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:17 — Identifier 'PasswordHash' looks like a password-hash field/property, but no KDF (PBKDF2 / Argon2 / BCrypt / PasswordHasher) was found anywhere in the source — so passwords aren't protected by a salted key-derivation function (whether a fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim). Password storage needs a salted KDF and a constant-time compare.

Serious — 109 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×27

Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App REDACTED:13 — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.2.0, — ) — the publisher's replacement is `2.2.0` Other,Legacy; migrate the reference to it.
Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore REDACTED:12 — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 8.3.0 — Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App REDACTED:14 — REDACTED — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App REDACTED:18 — REDACTED — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design REDACTED:15 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets REDACTED:16 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: xunit REDACTED:11 — xunit 2.4.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
Deprecated: xunit src/HRM.Infra.IdentityTest/HRM.Infra.IdentityUnitTests.csproj:12 — xunit 2.4.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization REDACTED:15 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity REDACTED:16 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore REDACTED:17 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design REDACTED:18 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 2.2.4 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design REDACTED:20 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 2.2.4 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer REDACTED:19 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 2.2.4 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer REDACTED:21 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 2.2.4 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools REDACTED:20 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 2.2.4 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration REDACTED:24 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration REDACTED:22 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions REDACTED:25 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions REDACTED:24 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json REDACTED:26 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json REDACTED:25 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens REDACTED:27 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 5.4.0 — Legacy
Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt REDACTED:28 — REDACTED — Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj:8 — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
+ 2 more in this group — see findings.md.

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×17

Async method without CancellationToken: Login src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:41 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RefreshToken src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:47 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Register src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:53 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Login REDACTED:35 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RefreshToken REDACTED:49 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Post REDACTED:58 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SendCommand src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/InMemoryBus.cs:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RaiseEvent src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/InMemoryBus.cs:24 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/ExchangeRefreshTokenHandler.cs:40 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/LoginHandler.cs:37 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/RegisterUserHandler.cs:40 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: FindByName src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:28 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AddAsync src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:22 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetByIdAsync src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetSingleBySpec src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:32 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: List src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:38 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SaveChangesAsync src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:76 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×10

Dead code: UseCentralRoutePrefix src/HRM.WebApi/Configurations/RouteConvention.cs:46 — Method UseCentralRoutePrefix — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.WebApi, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: UpdateAddress src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:39 — Method UpdateAddress — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: IHandler src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IHandler.cs:7 — NamedType IHandler — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: IsAuthenticated src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUser.cs:10 — Method IsAuthenticated — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: GetClaimsIdentity src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUser.cs:11 — Method GetClaimsIdentity — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: SendCommand src/HRM.Domain.Core/Bus/IMediatorHandler.cs:12 — Method SendCommand — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: Request src/HRM.Domain.Core/Requests/Request.cs:8 — NamedType Request — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: SendEmailAsync src/HRM.Domain.Core/Services/IEmailSender.cs:10 — Method SendEmailAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: SendSmsAsync src/HRM.Domain.Core/Services/ISmsSender.cs:10 — Method SendSmsAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Domain.Core, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: Error src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Dto/Error.cs:7 — NamedType Error — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×10

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code · Unfinished stub · ×4

Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:31 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:36 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:41 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/Commands/UpdateEmployeeCommand.cs:9 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Unfinished stub · ×4

Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:31 — `Handle` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:36 — `Handle` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/CommandHandlers/EmployeeCommandHandler.cs:41 — `Handle` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/HRM.Domain/Commands/UpdateEmployeeCommand.cs:9 — `IsValid` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.

DM11 · Constructible invalid state · Constructible in an invalid state · ×3

Constructible in an invalid state: Employee src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:27 — `Employee`'s public constructor takes `firstName`, `lastName` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `Employee` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse.
Constructible in an invalid state: RefreshToken src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/RefreshToken.cs:16 — `RefreshToken`'s public constructor takes `token`, `remoteIpAddress` as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `RefreshToken` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse.
Constructible in an invalid state: User src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:24 — `User`'s public constructor takes `firstName`, `lastName`, `identityId`, `email`, … as raw primitives, and neither of the two things that would make that safe was found. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: for VALIDATION, the constructor body was scanned for `throw`, `Guard.`, `Ensure.`, `ArgumentNullException`, `ArgumentException`, `CheckRule` or `Requires.` — a guard reached through a helper method those tokens do not name is not seen; for a FACTORY, only this type's OWN static members were read, and only names beginning `Create`, `Of`, `From`, `New` or `Build` — one inherited from a base type, one on a companion builder, or one called `Parse`, `Make` or `Rehydrate` is not seen. If either exists, this row is wrong. If neither does, a caller can build a `User` that breaks the rules it exists to enforce, and every rule downstream then has to cope with a state the model said was impossible. Guard in the constructor, take value objects that validate themselves, or make the constructor private behind a `Create` that can refuse.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · Disposes a dependency it does not own · ×3

Disposes a dependency it does not own src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/EventSourcing/EventStoreRepository.cs:31 — `_context` is never created by `EventStoreRepository` — every assignment to it takes a constructor parameter — yet this type disposes it here (line 31). Its declared type `EventSourcingContext` is an interface, so the instance came from whoever resolved it, and that owner decides when it ends. Disposing it from here reaches outside this object's lifetime: a dependency shared with the rest of the process is torn down when THIS instance goes away, and the real owner's later `Dispose()` runs a second time on an object already disposed. Drop the call — a type disposes what it constructed, and only that. If this dependency genuinely is exclusive to this instance, construct it here (or take an owned factory) so the ownership is stated in the code rather than assumed.
Disposes a dependency it does not own src/HRM.Infra.Data/Repository/Repository.cs:83 — `DbContext` is never created by `Repository` — every assignment to it takes a constructor parameter — yet this type disposes it here (line 83). Its declared type `HRMContext` is an interface, so the instance came from whoever resolved it, and that owner decides when it ends. Disposing it from here reaches outside this object's lifetime: a dependency shared with the rest of the process is torn down when THIS instance goes away, and the real owner's later `Dispose()` runs a second time on an object already disposed. Drop the call — a type disposes what it constructed, and only that. If this dependency genuinely is exclusive to this instance, construct it here (or take an owned factory) so the ownership is stated in the code rather than assumed.
Disposes a dependency it does not own src/HRM.Infra.Data/UoW/UnitOfWork.cs:22 — `_context` is never created by `UnitOfWork` — every assignment to it takes a constructor parameter — yet this type disposes it here (line 22). Its declared type `HRMContext` is an interface, so the instance came from whoever resolved it, and that owner decides when it ends. Disposing it from here reaches outside this object's lifetime: a dependency shared with the rest of the process is torn down when THIS instance goes away, and the real owner's later `Dispose()` runs a second time on an object already disposed. Drop the call — a type disposes what it constructed, and only that. If this dependency genuinely is exclusive to this instance, construct it here (or take an owned factory) so the ownership is stated in the code rather than assumed.

AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×2

Dependency-rule violation: HRM.Application (Application) → HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Infrastructure) src/HRM.Application/Interfaces/IAccountAppService.cs:2 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity`: it names `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Requests`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Responses`, `LoginResponse`, `ExchangeRefreshTokenResponse`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 3, 14, 15. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
Dependency-rule violation: HRM.Application (Application) → HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Infrastructure) src/HRM.Application/Services/AccountAppService.cs:3 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity`: it names `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Interfaces`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Presenters`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Requests`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Responses`, `HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Settings`, `ILoginHandler`, `IExchangeRefreshTokenHandler`, `LoginPresenter`, …. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 4, 5, 6, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, …. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain · Domain type reads the wall clock · ×2

Domain type reads the wall clock: EmployeeValidation src/HRM.Domain/Validations/EmployeeValidation.cs:42 — `EmployeeValidation` reads `DateTime.Now` inside `HaveMinimumAge`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
Domain type reads the wall clock: User src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:39 — `User` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `AddRefreshToken`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×2

Anemic entity: RefreshToken src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/RefreshToken.cs:8 — `RefreshToken` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
Anemic entity: User src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:10 — `User` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.

C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1

No data-protection/encryption — No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

D10 · Test Quality · Skipped test · ×1

Skipped test: Handle_GivenValidCredentials_ShouldSucceed src/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/Handlers/LoginHandlerUnitTest.cs:23 — Skipped — skipped

D10 · Test Quality · Test project verifies nothing · ×1

Test project verifies nothing: HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests src/HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests/UnitTest1.cs:8 — No conventional assertion call was detected in 1 of 1 tests in `HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests` — the project as a whole, not one method. Two things look like this: verification that happens indirectly (an approval/verifier harness or BDD step methods), or a suite that genuinely checks nothing. If it is the latter, this project passes unconditionally and cannot fail.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×1

Prerelease dependency: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design resolves to 2.2.0-preview3-35497, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/HRM.Domain/Validations/EmployeeValidation.cs:28 — src/HRM.Domain/Validations/EmployeeValidation.cs:28-33 | src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Validations/AuthValidation.cs:30-35 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AppIdentityDbContext.cs:17 — src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AppIdentityDbContext.cs:17-26 | src/HRM.Infra.Data/Context/EventSourcingContext.cs:24-33 | src/HRM.Infra.Data/Context/HRMContext.cs:21-28 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1

End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp2.2 REDACTED:4 — REDACTED declares .NET netcoreapp2.2 as this project's target framework, and .NET Core 2.2, support ended 2019-12-23. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2019-12-23 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.

D5 · Coupling · Unstable project HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC · ×1

Unstable project HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj:1 — HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC has instability 0.86 with 1 dependents.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.

DM7 · Repository granularity · Repository for a non-root entity · ×1

Repository for a non-root entity: IUserRepository → User src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs:10 — `IUserRepository` is a repository over `User`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `User` through its owning aggregate instead.

DM7 · Repository granularity · Repository contract exposes a live query handle · ×1

Repository contract exposes a live query handle: IRepository src/HRM.Domain/Interfaces/IRepository.cs:7 — `IRepository` returns `IQueryable` from `GetAll`. That hands the caller the persistence engine rather than an aggregate: query composition, and with it the shape of what gets loaded, moves out of the repository and out of the aggregate's reach — and the contract can no longer be implemented by anything that is not that ORM. Return the aggregate (or a list of them) from methods that name the question being asked.

ED5 · Idempotency · Non-idempotent mutation · ×1

Non-idempotent mutation: UseCaseHandlers.RegisterUserHandler.Handle src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/AuthHandlers/RegisterUserHandler.cs:40 — `UseCaseHandlers.RegisterUserHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.

P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1

No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · Token validation disabled · ×1

Token validation disabled REDACTED:22 — `ValidateAudience`, `ValidateIssuer`, `ValidateLifetime` are all set to `false`, which means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent.

SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1

NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.

Minor — 41 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×23

Outdated: AutoMapper REDACTED:8 — REDACTED → 16.2.0 available (referenced by HRM.Application).
Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection REDACTED:11 — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 6.0.0 → 12.0.1 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore REDACTED:12 — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 8.3.0 → 11.3.1 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection REDACTED:13 — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 6.0.1 → 11.1.0 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets REDACTED:16 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design REDACTED:17 — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design 2.2.0-preview3-35497 → 10.0.2 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore REDACTED:18 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 4.0.1 → 10.3.1 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: FluentValidation REDACTED:8 — FluentValidation 8.1.3 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by HRM.Domain).
Outdated: MediatR REDACTED:9 — MediatR 6.0.0 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by HRM.Domain.Core).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk REDACTED:10 — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 15.8.0 → 18.11.0 available (referenced by HRM.Domain.UnitTests).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization REDACTED:15 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore REDACTED:17 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design REDACTED:18 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 2.2.4 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer REDACTED:19 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 2.2.4 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools REDACTED:20 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 2.2.4 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration REDACTED:24 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions REDACTED:25 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json REDACTED:26 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens REDACTED:27 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 5.4.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt REDACTED:28 — REDACTED → 8.23.0 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj:8 — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 2.2.0 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore REDACTED:19 — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 2.2.4 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.Data).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVariables REDACTED:23 — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVariables 2.2.4 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.Data).

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids · Primitive id on a domain type · ×4

Primitive id on a domain type: RefreshToken.UserId src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/RefreshToken.cs:12 — `RefreshToken.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: User.IdentityId src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:14 — `User.IdentityId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: DomainNotification.DomainNotificationId src/HRM.Domain.Core/Notifications/DomainNotification.cs:10 — `DomainNotification.DomainNotificationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: DomainNotification.Key src/HRM.Domain.Core/Notifications/DomainNotification.cs:11 — `DomainNotification.Key` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×2

No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No security response headers detected src/HRM.WebApi/Program.cs:21 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.

X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×2

Duplicated predicate src/HRM.Domain.Core/Model/Entity.cs:29 — `ReferenceEquals(a, null) && ReferenceEquals(b, null)` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/HRM.Domain.Core/Model/Entity.cs, src/HRM.Domain.Core/Model/ValueObject.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate src/HRM.Domain.Core/Model/Entity.cs:32 — `ReferenceEquals(a, null) || ReferenceEquals(b, null)` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/HRM.Domain.Core/Model/Entity.cs, src/HRM.Domain.Core/Model/ValueObject.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.

C2 · Access Controls · Thin authorization enforcement · ×1

Thin authorization enforcement — Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

REDACTED

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/HRM.Infra.Data/Mappings/EmployeeMap.cs:11 — 1 of 228 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: HRM.Infra.Data.Mappings.EmployeeMap.Configure @ src/HRM.Infra.Data/Mappings/EmployeeMap.cs:11, 409 IL instructions; that pulled this dimension to 9.9/10. These bodies are far past the JIT's inline budget, so splitting them does not make them inlinable — what moves the number is emitting less: collapsing LINQ chains and closures on hot paths, and interpolation built eagerly where it is only sometimes used.

DM5 · Encapsulated state · Mutable entity · ×1

Mutable entity: Employee src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:8 — `Employee` exposes publicly writable state (Email).

ED3 · Event naming · Event not named in past tense · ×1

Event not named in past tense: DomainNotification src/HRM.Domain.Core/Notifications/DomainNotification.cs:8 — `DomainNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1

Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 0/17 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×1

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Auth/JwtTokenHandler.cs:41 — Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.

Minor — 18 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×8

Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App — REDACTED → 2.2.8 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Design 2.2.0 → 2.3.13 available (referenced by HRM.WebApi).
Outdated: System.ComponentModel.Annotations — System.ComponentModel.Annotations 4.5.0 → 5.0.0 available (referenced by HRM.Domain).
Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.4.0 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by HRM.Domain.UnitTests).
Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.4.0 → 4.0.1 available (referenced by HRM.Domain.UnitTests).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.2.0 → 2.3.13 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity).
Outdated: System.Reflection.TypeExtensions — System.Reflection.TypeExtensions 4.5.1 → 4.7.0 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.Data).
Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.10.1 → 4.21.0 available (referenced by HRM.Infra.IdentityUnitTests).

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×8

XML-doc coverage: HRM.Application REDACTED — HRM.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/34).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.WebApi REDACTED — HRM.WebApi: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/30).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.Domain src/HRM.Domain/HRM.Domain.csproj — HRM.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/112).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.Domain.Core REDACTED — HRM.Domain.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/52).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus.csproj — HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/4).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity REDACTED — HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity: 8 % XML-doc coverage (9/117).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj — HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
XML-doc coverage: HRM.Infra.Data REDACTED — HRM.Infra.Data: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/45).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2

Mock framework: Moq — HRM.Infra.IdentityUnitTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — HRM.Infrastructure.UnitTests references Moq.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-8f868dbe971e4e37baf7daccae86810b/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	2	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-8f868dbe971e4e37baf7daccae86810b/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	1	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	10	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list HRM.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	19	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).	0	—

Run 01a16130-a70d-7987-8349-490b2e3be942 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 29 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 12 field(s)

EmployeeViewModel.FirstName src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/EmployeeViewModel.cs:17
EmployeeViewModel.LastName src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/EmployeeViewModel.cs:23
RegisterUserViewModel.FirstName src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/RegisterUserViewModel.cs:9
RegisterUserViewModel.LastName src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/RegisterUserViewModel.cs:10
EmployeeCommand.FirstName src/HRM.Domain/Commands/EmployeeCommand.cs:29
EmployeeCommand.LastName src/HRM.Domain/Commands/EmployeeCommand.cs:31
User.FirstName src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:12
User.LastName src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:13
Person.FirstName src/HRM.Domain/SharedKernel/Person.cs:10
Person.LastName src/HRM.Domain/SharedKernel/Person.cs:12
AuthRequest.FirstName src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Requests/AuthRequest.cs:15
AuthRequest.LastName src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Requests/AuthRequest.cs:16

Email — 10 field(s)

EmployeeViewModel.Email src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/EmployeeViewModel.cs:28
LoginViewModel.Email src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/LoginViewModel.cs:12
RegisterUserViewModel.Email src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/RegisterUserViewModel.cs:11
EmployeeCommand.Email src/HRM.Domain/Commands/EmployeeCommand.cs:33
Employee.Email src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Employee.cs:22
User.Email src/HRM.Domain/Entities/Identity/User.cs:16
EmployeeRegisteredEvent.Email src/HRM.Domain/Events/EmployeeRegisteredEvent.cs:20
EmployeeUpdatedEvent.Email src/HRM.Domain/Events/EmployeeUpdatedEvent.cs:20
UserRegisteredEvent.Email src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Events/UserRegisteredEvent.cs:21
AuthRequest.Email src/HRM.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Requests/AuthRequest.cs:13

Date of birth — 5 field(s)

EmployeeViewModel.Dob src/HRM.Application/ViewModels/EmployeeViewModel.cs:34
EmployeeCommand.Dob src/HRM.Domain/Commands/EmployeeCommand.cs:37
EmployeeRegisteredEvent.BirthDate src/HRM.Domain/Events/EmployeeRegisteredEvent.cs:22
EmployeeUpdatedEvent.BirthDate src/HRM.Domain/Events/EmployeeUpdatedEvent.cs:22
Person.Dob src/HRM.Domain/SharedKernel/Person.cs:16

Address — 2 field(s)

EmployeeCommand.ZipCode src/HRM.Domain/Commands/EmployeeCommand.cs:25
Address.ZipCode src/HRM.Domain/SharedKernel/Address.cs:17

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate · gated by X4 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 64% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 23% · Critical · gated by D12, D13, P1, P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 30% · Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2, S1 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 49% · Weak · gated by DM2, DM7, DM11 ·

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts