Executive summary
AngelMunoz/Hox falls short of our standard for production, in part because we found no access checks on the code's endpoints or handlers. It scores 47 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and all 12 of its critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.
Security and Compliance, at 29, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding access checks, worth about 12 points. Recording design decisions comes next, worth about 5 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 70 would lift the score to about 59.
Eleven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. One secret can leak from the build pipeline. Pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting the secret to its own step would close both risks.
The product code is 2,858 lines, about €5,200 to rebuild.
If Security and Compliance rose from 29 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 47 to about 59.
Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding
- Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 2) src/Hox/Node.fs
Rebuild cost: about €5,200 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,700 to €8,600, for 29 to 90 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 47. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,858 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 Hox.Core | 2 Hox.Docs.Toc | 3 Hox.Docs.Toc.Decoders | 4 Hox.Markdown | 5 Hox.Markdown.Html | 6 Program | 7 src.Hox_Docs.assets | 8 Hox | 9 Hox.Docs | 10 Hox.Docs.Views | 11 Hox.Feliz.Engine | 12 Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr | 13 Hox.NodeOps | 14 Hox.NodeOps.Operators | 15 Hox.Parsers | 16 Hox.Rendering |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Hox.Core | ||||||||||||||||
| 2 Hox.Docs.Toc | ||||||||||||||||
| 3 Hox.Docs.Toc.Decoders | ||||||||||||||||
| 4 Hox.Markdown | ||||||||||||||||
| 5 Hox.Markdown.Html | ||||||||||||||||
| 6 Program | ||||||||||||||||
| 7 src.Hox_Docs.assets | ||||||||||||||||
| 8 Hox | 6 | |||||||||||||||
| 9 Hox.Docs | 1 | |||||||||||||||
| 10 Hox.Docs.Views | 1 | |||||||||||||||
| 11 Hox.Feliz.Engine | 2 | |||||||||||||||
| 12 Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr | 2 | |||||||||||||||
| 13 Hox.NodeOps | 3 | |||||||||||||||
| 14 Hox.NodeOps.Operators | 2 | |||||||||||||||
| 15 Hox.Parsers | 1 | |||||||||||||||
| 16 Hox.Rendering | 1 |
8→1 Hox uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in Hox uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.DeclarativeShadowDom→Hox.Core.NodeHox.NodeDsl→Hox.Core.AttributeNodeHox.NodeDsl→Hox.Core.NodeHox.NodeExtensions→Hox.Core.AttributeNodeHox.NodeExtensions→Hox.Core.NodeHox.ScopableElements→Hox.Core.Node
- Direction
- Hox uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox, while a change to Hox can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→2 Hox.Docs uses Hox.Docs.Toc✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Hox.Docs uses a type in Hox.Docs.Toc.
- The types involved
Hox.Docs.Layout→Hox.Docs.Toc.EntryMetadata
- Direction
- Hox.Docs uses Hox.Docs.Toc, so a change to Hox.Docs.Toc can break Hox.Docs, while a change to Hox.Docs can't break Hox.Docs.Toc.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.Docs uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→2 Hox.Docs.Views uses Hox.Docs.Toc✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Hox.Docs.Views uses a type in Hox.Docs.Toc.
- The types involved
Hox.Docs.Views.Views→Hox.Docs.Toc.EntryMetadata
- Direction
- Hox.Docs.Views uses Hox.Docs.Toc, so a change to Hox.Docs.Toc can break Hox.Docs.Views, while a change to Hox.Docs.Views can't break Hox.Docs.Toc.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.Docs.Views uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→1 Hox.Feliz.Engine uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in Hox.Feliz.Engine uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.Feliz.Engine.Engine→Hox.Core.HAttributeHox.Feliz.Engine.Engine→Hox.Core.Node
- Direction
- Hox.Feliz.Engine uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox.Feliz.Engine, while a change to Hox.Feliz.Engine can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.Feliz.Engine uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→1 Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr.Attr→Hox.Core.HAttributeHox.Feliz.Engine.Attr.Attr→Hox.Core.Node
- Direction
- Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr, while a change to Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.Feliz.Engine.Attr uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→1 Hox.NodeOps uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in Hox.NodeOps uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.NodeOps.NodeOps→Hox.Core.AttributeNodeHox.NodeOps.NodeOps→Hox.Core.ElementHox.NodeOps.NodeOps→Hox.Core.Node
- Direction
- Hox.NodeOps uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox.NodeOps, while a change to Hox.NodeOps can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.NodeOps uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→1 Hox.NodeOps.Operators uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in Hox.NodeOps.Operators uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.NodeOps.Operators.Operators→Hox.Core.AttributeNodeHox.NodeOps.Operators.Operators→Hox.Core.Node
- Direction
- Hox.NodeOps.Operators uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox.NodeOps.Operators, while a change to Hox.NodeOps.Operators can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.NodeOps.Operators uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→1 Hox.Parsers uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Hox.Parsers uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.Parsers.Parsers→Hox.Core.Element
- Direction
- Hox.Parsers uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox.Parsers, while a change to Hox.Parsers can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.Parsers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→1 Hox.Rendering uses Hox.Core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Hox.Rendering uses a type in Hox.Core.
- The types involved
Hox.Rendering.Render→Hox.Core.Node
- Direction
- Hox.Rendering uses Hox.Core, so a change to Hox.Core can break Hox.Rendering, while a change to Hox.Rendering can't break Hox.Core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Hox.Rendering uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 13 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 10 | Medium |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler; Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Hox.Docs.fsproj.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. | +11.7 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Hox.Docs.fsproj. | +5.2 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — start with REDACTED. | +4.0 pts | Low | Vulnerability-disclosure Policy |
| Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. | +7.6 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce. | +4.3 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +3.6 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with Hox.Tests.fsproj. | +1.5 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +1.5 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| src/Hox/DSL.fs | 7.0 | Mixed | God Classes: FileTooLong: Hox/DSL.fs |
| src/Hox/Rendering.fs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: Render.ToStream (cognitive 16) |
| src/Hox.Docs/Hox.Docs.fsproj | 8.0 | Near-clean | Code Coverage: No test project references Hox.Docs |
| samples/Server/Program.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| src/Hox.Feliz/Hox.Feliz.fsproj | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Coverage: No test project references Hox.Feliz |
| tests/Hox.Tests/Hox.Tests.fsproj | 8.5 | Near-clean | Dependency Hygiene: Deprecated: xunit |
| REDACTED | 9.3 | Near-clean | Vulnerability-disclosure Policy: REDACTED |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 44 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 1.0, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 37 of 62 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 155 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 1 hold 1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The C# workspace loaded this repository's projects but reported a load failure, and the dead-code reference search is unreliable over a graph that did not load cleanly, so it was skipped. The other debt markers on this row were read; dead symbols were not, and their absence from the score is not a finding that the code has none. First load diagnostic: Failure: Cannot open project 'src/Hox.Docs/Hox.Docs.fsproj' because the file extension '.fsproj' is not associated with a language.
- D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 0 deducted marker(s) and the 0.0/KLoC density on this row were taken over this repository's .NET projects ALONE: .fs (2,507 lines, 91% of production source) went unread, because every marker collector on this path is reached through a C# workspace. D17's marker collectors need a compiler we do not have for that language, so none of its nine marker kinds were read there. The debt in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the score above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code carries none.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being NodeOps.addToNode at 29 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 1 file carries no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of its over-threshold methods was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: src/Hox/DSL.fs (NodeOps.addToNode at 29). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Render.ToStream at 16.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Render.ToStream (cognitive 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.9 to about 10.0/10.
D3 · God Classes
1 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with DSL.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 · Code Duplication
9 duplicated block group(s) detected. 7.9 % of the production lines (223 of 2,836) are in a reported copy. 1 of the 9 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, project-template, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DSL.fs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (14 lines × 4) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DSL.fs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DSL.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
2 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D8 · Code Coverage
Line coverage 46.9%.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No test project references Hox.Docs finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with Hox.Docs.fsproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No test project references Hox.Feliz finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with Hox.Feliz.fsproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
8 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated, 1 prerelease packages.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with Hox.Tests.fsproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 116 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 15 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 99 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + unmeasured dead symbols across 234 LoC in the .NET projects (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Dead code not measured: the solution did not load cleanly, so the reference search was skipped. Measured on the .NET source only: .fs (91% of production source) was not read, and carries at least 0 uncounted task marker(s) in 0 file(s).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 3 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Hox.Docs.fsproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
94 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 3 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 12 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 11 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `samples/ServerCs/Program.cs` (lines 76–77, line 88, line 100) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 1 of those file(s) — `samples/ServerCs/Program.cs` — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 11 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 8 of the 9 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (REDACTED) is present but only routes reports to a public channel (no private reporting contact).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 10 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX5 · Architecture & structure
AX8 · Test isolation
C2 · Access Controls
- No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
- `MapGet("/")` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:10
- `MapGet("/string")` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:21
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
- No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page — but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.
What to do
- Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:12
- `samples/Falco/ServerF.fsproj` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — samples/Falco/ServerF.fsproj:13
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. — samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:6
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
- This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. — samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:6
- No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
- Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
X5 · Nullable reference types
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 95% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 97% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 60% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 45% | Weak — gated by P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 29% | Weak — gated by D36, C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — ~2456 lines of test source are present (.fs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .fs, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read Visual Basic yet; not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (2,836 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .fs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (3 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 3 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 1 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (command argument 1); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HttpClient/IHttpClientFactory/AddHttpClient in source, and no Refit/RestSharp/Flurl.Http namespace or package reference
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 4 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async method does work a token could cancel
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — X24 reached only 4% of this repository's production lines — fsharp (2,602 lines), vbnet (150 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X4 Structured logging — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 12 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 25 finding(s)
- No authorization
- No authorization samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:10
- No authorization samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:21
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Hox/DSL.fs:200
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Hox/DSL.fs:553
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Hox/DSL.fs:639
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 4) src/Hox/DSL.fs:551
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 4) src/Hox/DSL.fs:569
- Deprecated: xunit tests/Hox.Tests/Hox.Tests.fsproj:18
- Prerelease dependency: Feliz.Engine
- Render.ToStream (cognitive 16) src/Hox/Rendering.fs:547
- REDACTED
- FileTooLong: Hox/DSL.fs src/Hox/DSL.fs
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) src/Hox/DSL.fs:589
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/Hox/DSL.fs:359
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Hox/Rendering.fs:573
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) samples/Server/Program.fs:131
- No test project references Hox.Docs src/Hox.Docs/Hox.Docs.fsproj
- No test project references Hox.Feliz src/Hox.Feliz/Hox.Feliz.fsproj
- No structured logging
- NuGet dependencies are not locked
Minor — 17 finding(s)
- No security response headers detected
- No security response headers detected samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:6
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected samples/ServerCs/Program.cs:6
- No ADRs found src/Hox.Docs/Hox.Docs.fsproj:3
- Scattered collaborators
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No SAST REDACTED:12
- No dependency-update automation samples/Falco/ServerF.fsproj:13
- No inbound model validation detected
Minor — 8 finding(s)
- Outdated: FSharp.Core
- Outdated: Markdig
- Outdated: Ionide.KeepAChangelog.Tasks
- Outdated: coverlet.collector
- Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk
- Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio
- Outdated: Falco
- Outdated: Giraffe
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-230ab025da01435799ce37db5e14fd32/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-230ab025da01435799ce37db5e14fd32/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 13 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list Hox.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 0 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-513f9554494c4881a9bc626acd116937 | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |