Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
AntonioFalcaoJr/EventualShop carries serious risk (35%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (21%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (40%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture).
For scale: Medium (~24,743 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Code Health
79%
Strong
Architecture
82%
Strong
Maturity
40%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
42%
Weak · gated by D8, D12, P5
Security
21% ⚠
Critical · gated by D31, C1, C2
Domain Modelling
71%
Adequate · gated by DM2
Accessibility
48%
Weak · gated by AC4
Performance
73%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 21% · 45% weightMaturity 40% · 25% weightReadiness 42% · 14% weightAccessibility 48% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 71% · 4% weightPerformance 73% · 2% weightCode Health 79% · 1% weightArchitecture 82% · 1% weight
Raise Security 21 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~47.
Code composition — where the lines go
Plumbing-heavy — business logic is 3% of hand-written app code; most lines are wiring, declarations and straight-line glue. Fine for an integration/CRUD service; worth a look if this is meant to be logic-rich.
Business logic 3%Plumbing 81%Tests 1%Generated 15%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,600–€37,000
| Cost to rebuild | €7,600–€37,000 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 35% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · 51% boilerplate · 45% straight-line · 3% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€22,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 21% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
2
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
3
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 21%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain
49 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.
Improving trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+8.6 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Trajectory
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityDomain ModellingAccessibilityPerformance
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
9.7
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
9.7
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
9.9
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
X5 · Repo
Nullable reference types
9.9
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
9.7
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
9.8
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
7.4
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX7 · Repo
Slice cohesion
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
The Ugly
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
D9 · .NET / C#
Test Distribution
10.0
D10 · .NET / C#
Test Quality
10.0
D11 · .NET / C#
Test Reliability
10.0
D13 · .NET / C#
Secret Scanning
10.0
D14 · .NET / C#
License Compliance
10.0
P1 · Repo
CI/CD gates
10.0
P3 · Repo
Security & performance tooling
7.0
P7 · Repo
Outbound HTTP resilience
10.0
P8 · Repo
Schema migrations
10.0
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Accessibility
The Good
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 39 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, encrypt sensitive data at rest and manage keys in a vault, skipping only if infrastructure handles this. Next, protect all endpoints with default-deny access controls using authorization attributes or imperative guards. Then, add security response headers like Content-Security-Policy to strengthen the web-security posture. Finally, resolve the 20 high-priority and 18 low-priority findings in IaC and container security, starting with the Dockerfile.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). | +12.2 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
| Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. | +12.2 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. | +11.9 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +3.0 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 20 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (20). | +6.1 pts | Medium | IaC & Container Security |
| Resolve the 1 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.Development.json. | +3.0 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. | +3.0 pts | Low | IaC & Container Security |
| Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +2.9 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile | 4.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: DS-0010 |
| src/Services/Account/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Account/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Catalog/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Catalog/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Communication/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Communication/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Identity/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Identity/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Order/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Order/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Payment/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Payment/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Warehouse/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Warehouse/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Web/WebAPP/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/CreditCards/CreditCardPaymentService.cs | 6.9 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/PayPals/PayPalPaymentService.cs | 6.9 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 70 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX7AX8C1C2C5DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8P9PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 165 of 239 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — absence of evidence here means the scan found no in-repo trace, not that the control does not exist.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
15 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Accounts/AccountApi.cs:12
Duplicated block (8 lines × 8) src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/EventStoreGateway.cs:23
Duplicated block (18 lines × 8)src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/Contexts/Configurations/StoreEventConfiguration.cs:16
Duplicated block (17 lines × 16)src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/PipeFilters/ContractValidatorFilter.cs:20
Duplicated block (17 lines × 8)src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/Contexts/Configurations/SnapshotConfiguration.cs:15
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D5 · Coupling
17 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
Off the main sequence: Contracts
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
2 of 85 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
Low cohesion: ShoppingCartGrpcService (LCOM4 6) src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/GrpcService/ShoppingCartGrpcService.cs:10
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D8 · Code Coverage
Line coverage 3.8%, branch coverage 1.1%.
What to do
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
11 test methods: 11 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 11 tests.
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D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
56 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 5 deprecated packages.
Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: coverlet.collector
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 7 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
12 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/ShoppingCarts/ShoppingCartApi.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D17 · Explicit Debt
29 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 21527 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.7.
TodoComment src/Contracts/Enumerations/Gender.cs:5
CommentedOutCode src/Contracts/Services/ShoppingCart/Validators/AddCartItemValidator.cs:7
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D18 · Solution Shape
81 projects, 965 .cs files, 21860 hand-written lines of code (21527 production / 333 test), plus 4398 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 44 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The README is a single page with an unhelpful header and a command-stack/query-stack table linking to CI workflows but no content describing the application's purpose, architecture, or running instructions. The visible portion is thin and does not cover any of the outlined sections (About, Solution Architecture, Research, Running, Tech Stack), so it cannot be trusted as documentation for the project.
XML-doc coverage: WebAPI src/Web/WebAPI/WebAPI.csproj
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 3.0/10. — The README is a single page with an unhelpful header and a command-stack/query-stack table linking to CI workflows but no content describing the application's purpose, architecture, or running instructions. The visible portion is thin and does not cover any of the outlined sections (About, Solution Architecture, Research, Running, Tech Stack), so it cannot be trusted as documentation for the project.
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
1 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Inconsistent naming for account-related domain events. Some events use the past tense for completed actions (AccountDeleted, AccountDeactivated), while others use the present participle or noun phrase for state changes (BillingAddressPreferred, ShippingAddressAdded).
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D24 · Comment Value
5 valuable / 0 redundant across 48 sampled comments.
What to do
- Improve Comment Value — currently 3.0/10. — 5 valuable / 0 redundant across 48 sampled comments.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
1 of 81 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split Contracts
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D27 · Navigability
93 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 74 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
- Improve Navigability — currently 7.4/10. — 93 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 74 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-keysrc/Web/WebAPI/ECommerce.WebAPI/appsettings.Development.json:10
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
39 finding(s): 1 critical, 20 high, 0 medium, 18 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Account/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
Critical IaC: DS-0010src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Account/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 20 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (20). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
- Resolve the 18 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (18). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
81 of 81 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Web/WebAPI/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs.
Dormant codebase
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: SwaggerExtensions.cs↔Program.cs 57%
Change coupling: SwaggerExtensions.cs ↔ Program.cssrc/Web/WebAPI/DependencyInjection/Extensions/SwaggerExtensions.cs
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
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AC2 · Forms & labels
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AC3 · Page structure
- user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — index.html:6
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — index.html:30
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
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AC5 · ARIA correctness
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — bootstrap.css:0
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
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AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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AX7 · Slice cohesion
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AX8 · Test isolation
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C1 · Data Protection
- No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
- Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
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C2 · Access Controls
- No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
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C5 · Data-Subject Rights
- Corroborated rights: erasure ✓ · export ✗ · consent ✗. The missing right(s) would have to be fulfilled manually.
What to do
- Implement data export/portability for a data subject (a machine-readable export of their personal data).
- Track GDPR consent (lawful basis) alongside the personal data it authorises.
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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `AccountDeleted.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:8
- `BillingAddressDeleted.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:10
- `BillingAddressDeleted.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:10
- `ShippingAddressDeleted.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:12
- `ShippingAddressDeleted.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:12
- `AccountDeactivated.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:14
- `AccountCreated.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:16
- `AccountActivated.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:18
- `BillingAddressAdded.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:20
- `BillingAddressAdded.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:20
- `BillingAddressRestored.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:22
- `BillingAddressRestored.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:22
- `ShippingAddressAdded.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:24
- `ShippingAddressAdded.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:24
- `ShippingAddressRestored.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:26
- `ShippingAddressRestored.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:26
- `BillingAddressPreferred.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:28
- `BillingAddressPreferred.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:28
- `ShippingAddressPreferred.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:30
- `ShippingAddressPreferred.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:30
- `PrimaryBillingAddressRemoved.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:32
- `PrimaryBillingAddressRemoved.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:32
- `PrimaryShippingAddressRemoved.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:34
- `PrimaryShippingAddressRemoved.AddressId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AddressId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:34
- `CatalogCreated.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:8
- `CatalogDeleted.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:10
- `CatalogActivated.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:12
- `CatalogDeactivated.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:14
- `CatalogTitleChanged.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:16
- `CatalogDescriptionChanged.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:18
- `CatalogItemAdded.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:20
- `CatalogItemAdded.ItemId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ItemId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:20
- `CatalogItemAdded.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct InventoryId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:20
- `CatalogItemRemoved.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:22
- `CatalogItemRemoved.ItemId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ItemId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:22
- `CatalogItemIncreased.CatalogId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CatalogId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:24
- `CatalogItemIncreased.ItemId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ItemId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:24
- `CatalogItemIncreased.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct InventoryId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:24
- `NotificationRequested.NotificationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct NotificationId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:8
- `NotificationMethodFailed.NotificationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct NotificationId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:10
- 98 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 138.
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `User` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — User.cs:10
- `Notification` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Notification.cs:10
- `Account` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Account.cs:11
- `Order` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Order.cs:14
- `OrderItem` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OrderItem.cs:7
- `PaymentMethod` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. (×2) — PaymentMethod.cs:11, PaymentMethod.cs:11
- `ShoppingCart` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — ShoppingCart.cs:17
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
- A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×9) — NotificationMethod.cs:39, EmailGateway.cs:26, PaymentMethod.cs:29, …
What to do
- Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `PostConsume` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. (×14) — LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:17, LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:17, LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:17, …
- `ConsumeFault` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. (×14) — LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:21, LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:21, LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:21, …
- `ConfigureEventReceiveEndpoints` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — RabbitMqBusFactoryConfiguratorExtensions.cs:8
- `CancelAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmailGateway.cs:25
What to do
- Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 81 of 81 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Only 35/81 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
- Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists
- README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists; README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P2 · Observability
- Only 44/77 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
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P8 · Schema migrations
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P9 · Domain vs controller coverage
- Domain coverage is 49% — the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.
What to do
- Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.
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PF1 · Benchmark discipline
- No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
- Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
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PF2 · Allocation hygiene
What to do
- Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 99 use(s) across 44,919 production line(s) (~2.2/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
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S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
- Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 144/335 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×13) — ApplicationApi.cs:15, LoggingConsumeObserver.cs:8, LoggingReceiveObserver.cs:10, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 79% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 82% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 40% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 42% | Weak — gated by D8, D12, P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 21% | Critical — gated by D31, C1, C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 71% | Adequate — gated by DM2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 48% | Weak — gated by AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 73% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 28 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 81 event handler(s); a message-bus package
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 16 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds; 23 projection(s)
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
- X8 JS interop contract — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 25 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Account/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Account/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Catalog/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Catalog/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Communication/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Communication/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Identity/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Identity/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Order/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Order/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Payment/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Payment/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Warehouse/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Warehouse/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0016 src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/Web/WebAPP/Dockerfile
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
- Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Jaeger
- Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key src/Web/WebAPI/ECommerce.WebAPI/appsettings.Development.json:10
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Critical IaC: DS-0010 src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile
Warning — 53 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt
- TodoComment src/Contracts/Enumerations/Gender.cs:5
- TodoComment src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Aggregates/Account.cs:16
- TodoComment src/Services/Account/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Catalog/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Communication/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Order/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Warehouse/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/DependencyInjection/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:67
- TodoComment src/Services/Catalog/Command/Domain/Entities/CatalogItems/CatalogItem.cs:25
- TodoComment src/Services/Catalog/Query/Application/UseCases/Events/ProjectCatalogGridItemWhenCatalogChangedInteractor.cs:37
- TodoComment src/Services/Communication/Command/Application/Abstractions/Gateways/NotificationService.cs:50
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/CreditCards/CreditCardPaymentService.cs:23
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/CreditCards/CreditCardPaymentService.cs:31
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/CreditCards/CreditCardPaymentService.cs:39
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/PayPals/PayPalPaymentService.cs:25
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/PayPals/PayPalPaymentService.cs:33
- TodoComment src/Services/Payment/Command/Infrastructure.HTTP/PayPals/PayPalPaymentService.cs:41
- TodoComment src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/Application/UseCases/Events/ProjectPaymentMethodListItemWhenCartChangedInteractor.cs:27
- TodoComment src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/Application/UseCases/Events/ProjectPaymentMethodListItemWhenCartChangedInteractor.cs:40
- TodoComment src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/Application/UseCases/Events/ProjectPaymentMethodListItemWhenCartChangedInteractor.cs:53
- TodoComment src/Services/Warehouse/Command/Application/UseCases/Events/ReserveInventoryItemWhenCartItemAddedInteractor.cs:26
- TodoComment src/Services/Warehouse/Query/Application/UseCases/Events/ProjectInventoryItemListItemWhenInventoryItemChangedInteractor.cs:26
- TodoComment src/Web/WebAPI/Program.cs:74
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Deprecated: xunit
- Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore
- Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
- Deprecated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Jaeger
- Deprecated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Accounts/AccountApi.cs:12
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/IdentityApi.cs:12
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Payments/PaymentApi.cs:12
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Warehouses/WarehouseApi.cs:12
D17 · Explicit Debt
- CommentedOutCode src/Contracts/Services/ShoppingCart/Validators/AddCartItemValidator.cs:7
- CommentedOutCode src/Services/Warehouse/Command/Domain/Entities/InventoryItems/InventoryItem.cs:61
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 8) src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/EventStoreGateway.cs:23
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 8) src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/PipeFilters/BusinessValidatorFilter.cs:12
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
- Low cohesion: ShoppingCartGrpcService (LCOM4 6) src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/GrpcService/ShoppingCartGrpcService.cs:10
- Low cohesion: CatalogGrpcService (LCOM4 4) src/Services/Catalog/Query/GrpcService/CatalogGrpcService.cs:10
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: SwaggerExtensions.cs ↔ Program.cs src/Web/WebAPI/DependencyInjection/Extensions/SwaggerExtensions.cs
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (18 lines × 8) src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/Contexts/Configurations/StoreEventConfiguration.cs:16
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 16) src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/PipeFilters/ContractValidatorFilter.cs:20
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 8) src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/Contexts/Configurations/SnapshotConfiguration.cs:15
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 5) src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Validators/AddressValidator.cs:10
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) src/Services/Order/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/PaymentOptions/CreditCards/CreditCardValidator.cs:10
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Validators/CreditCardValidator.cs:8
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Warehouses/Validators/ReceiveInventoryItemValidator.cs:9
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) src/Services/Order/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/Currency.cs:22
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Communications/CommunicationApi.cs:13
D5 · Coupling
- Off the main sequence: Contracts
Recommendation — 26 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Account/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Account/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Communication/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Communication/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Identity/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Identity/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Payment/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Payment/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/ShoppingCart/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Warehouse/Command/WorkerService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Warehouse/Query/GrpcService/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Web/WebAPI/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Web/WebAPP/Dockerfile
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Inconsistent naming for account-related domain events. Some events use the past tense for completed actions (AccountDeleted, AccountDeactivated), while others use the present participle or noun phrase for state changes (BillingAddressPreferred, ShippingAddressAdded).
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D26 · Project Cohesion
- Split Contracts
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Dormant codebase
Info — 135 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: WebAPI src/Web/WebAPI/WebAPI.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: WebAPP src/Web/WebAPP/WebAPP.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Contracts src/Contracts/Contracts.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Application src/Services/Identity/Command/Application/Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.EventStore src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/Infrastructure.EventStore.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: WorkerService src/Services/Identity/Command/WorkerService/WorkerService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Domain src/Services/Identity/Command/Domain/Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: GrpcService src/Services/Identity/Query/GrpcService/GrpcService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.Authentication src/Services/Identity/Query/Infrastructure.Authentication/Infrastructure.Authentication.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.Projections src/Services/Identity/Query/Infrastructure.Projections/Infrastructure.Projections.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Application src/Services/Identity/Query/Application/Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.MessageBus src/Services/Identity/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/Infrastructure.MessageBus.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Application src/Services/Communication/Command/Application/Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Domain src/Services/Communication/Command/Domain/Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.EventStore src/Services/Communication/Command/Infrastructure.EventStore/Infrastructure.EventStore.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.MessageBus src/Services/Communication/Command/Infrastructure.MessageBus/Infrastructure.MessageBus.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: WorkerService src/Services/Communication/Command/WorkerService/WorkerService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.SMTP src/Services/Communication/Command/Infrastructure.SMTP/Infrastructure.SMTP.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Application src/Services/Account/Command/Application/Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Domain src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Application src/Services/Account/Query/Application/Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: GrpcService src/Services/Account/Query/GrpcService/GrpcService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.EventBus src/Services/Account/Query/Infrastructure.EventBus/Infrastructure.EventBus.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure.Projections src/Services/Account/Query/Infrastructure.Projections/Infrastructure.Projections.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: WorkerService src/Services/Account/Command/WorkerService/WorkerService.csproj
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: coverlet.collector
- Outdated: MassTransit
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting
- Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk
- Outdated: xunit
- Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio
- Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Http
- Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer
- Outdated: FluentValidation
- Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore
- Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.ClientFactory
- Outdated: Grpc.Net.Client
- Outdated: Grpc.Net.ClientFactory
- Outdated: MassTransit.Newtonsoft
- Outdated: MassTransit.RabbitMQ
- Outdated: MicroElements.Swashbuckle.FluentValidation
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson
- Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json
- Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore
- Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch
- Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore
- Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Newtonsoft
- Outdated: BlazorStrap.V5
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 39 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 30 field(s)
- PayPal.Email src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:69
- Profile.Email src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:131
- CreateAccount.Email src/Contracts/Services/Account/Command.cs:8
- AccountCreated.Email src/Contracts/Services/Account/DomainEvent.cs:16
- AccountDetails.Email src/Contracts/Services/Account/Projection.cs:8
- ChangeEmail.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:7
- ConfirmEmail.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:9
- ExpiryEmail.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:11
- RegisterUser.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:13
- DefinePrimaryEmail.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:17
- EmailConfirmationExpired.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DelayedEvent.cs:7
- UserRegistered.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:9
- EmailChanged.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:11
- EmailConfirmed.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:15
- EmailExpired.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:17
- PrimaryEmailDefined.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:19
- UserDetails.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Projection.cs:8
- Login.Email src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Query.cs:8
- Profile.Email src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Entities/Profiles/Profile.cs:27
- NotificationService._emailGateway src/Services/Communication/Command/Application/Abstractions/Gateways/NotificationService.cs:10
- User._emails src/Services/Identity/Command/Domain/Aggregates/User.cs:13
- User.PrimaryEmail src/Services/Identity/Command/Domain/Aggregates/User.cs:18
- User.Emails src/Services/Identity/Command/Domain/Aggregates/User.cs:20
- PayPal.Email src/Services/Order/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/PaymentOptions/PayPals/PayPal.cs:5
- PayPal.Email src/Services/Payment/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/PaymentOptions/PayPals/PayPal.cs:5
- PayPal.Email src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/PaymentOptions/PayPals/PayPal.cs:5
- ChangeEmail.Email src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/Commands.cs:17
- ConfirmEmail.Email src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/Commands.cs:29
- SignUp.Email src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/Payloads.cs:5
- SignIn.Email src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/Queries.cs:9
Name — 20 field(s)
- Profile.FirstName src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:131
- Profile.LastName src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:131
- CreateAccount.FirstName src/Contracts/Services/Account/Command.cs:8
- CreateAccount.LastName src/Contracts/Services/Account/Command.cs:8
- AccountCreated.FirstName src/Contracts/Services/Account/DomainEvent.cs:16
- AccountCreated.LastName src/Contracts/Services/Account/DomainEvent.cs:16
- AccountDetails.FirstName src/Contracts/Services/Account/Projection.cs:8
- AccountDetails.LastName src/Contracts/Services/Account/Projection.cs:8
- RegisterUser.FirstName src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:13
- RegisterUser.LastName src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Command.cs:13
- UserRegistered.FirstName src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:9
- UserRegistered.LastName src/Contracts/Services/Identity/DomainEvent.cs:9
- UserDetails.FirstName src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Projection.cs:8
- UserDetails.LastName src/Contracts/Services/Identity/Projection.cs:8
- Profile.FirstName src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Entities/Profiles/Profile.cs:28
- Profile.LastName src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Entities/Profiles/Profile.cs:29
- User.FirstName src/Services/Identity/Command/Domain/Aggregates/User.cs:15
- User.LastName src/Services/Identity/Command/Domain/Aggregates/User.cs:16
- SignUp.FirstName src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/Payloads.cs:5
- SignUp.LastName src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/Identities/Payloads.cs:5
Address — 15 field(s)
- Address.ZipCode src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:22
- ShoppingCart.BillingAddress src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:133
- PlaceOrder.BillingAddress src/Contracts/Services/Order/Command.cs:8
- OrderPlaced.BillingAddress src/Contracts/Services/Order/DomainEvent.cs:8
- OrderDetails.BillingAddress src/Contracts/Services/Order/Projection.cs:8
- RequestPayment.BillingAddress src/Contracts/Services/Payment/Command.cs:8
- PaymentRequested.BillingAddress src/Contracts/Services/Payment/DomainEvent.cs:8
- Account.PrimaryBillingAddress src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Aggregates/Account.cs:22
- Address.ZipCode src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Entities/Addresses/Address.cs:22
- Order.BillingAddress src/Services/Order/Command/Domain/Aggregates/Order.cs:24
- Address.ZipCode src/Services/Order/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/Addresses/Address.cs:5
- Payment.BillingAddress src/Services/Payment/Command/Domain/Aggregates/Payment.cs:21
- Address.ZipCode src/Services/Payment/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/Addresses/Address.cs:5
- ShoppingCart.BillingAddress src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/Domain/Aggregates/ShoppingCart.cs:27
- Address.ZipCode src/Services/ShoppingCart/Command/Domain/ValueObjects/Addresses/Address.cs:5
Financial (card / IBAN) — 4 field(s)
- CreditCardAdded.CreditCard src/Contracts/Services/Payment/DomainEvent.cs:28
- AddCreditCard.CreditCard src/Contracts/Services/ShoppingCart/Command.cs:10
- CreditCardAdded.CreditCard src/Contracts/Services/ShoppingCart/DomainEvent.cs:26
- AddCreditCardPayload.CreditCard src/Web/WebAPI/APIs/ShoppingCarts/Payloads.cs:9
Date of birth — 2 field(s)
- Profile.Birthdate src/Contracts/DataTransferObjects/Dto.cs:131
- Profile.Birthdate src/Services/Account/Command/Domain/Entities/Profiles/Profile.cs:26
Phone — 1 field(s)
- NotificationService._pushMobileGateway src/Services/Communication/Command/Application/Abstractions/Gateways/NotificationService.cs:12