Public report — blazor-ecommerce, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 17:32 UTC Public

Small · 6,501 LoC · 10 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (32%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

57/60dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
28findings with an exact file:lineof 83 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
60/97dimensions across the health lenses6501 LoC · 10 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

Atharva-System/blazor-ecommerce carries serious risk (43%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (88%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (87%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (38%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience).

For scale: Small (~6,501 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 32% · 46% weightAccessibility 38% · 25% weightMaturity 57% · 14% weightSecurity 58% · 8% weightCode Health 87% · 4% weightArchitecture 88% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 43 → ~51.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 13%Plumbing 59%Generated 29%
New since the last scan (2+)

2 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D30 · Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,500–€12,000
Cost to rebuild€2,500–€12,000 (0.1 person-years (42–131 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 43% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 37% boilerplate · 45% straight-line · 18% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+10.2 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+7.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.
+7.5 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (6,501 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 32%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch BlazorEcommerce.Application Application BlazorEcommerce.Domain Domain BlazorEcommerce.Application->BlazorEcommerce.Domain BlazorEcommerce.Shared Shared BlazorEcommerce.Application->BlazorEcommerce.Shared BlazorEcommerce.Client Client BlazorEcommerce.Client->BlazorEcommerce.Shared BlazorEcommerce.Identity Identity BlazorEcommerce.Identity->BlazorEcommerce.Application BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure Infrastructure BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure->BlazorEcommerce.Application BlazorEcommerce.Persistence Persistence BlazorEcommerce.Persistence->BlazorEcommerce.Application BlazorEcommerce.Server Server BlazorEcommerce.Server->BlazorEcommerce.Application BlazorEcommerce.Server->BlazorEcommerce.Client BlazorEcommerce.Server->BlazorEcommerce.Identity BlazorEcommerce.Server->BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure BlazorEcommerce.Server->BlazorEcommerce.Persistence BlazorEcommerce.Server->BlazorEcommerce.Shared

Architecture — module dependency matrix

92 modules, 149 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…Repositories.Commands…merce.Domain.EntitiesBlazorEcommerce.Shared…Ecommerce.Shared.Cart…merce.Shared.Category…red.Response.Abstract…Ecommerce.Shared.User…on.Contracts.Identity…ion.Contracts.Payment….Repositories.Queries…merce.Server.Contexts…mmerce.Shared.Product…red.Response.Concrete…pplication.UnitOfWork….Services.AuthService…erce.Identity.Service…rvices.PaymentService…itories.Commands.Base…sitories.Queries.Base…ce.Server.Controllers…ss.Command.AddAddress…ress.Query.GetAddress…rt.Commands.AddToCart…ds.RemoveItemFromCart…mmands.StoreCartItems…mmands.UpdateQuantity…ery.GetCartItemsCount…Query.GetCartProducts…ery.GetDbCartProducts….Commands.AddCategory…mmands.UpdateCategory…er.Command.PlaceOrder….Order.Query.GetOrder…Query.GetOrderDetails…Command.CreateProduct…Command.UpdateProduct….Query.GetProductById…Repositories.Commands….Repositories.Queries…ersistence.UnitOfWork…Repositories.Commands1…merce.Domain.Entities2BlazorEcommerce.Shared3…Ecommerce.Shared.Cart4…merce.Shared.Category5…red.Response.Abstract6…Ecommerce.Shared.User7…on.Contracts.Identity8…ion.Contracts.Payment9….Repositories.Queries10…merce.Server.Contexts11…mmerce.Shared.Product12…red.Response.Concrete13…pplication.UnitOfWork14….Services.AuthService15…erce.Identity.Service16…rvices.PaymentService17…itories.Commands.Base18…sitories.Queries.Base19…ce.Server.Controllers20…ss.Command.AddAddress21…ress.Query.GetAddress22…rt.Commands.AddToCart23…ds.RemoveItemFromCart24…mmands.StoreCartItems25…mmands.UpdateQuantity26…ery.GetCartItemsCount27…Query.GetCartProducts28…ery.GetDbCartProducts29….Commands.AddCategory30…mmands.UpdateCategory31…er.Command.PlaceOrder32….Order.Query.GetOrder33…Query.GetOrderDetails34…Command.CreateProduct35…Command.UpdateProduct36….Query.GetProductById37…Repositories.Commands38….Repositories.Queries39…ersistence.UnitOfWork402411291119942242111111211942111112121111211211111112111111111111124111211111111111211199929999192299+52 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 87% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 88% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 57% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 32% · Weak · gated by D9, P3, P7

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D28, D30

At a glance — Accessibility · 38% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components13High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures9High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, address the single missing test and three deprecated dependencies to establish a baseline of quality and safety. Next, integrate a security analysis step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on new vulnerabilities. Then, implement HTTP resilience policies to protect the application from external service failures. Finally, improve observability by extending structured logging and adding diagnostic seams to libraries for better runtime insights.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+10.2 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+7.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.+7.5 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+10.2 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+10.2 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+9.5 ptsMediumObservability
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.+7.5 ptsMediumText alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+7.5 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 11 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 9% slop · 36% mixed · 55% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/Presentation/Server/appsettings.json3.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
src/Server/Services/PaymentService/PaymentService.cs4.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/dotnet.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs7.2MixedCyclomatic Complexity: QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cyclomatic 16)
src/BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure/Service/PaymentService.cs7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: stripe-access-token
src/BlazorEcommerce.Application/Features/Address/Query/GetAddress/GetAddressQueryHandler.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: GetAddressQueryHandler.Handle (cognitive 17)
src/Presentation/Client/Services/CategoryService/CategoryService.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
tests/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests
tests/BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests/BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests
src/Presentation/Server/Program.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/DataSeed/ProductVariantSeed.cs9.5Near-cleanIL Efficiency: IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 57 of 60 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 60 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D39AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX9C1C2ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 28 of 83 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8af-3522-7748-96aa-ec9f1c6d877b.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync at 16.

QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cyclomatic 16)src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:50

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync at 48.

QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 48)src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:50
QueryRepository.GetWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 36)src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:170
GetAddressQueryHandler.Handle (cognitive 17)src/BlazorEcommerce.Application/Features/Address/Query/GetAddress/GetAddressQueryHandler.cs:23

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 48) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with QueryRepository.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 QueryRepository.GetWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 36) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with QueryRepository.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 GetAddressQueryHandler.Handle (cognitive 17) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with GetAddressQueryHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:119
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)src/Presentation/Client/Services/CategoryService/CategoryService.cs:21

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: BlazorEcommerce.Shared

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 21 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

26 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 3 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: Blazored.LocalStorage · ×3
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Server · ×26

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keysrc/Presentation/Server/appsettings.json:12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 28 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 4967 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 192 source files, 4967 hand-written lines of code (4967 production / 0 test), plus 2601 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 19 inter-project edges.

Shell project: BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests · ×2tests/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests.csproj, BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The README for the main E-Commerce app is clear and complete with a table of contents listing Technologies, Architecture Overview, Why Blazor WebAssembly?, Blazor WebAssembly vs Blazor Server/, Clean architecture with Blazor WebAssembly/, Diagrams, Features, Installation, Getting Started, Deployment, Contributing, and License. It also documents Open Iconic as an open-source icon library (223 icons, 61.8 kB total) with usage examples for SVG sprite and standalone use, plus links to the reference sections. However, the document is clipped mid-Technologies section by the scanner, so the full outline is visible but not every detail in the middle of the body can be confirmed.

XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Server · ×8src/Presentation/Server/BlazorEcommerce.Server.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The README for the main E-Commerce app is clear and complete with a table of contents listing Technologies, Architecture Overview, Why Blazor WebAssembly?, Blazor WebAssembly vs Blazor Server/, Clean architecture with Blazor WebAssembly/, Diagrams, Features, Installation, Getting Started, Deployment, Contributing, and License. It also documents Open Iconic as an open-source icon library (223 icons, 61.8 kB total) with usage examples for SVG sprite and standalone use, plus links to the reference sections. However, the document is clipped mid-Technologies section by the scanner, so the full outline is visible but not every detail in the middle of the body can be confirmed.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent use of the letter 'i' in the word 'Profiles' within the namespace 'BlazorEcommerce.Application.MappingProfıles'. The namespace uses a Cyrillic 'і' (U+0456) instead of the Latin 'i' (U+0069). This is a critical inconsistency as it breaks the namespace path and likely causes compilation errors or reflection issues.
Typo in the query handler name: 'GetOrderDeatils' (missing 'a' in Details) compared to the repository method 'GetOrderDetails'. The handler name contains a typo.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent use of the letter 'i' in the word 'Profiles' within the… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Typo in the query handler name finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 valuable / 1 redundant across 7 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsrc/Presentation/Server/Program.cs:59

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

96 % of calls cross a namespace and 36 % go through an interface, but 94 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

High interface indirection

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High interface indirection finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: stripe-access-token · ×7src/BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure/Service/PaymentService.cs:34detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with PaymentService.cs (5), appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×2.github/workflows/dotnet.yml:18detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dotnet.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities2.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 6 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.0 · ×6detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 · ×5detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 of 22 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/DataSeed/ProductSeed.cs.

Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 558 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/DataSeed/ProductVariantSeed.cs:10

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives2.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×6) — EditProduct.razor:38, Products.razor:35, Cart.razor:23, …

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×4) — Cart.razor:28, ProductDetails.razor:33, CultureSelector.razor:1, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure5.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×6) — App.razor:7, Cart.razor:26, OrderDetails.razor:21, …
  • user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. (×2) — index.html:6, Error.cshtml:9
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — Error.cshtml:5

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — NavMenu.razor:12, ShopNavMenu.razor:12

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IProductService` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IProductService.cs:3

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX9 · CQS / query purity9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

  • `StoreCartItems.StoreCartItemsCommandHandler` is a read (query) handler but its body writes persistent state — a query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica. — StoreCartItemsCommandHandler.cs:8
  • `PlaceOrder.PlaceOrderCommandHandler` is a read (query) handler but its body writes persistent state — a query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica. — PlaceOrderCommandHandler.cs:9

What to do

  • Keep query handlers read-only — move the writes/event-publishes into a command handler so reads stay safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica.
C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

ED5 · Idempotency9.4 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `CreateProduct.CreateProductCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateProductCommandHandler.cs:18

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `CreateCheckoutSession` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — PaymentService.cs:33

What to do

  • Remove the dead code that still moves this score: delete dead if(false) / #if false branches and either do the real async work or drop the async keyword from fake-async methods.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/6 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 6, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 33/79 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AddressController.cs:21, AddressController.cs:28, AuthController.cs:20, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health87%StrongSolid.
Architecture88%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity57%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness32%Weak — gated by D9, P3, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security58%Adequate — gated by D28, D30Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility38%Weak — gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 37 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 domain event(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a message-bus package; 29 CQRS handler(s)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X8 JS interop contract — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 18 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×7
  • Secret: stripe-access-token src/BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure/Service/PaymentService.cs:34 — matched rule 'stripe-access-token'
  • Secret: stripe-access-token src/Presentation/Server/appsettings.json:13 — matched rule 'stripe-access-token'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Presentation/Server/appsettings.json:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Server/Services/PaymentService/PaymentService.cs:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: stripe-access-token src/Server/Services/PaymentService/PaymentService.cs:18 — matched rule 'stripe-access-token'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Server/Services/PaymentService/PaymentService.cs:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: stripe-access-token src/Server/Services/PaymentService/PaymentService.cs:18 — matched rule 'stripe-access-token'
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×6
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.0 — AutoMapper 11.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 — Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×2
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 — System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: signing-key src/Presentation/Server/appsettings.json:12 — signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Warning — 18 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components 7.0.5 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components 7.0.5 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.21.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.21.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.21.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.21.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×3
  • Deprecated: Blazored.LocalStorage — Blazored.LocalStorage 4.3.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebUtilities — Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebUtilities 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cyclomatic 16) src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:50 — QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1
  • Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 68 commit(s) sampled).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 48) · ×1
  • QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 48) src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:50 — QueryRepository.GetAllWithIncludeAsync has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueryRepository.GetWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 36) · ×1
  • QueryRepository.GetWithIncludeAsync (cognitive 36) src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:170 — QueryRepository.GetWithIncludeAsync has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GetAddressQueryHandler.Handle (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • GetAddressQueryHandler.Handle (cognitive 17) src/BlazorEcommerce.Application/Features/Address/Query/GetAddress/GetAddressQueryHandler.cs:23 — GetAddressQueryHandler.Handle has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:119 — src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:119-138 | src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:148-167 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/Repositories/Queries/Base/QueryRepository.cs:119` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Presentation/Client/Services/CategoryService/CategoryService.cs:21 — src/Presentation/Client/Services/CategoryService/CategoryService.cs:21-33 | src/Presentation/Client/Services/CategoryService/CategoryService.cs:82-94 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Presentation/Client/Services/CategoryService/CategoryService.cs:21` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: BlazorEcommerce.Shared — BlazorEcommerce.Shared: abstractness 0.07, instability 0.00, distance 0.93 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×2
  • Shell project: BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests tests/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests.csproj — `BlazorEcommerce.Domain.UnitTests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests tests/BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests/BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests.csproj — `BlazorEcommerce.Application.UnitTests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent use of the letter 'i' in the word 'Profiles' within the namespace 'BlazorEcommerce.Application.MappingProfıles'. The namespace uses a Cyrillic 'і' (U+0456) instead of the Latin 'i' (U+0069). This is a critical inconsistency as it breaks the namespace path and likely causes compilation errors or reflection issues. · ×1
  • Inconsistent use of the letter 'i' in the word 'Profiles' within the namespace 'BlazorEcommerce.Application.MappingProfıles'. The namespace uses a Cyrillic 'і' (U+0456) instead of the Latin 'i' (U+0069). This is a critical inconsistency as it breaks the namespace path and likely causes compilation errors or reflection issues. — Rename namespace to 'BlazorEcommerce.Application.MappingProfiles' using standard Latin characters. (symbols: BlazorEcommerce.Application.MappingProfıles.ProductProfile, BlazorEcommerce.Application.MappingProfıles.CategoryProfile)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in the query handler name · ×1
  • Typo in the query handler name: 'GetOrderDeatils' (missing 'a' in Details) compared to the repository method 'GetOrderDetails'. The handler name contains a typo. — Rename 'GetOrderDeatilsQueryHandler' to 'GetOrderDetailsQueryHandler' to match the repository and correct the typo. (symbols: BlazorEcommerce.Application.Features.Order.Query.GetOrderDetails.GetOrderDeatilsQueryHandler.Handle, BlazorEcommerce.Persistence.Repositories.Queries.OrderQueryRepository.GetOrderDetails)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 5k LoC across 10 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment src/Presentation/Server/Program.cs:59 — "Configure the HTTP request pipeline." — delete - duplicate of Configure; remove one
D27 · Navigability · High interface indirection · ×1
  • High interface indirection — 36 % of calls go through an interface — tracing a call means resolving the implementation each hop. Prefer concrete types where there's a single implementation.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 22 of 22 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 22 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/DataSeed/ProductVariantSeed.cs:10 — 1 of 558 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: BlazorEcommerce.Persistence.DataSeed.ProductVariantSeed.Configure @ src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/DataSeed/ProductVariantSeed.cs:10, 390 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 35 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×26
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Server — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Server 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Server).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Server).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Server).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.5.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Server).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Authorization — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Authorization 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.DevServer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.DevServer 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebUtilities — Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebUtilities 2.2.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Localization — Microsoft.Extensions.Localization 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: MudBlazor — MudBlazor 6.2.2 → 9.7.0 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Client).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.5.2 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Shared).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions 2.2.0 → 2.3.11 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Shared).
  • Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 11.0.0 → 12.0.1 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Application).
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.5.2 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 7.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Application).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 7.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Application).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.0.1 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Domain).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Diagnostics.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Diagnostics.EntityFrameworkCore 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Stripe.net — Stripe.net 41.14.0 → 52.2.0 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Ardalis.GuardClauses — Ardalis.GuardClauses 4.0.1 → 5.0.0 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Identity).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Identity).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Identity).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.UI — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.UI 7.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BlazorEcommerce.Identity).
  • + 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×8
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Server src/Presentation/Server/BlazorEcommerce.Server.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Server: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/64).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Client src/Presentation/Client/BlazorEcommerce.Client.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Client: 5 % XML-doc coverage (5/109).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Shared src/Presentation/Shared/BlazorEcommerce.Shared.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/196).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Application src/BlazorEcommerce.Application/BlazorEcommerce.Application.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/181).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Domain src/BlazorEcommerce.Domain/BlazorEcommerce.Domain.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/70).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure src/BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure/BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Identity src/BlazorEcommerce.Identity/BlazorEcommerce.Identity.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Identity: 3 % XML-doc coverage (1/32).
  • XML-doc coverage: BlazorEcommerce.Persistence src/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence/BlazorEcommerce.Persistence.csproj — BlazorEcommerce.Persistence: 1 % XML-doc coverage (1/123).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .7artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list BlazorEcommerce.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json13artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc8af-3522-7748-96aa-ec9f1c6d877b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 21 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 11 field(s)
  • ICurrentUser.UserEmail src/BlazorEcommerce.Application/Contracts/Identity/ICurrentUser.cs:7
  • CurrentUser.UserEmail src/Presentation/Server/Services/CurrentUser.cs:19
  • Constants.AdminEmail src/Presentation/Shared/Constant/Constants.cs:7
  • Messages.ConfirmYourEmail src/Presentation/Shared/Constant/Constants.cs:27
  • Messages.AlreadyEmailConfirmed src/Presentation/Shared/Constant/Constants.cs:32
  • Messages.SuccessfullyEmailConfirmed src/Presentation/Shared/Constant/Constants.cs:33
  • Messages.IfEmailTrue src/Presentation/Shared/Constant/Constants.cs:36
  • Messages.EmailSuccessfullyChangedConfirmYourEmail src/Presentation/Shared/Constant/Constants.cs:39
  • UserDto.Email src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserDto.cs:20
  • UserLogin.Email src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserLogin.cs:8
  • UserRegister.Email src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserRegister.cs:15
Name — 10 field(s)
  • Address.FirstName src/BlazorEcommerce.Domain/Entities/Address.cs:8
  • Address.LastName src/BlazorEcommerce.Domain/Entities/Address.cs:9
  • ApplicationUser.FirstName src/BlazorEcommerce.Identity/Entities/ApplicationUser.cs:7
  • ApplicationUser.LastName src/BlazorEcommerce.Identity/Entities/ApplicationUser.cs:8
  • AddressDto.FirstName src/Presentation/Shared/Address/AddressDto.cs:7
  • AddressDto.LastName src/Presentation/Shared/Address/AddressDto.cs:8
  • UserDto.FirstName src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserDto.cs:22
  • UserDto.LastName src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserDto.cs:24
  • UserRegister.FirstName src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserRegister.cs:9
  • UserRegister.LastName src/Presentation/Shared/User/UserRegister.cs:12

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md