Public report — StockTradingAnalysisWebsite, published 29 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
140findings with an exact file:lineof 189 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
52/103dimensions across the health lenses28863 LoC · 21 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
BenjaminBest/StockTradingAnalysisWebsite carries serious risk (37%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (80%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (29%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (33%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Medium (~28,863 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Code composition — where the lines goPlumbing-heavy — business logic is 11% of hand-written app code; most lines are wiring, declarations and straight-line glue. Fine for an integration/CRUD service; worth a look if this is meant to be logic-rich.
Business logic 8%Plumbing 71%Tests 11%Generated 10%
New since the last scan (44+)
44 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€29,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 29% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, CQRS, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 29%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
42
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
30
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, enforce default-deny access controls on all endpoints using authorization attributes or imperative guards. Next, establish a CI/CD pipeline that builds the code and runs the test suite on every push or pull request. Then, integrate a static analysis tool like CodeQL or Semgrep into the build process to fail the build on security regressions. After that, add standard resilience policies to all outgoing HTTP client calls to prevent dependency failures from taking down the application. Finally, extend structured logging across all service-like projects to ensure full observability in production.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Resolve the 30 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with TransactionController.cs (7), CalculationController.cs (4), FeedbackController.cs (4).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 49 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 140 of 189 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D5 · Coupling9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
223 test methods: 223 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
No assertions: DefaultCtorOfTransactionAllQueryShouldCorrectlyInitializeValues · ×4StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web.Tests/TypesTests.cs:9
Mock framework: Moq · ×9
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The Stock Trading Analysis README gives a clear description of what the application does and its history (CQRS/Eventsourcing re-architecture), setup steps for MSSQL and RavenDB, and an outline of technologies used. However it is the only document in the set, so architecture and design docs are missing; coverage is strong with 94% CQRS/ES coverage across four projects but the README itself is thin on structure (e.g. no overview of domain/cqrs/query/service layers or a table of contents).
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The Stock Trading Analysis README gives a clear description of what the application does and its history (CQRS/Eventsourcing re-architecture), setup steps for MSSQL and RavenDB, and an outline of technologies used. However it is the only document in the set, so architecture and design docs are missing; coverage is strong with 94% CQRS/ES coverage across four projects but the README itself is thin on structure (e.g. no overview of domain/cqrs/query/service layers or a table of contents).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
1 of 21 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split StockTradingAnalysis.Web
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
96 % of calls cross a namespace and 11 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 8.9/10. — 96 % of calls cross a namespace and 11 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: csharp-sqli · ×12StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/EventDatastore.cs:68detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization · ×30StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/CalculationController.cs:22detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 30 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with TransactionController.cs (7), CalculationController.cs (4), FeedbackController.cs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (30 warning-level).
Resolve the 12 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with EventDatastore.cs (4), SnapShotDatastore.cs (3), MigrationItemPersister.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
129 of 129 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/TestDataController.cs.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — ViewModelImage.cshtml:16, ViewModelImage.cshtml:20
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels5.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×3) — Date.cshtml:16, Date.cshtml:20, ViewModelImage.cshtml:47
A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child. — Create.cshtml:33
A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). — Popup.jsx:15
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — _Layout.cshtml:2
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — _Layout.cshtml:2
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). (×2) — LatestQuote.cshtml:12, Index.cshtml:120
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
`.list-group-item.disabled, .list-group-item:disabled` sets color: #52575C on background-color: #32383e — 1.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×2) — bootstrap.css:5273, site.css:5273
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
`AccumulationPlanStatisticService` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `IInterestRateCalculatorService iirCalculationService`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `IInterestRateCalculatorService` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — AccumulationPlanStatisticService.cs:18
`AccumulationPlanStatisticService` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `ITransactionCalculationService transactionCalculationService`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `ITransactionCalculationService` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — AccumulationPlanStatisticService.cs:18
`EventStoreInitializer` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `ILoggingService loggingService`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `ILoggingService` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — EventStoreInitializer.cs:13
`StockQuoteExternalService` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `ILoggingService loggingService`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `ILoggingService` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — StockQuoteExternalService.cs:16
`ProcessManagerCoordinator` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `IEnumerable processManagers`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `IProcessManager` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — ProcessManagerCoordinator.cs:16
`ProcessManagerFinderRepository` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `ILoggingService loggingService`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `ILoggingService` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — ProcessManagerFinderRepository.cs:14
What to do
Don't inject scoped/transient services into singletons; resolve them per-use via IServiceScopeFactory or a factory delegate, or align the lifetimes.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`PerformanceMeasurementService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_counters; e.g. `_counters` at line 77). — PerformanceMeasurementService.cs:13
`ProcessManagerCoordinator` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_observableMessageTypes; e.g. `_observableMessageTypes` at line 60). — ProcessManagerCoordinator.cs:16
`UpdateQuotationsScheduledJob` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (Status; e.g. `Status` at line 79). — UpdateQuotationsScheduledJob.cs:17
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`ICalculationResult` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ICalculationResult.cs:5
`IStatistic` declares 47 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IStatistic.cs:8
`IDateCalculationService` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IDateCalculationService.cs:9
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
What to do
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
`EventHandler.CalculationWasCopiedEventHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CalculationWasCopiedEventHandler.cs:33
`EventHandler.TransactionBuyingOrderAddedEventHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — TransactionBuyingOrderAddedEventHandler.cs:40
What to do
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×4) — MathCalculatorServiceTests.cs:56, MathCalculatorServiceTests.cs:66, SnapshotTests.cs:238, …
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×7) — StatisticsProcessManager.cs:78, SnapshotProcessor.cs:84, EventSourcingBindingModule.cs:30, …
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 21 of 21 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
omits CQRS/Eventsourcing from the description
omits RavenDB from the described features (candlestick chat)
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: omits CQRS/Eventsourcing from the description; omits RavenDB from the described features (candlestick chat).
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/5 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×5) — HtmlDownload.cs:19, HtmlDownload.cs:96, HtmlDownload.cs:41, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 13 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (24%; ≈26% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 42 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 51 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .jsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .jsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .jsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 44 event handler(s); 102 CQRS handler(s)
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: AutoMapper 8.0.0 — AutoMapper 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 — Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 17 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 13.0.1
High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.6.0 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.6.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.8.6
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.2 — System.Net.Http 4.3.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 11 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.1.0 — System.Net.Http 4.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 14 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 14 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 13.0.1
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebSockets 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebSockets 2.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketProtocol 4.5.1 — System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketProtocol 4.5.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/EventDatastore.cs:68— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/EventDatastore.cs:107— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/EventDatastore.cs:139— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/EventDatastore.cs:175— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/SnapShotDatastore.cs:69— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/SnapShotDatastore.cs:108— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/SnapShotDatastore.cs:140— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Migration/Common/MigrationItemPersister.cs:21— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High: insecure-binaryformatter-deserialization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Migration/Common/MigrationItemPersister.cs:32— The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can't be made secure
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Migration/Importer/ImportStrategy.cs:94— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Migration/Importer/ImportTransaction.cs:324— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: csharp-sqli StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Migration/Importer/ImportTransaction.cs:352— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core.Tests/Common/HtmlDownloadTests.cs:32— //TODO: Test non working async url — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core.Tests/Common/HtmlDownloadTests.cs:75— //TODO: Test non working async url — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core/Services/PerformanceMeasurementService.cs:59— //TODO: Maybe use const string — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core/Services/PerformanceMeasurementService.cs:60— //TODO: Possible counters (absolute time for dehydration) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core/Services/PerformanceMeasurementService.cs:201— //TODO: ToString to write all to console — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core/Services/PerformanceMeasurementService.cs:202— //TODO: Persistence — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/EventDatastore.cs:85— //TODO: Use multiple inserts — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Data.MSSQL/SnapShotDatastore.cs:86— //TODO: Use multiple inserts — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/CalculationAddCommandHandler.cs:30— //TODO: Validate if name is unique ->Exception: Resources.Validation_CalculationNameExists(felt noch) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/CalculationAddCommandHandler.cs:31— //TODO: Validate if name, description is not empty — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/FeedbackAddCommandHandler.cs:31— //TODO: Validate if name, description is not empty — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/StrategyAddCommandHandler.cs:31— //TODO: Validate if name, description is not empty — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/FeedbackAddCommandHandler.cs:30— //TODO: Validate if name is unique ->Exception: Resources.Validation_FeedbackNameExists(fehlt noch) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/StockAddCommandHandler.cs:31— //TODO: Validate if name of stock and wkn is unique bei gleichem type ->Exception: Resources.Validation_StockNameExists — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/StockAddCommandHandler.cs:32— //TODO: Validate if name, wkn and type is not empty — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/StrategyAddCommandHandler.cs:30— //TODO: Validate if name is unique ->Exception: Resources.Validation_StrategyNameExists(fehlt noch) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/StrategyAddCommandHandler.cs:32— //TODO: Validate if image is valid — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/TransactionBuyCommandHandler.cs:29— //TODO: Validation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/TransactionRemoveCommandHandler.cs:32— //TODO: Validation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/TransactionDividendCommandHandler.cs:36— //TODO: Further Validation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/TransactionSellCommandHandler.cs:36— //TODO: Further Validation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/TransactionSplitCommandHandler.cs:36— //TODO: Further Validation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd/CommandHandler/TransactionSellCommandHandler.cs:40— //TODO: Validation MAE must be smaller than share price if long, else higher, same for MFE — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.Events/EventHandler/TransactionUndoEventHandler.cs:34— //TODO: Further processing, what must be done when a transaction was reverted? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.Events/EventHandler/TransactionUndoEventHandler.cs:35— //TODO: Revert balance — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/CalculationController.cs:22— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/CalculationController.cs:81— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/CalculationController.cs:111— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/CalculationController.cs:139— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/ChartController.cs:16— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/DashboardController.cs:18— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/FeedbackController.cs:15— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/FeedbackController.cs:60— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/FeedbackController.cs:85— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/FeedbackController.cs:109— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/MigrationController.cs:18— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/QuotationController.cs:13— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StockController.cs:16— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StockController.cs:62— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StockController.cs:87— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StockController.cs:111— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StrategyController.cs:19— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StrategyController.cs:67— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StrategyController.cs:105— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StrategyController.cs:129— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/TestDataController.cs:13— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/TransactionController.cs:21— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/TransactionController.cs:93— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/TransactionController.cs:131— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: mass-assignment StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/TransactionController.cs:166— Mass assignment or Autobinding vulnerability in code allows an attacker to execute over-posting attacks, which could create a new parameter in the binding request and manipulate the underlying object in the application. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
+ 5 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×11
Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: log4net 2.0.8 — log4net 2.0.8 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 17 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.3.0
Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.6.0 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.8.5
Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.2.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IIS 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IIS 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.SpaServices 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.SpaServices 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.3.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.3.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
No assertions: DefaultCtorOfTransactionAllQueryShouldCorrectlyInitializeValues StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web.Tests/TypesTests.cs:9— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: DeserializeShouldWorkWithDifferentCLassesIfStructureIsTheSame StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Core.Tests/Services/JsonServiceTests.cs:61— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: TransactionAllQueryShouldBeProperlyInitialized StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Query.Tests/Queries/TransactionAllQueryTests.cs:9— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: TransactionYearsQueryShouldBeProperlyInitialized StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Query.Tests/Queries/TransactionYearsQueryTests.cs:9— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Domain/CalculationResult.cs:42— StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Domain/CalculationResult.cs:42-56 | StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Models/CalculationResultViewModel.cs:52-66 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Domain/CalculationResult.cs:69— StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Domain/CalculationResult.cs:69-83 | StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Models/CalculationResultViewModel.cs:81-95 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Domain/CalculationResult.cs:96— StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Domain/CalculationResult.cs:96-110 | StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Models/CalculationResultViewModel.cs:110-124 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Dead code: CreateMonths StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Services/TimeSliceCreationService.cs:119— Method CreateMonths — no references found in solution.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1017.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/QuotationController.cs:62— StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/QuotationController.cs:62-79 | StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Web/Controllers/StockController.cs:134-151 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Services/TransactionPerformanceService.cs:104— StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Services/TransactionPerformanceService.cs:104-113 | StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services/Services/TransactionPerformanceService.cs:128-137 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services.External/Providers/QuotationDownloadBoerseDuesseldorf.cs:74— StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services.External/Providers/QuotationDownloadBoerseDuesseldorf.cs:74-81 | StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Services.External/Providers/QuotationDownloadBoerseDuesseldorf.cs:82-89 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Off the main sequence: StockTradingAnalysis.Core — StockTradingAnalysis.Core: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.10, distance 0.90 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces and real coverage will be read.
Shell project: StockTradingAnalysis.CQRS.Tests StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.CQRS.Tests/StockTradingAnalysis.CQRS.Tests.csproj— `StockTradingAnalysis.CQRS.Tests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
Shell project: StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd.Tests StockTradingAnalysisWebsite/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd.Tests/StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd.Tests.csproj— `StockTradingAnalysis.Domain.CQRS.Cmd.Tests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test runner surfaced no tests · ×1
Test runner surfaced no tests — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 223 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 28k LoC across 21 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
Split StockTradingAnalysis.Web — A web application whose name implies trading analysis but is a sprawling catch-all at 7840 LoC and 154 types across 23 namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: WebRoutes, OrderProcessing, RiskAnalytics, Reporting
Dormant codebase — 129 of 129 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 129 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fb01f-68ec-7946-984f-794c6e1a3573 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 31 · Warnings: 129 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 22 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 23:04 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.