Public report — Qitar, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 5,142 LoC · 16 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (35%)
Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (2 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS0277: 'Aggregate<TKey>' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<TKey>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<TKey>.Id.set' is not public.; CS0277: 'Aggregate' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<Guid>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<Guid>.Id.set' is not public.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
55findings with an exact file:lineof 130 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
57/98dimensions across the health lenses5142 LoC · 16 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Bullabs/Qitar carries serious risk (45%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (35%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (43%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene (Dependency Hygiene); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage); 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution).
For scale: Small (~5,142 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS0277: 'Aggregate<TKey>' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<TKey>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<TKey>.Id.set' is not public.; CS0277: 'Aggregate' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<Guid>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<Guid>.Id.set' is not public..
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS0277: 'Aggregate<TKey>' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<TKey>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<TKey>.Id.set' is not public.; CS0277: 'Aggregate' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<Guid>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<Guid>.Id.set' is not public..
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
86 modules, 107 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 58% · Adequate · gated by D18, X5, IC1
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
21
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
15
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by addressing the six security vulnerabilities in the dependency hygiene layer to immediately reduce risk. Next, establish automated testing for the uncovered code and ensure all tests are properly distributed across the codebase. Finally, maintain a consistent changelog to track release history and resolve the four deprecated dependencies to keep the codebase modern and secure.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 53 of 57 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 57 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 55 of 130 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
16 projects, 260 source files, 5142 hand-written lines of code (5142 production / 0 test), 20 inter-project edges (build failed).
Build failed
Thin analysable surface across projects
What to do
Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Qitar's documentation is a single README plus two markdown guide docs covering installation/requirements and community help, with an external links section to its website. The VuePress guide features a Config sidebar and a Using Vue in Markdown doc that explains SSR API access restrictions for server-rendered static sites. However the project has 0 XML-doc coverage across 487 source files (Qitar) and 15 other namespaces, leaving no documentation for Qitar.Bus.RabbitMQ/Qitar.Store.Dapper/Qitar.Task.Hangfire/Qitar.Serializer.Text.Json/Qitar.Caching.DistributedCache/* Qitar.Web/Qitar.Caching.DistributedCache.Redis/Qitar.Validation.FluentValidation/Qitar.Store/... components. The README's 'Useful Resources' section links to DDD/CQRS references, but no Qitar-specific guides exist for the namespaces covered by the 0 coverage.
Resolve the 16 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Qitar.csproj, Qitar.Bus.RabbitMQ.csproj, Qitar.Store.Dapper.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
The concept of the 'current user' is represented by a type `ICurrentUser` and a property `CurrentUser` on `IClaimsAccessor`/`ClaimsAccessor`. This mixes a dedicated interface/type with a property on an accessor, which is inconsistent. The accessor pattern (`IClaimsAccessor`) suggests the user info should be retrieved via that accessor, but `ICurrentUser` exists as a standalone type.
There is an interface `IDateTimeRangeService` and a concrete implementation `DateTimeRangeService`. However, there is also a type `IDateTimeRange` which seems to represent a range, but the service naming is inconsistent with the type naming (Service vs Range).
The bus abstraction is split between `IBusProvider` (which seems to handle publishing/subscribing) and `IBus` (used in parameters). This creates confusion about whether the bus is a provider or a direct service.
What to do
Resolve the 1 The concept of the 'current user' is represented by a type… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 There is an interface `IDateTimeRangeService` and a concrete… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The bus abstraction is split between `IBusProvider` (which seems to… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with EventEntityFactory.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
1 of 16 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split Qitar
What to do
Resolve the 1 Split Qitar finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
83 % of calls cross a namespace and 24 % go through an interface, but 64 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 7.3/10. — 83 % of calls cross a namespace and 24 % go through an interface, but 64 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×15.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 15 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4), devskim-analysis.yml (3), dotnet-build.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
11 of 11 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Qitar/Extentions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
`JobRunner` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `ILogger logger`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `ILogger` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — JobRunner.cs:12
`RabbitMQBusProvider` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `ISerializer serializer`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `ISerializer` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — RabbitMQBusProvider.cs:13
What to do
Don't inject scoped/transient services into singletons; resolve them per-use via IServiceScopeFactory or a factory delegate, or align the lifetimes.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`LogProvider` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_loggers; e.g. `_loggers` at line 30). — LogProvider.cs:10
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×25) — Bus.cs:40, Bus.cs:45, EventMetadata.cs:10, …
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`Subscribe` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — KafkaBusProvider.cs:39, Bus.cs:38
`Unsubscribe` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×3) — KafkaBusProvider.cs:44, RabbitMQBusProvider.cs:53, Bus.cs:43
`Append` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — DapperEventStore.cs:11
`Delete` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — DapperEventStore.cs:16, DapperRepository.cs:30, EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:20, …
`Load` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — DapperEventStore.cs:21
`Find` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — DapperRepository.cs:43, EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:35
`EntityFrameworkRepository` has 9 unfinished members out of 9 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:11
`DeleteMany` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:30
`GetById` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:40
`Insert` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:45
`InsertMany` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:50
`Update` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:55
`UpdateMany` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EntityFrameworkRepository.cs:60
`SetTenantInfo` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — HttpContextExtensions.cs:12
`InvokeAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — RateLimitingMiddleware.cs:12
`IsAllowed` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — ClientRateLimit.cs:9, IpRateLimit.cs:12
`StartAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — BusSubscribersService.cs:25
`StopAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — BusSubscribersService.cs:34
`EventMetadata` has 3 unfinished members out of 4 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — EventMetadata.cs:8
`ContainsKey` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EventMetadata.cs:34
`GetEnumerator` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EventMetadata.cs:39
`TryGetValue` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EventMetadata.cs:44
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
The root README is 115 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 16 of 16 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
What to do
Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`dotnet test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.
260/286 types (91%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 6/16 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 16, 0 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 67/70 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×2) — JobRunner.cs:35, GuidFactory.cs:49
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — RabbitMQBusProvider.cs:58
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
0/16 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (4 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot))
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a message-bus package; 3 CQRS handler(s)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 3 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:38— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/autobuild` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/autobuild` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:67— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devskim-analysis.yml:26— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devskim-analysis.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: microsoft/DevSkim-Action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `microsoft/DevSkim-Action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/microsoft/DevSkim-Action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devskim-analysis.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/upload-sarif` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/upload-sarif` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-build.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-build.yml:16— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3.0.2 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.2` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-build.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: Hobbs1210/dotnet-sonarscanner@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `Hobbs1210/dotnet-sonarscanner@v5.5.3.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/Hobbs1210/dotnet-sonarscanner/commits/v5.5.3.2 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.5.3.2` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-publish-nuget.yml:15— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-publish-nuget.yml:17— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3.0.2 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.2` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-publish.yml:15— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-publish.yml:17— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3.0.2 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.2` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.5 — System.Text.Json 6.0.5 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.3 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.3 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Npgsql 6.0.6 — Npgsql 6.0.6 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Oracle.ManagedDataAccess.Core 3.21.70 — Oracle.ManagedDataAccess.Core 3.21.70 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×6
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— linkify-it 4.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — linkify-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against linkify-it 4.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.0.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.0.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against linkify-it 4.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— postcss 8.4.31: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.4.31, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.4.31: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Dead code: IAuditableEntity src/Qitar/Entities/IAuditableEntity.cs:9— NamedType IAuditableEntity — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IHaveName src/Qitar/Objects/IHaveName.cs:3— NamedType IHaveName — no references found in solution.
Dead code: ISagaResult src/Qitar/Saga/ISagaResult.cs:5— NamedType ISagaResult — no references found in solution.
Dead code: ServiceCollectionExtensions src/Qitar.Store.EntityFramework/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:7— NamedType ServiceCollectionExtensions — no references found in solution.
Dead code: UseMetrics src/Qitar.Web/Extensions/ApplicationBuilderExtensions.cs:55— Method UseMetrics — no references found in solution.
Dead code: UseSwaggerAPI src/Qitar.Web/Extensions/ApplicationBuilderExtensions.cs:66— Method UseSwaggerAPI — no references found in solution.
Dead code: RateLimitingMiddleware src/Qitar.Web/RateLimiting/RateLimitingMiddleware.cs:10— NamedType RateLimitingMiddleware — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IRateLimiterStore src/Qitar.Web/RateLimiting/Store/IRateLimiterStore.cs:9— NamedType IRateLimiterStore — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IRateLimiterStoreProvider src/Qitar.Web/RateLimiting/Store/IRateLimiterStoreProvider.cs:9— NamedType IRateLimiterStoreProvider — no references found in solution.
Dead code: ClientRateLimit src/Qitar.Web/RateLimiting/Strategies/ClientRateLimit.cs:7— NamedType ClientRateLimit — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IpRateLimit src/Qitar.Web/RateLimiting/Strategies/IpRateLimit.cs:10— NamedType IpRateLimit — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetIp src/Qitar.Web/WebClient/HttpContextWebClientProvider.cs:23— Method GetIp — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SqlTransaction src/Qitar.Store/Sql/SqlTransaction.cs:10— NamedType SqlTransaction — no references found in solution.
Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.3 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.3 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Snowflake.Data 2.0.21 — Snowflake.Data 2.0.21 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: log4net 2.0.12 — log4net 2.0.12 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.2 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.2 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning 5.0.0 — Other — the publisher's replacement is `Asp.Versioning.Mvc`; migrate the reference to it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— markdown-it 13.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — markdown-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 14.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 13.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 13.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against markdown-it 13.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 14.2.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 14.2.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against markdown-it 13.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— micromatch 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin micromatch to 4.0.8 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— nanoid 3.3.6: [GHSA redacted] — nanoid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin nanoid to 3.3.8 with an `overrides` entry).
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 11 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 2), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS0277: 'Aggregate<TKey>' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<TKey>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<TKey>.Id.set' is not public.; CS0277: 'Aggregate' does not implement interface member 'IEntity<Guid>.Id.set'. 'Aggregate<Guid>.Id.set' is not public..
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 14 floating ref(s) across 5 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 2 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (dotnet-build.yml, codeql-analysis.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 1 sibling workflow in the same repository is already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 1 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): dotnet-publish-nuget.yml: dotnet nuget push artifacts/*.nupkg --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json --no-symbols true --api-key ${{secrets.NUGET_API_KEY}} --skip-duplicate. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
Thin analysable surface across projects — 7 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Qitar.Caching.DistributedCache.Memory` with 19 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 78 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.76 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D21 · Naming Consistency· The concept of the 'current user' is represented by a type `ICurrentUser` and a property `CurrentUser` on `IClaimsAccessor`/`ClaimsAccessor`. This mixes a dedicated interface/type with a property on an accessor, which is inconsistent. The accessor pattern (`IClaimsAccessor`) suggests the user info should be retrieved via that accessor, but `ICurrentUser` exists as a standalone type. · ×1
The concept of the 'current user' is represented by a type `ICurrentUser` and a property `CurrentUser` on `IClaimsAccessor`/`ClaimsAccessor`. This mixes a dedicated interface/type with a property on an accessor, which is inconsistent. The accessor pattern (`IClaimsAccessor`) suggests the user info should be retrieved via that accessor, but `ICurrentUser` exists as a standalone type. — Either use `ICurrentUser` as the primary abstraction and have accessors return it, or remove `ICurrentUser` and rely on the accessor pattern consistently. (symbols: Qitar.Security.ICurrentUser, Qitar.Security.IClaimsAccessor.CurrentUser, Qitar.Security.ClaimsAccessor.CurrentUser)
D21 · Naming Consistency· There is an interface `IDateTimeRangeService` and a concrete implementation `DateTimeRangeService`. However, there is also a type `IDateTimeRange` which seems to represent a range, but the service naming is inconsistent with the type naming (Service vs Range). · ×1
There is an interface `IDateTimeRangeService` and a concrete implementation `DateTimeRangeService`. However, there is also a type `IDateTimeRange` which seems to represent a range, but the service naming is inconsistent with the type naming (Service vs Range). — Align the naming of the service with the domain concept it serves. If it provides date ranges, `IDateTimeRangeService` is acceptable, but ensure `DateTimeRangeService` is the only implementation. (symbols: Qitar.Utils.Timing.IDateTimeRange, Qitar.Utils.Timing.DateTimeRangeService, Qitar.Utils.Timing.IDateTimeRangeService)
D21 · Naming Consistency· The bus abstraction is split between `IBusProvider` (which seems to handle publishing/subscribing) and `IBus` (used in parameters). This creates confusion about whether the bus is a provider or a direct service. · ×1
The bus abstraction is split between `IBusProvider` (which seems to handle publishing/subscribing) and `IBus` (used in parameters). This creates confusion about whether the bus is a provider or a direct service. — Consolidate bus interactions into a single abstraction, likely `IBus` or `IBusProvider`, but not both with overlapping responsibilities. (symbols: Qitar.Bus.IBusProvider, Qitar.Bus.IBus)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 5k LoC across 16 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
redundant comment src/Qitar.Store/Entities/Factories/EventEntityFactory.cs:23— "update" — delete - 'update' restates the obvious assignment of _subscribers to a Task.
Split Qitar — A generic catch-all name that is huge (over 3k LoC) and sprawls over 44 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: Qitar-1, Qitar-2,...Qitar-44
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 11 of 11 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: src/Qitar/Extentions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs, src/Qitar/Serialization/Serializer.cs, src/Qitar/Utils/Timing/DateTimeRangeService.cs (and 8 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, `npm publish --provenance` under GitHub OIDC for npm packages, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `npm sbom --sbom-format cyclonedx` (npm 9+) or `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` over the lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Outdated: Json.Abstraction — Json.Abstraction 2.0.0 → 3.1.0 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Mapster — Mapster 7.3.0 → 10.0.11 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Mapster.Async — Mapster.Async 2.0.0 → 10.0.11 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 6.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options — Microsoft.Extensions.Options 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: Scrutor — Scrutor 4.2.0 → 7.0.0 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: System.Text.Json — System.Text.Json 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: System.Threading.Tasks.Extensions — System.Threading.Tasks.Extensions 4.5.4 → 4.6.3 available (referenced by Qitar).
Outdated: RabbitMQ.Client — RabbitMQ.Client 6.4.0 → 7.2.1 available (referenced by Qitar.Bus.RabbitMQ).
Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.0.123 → 2.1.79 available (referenced by Qitar.Store.Dapper).
Outdated: Hangfire.Core — Hangfire.Core 1.7.31 → 1.8.24 available (referenced by Qitar.Task.Hangfire).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar.Caching.DistributedCache).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar.Caching.DistributedCache.Memory).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar.Caching.DistributedCache.Memory).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 6.0.8 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Qitar.Store.EntityFramework).
Outdated: Confluent.Kafka — Confluent.Kafka 2.0.2 → 2.15.0 available (referenced by Qitar.Bus.Kafka).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Abstractions 2.2.0 → 2.3.11 available (referenced by Qitar.Web).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.2.5 → 2.3.11 available (referenced by Qitar.Web).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Versioning 5.0.0 → 5.1.0 available (referenced by Qitar.Web).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Qitar.Web).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerGen — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerGen 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Qitar.Web).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Qitar.Web).
+ 9 more in this group — see findings.md.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fc82f-e931-7ca2-8441-4f6c62be7041 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 2 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 35 · Warnings: 47 · Recommendations: 13 · Info: 35 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 15:13 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.