CollatzConjecture/nestjs-clean-architecture-postgres

Executive summary

CollatzConjecture/nestjs-clean-architecture-postgres scores 39 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 22 and is rated Critical. Its CI/CD gates dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene and to resolve the 3 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 39 to about 54.

35 findings are critical: 26 in Dependency Vulnerabilities, three in IaC & Container Security, two in Dependency Hygiene, two in Web-Security Posture, one in Circular Imports and one in Static Analysis (SAST).

Watchdog couldn't measure 5 dimensions in this code, among them Internal API Consistency, Navigability and Structured logging, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 4,261 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €7,500, to rebuild.

Code Health 57 Adequate, capped by Nullable reference types Architecture 63 Adequate, capped by Import Boundaries Maturity 65 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 22 ⚠ Critical, capped by Dependency Hygiene, CI/CD gates, Security & performance tooling, DR & Backup and Outbound HTTP resilience Security and Compliance 55 Adequate, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities and Data Protection Domain Modelling 48 Weak, capped by Rich vs anemic model, Encapsulated state and Strongly-typed ids Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Production Readiness 22 · counts for 46%Domain Modelling 48 · counts for 25%Security and Compliance 55 · counts for 14%Code Health 57 · counts for 8%Architecture 63 · counts for 4%Maturity 65 · counts for 2%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 22 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 39 to about 54.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Product code 75%Tests 25%

New since the last survey: 12 findings

These 12 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026.

Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: prom-client package.json
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: uuid package.json
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: eslint package.json
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Large Files · src/application/services/auth.service.ts: 684 lines of code src/application/services/auth.service.ts
Web-Security Posture · TLS certificate validation disabled src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts
Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/application/services/auth.service.ts
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/auth.service.ts
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/auth.service.ts
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings

These 2 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 8 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/auth.service.ts
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts

Rebuild cost: about €7,500 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€2,500 to €12,000, for 41 to 131 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	High, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 39. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 4,261 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (3).

Raises the score by about 5 points · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 3 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (3).

Raises the score by about 5 points · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €7,500 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 22 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.

One cause behind 7 Domain Modelling findings · Common cause

7 findings in the Domain Modelling lens come from the same cause. The code models the business as objects, such as an order or a customer, and each object should guard its own rules: an order, for example, should refuse to be shipped before it has been paid. Here the objects don't do that. Other code can change an object's data directly, so it can put an order into a state the rules forbid. Some objects only hold data, while the rules that should keep that data valid sit elsewhere in the code. Identifiers, such as order numbers and customer numbers, are passed around as plain numbers or text, so nothing stops the code from using one kind where another belongs. Because all of these findings have the same cause, fixing it once, in the business objects themselves, deals with them together.

Based on: Encapsulated state (2 findings) · Rich vs anemic model (2 findings) · Strongly-typed ids (3 findings)

What to do: Give each business object the methods that enforce its rules, such as a method for shipping an order that first checks it has been paid, and let only those methods change its data. Give each kind of identifier a type of its own, so an order number can't be used where a customer number belongs.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 5 points for low effort, because it clears the 3 Dependency Hygiene findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

72 modules, with 94 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 32 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	1 api.dto.auth.change-password_dto	2 api.dto.auth.login-auth_dto	3 api.dto.auth.mobile-apple-auth_dto	4 api.dto.auth.mobile-google-auth_dto	5 api.dto.auth.refresh-token_dto	6 api.dto.auth.register-auth_dto	7 api.dto.common.api-response_dto	8 api.dto.create-profile_dto	9 api.dto.update-profile_dto	10 application.auth.command.create-apple-auth-user_command	11 application.services.apple-oauth-config_service	12 application.services.logger_service	13 domain.entities.Auth	14 domain.entities.Profile	15 domain.entities.enums.role_enum	16 infrastructure.entities.base.soft-deletable_entity	17 application.auth.command.create-auth-user_command	18 application.services.mobile-oauth-config_service	19 application.services.response_service	20 domain.interfaces.repositories.auth-repository_interface	21 domain.interfaces.repositories.profile-repository_interface	22 domain.services.auth-domain_service	23 domain.services.profile-domain_service	24 infrastructure.entities.profile_entity	31 application.services.apple-token-validation_service	32 application.services.jwks-token-validation_service	33 application.services.profile_service	34 infrastructure.entities.auth_entity	37 application.services.mobile-token-validation_service	39 application.services.auth_service
1 api.dto.auth.change-password_dto
2 api.dto.auth.login-auth_dto
3 api.dto.auth.mobile-apple-auth_dto
4 api.dto.auth.mobile-google-auth_dto
5 api.dto.auth.refresh-token_dto
6 api.dto.auth.register-auth_dto
7 api.dto.common.api-response_dto
8 api.dto.create-profile_dto
9 api.dto.update-profile_dto
10 application.auth.command.create-apple-auth-user_command
11 application.services.apple-oauth-config_service
12 application.services.logger_service
13 domain.entities.Auth
14 domain.entities.Profile
15 domain.entities.enums.role_enum
16 infrastructure.entities.base.soft-deletable_entity
17 application.auth.command.create-auth-user_command						1
18 application.services.mobile-oauth-config_service												1
19 application.services.response_service							4
20 domain.interfaces.repositories.auth-repository_interface													1
21 domain.interfaces.repositories.profile-repository_interface														1	1
22 domain.services.auth-domain_service													1		1
23 domain.services.profile-domain_service														1
24 infrastructure.entities.profile_entity																1												1
25 api.controllers.hello_controller							1					1							1
26 application.auth.command.handler.create-apple-auth-user_handler										1		1								1		1
27 application.auth.command.handler.create-auth-user_handler												1					1			1		1
28 application.auth.command.handler.create-google-auth-user_handler												1								1		1
29 application.auth.command.handler.delete-auth-user_handler												1								1	1	1
30 application.profile.command.handler.create-profile_handler												1									1
31 application.services.apple-token-validation_service											1	1										1
32 application.services.jwks-token-validation_service												1						1
33 application.services.profile_service								1				1		1	1						1		1
34 infrastructure.entities.auth_entity																1								1
35 infrastructure.repository.profile_repository														1	1						1			1
36 api.controllers.profile_controller							1	1	1					1					1								1
37 application.services.mobile-token-validation_service												1						1				1				2
38 infrastructure.repository.auth_repository													1							1								1
39 application.services.auth_service		1	1	1		1				1	1	1	1					1		1	1	1	1		1				1
40 api.controllers.auth_controller	1	1	1	1	1	1													1											1

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 57% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·

The Good

D1 · TypeScript Cyclomatic Complexity 9.2 D2 · TypeScript Cognitive Complexity 9.0 D3 · TypeScript God Classes 9.2 D17 · TypeScript Explicit Debt 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 7.5 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 8.4 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 9.5 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 8.6 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0

The Bad

X3 · Repo Exception handling 6.1

The Ugly

X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 63% · Adequate · gated by R11 ·

The Good

D6 · TypeScript Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · TypeScript Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · TypeScript Change Coupling 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 7.6 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 8.3

The Ugly

R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 0.0

At a glance — Maturity · 65% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · TypeScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · TypeScript Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Bad

D19 · TypeScript Documentation Quality 6.0

The Ugly

D20 · TypeScript ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Critical · gated by R8, P1, P3, P5, P7 ·

The Good

D8 · TypeScript Code Coverage 10.0 D9 · TypeScript Test Distribution 8.9 D10 · TypeScript Test Quality 10.0 D11 · TypeScript Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · TypeScript Dependency Hygiene 7.2 D13 · TypeScript Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · TypeScript License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 10.0 P9 · Repo Domain vs controller coverage 9.1 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 9.3 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 2.5

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D30, C1 ·

The Good

D28 · TypeScript Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · TypeScript Static Analysis (SAST) 7.6 D31 · TypeScript IaC & Container Security 8.8 D43 · TypeScript Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · TypeScript Platform End-of-Life 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Ugly

D30 · TypeScript Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.5 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 48% · Weak · gated by DM4, DM5, DM2 ·

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Ugly

DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 1.0

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	42	High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration	6	High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection	3	High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by cleaning up package.json to resolve deprecated and outdated dependencies, ensuring a stable foundation. Next, establish a CI pipeline that builds and tests every push, integrating security scanning to block regressions immediately. Finally, codify disaster recovery by documenting RTO/RPO and implementing automated backups within your infrastructure as code.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (3).	+4.7 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (3).	+4.7 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+3.7 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+3.7 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+3.7 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).	+2.7 pts	Medium	Encapsulated state
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.	+2.3 pts	Medium	Strongly-typed ids
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.	+2.3 pts	Medium	Rich vs anemic model

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 12 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 17% slop · 83% mixed · 0% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.7	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
package.json	6.5	Mixed	Dependency Hygiene: Deprecated: prom-client
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: LoggerMiddleware.use (cyclomatic 23)
src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19)
src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19)
src/application/filters/api-exception.filter.ts	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cyclomatic 16)
src/application/services/auth.service.ts	7.8	Mixed	God Classes: ClassTooLong: AuthService
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 35

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 102

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 60

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 9

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 81 of 85 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 85 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D19D20D21D26D28D29D30D31D35D43D44AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6C1C2DM1DM11DM2DM4DM5DM6DM7DM9ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P9PF3R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X21X22X23X24X25X28X29X3X30X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 164 of 197 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a163ba-c8e9-7773-92b4-962e117b3ed7.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 18 commit(s), too few for a reliable trend signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 18 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (18 commit(s) sampled).
D35 Change Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 18 commit(s), too few for a reliable change-coupling signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — prometheus Pulling grafana Pulling postgres Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden prometheus Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden grafana Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: time="2026-10-22T13:09:40Z" level=warning msg="The \"GRAFANA_PASSWORD\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." grafana Pulling prometheus Pulling postgres Pulling grafana Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden prometheus Error context canceled postgres Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm two tells a construction that PRODUCES a measurement from one that merely passes it along, and this repository's frontend does not compute that fact. A measurement built independently in two places would not appear above.
P8 Schema migrations — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The schema may be created by a runner, a deploy script or a config file outside what this check reads, so an absence here is our blind spot rather than a missing migration strategy. The card abstains instead of scoring. You can widen what we reach: if the schema is created and evolved by a tool this check does not name, naming it lets us teach the detector to read it.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP log through no library that carries a message's values as fields (pino, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr; Python's logging, structlog; PHP's PSR-3 loggers), so its log calls cannot be judged, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.2 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was LoggerMiddleware.use at 23.

LoggerMiddleware.use (cyclomatic 23)src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:13

AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19)src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:47

JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19)src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:53

ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cyclomatic 16)src/application/filters/api-exception.filter.ts:16

What to do

Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with LoggerMiddleware.use (cyclomatic 23), AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19), JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.2 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken at 29.

AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cognitive 29)src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:47

LoggerMiddleware.use (cognitive 28)src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:13

JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cognitive 27)src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:53

ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cognitive 18)src/application/filters/api-exception.filter.ts:16

What to do

Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cognitive 29), LoggerMiddleware.use (cognitive 28), JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cognitive 27). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes9.2 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

ClassTooLong: AuthServicesrc/application/services/auth.service.ts:46

FileTooLong: services/auth.service.tssrc/application/services/auth.service.ts

What to do

Resolve the 1 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with auth.service.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with auth.service.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 12 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 94.6%. Measured from the JavaScript/TypeScript suite (jest via `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` in the repository root).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

115 test methods: 105 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 10 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 115 `it`/`test` case(s) across 9 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.

What to do

Improve Test Distribution — currently 8.9/10. — 115 test methods: 105 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 10 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 115 `it`/`test` case(s) across 9 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 115 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). JavaScript/TypeScript (jest via `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` in the repository root (84 tests)): measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

25 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 37 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 1 package.json (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded for currency: that grade is about what SHIPS. 3 direct dependency(ies) — production, development or optional — are marked DEPRECATED by their publisher (the registry's per-version mark, or the lockfile's copy of it when the registry could not be asked); deprecated transitive packages are listed but not charged. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — the registry publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.

Deprecated: prom-client · ×3package.json:61

Outdated (npm): @nestjs/axios · ×3package.json:32

Deprecated: glob · ×2REDACTED:1695

Outdated (npm): @nestjs/common · ×22

What to do

Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 37 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 37 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 1 product package.json manifest(s). Its 28 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted task-comment markers across 4261 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

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D19 · Documentation QualityAdequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is a well-written overview of an advanced NestJS project implementing Clean Architecture with DDD, CQRS, Event Sourcing, and PostgreSQL. It states what the project is (an enterprise boilerplate) and gives links to external resources, plus a brief note about the MongoDB version. The document begins with an overview heading and then a bulleted list of features ('Core Architecture', 'Proper Layer Separation'), followed by a full outline that all sections exist in the visible text; it is clear but not yet complete for its stated scope.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The repository's root README is a well-written overview of an advanced NestJS project implementing Clean Architecture with DDD, CQRS, Event Sourcing, and PostgreSQL. It states what the project is (an enterprise boilerplate) and gives links to external resources, plus a brief note about the MongoDB version. The document begins with an overview heading and then a bulleted list of features ('Core Architecture', 'Proper Layer Separation'), followed by a full outline that all sections exist in the visible text; it is clear but not yet complete for its stated scope.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.6 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

42 finding(s): 2 critical, 24 high, 14 medium, 2 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 24 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (24). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 issue-level).
Resolve the 13 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security8.8 / 10Adequategated by 3 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 2 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 37 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

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AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

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C1 · Data Protection3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS / Secret Manager, HashiCorp Vault) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (typeorm-encrypted, prisma-field-encryption, mongoose-field-encryption or MongoDB CSFLE) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (serve through https.createServer / NestJS httpsOptions, or redirect plain HTTP with express-sslify behind your TLS terminator) so data in transit is always encrypted.

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C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`AuthUser.googleId` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:7
`AuthUser.appleId` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:8
`Profile.authId` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/domain/entities/Profile.ts:3

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`AuthUser` is an aggregate/entity with 11 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:3
`Profile` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/domain/entities/Profile.ts:1

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM5 · Encapsulated state1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`AuthUser` exposes publicly writable state (email, password, googleId, appleId, role, currentHashedRefreshToken, and 4 more). — src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:3
`Profile` exposes publicly writable state (name, lastname, age, createdAt, updatedAt, deletedAt). — src/domain/entities/Profile.ts:1

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions whose whole body still throws a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings and JSX of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions that only throw a "not implemented" error, functions that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, async functions that never await, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`googleAuth` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:148
`initializeJWKS` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×2) — src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:28, src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:33

What to do

Remove the dead code that still moves this score: delete dead if(false) branches and either do the real async work or drop the async keyword from fake-async functions.

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M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

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P2 · Observability10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

`src/application/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 12 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/application/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:12

What to do

Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

`axios.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. (×2) — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:307, src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:144
`axios.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. (×2) — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:322, src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:217

What to do

Bound every outbound call: pass `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ms)` to `fetch`, set `timeout` on the axios instance (`axios.create({ timeout })`), and add retries with back-off (`axios-retry`, `p-retry`) and a breaker (`opossum`, `cockatiel`) around dependencies that fail.

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P9 · Domain vs controller coverage9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

What to do

Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

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R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

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R10 · Code Duplication8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

src/application/services/auth.service.ts:477 · src/application/services/auth.service.ts:607 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:477
src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:22 · src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:27 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 511 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:22
src/infrastructure/repository/auth.repository.ts:8 · src/infrastructure/repository/profile.repository.ts:9 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 381 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/infrastructure/repository/auth.repository.ts:8
src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:10 · src/application/auth/command/handler/create-google-auth-user.handler.ts:10 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:10
src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:87 · src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:159 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 93 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:87
src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:8 · src/application/auth/command/handler/create-auth-user.handler.ts:7 · src/application/auth/command/handler/create-google-auth-user.handler.ts:8 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:8
src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:257 · src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:274 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:257
src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:178 · src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:196 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:178
src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts:25 · src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts:62 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts:25
src/application/auth/sagas/registration.saga.ts:12 · src/application/auth/sagas/registration.saga.ts:32 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/application/auth/sagas/registration.saga.ts:12
src/application/services/logger.service.ts:11 · src/application/services/logger.service.ts:23 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — src/application/services/logger.service.ts:11
src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:8 · src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:28 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:8
src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:119 · src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:179 · src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:197 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:119
src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:61 · src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:69 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:61
src/application/services/auth.service.ts:168 · src/application/services/auth.service.ts:535 · src/application/services/auth.service.ts:665 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:168
src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:185 · src/api/controllers/profile.controller.ts:96 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the SHAPE of this repetition could not be determined. It is not a run of declarations, a listing, a declaration header, a type body or a slice through a construct — and it was not measured as a run of executable statements either, so this row cannot tell you whether a function can stand where these lines are. Read the two spans before acting, because the move is opposite in the two cases. Where they are statements, the ordinary answer holds: give the shared part one home and call it from each site. Where they turn out to be declarations, a literal's entries, or the cases of an enumeration, there is no call site to call anything from, and collapsing them would delete what each copy pins — a shared base type, a generated set, or one exported constant each site refers to is the move instead, and sometimes the honest answer is that there is nothing to extract at all. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is true whichever of those they are. — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:185

What to do

Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.

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R11 · Import Boundaries0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:1 imports src/api/controllers/profile.controller.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:1
src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:2 imports src/api/dto/create-profile.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:2
src/application/application.module.ts:3 imports src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/application.module.ts:3
src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:17 imports src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:17
src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:18 imports src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:18
src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:19 imports src/infrastructure/repository/auth.repository.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:19
src/application/auth/command/create-auth-user.command.ts:1 imports src/api/dto/auth/register-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/auth/command/create-auth-user.command.ts:1
src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:5 imports src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:5
src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:6 imports src/infrastructure/entities/profile.entity.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:6
src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:7 imports src/infrastructure/repository/profile.repository.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:7
src/application/services/auth.service.ts:14 imports src/api/dto/auth/login-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:14
src/application/services/auth.service.ts:15 imports src/api/dto/auth/mobile-apple-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:15
src/application/services/auth.service.ts:16 imports src/api/dto/auth/mobile-google-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:16
src/application/services/auth.service.ts:17 imports src/api/dto/auth/register-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:17
src/application/services/profile.service.ts:3 imports src/api/dto/create-profile.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/services/profile.service.ts:3
src/application/services/response.service.ts:3 imports src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/application/services/response.service.ts:3
src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:1 imports src/application/services/logger.service.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:1
src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:2 imports src/application/services/profile.service.ts against the layered-src rules. — src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:2

What to do

Fix the listed violations: respect the layer/slice order — import only through a slice's public index and never upward into a higher layer (18 rows).

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

validateIdToken has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 29; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:47
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 26; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:25
verifyIdToken has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 26; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:53
(top-level) has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 17; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — REDACTED:1
mobileGoogleAuth has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:347
validateAuthorizationCode has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 15; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:113
validateMobileOAuthData has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:192

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R3 · Large Files9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

src/application/services/auth.service.ts has 684 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:1

What to do

Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.

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R4 · Test Coverage9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×5) — src/main.ts:1, src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:1, src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts:1, …

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

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R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

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R7 · Dead Code8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Unreachable from the 1 application, 1 tooling and 10 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `pnpm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 10 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×4) — src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts, src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts, src/application/middlewere/request-id.middlerware.ts, …
Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×15) — src/application/interfaces/authenticated-request.interface.ts:12, src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:14, src/application/services/logger.service.ts:4, …

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — eslint.config.mjs:1, src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:35
Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
Only test files import it (first: src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:9) — move it to devDependencies. — package.json:53

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts → src/infrastructure/entities/profile.entity.ts → src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts — src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts:2

What to do

Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository. Its Node HTTP listeners were read for HTTPS enforcement alone — TLS served, a redirect to https:// or HSTS, or a TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside the server — each judged per server package.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

`rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose. (×2) — src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts:15, src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts:16
`app.listen(…)` serves plain HTTP on a network address, and nothing in its package enforces HTTPS: no TLS served (`https.createServer`, Fastify `https`, Nest `httpsOptions`), no redirect of plain requests to `https://`, no `Strict-Transport-Security` (helmet sends it by default), and no TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside it — so a browser may talk to it in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) — src/main.ts:53

What to do

Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `rejectUnauthorized: false` / `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by passing its CA (`ca`, or `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`) — never by switching verification off. This repository constructs a TLS client that accepts any certificate at 2 sites, not one: `src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts:15` (`rejectUnauthorized: false`), `src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts:16` (`rejectUnauthorized: false`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Enforce HTTPS on each listed server: serve TLS itself, or redirect plain requests to `https://` and send `Strict-Transport-Security` (`helmet()` does by default) behind the TLS-terminating proxy — and commit that proxy's configuration beside the service. A server only this machine reaches should bind `127.0.0.1`.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/3 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
`validateAuthorizationCode` awaits `axios.post(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.post(url, { signal })`. — src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:113
`getUserInfoFromAccessToken` awaits `axios.get(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.get(url, { signal })`. — src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:206
`handleGoogleRedirect` awaits `axios.post(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.post(url, { signal })`. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:298

What to do

Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:107

What to do

Swallowed exception (empty catch)

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether strict null checking is enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` assertion — TypeScript's `strictNullChecks` (which `strict` turns on) is what makes `string` exclude `null` and `undefined`, and the postfix `!` is the operator that silences it.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

0/1 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.

What to do

The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	57%	Adequate — gated by X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	63%	Adequate — gated by R11	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity	65%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	22%	Critical — gated by R8, P1, P3, P5, P7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	55%	Adequate — gated by D30, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	48%	Weak — gated by DM4, DM5, DM2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

X10 Duplicated predicate — 3 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.

Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model, an ORM write hook that records changes — a TypeORM/MikroORM subscriber, a Sequelize or Mongoose hook, Prisma middleware — or a change-history plugin such as mongoose-history or sequelize-paper-trail) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo

Not included — 50 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: NestJS makes a provider that injects a request-scoped one request-scoped itself (scope bubbles up the injection chain), and gives every consumer its own transient instance by contract.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — prometheus Pulling grafana Pulling postgres Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden prometheus Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden grafana Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: time="2026-10-22T13:09:40Z" level=warning msg="The \"GRAFANA_PASSWORD\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." grafana Pulling prometheus Pulling postgres Pulling grafana Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden prometheus Error context canceled postgres Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.ts), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.ts) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — no repository writes detected — no operation to judge against the one-aggregate rule
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (5 CQRS handler(s))
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P8 Schema migrations — TypeORM is declared, but the schema-migration mechanism could not be identified. Our limit, not a verdict on this repository.
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 35 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×24

REDACTED
REDACTED
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

S1 · Web-Security Posture · TLS certificate validation disabled · ×2

TLS certificate validation disabled src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts:15 — `rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose.
TLS certificate validation disabled src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts:16 — `rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import '@eslint/js' · ×1

Unlisted import '@eslint/js' eslint.config.mjs:1 — Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import 'express' · ×1

Unlisted import 'express' src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:35 — Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident.

R9 · Circular Imports · Import cycle (2 files) · ×1

Import cycle (2 files) src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts:2 — src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts → src/infrastructure/entities/profile.entity.ts → src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts

Serious — 102 finding(s)

R11 · Import Boundaries · Boundary violation [layered · ×18

Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:1 — src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:1 imports src/api/controllers/profile.controller.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:2 — src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:2 imports src/api/dto/create-profile.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/application.module.ts:3 — src/application/application.module.ts:3 imports src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:17 — src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:17 imports src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:18 — src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:18 imports src/infrastructure/entities/auth.entity.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:19 — src/application/auth/auth.module.ts:19 imports src/infrastructure/repository/auth.repository.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/auth/command/create-auth-user.command.ts:1 — src/application/auth/command/create-auth-user.command.ts:1 imports src/api/dto/auth/register-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:5 — src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:5 imports src/infrastructure/database/database.module.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:6 — src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:6 imports src/infrastructure/entities/profile.entity.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:7 — src/application/profile/profile.module.ts:7 imports src/infrastructure/repository/profile.repository.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/services/auth.service.ts:14 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:14 imports src/api/dto/auth/login-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/services/auth.service.ts:15 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:15 imports src/api/dto/auth/mobile-apple-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/services/auth.service.ts:16 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:16 imports src/api/dto/auth/mobile-google-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/services/auth.service.ts:17 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:17 imports src/api/dto/auth/register-auth.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/services/profile.service.ts:3 — src/application/services/profile.service.ts:3 imports src/api/dto/create-profile.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/application/services/response.service.ts:3 — src/application/services/response.service.ts:3 imports src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:1 — src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:1 imports src/application/services/logger.service.ts against the layered-src rules.
Boundary violation [layered:upward-import] src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:2 — src/domain/__test__/profile.service.spec.ts:2 imports src/application/services/profile.service.ts against the layered-src rules.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×13

REDACTED
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R4 · Test Coverage · No test reaches this file · ×5

No test reaches this file src/main.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
No test reaches this file src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
No test reaches this file src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
No test reaches this file src/application/middlewere/request-id.middlerware.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
No test reaches this file src/infrastructure/entities/base/base.entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×4

Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/auth.service.ts:307 — `axios.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/auth.service.ts:322 — `axios.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:144 — `axios.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Outbound HTTP without resilience src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:217 — `axios.get(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) · ×4

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:178 — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:178 · src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:196 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts:25 — src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts:25 · src/api/dto/common/api-response.dto.ts:62 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/application/auth/sagas/registration.saga.ts:12 — src/application/auth/sagas/registration.saga.ts:12 · src/application/auth/sagas/registration.saga.ts:32 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/application/services/logger.service.ts:11 — src/application/services/logger.service.ts:11 · src/application/services/logger.service.ts:23 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×3

Deprecated: prom-client package.json:61 — prom-client 15.1.3, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "prom-client has been replaced by @prometheus-io/client". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
Deprecated: uuid package.json:67 — uuid 10.0.0, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "uuid@10 and below is no longer supported. For ESM codebases, update to uuid@latest. For CommonJS codebases, use uuid@11 (but be aware this version will likely be deprecated in 2028).". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
Deprecated: eslint package.json:86 — eslint 9.37.0, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This version is no longer supported. Please see https://eslint.org/version-support for other options.". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Fake-async · ×3

Fake-async — async method never awaits src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:148 — `googleAuth` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.
Fake-async — async method never awaits src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:28 — `initializeJWKS` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.
Fake-async — async method never awaits src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:33 — `initializeJWKS` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async function without AbortSignal · ×3

Async function without AbortSignal: validateAuthorizationCode src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:113 — `validateAuthorizationCode` awaits `axios.post(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.post(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: getUserInfoFromAccessToken src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:206 — `getUserInfoFromAccessToken` awaits `axios.get(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.get(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: handleGoogleRedirect src/application/services/auth.service.ts:298 — `handleGoogleRedirect` awaits `axios.post(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.post(url, { signal })`.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×2

Anemic entity: AuthUser src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:3 — `AuthUser` is an aggregate/entity with 11 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
Anemic entity: Profile src/domain/entities/Profile.ts:1 — `Profile` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.

DM5 · Encapsulated state · Mutable entity · ×2

Mutable entity: AuthUser src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:3 — `AuthUser` exposes publicly writable state (email, password, googleId, appleId, role, currentHashedRefreshToken, and 4 more).
Mutable entity: Profile src/domain/entities/Profile.ts:1 — `Profile` exposes publicly writable state (name, lastname, age, createdAt, updatedAt, deletedAt).

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · LoggerMiddleware.use (cyclomatic 23) · ×1

LoggerMiddleware.use (cyclomatic 23) src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:13 — LoggerMiddleware.use has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 23 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 25). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19) · ×1

AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19) src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:47 — AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19) · ×1

JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19) src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:53 — JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cyclomatic 16) · ×1

ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cyclomatic 16) src/application/filters/api-exception.filter.ts:16 — ApiExceptionFilter.catch has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cognitive 29) · ×1

AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken (cognitive 29) src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:47 — AppleTokenValidationService.validateIdToken has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), boolean chains 5, ternaries 2 (5 pts), error handling 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · LoggerMiddleware.use (cognitive 28) · ×1

LoggerMiddleware.use (cognitive 28) src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:13 — LoggerMiddleware.use has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (16 pts), boolean chains 10, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 5). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 28 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 25). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cognitive 27) · ×1

JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken (cognitive 27) src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:53 — JWKSTokenValidationService.verifyIdToken has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (20 pts), boolean chains 3, ternaries 2 (3 pts), error handling 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cognitive 18) · ×1

ApiExceptionFilter.catch (cognitive 18) src/application/filters/api-exception.filter.ts:16 — ApiExceptionFilter.catch has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (14 pts), match/switch 1 (3 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1

ClassTooLong: AuthService src/application/services/auth.service.ts:46 — ClassTooLong — 467 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 18 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 67 over it, 1.17× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1

FileTooLong: services/auth.service.ts src/application/services/auth.service.ts — FileTooLong — 511 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 91% of them inside a single declaration: AuthService (47-798). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 11 over it, 1.02× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×1

REDACTED

P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1

No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

P5 · DR & Backup · No DR/backup evidence · ×1

No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (101 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (101 lines × 2 locations) src/application/services/auth.service.ts:477 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:477 · src/application/services/auth.service.ts:607 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (87 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block with local edits (87 matched lines × 2 locations) src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:22 — src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:22 · src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:27 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 511 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (59 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block with local edits (59 matched lines × 2 locations) src/infrastructure/repository/auth.repository.ts:8 — src/infrastructure/repository/auth.repository.ts:8 · src/infrastructure/repository/profile.repository.ts:9 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 381 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (36 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (36 lines × 2 locations) src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:10 — src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:10 · src/application/auth/command/handler/create-google-auth-user.handler.ts:10 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (24 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block with local edits (24 matched lines × 2 locations) src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:87 — src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:87 · src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:159 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 93 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 3 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (13 lines × 3 locations) src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:8 — src/application/auth/command/handler/create-apple-auth-user.handler.ts:8 · src/application/auth/command/handler/create-auth-user.handler.ts:7 · src/application/auth/command/handler/create-google-auth-user.handler.ts:8 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2 locations) src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:257 — src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:257 · src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:274 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:8 — src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:8 · src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts:28 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 3 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 3 locations) src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:119 — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:119 · src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:179 · src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:197 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:61 — src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:61 · src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:69 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (6 lines × 3 locations) src/application/services/auth.service.ts:168 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts:168 · src/application/services/auth.service.ts:535 · src/application/services/auth.service.ts:665 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2 locations) src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:185 — src/api/controllers/auth.controller.ts:185 · src/api/controllers/profile.controller.ts:96 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the SHAPE of this repetition could not be determined. It is not a run of declarations, a listing, a declaration header, a type body or a slice through a construct — and it was not measured as a run of executable statements either, so this row cannot tell you whether a function can stand where these lines are. Read the two spans before acting, because the move is opposite in the two cases. Where they are statements, the ordinary answer holds: give the shared part one home and call it from each site. Where they turn out to be declarations, a literal's entries, or the cases of an enumeration, there is no call site to call anything from, and collapsing them would delete what each copy pins — a shared base type, a generated set, or one exported constant each site refers to is the move instead, and sometimes the honest answer is that there is nothing to extract at all. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is true whichever of those they are.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 29) · ×1

Complex function validateIdToken (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 29) src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:47 — validateIdToken has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 29; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 26) · ×1

Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 26) src/application/middlewere/logger.middleware.ts:25 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 26; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 26) · ×1

Complex function verifyIdToken (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 26) src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:53 — verifyIdToken has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 26; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function (top-level) (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 17) · ×1

Complex function (top-level) (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 17) REDACTED:1 — (top-level) has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 17; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function mobileGoogleAuth (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 13) · ×1

Complex function mobileGoogleAuth (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 13) src/application/services/auth.service.ts:347 — mobileGoogleAuth has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function validateAuthorizationCode (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 15) · ×1

Complex function validateAuthorizationCode (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 15) src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts:113 — validateAuthorizationCode has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 15; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function validateMobileOAuthData (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) · ×1

Complex function validateMobileOAuthData (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts:192 — validateMobileOAuthData has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R3 · Large Files · src/application/services/auth.service.ts · ×1

src/application/services/auth.service.ts: 684 lines of code src/application/services/auth.service.ts:1 — src/application/services/auth.service.ts has 684 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~47 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~47 LoC) src/infrastructure/utils/encryption.util.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 10 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~22 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~22 LoC) src/infrastructure/database/database.providers.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 10 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~20 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~20 LoC) src/application/middlewere/request-id.middlerware.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 10 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~12 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~12 LoC) src/infrastructure/entities/base/base.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 10 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@godaddy/terminus' · ×1

Unused dependency '@godaddy/terminus' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@nestjs/event-emitter' · ×1

Unused dependency '@nestjs/event-emitter' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'moment' · ×1

Unused dependency 'moment' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) · ×1

Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/application/services/auth.service.ts:107 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.

Minor — 38 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×3

Outdated (npm): @nestjs/axios package.json:32 — @nestjs/axios is pinned at 4.0.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/event-emitter package.json:36 — @nestjs/event-emitter is pinned at 3.0.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): uuid package.json:67 — uuid is pinned at 10.0.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 14.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids · Primitive id on a domain type · ×3

Primitive id on a domain type: AuthUser.googleId src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:7 — `AuthUser.googleId` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: AuthUser.appleId src/domain/entities/Auth.ts:8 — `AuthUser.appleId` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: Profile.authId src/domain/entities/Profile.ts:3 — `Profile.authId` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that.

X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×3

Duplicated predicate src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts:170 — `!payload.sub || String(payload.sub).trim() === ''` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/application/services/apple-token-validation.service.ts, src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:114 — `error instanceof UnauthorizedException || error instanceof BadRequestException` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts, src/application/services/mobile-token-validation.service.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate src/application/services/mobile-oauth-config.service.ts:115 — `platform === 'ios' || platform === 'android'` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/application/services/mobile-oauth-config.service.ts, src/domain/services/auth-domain.service.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2

Deprecated: glob REDACTED:1695 — glob 7.2.3 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Old versions of glob are not supported, and contain widely publicized security vulnerabilities, which have been fixed in the current version. Please update. Support for old versions may be purchased (at exorbitant rates) by contacting i@izs.me". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: inflight REDACTED:1782 — inflight 1.0.6 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This module is not supported, and leaks memory. Do not use it. Check out lru-cache if you want a good and tested way to coalesce async requests by a key value, which is much more comprehensive and powerful.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

P2 · Observability · Console output used as the logging channel · ×1

Console output used as the logging channel src/application/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts:12 — `src/application/interceptors/logging.interceptor.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 12 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'AuthenticatedRequest' · ×1

Unused export 'AuthenticatedRequest' src/application/interfaces/authenticated-request.interface.ts:12 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'JWKSTokenValidationResult' · ×1

Unused export 'JWKSTokenValidationResult' src/application/services/jwks-token-validation.service.ts:14 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'Context' · ×1

Unused export 'Context' src/application/services/logger.service.ts:4 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'SERVICE' · ×1

Unused export 'SERVICE' REDACTED:8 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'DATABASE_SERVICE' · ×1

Unused export 'DATABASE_SERVICE' REDACTED:9 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'APP_NAME' · ×1

Unused export 'APP_NAME' REDACTED:13 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'POSTGRES_PORT' · ×1

Unused export 'POSTGRES_PORT' REDACTED:22 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GOOGLE_IOS_CLIENT_ID' · ×1

Unused export 'GOOGLE_IOS_CLIENT_ID' REDACTED:39 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GOOGLE_ANDROID_CLIENT_ID' · ×1

Unused export 'GOOGLE_ANDROID_CLIENT_ID' REDACTED:40 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GOOGLE_MOBILE_CALLBACK_IOS_URL' · ×1

Unused export 'GOOGLE_MOBILE_CALLBACK_IOS_URL' REDACTED:41 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GOOGLE_MOBILE_CALLBACK_ANDROID_URL' · ×1

Unused export 'GOOGLE_MOBILE_CALLBACK_ANDROID_URL' REDACTED:43 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GRAFANA_USER' · ×1

Unused export 'GRAFANA_USER' REDACTED:73 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GRAFANA_PASSWORD' · ×1

Unused export 'GRAFANA_PASSWORD' REDACTED:74 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'PROMETHEUS_PORT' · ×1

Unused export 'PROMETHEUS_PORT' REDACTED:77 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'GRAFANA_PORT' · ×1

Unused export 'GRAFANA_PORT' REDACTED:81 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Test-only dependency 'lodash' in production deps · ×1

Test-only dependency 'lodash' in production deps package.json:53 — Only test files import it (first: src/application/__test__/profile.controller.spec.ts:9) — move it to devDependencies.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×1

No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/main.ts:53 — `app.listen(…)` serves plain HTTP on a network address, and nothing in its package enforces HTTPS: no TLS served (`https.createServer`, Fastify `https`, Nest `httpsOptions`), no redirect of plain requests to `https://`, no `Strict-Transport-Security` (helmet sends it by default), and no TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside it — so a browser may talk to it in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal · ×1

Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal — Only 0/3 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks · ×1

Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks — 0/1 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.

Minor — 22 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×22

Outdated (npm): @nestjs/common — @nestjs/common is pinned at 11.1.6; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/core — @nestjs/core is pinned at 11.1.6; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/cqrs — @nestjs/cqrs is pinned at 11.0.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.1.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/jwt — @nestjs/jwt is pinned at 11.0.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/passport — @nestjs/passport is pinned at 11.0.5; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/platform-express — @nestjs/platform-express is pinned at 11.1.6; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/swagger — @nestjs/swagger is pinned at 11.2.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/terminus — @nestjs/terminus is pinned at 11.0.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.1.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/throttler — @nestjs/throttler is pinned at 6.4.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 6.7.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @nestjs/typeorm — @nestjs/typeorm is pinned at 11.0.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 12.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @types/uuid — @types/uuid is pinned at 10.0.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 11.0.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @willsoto/nestjs-prometheus — @willsoto/nestjs-prometheus is pinned at 6.0.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.0.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): axios — axios is pinned at 1.12.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.20.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): class-validator — class-validator is pinned at 0.14.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 0.15.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): dotenv — dotenv is pinned at 16.6.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 18.0.8 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): jose — jose is pinned at 6.1.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 6.2.13 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): lodash — lodash is pinned at 4.17.21; registry.npmjs.org publishes 4.18.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): module-alias — module-alias is pinned at 2.2.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 2.3.4 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): moment — moment is pinned at 2.30.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 2.31.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): pg — pg is pinned at 8.16.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.23.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): rimraf — rimraf is pinned at 6.0.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 6.1.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): typeorm — typeorm is pinned at 0.3.27; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.1.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a48155057f78435aa483c2b2bc11e179/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a48155057f78435aa483c2b2bc11e179/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	3	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	42	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	6	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a163ba-c8e9-7773-92b4-962e117b3ed7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 57% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 63% · Adequate · gated by R11 ·

At a glance — Maturity · 65% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Critical · gated by R8, P1, P3, P5, P7 ·

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D30, C1 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 48% · Weak · gated by DM4, DM5, DM2 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts