Public report — unity-mcp, published 5 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
147findings with an exact file:lineof 161 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
24/95dimensions across the health lenses91658 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
CoplayDev/unity-mcp is sound in substance but carries real gaps (61%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (98%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (97%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (46%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (66%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene); `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Medium (~91,658 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~4.3 person-years (~2–9 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (98%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €200,000–€1,000,000
This codebase represents roughly ~4.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€620,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 46% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — high decision density × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~4.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 46%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Architecture — module dependency matrix
94 modules, 7 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
16
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a tested disaster recovery plan by documenting recovery time objectives and restore procedures. Next, ensure every release is traceable by stamping version numbers in build manifests or tags. Then, improve deployment reliability by adding health checks to services and maintaining immutable image tags to simplify rollbacks. After that, document significant architectural decisions in a centralized location to preserve context and consequences. Finally, update the root README with a quick-start section to help new contributors understand how to build and run the project.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 23 of 24 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 24 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 147 of 161 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 31 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
1153 test methods: 1153 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Tests co-located / outside the solution
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
54 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is MCPForUnity/Editor/Tools/ManageTexture.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×47.github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:37detected by semgrep finding
Medium: python-logger-credential-disclosure · ×3Server/src/services/api_key_service.py:160detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 47 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (14), action.yml (10), beta-release.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (47 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with api_key_service.py (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
135 of 326 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is MCPForUnity/Editor/External/Tommy.cs.
Resolve the 3 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Tommy.cs, SkillSyncService.cs, ScriptUtilityService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6Server/uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2Server/uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]Server/uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2132 · ×7Server/uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.5 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets — this tree has no MSBuild project file, so CodeQL's csharp pack (which traces a build) and NuGet security analyzers (which are referenced from a project) have nothing to attach to as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets — this tree has no MSBuild project file, so CodeQL's csharp pack (which traces a build) and NuGet security analyzers (which are referenced from a project) have nothing to attach to — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.cs, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (75 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:44— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:56— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:69— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:77— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:89— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:99— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-docker/action.yml:102— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-pypi/action.yml:7— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `astral-sh/setup-uv@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/astral-sh/setup-uv/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/publish-pypi/action.yml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@v1.12.4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish/commits/v1.12.4 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.12.4` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/beta-release.yml:20— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/beta-release.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/beta-release.yml:168— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/beta-release.yml:174— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `astral-sh/setup-uv@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/astral-sh/setup-uv/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/beta-release.yml:239— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish/commits/release/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-nl-suite.yml:44— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-nl-suite.yml:49— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `astral-sh/setup-uv@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/astral-sh/setup-uv/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-nl-suite.yml:1634— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: mikepenz/action-junit-report@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `mikepenz/action-junit-report@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/mikepenz/action-junit-report/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-nl-suite.yml:1649— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/claude-nl-suite.yml:1669— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: game-ci/unity-return-license@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `game-ci/unity-return-license@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/game-ci/unity-return-license/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/compile-check.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs-deploy.yml:46— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs-deploy.yml:57— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs-deploy.yml:69— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/configure-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/configure-pages@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/configure-pages/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs-deploy.yml:82— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
+ 22 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×6
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— jaraco-context 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — jaraco-context is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package jaraco-context`)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— mcp 1.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.27.2. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mcp 1.25.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.28.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.28.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against mcp 1.25.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— pyjwt 2.10.1: [GHSA redacted] — pyjwt is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package pyjwt`)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against pyjwt 2.10.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.13.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.13.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against pyjwt 2.10.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2025-183, PYSEC-2026-177.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— python-multipart 0.0.21: [GHSA redacted] — python-multipart is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package python-multipart`)). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against python-multipart 0.0.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.0.31 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.0.31 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against python-multipart 0.0.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2026-3037, PYSEC-2026-3040, PYSEC-2026-3041.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— starlette 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted] — starlette is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package starlette`)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against starlette 0.50.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.3.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.3.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against starlette 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2026-248.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— urllib3 2.6.3: [GHSA redacted] — urllib3 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package urllib3`)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against urllib3 2.6.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Orphaned knowledge MCPForUnity/Editor/External/Tommy.cs— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge MCPForUnity/Editor/Setup/SkillSyncService.cs— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge TestProjects/AssetStoreUploads/Packages/com.unity.asset-store-tools/Editor/Validator/Scripts/Services/Validation/ScriptUtilityService.cs— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— authlib 1.6.6: [GHSA redacted] — authlib is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package authlib`)). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against authlib 1.6.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.6.12 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.6.12 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against authlib 1.6.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— fastmcp 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.0. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against fastmcp 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 Server/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— cryptography 46.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cryptography is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package cryptography`)). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cryptography 46.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 46.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 46.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against cryptography 46.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2026-35.
Change coupling: manage_asset.py ↔ manage_gameobject.py Server/src/services/tools/manage_asset.py— `Server/src/services/tools/manage_asset.py` and `Server/src/services/tools/manage_gameobject.py` change together 62% of the time (8 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: CodexConfigHelper.cs ↔ ConfigJsonBuilder.cs MCPForUnity/Editor/Helpers/CodexConfigHelper.cs— `MCPForUnity/Editor/Helpers/CodexConfigHelper.cs` and `MCPForUnity/Editor/Helpers/ConfigJsonBuilder.cs` change together 58% of the time (7 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ConfigJsonBuilder.cs ↔ McpClientConfigSection.cs MCPForUnity/Editor/Helpers/ConfigJsonBuilder.cs— `MCPForUnity/Editor/Helpers/ConfigJsonBuilder.cs` and `MCPForUnity/Editor/Windows/Components/ClientConfig/McpClientConfigSection.cs` change together 50% of the time (9 of the 18 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: McpClientConfigSection.cs ↔ EditorPrefsWindow.cs MCPForUnity/Editor/Windows/Components/ClientConfig/McpClientConfigSection.cs— `MCPForUnity/Editor/Windows/Components/ClientConfig/McpClientConfigSection.cs` and `MCPForUnity/Editor/Windows/EditorPrefs/EditorPrefsWindow.cs` change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ServerManagementService.cs ↔ EditorPrefsWindow.cs MCPForUnity/Editor/Services/ServerManagementService.cs— `MCPForUnity/Editor/Services/ServerManagementService.cs` and `MCPForUnity/Editor/Windows/EditorPrefs/EditorPrefsWindow.cs` change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: manage_gameobject.py ↔ manage_material.py Server/src/services/tools/manage_gameobject.py— `Server/src/services/tools/manage_gameobject.py` and `Server/src/services/tools/manage_material.py` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: manage_components.py ↔ manage_gameobject.py Server/src/services/tools/manage_components.py— `Server/src/services/tools/manage_components.py` and `Server/src/services/tools/manage_gameobject.py` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: debug_request_context.py ↔ set_active_instance.py Server/src/services/tools/debug_request_context.py— `Server/src/services/tools/debug_request_context.py` and `Server/src/services/tools/set_active_instance.py` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×7
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2132 Server/uv.lock— click 8.3.1: PYSEC-2026-2132 — upgrade to 8.3.3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— idna 3.11: [GHSA redacted] — idna is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package idna`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— pydantic-settings 2.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — pydantic-settings is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package pydantic-settings`)).
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2987 Server/uv.lock— pygments 2.19.2: PYSEC-2026-2987 — pygments is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package pygments`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— pytest 9.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares pytest 8.0.0, but the vulnerable 9.0.2 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own pytest entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package pytest`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— python-dotenv 1.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — python-dotenv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package python-dotenv`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Server/uv.lock— requests 2.32.5: [GHSA redacted] — requests is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package requests`)).
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/asset.py:153— Server/src/cli/commands/asset.py:153-161 | Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:616-624 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/batch.py:60— Server/src/cli/commands/batch.py:60-68 | Server/src/cli/commands/batch.py:108-116 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/code.py:249— Server/src/cli/commands/code.py:249-257 | Server/src/services/tools/find_in_file.py:154-164 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_prefabs.py:131— Server/src/services/tools/manage_prefabs.py:131-141 | Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:538-546 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:263— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:263-272 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:275-283 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1272— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1272-1280 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1359-1367 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1272` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/physics.py:253— Server/src/cli/commands/physics.py:253-258 | Server/src/cli/commands/physics.py:434-439 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:122— Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:122-127 | Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:134-141 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/find_in_file.py:110— Server/src/services/tools/find_in_file.py:110-115 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:134-139 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:455— Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:455-460 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:496-501 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_texture.py:129— Server/src/services/tools/manage_texture.py:129-134 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_texture.py:349-354 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/component.py:99— Server/src/cli/commands/component.py:99-112 | Server/src/cli/commands/component.py:202-216 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:23— Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:23-36 | Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:66-79 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:322— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:322-335 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:340-353 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Server/src/transport/unity_instance_middleware.py:240— Server/src/transport/unity_instance_middleware.py:240-253 | Server/src/transport/unity_instance_middleware.py:278-291 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/graphics.py:477— Server/src/cli/commands/graphics.py:477-481 | Server/src/cli/commands/physics.py:404-408 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_editor.py:56— Server/src/services/tools/manage_editor.py:56-60 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_gameobject.py:321-325 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1038— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1038-1042 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1184-1188 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) tools/stress_editor_state.py:31— tools/stress_editor_state.py:31-35 | tools/stress_mcp.py:23-28 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Medium: python-logger-credential-disclosure Server/src/services/api_key_service.py:160— Detected a python logger call with a potential hardcoded secret "API key validation returned status %d for key %s" being logged. This may lead to secret credentials being exposed. Make sure that the logger is not logging sensitive information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: python-logger-credential-disclosure Server/src/services/api_key_service.py:174— Detected a python logger call with a potential hardcoded secret "API key validation timeout for key %s, retrying..." being logged. This may lead to secret credentials being exposed. Make sure that the logger is not logging sensitive information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: python-logger-credential-disclosure Server/src/services/api_key_service.py:180— Detected a python logger call with a potential hardcoded secret "API key validation timeout for key %s after %d attempts" being logged. This may lead to secret credentials being exposed. Make sure that the logger is not logging sensitive information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:743— Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:743-761 | Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:773-792 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/prefab.py:101— Server/src/cli/commands/prefab.py:101-119 | Server/src/cli/commands/prefab.py:147-166 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/find_in_file.py:17— Server/src/services/tools/find_in_file.py:17-35 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:20-38 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:149— Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:149-159 | Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:426-436 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/packages.py:21— Server/src/cli/commands/packages.py:21-33 | Server/src/cli/commands/packages.py:134-144 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_texture.py:302— Server/src/services/tools/manage_texture.py:302-312 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_texture.py:325-336 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/script.py:102— Server/src/cli/commands/script.py:102-111 | Server/src/cli/commands/script.py:149-158 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_prefabs.py:157— Server/src/services/tools/manage_prefabs.py:157-166 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_ui.py:231-244 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:162— Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:162-171 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:228-237 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/build.py:206— Server/src/cli/commands/build.py:206-212 | Server/src/cli/commands/packages.py:54-60 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:596— Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:596-602 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_shader.py:61-67 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Server/src/services/tools/manage_script.py:596` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:327— Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:327-333 | Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:388-394 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:405— Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:405-428 | Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:467-490 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_graphics.py:130— Server/src/services/tools/manage_graphics.py:130-163 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_profiler.py:80-103 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Server/src/services/tools/manage_graphics.py:130` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/asset.py:112— Server/src/cli/commands/asset.py:112-133 | Server/src/cli/commands/material.py:54-75 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/ui.py:99— Server/src/cli/commands/ui.py:99-120 | Server/src/cli/commands/ui.py:220-241 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Server/src/cli/commands/ui.py:99` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:79— Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:79-98 | Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:263-283 | Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:685-704 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:270— Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:270-290 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:302-324 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:382-401 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/prefab.py:50— Server/src/cli/commands/prefab.py:50-68 | Server/src/cli/commands/scene.py:259-276 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:965— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:965-983 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1128-1145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:44— Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:44-56 | Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:87-99 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:87— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:87-100 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:212-224 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:357— Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:357-369 | Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:437-448 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Server/src/cli/commands/texture.py:357` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:125— Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:125-136 | Server/src/core/telemetry_decorator.py:150-161 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:120— Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:120-129 | Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:150-159 | Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:427-436 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) Server/src/services/tools/manage_scene.py:104— Server/src/services/tools/manage_scene.py:104-117 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_ui.py:199-208 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_ui.py:235-246 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1015— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1015-1022 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1159-1167 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1074— Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1074-1081 | Server/src/services/tools/script_apply_edits.py:1231-1239 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1179.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 46 floating ref(s) across 12 workflow file(s), 3 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 2 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (python-tests.yml, docs-generate.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 9 sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 3 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): e2e-bridge.yml: /opt/unity/Editor/Unity -batchmode -nographics -logFile - -username "$UNITY_EMAIL" -password "$UNITY_PASSWORD" -serial "$UNITY_SERIAL" -quit || true; claude-nl-suite.yml: /opt/unity/Editor/Unity -batchmode -nographics -logFile - -username "$UNITY_EMAIL" -password "$UNITY_PASSWORD" -serial "$UNITY_SERIAL" -quit || true; claude-nl-suite.yml: /opt/unity/Editor/Unity -batchmode -nographics -logFile - -username "$UNITY_EMAIL" -password "$UNITY_PASSWORD" -quit || true. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Duplicated block (28 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_animation.py:63— Server/src/services/tools/manage_animation.py:63-90 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_vfx.py:75-106 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (27 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/manage_camera.py:130— Server/src/services/tools/manage_camera.py:130-156 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_probuilder.py:126-155 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/scene.py:174— Server/src/cli/commands/scene.py:174-202 | Server/src/cli/commands/script.py:48-73 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/gameobject.py:142— Server/src/cli/commands/gameobject.py:142-166 | Server/src/cli/commands/gameobject.py:286-313 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (23 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/gameobject.py:471— Server/src/cli/commands/gameobject.py:471-496 | Server/src/cli/commands/material.py:170-194 | Server/src/cli/commands/material.py:217-239 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/asset_gen.py:59— Server/src/cli/commands/asset_gen.py:59-86 | Server/src/cli/commands/asset_gen.py:174-200 | Server/src/cli/commands/asset_gen.py:219-240 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:269— Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:269-290 | Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:300-320 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 6) Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:159— Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:159-180 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:264-282 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:365-384 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:397-416 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:429-448 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:523-543 — all 6 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 5) Server/src/services/tools/generate_audio.py:56— Server/src/services/tools/generate_audio.py:56-79 | Server/src/services/tools/generate_image.py:60-88 | Server/src/services/tools/generate_model.py:59-88 | Server/src/services/tools/import_model.py:58-84 | Server/src/services/tools/import_model_file.py:54-72 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 4) Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:195— Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:195-221 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:233-254 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:494-512 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:580-598 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:715— Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:715-734 | Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:804-822 | Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:834-855 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) Server/src/services/tools/find_gameobjects.py:110— Server/src/services/tools/find_gameobjects.py:110-126 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_components.py:140-156 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Server/src/cli/commands/code.py:135— Server/src/cli/commands/code.py:135-149 | Server/src/cli/commands/script.py:107-121 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:557— Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:557-570 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:607-620 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:649-662 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:85— Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:85-102 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:115-126 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:158-169 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:180-191 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 6) Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:58— Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:58-75 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:138-148 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:211-227 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:333-343 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:362-372 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:410-420 — all 6 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:22— Server/src/cli/commands/animation.py:22-32 | Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:21-31 | Server/src/cli/commands/probuilder.py:34-44 | Server/src/cli/commands/vfx.py:23-33 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:215— Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:215-225 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_animation.py:94-104 | Server/src/services/tools/manage_scene.py:123-134 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Server/src/cli/commands/camera.py:215` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) Server/src/cli/commands/build.py:59— Server/src/cli/commands/build.py:59-64 | Server/src/cli/commands/build.py:208-213 | Server/src/cli/commands/packages.py:56-61 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 4) Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:155— Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:155-159 | Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:166-170 | Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:188-192 | Server/src/services/tools/utils.py:202-206 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository's production source is C#, but it contains no MSBuild project file (no `.csproj`/`.sln`) — a build-less C# tree, e.g. a Unity/Godot package whose project files the editor generates, or a scripts-only repo — so there was nothing for the collector to restore, build or run. This is a limitation of what we can read, not a defect in the repo: coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. To have it read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference (.NET: C#, VB.NET and F# alike), lcov — `swift test --enable-code-coverage` or `xcodebuild -enableCodeCoverage YES` then `xcrun llvm-cov export -format=lcov` (Swift/Xcode), `cargo llvm-cov --lcov`, `go test -coverprofile`, `rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` or covertool (Erlang/BEAM), `flutter test --coverage` or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov` (Dart/Flutter), `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport` via sbt-scoverage (Scala/sbt), jest/nyc, JaCoCo/Cobertura XML, coverage.py … most ecosystems' coverage tools can emit one) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored and real coverage will be read.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.py, .mjs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (34199 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 50 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: MCPForUnity/Editor/Tools/UnityReflect.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Services/AssetGen/AssetGenJobManager.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Windows/Components/AssetGen/McpAssetGenSection.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Tools/Physics/PhysicsMaterialOps.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Tools/Vfx/VfxGraphAssets.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Tools/CommandRegistry.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Tools/Vfx/ParticleWrite.cs, MCPForUnity/Editor/Helpers/RenderPipelineUtility.cs (+42 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 3 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (54 single-owned of 326 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #2 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #3 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #4 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
Low IaC: DS-0026 Server/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 132 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (135 orphaned of 326 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 3 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution· Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
Tests co-located / outside the solution — 1153 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
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Run 019fd17d-7362-7142-a984-2ede84e9a9b2 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 60 · Warnings: 91 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 3 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 05-08-2026 @ 10:34 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.