Public report — Insightify, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
137findings with an exact file:lineof 271 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
83/110dimensions across the health lenses7253 LoC · 23 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
DEVids-VT/Insightify carries serious risk (39%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (37%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate (Security & performance tooling); 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene (Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: Small (~7,253 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label src/Web/Insightify.MVC/Insightify.MVC/Views/Posts/Create.cshtml
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
~15 LoC unreachable (1 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — microservices, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
148 modules, 154 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 63% · Adequate · gated by X4
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
87
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
17
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a formal disaster recovery plan by codifying backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code, ensuring clear recovery time and point objectives. Next, enable automated dependency scanning and review gates to improve security and performance tooling. Then, address the four deprecated and four vulnerable dependencies to improve overall hygiene. Finally, implement a health check for the served compose service and ensure immutable image tags to facilitate reliable rollbacks.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 80 of 83 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 83 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 137 of 271 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
26 test methods: 26 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 3 mock references across 30 tests.
Mock framework: Moq · ×3
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The Insightify documentation is a mixed bag: the README for the crypto microservice gives an impressive short description with awards, key features, and a presentation link plus an application diagram, but it also clips mid-sentence in the 'Key features' section. The Angular CLI project README covers development server, code scaffolding, unit/e2e test commands, and links to further help, while the Open Iconic README is complete (description, what's in it, getting started with SVGs and sprite usage) but ends in a clipped clip marker mid-sentence ('Sizing icons only needs basic CSS...'). The Insightify.SPA project README is long and mostly scaffolding content. Coverage across all Insightify projects is zero for the named ones and low for others (e.g., 4% for Insights.BackgroundTasks, 0% for NewsAPI).
The Open Iconic README ends in a clipped clip marker mid-sentence ('Sizing icons only needs basic CSS...') rather than stating the license or how to use it on Bootstrap/Foundation.Web/Insightify.SPA/wwwroot/css/open-iconic/README.md
Resolve the 1 The Open Iconic README ends in a clipped clip marker mid-sentence… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Typo in namespace prefix: 'Insighify' instead of 'Insightify'. This appears in multiple symbols under the FinancialDataApi models. · ×3
What to do
Resolve the 3 Typo in namespace prefix finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
97 % of calls cross a namespace and 7 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2src/Services/Insightify.NewsAPI/Insightify.NewsBackgroundTasks/appsettings.json:10detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json, docker-compose.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×49.github/workflows/financial-data-bgt.yml:22detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorizationsrc/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Controllers/HomeController.cs:7detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 49 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with financial-data-bgt.yml (5), financial-data.yml (5), gateway.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (49 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with HomeController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×9src/Gateways/Insightify.Web.Gateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: DS-0011src/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×7src/Gateways/Insightify.Web.Gateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 9 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
39 of 39 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Web/Insightify.MVC/Insightify.MVC/Models/FinancialData/CryptoCurrencyModel.cs.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×41src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 41 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (41). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (41 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
0 of 644 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×10) — Profile.cshtml:24, Currency.cshtml:6, Crypto.razor:4, …
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×7) — Profile.cshtml:26, ViewPost.cshtml:44, ViewPost.cshtml:45, …
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — Create.cshtml:19, ViewPost.cshtml:53
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — Create.cshtml:20
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×5) — Profile.cshtml:57, Index.cshtml:39, Index.razor:21, …
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — _HomeLayout.cshtml:2
user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — index.html:6
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×18) — Currency.cshtml:41, Currency.cshtml:42, Index.cshtml:48, …
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — NavMenu.razor:11
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
`.account-menu:hover` sets color: #ad5adc on background-color: #ecdff5 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — LoginDisplay.razor.css:21
`.top-row .top-row-left .top-row-item:hover` sets color: #ad5adc on background-color: #ecdff5 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — MainLayout.razor.css:30
`.nav-item ::deep a:hover` sets color: #ad5adc on background-color: #ecdff5 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — NavMenu.razor.css:48
`.links .link-item:hover` sets color: #ad5adc on background-color: #ecdff5 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×2) — Crypto.razor.css:125, crypto.css:142
`.post-container .post-header .post-header-buttons .report-btn` sets color: white on background-color: #C864F7 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — create-post.css:224
`.posts-container .sections-container .section-posts .post-container .post-header .post-header-buttons .follow-btn` sets color: white on background-color: #C864F7 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — feed.css:90
`.direct-message-item:hover` sets color: rgb(121, 120, 120) on background-color: #f0f0f0 — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — layout.css:151
`body` sets color: #D1D5DB on background-color: white — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — site.css:10
`.post-container-main .post-content-container .post-content-data .post-hashtags .hashtag` sets color: white on background-color: #ba46d7 — 4.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — view-post-page.css:128
`button` sets color: white on background-color: #808080 — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — identity.component.css:1
`.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #b649f3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — account.css:51
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IRepository<T>` declares 17 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRepository.cs:8
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
`Insightify.Posts.Application` (production) references the test project `Insightify.Posts.Domain`. Production must never depend on test code — it pulls a unit-test framework and test fixtures into the shipped product and inverts the only correct direction (tests depend on production, never the reverse). Move any shared helper into a production support library, or invert the reference.
`Insightify.Posts.Infrastructure` (production) references the test project `Insightify.Posts.Domain`. Production must never depend on test code — it pulls a unit-test framework and test fixtures into the shipped product and inverts the only correct direction (tests depend on production, never the reverse). Move any shared helper into a production support library, or invert the reference.
`Insightify.Posts.Startup` (production) references the test project `Insightify.Posts.Domain`. Production must never depend on test code — it pulls a unit-test framework and test fixtures into the shipped product and inverts the only correct direction (tests depend on production, never the reverse). Move any shared helper into a production support library, or invert the reference.
What to do
Remove every production → test project reference: extract any shared test helper into a production support library (which the tests reference), or invert the dependency so the test project depends on production — not the reverse.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
[AllowAnonymous] (12) outweighs [Authorize] (6) — review whether the open surface is intended.
What to do
Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×3) — ExceptionHandlingMiddleware.cs:42, Program.cs:52, Program.cs:25
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 23 of 23 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README omits the Angular client application (insightify-client)
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the Angular client application (insightify-client); README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.
275/286 types (96%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 9/13 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 13, 6 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.
What to do
On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. — notification.module.ts
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓
What to do
Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 1 application, 0 tooling and 6 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (1 application, 0 tooling, 6 test roots considered) — notification.module.ts
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:49
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 5/42 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — CryptoDataController.cs:15, CryptoDataController.cs:28, CryptoDataController.cs:41, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — AccountSettingsService.cs:35
`throw e;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack. — NotificationService.cs:35
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×16) — NewsReadService.cs:42, NewsService.cs:37, NewsService.cs:51, …
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
15/16 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
~2.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 84 suppression(s) across the 38478 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 27 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (1 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X8 JS interop contract — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data-bgt.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data-bgt.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data-bgt.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data-bgt.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data-bgt.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/financial-data.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/gateway.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/gateway.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/gateway.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/gateway.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/gateway.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/identity-server.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/identity-server.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/identity-server.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/identity-server.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/identity-server.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/mvc-client.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/mvc-client.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/mvc-client.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/mvc-client.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/mvc-client.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
+ 24 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×41
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @angular/common 16.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 20.3.25. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/common 16.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 16.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @angular/compiler 16.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.18. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/compiler 16.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 16.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @angular/core 16.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.18. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/core 16.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 16.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.20.11: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.20.2: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.17 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.17 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— engine.io 6.4.2: [GHSA redacted] — engine.io is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin engine.io to 6.6.7 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— glob 10.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— immutable 4.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 4.3.9 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against immutable 4.3.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 4.3.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— ip 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; ip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— launch-editor 2.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — launch-editor is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin launch-editor to 2.9.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against launch-editor 2.6.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.14.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.14.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against launch-editor 2.6.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— minimatch 5.1.6: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 5.1.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.1.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.1.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 5.1.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— minimatch 9.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— node-forge 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — node-forge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin node-forge to 1.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against node-forge 1.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against node-forge 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.1.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.1 — AutoMapper 12.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 14 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.1.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.1.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MimeKit 4.1.0 — MimeKit 4.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 7.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.3 — System.Text.Json 7.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0 — System.Text.Json 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.2 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Gateways/Insightify.Web.Gateway/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insighify.FinancialDataApi/Insighify.FinancialDataApi/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insighify.FinancialDataApi/Insightify.FinancialBackgroundTasks/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insightify.NewsAPI/Insightify.NewsAPI/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insightify.NewsAPI/Insightify.NewsBackgroundTasks/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insightify.Notifications/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Services/Insightify.Posts/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Web/Insightify.MVC/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @babel/traverse 7.21.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— crypto-js 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — crypto-js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin crypto-js to 4.2.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— shell-quote 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— tar 6.1.15: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.15, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.15; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.1.15: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 — System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 13 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Critical CVE: Refit 7.0.0 — Refit 7.0.0 (direct) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×2
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 6.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
EmptyCatchBlock src/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Services/AccountSettings/AccountSettingsService.cs:35— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
Critical IaC: DS-0011 src/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Dockerfile— COPY with more than two arguments not ending with slash
Warning — 31 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×19
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: KubernetesClient 4.0.26 — KubernetesClient 4.0.26 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.21.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.21.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.10 — Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.10 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 14 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.21.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.21.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Duende.IdentityServer 6.3.3 — Duende.IdentityServer 6.3.3 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MailKit 4.1.0 — MailKit 4.1.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 — BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 — BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 — BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: KubernetesClient 11.0.44 — KubernetesClient 11.0.44 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.32.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.32.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MimeKit 4.1.0 — MimeKit 4.1.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.32.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.32.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components 7.0.7 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components 7.0.7 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Deprecated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 12.0.1 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `AutoMapper` >= 13.0.0; migrate the reference to it.
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×2
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @babel/helpers 7.21.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/Angular.Client/insightify-client/package-lock.json— @babel/runtime 7.21.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/runtime is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/runtime to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 39 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
Monorepo: only 1 of 4 solutions was scored — This repository contains 4 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `Insightify.sln` — the other 3 (`src/Services/Insighify.FinancialDataApi/Insightify.FinancialBackgroundTasks.sln`, `src/Services/Insightify.NewsAPI/Insightify.NewsAPI.sln`, `src/Web/Insightify.MVC/Insightify.MVC.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization src/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Controllers/HomeController.cs:7— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 49 floating ref(s) across 10 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (10 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Off the main sequence: Insightify.Framework — Insightify.Framework: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Gateways/Insightify.Web.Gateway/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Insighify.FinancialDataApi/Insighify.FinancialDataApi/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Insightify.IdentityAPI/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 5001`, so a request to `localhost:5001` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Insightify.NewsAPI/Insightify.NewsAPI/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Insightify.Notifications/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Insightify.Posts/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Web/Insightify.MVC/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 5030`, so a request to `localhost:5030` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D21 · Naming Consistency· Typo in namespace prefix · ×3
Typo in namespace prefix: 'Insighify' instead of 'Insightify'. This appears in multiple symbols under the FinancialDataApi models. — Rename 'Insighify' to 'Insightify' to match the rest of the codebase. (symbols: Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Large, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Thumb)
Typo in namespace prefix: 'Insigghtify' (double 'g') instead of 'Insightify'. — Rename 'Insigghtify' to 'Insightify' to match the rest of the codebase. (symbols: Insigghtify.Framework.Mongo.Repository<T>.InsertAsync, Insigghtify.Framework.Mongo.Repository<T>.DeleteAsync)
Typo in namespace prefix: 'Insighify' instead of 'Insightify'. This appears in multiple symbols under the FinancialDataApi. — Rename 'Insighify' to 'Insightify' to match the rest of the codebase. (symbols: Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Configuration.UrlsConfig.CryptoCoinsOpperations, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.Image, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.MarketData, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.BitcointalkThreadIdentifier, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.AthChangePercentage, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.PriceChange24hInCurrency.Usd, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.ReposUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.AnnouncementUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.TotalSupply, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Thumb, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.Low24h, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.BitcointalkThreadIdentifier, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.AnnouncementUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.AthChangePercentage, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.PriceChange24hInCurrency.Usd, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.ReposUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.Image, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.MarketData, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Large, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Thumb, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Configuration.UrlsConfig.CryptoCoinsOpperations, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.BitcointalkThreadIdentifier, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.Image, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.MarketData, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.AnnouncementUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.TotalSupply, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Thumb, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.Low24h, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.BitcointalkThreadIdentifier, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links.AnnouncementUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.MarketData.AthChangePercentage, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.PriceChange24hInCurrency.Usd, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.ReposUrl, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Links, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.Image, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.CryptoCurrencyModel.MarketData, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Large, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Models.Image.Thumb, Insighify.FinancialDataApi.Configuration.UrlsConfig.CryptoCoinsOpperations)
Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Insightify.Posts.Startup` with 47 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 99 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.05 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The Open Iconic README ends in a clipped clip marker mid-sentence ('Sizing icons only needs basic CSS...') rather than stating the license or how to use it on Bootstrap/Foundation. · ×1
The Open Iconic README ends in a clipped clip marker mid-sentence ('Sizing icons only needs basic CSS...') rather than stating the license or how to use it on Bootstrap/Foundation. Web/Insightify.SPA/wwwroot/css/open-iconic/README.md— Complete the trailing section with license info and instructions for using the sprite with Bootstrap/Foundation.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 6783 LoC across 23 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Dormant codebase — 39 of 39 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 39 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
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Run 019fc7d8-4b2c-776a-9492-79fa56bbb55c · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 2 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 132 · Warnings: 31 · Recommendations: 19 · Info: 89 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 13:37 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.