Crypto trading bot, event-driven microservices on .NET 8
Public report — QuantTrader, published 29 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-06-2026 @ 21:46 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Dev0031/QuantTrader

32% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Critical

Small · 9,197 LoC · 16 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (21%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

72/75dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
126findings with an exact file:lineof 188 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
75/106dimensions across the health lenses9197 LoC · 16 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

Dev0031/QuantTrader carries serious risk (32%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (21%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (30%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Shift coverage toward the domain (Domain vs controller coverage); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Small (~9,197 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 21% · 46% weightMaturity 30% · 25% weightSecurity 40% · 14% weightAccessibility 54% · 8% weightCode Health 69% · 4% weightArchitecture 82% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 21 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 32 → ~42.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 33%Plumbing 47%Tests 20%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,200–€37,000
Cost to rebuild€7,200–€37,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (120–387 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 32% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 42% boilerplate · 17% straight-line · 41% branching logic
Dead frontend code~749 LoC unreachable (13 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€22,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 21% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — microservices, transaction-script/CRUD, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.yaml (3).
+9.9 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+8.9 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+6.8 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 21%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (9,197 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 21%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+1.6 pts/run over 15 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +1.6 pts/run over 15 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 32 ▲ 2 over 15 runs.

025507510019 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityAccessibility

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch ApiGateway ApiGateway QuantTrader.Common Common ApiGateway->QuantTrader.Common QuantTrader.Infrastructure Infrastructure ApiGateway->QuantTrader.Infrastructure DataIngestion DataIngestion DataIngestion->QuantTrader.Common DataIngestion->QuantTrader.Infrastructure ExecutionEngine ExecutionEngine ExecutionEngine->QuantTrader.Common ExecutionEngine->QuantTrader.Infrastructure QuantTrader.Indicators Indicators QuantTrader.Indicators->QuantTrader.Common QuantTrader.Infrastructure->QuantTrader.Common RiskManager RiskManager RiskManager->QuantTrader.Common RiskManager->QuantTrader.Infrastructure StrategyEngine StrategyEngine StrategyEngine->QuantTrader.Common StrategyEngine->QuantTrader.Indicators StrategyEngine->QuantTrader.Infrastructure

At a glance — Code Health · 69% · Adequate · gated by R7

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 30% · Weak · gated by M1, M2, M4

At a glance — Readiness · 21% · Critical · gated by D13, R4, P3, P5, P9

At a glance — Security · 40% · Weak · gated by D31, D36, D38, C2

At a glance — Accessibility · 54% · Adequate

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures6High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a robust disaster recovery strategy by codifying backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code, while clearly documenting recovery time and point objectives. Next, improve software reliability by shifting test coverage to the domain layer, where the most costly bugs reside, and ensure all production modules are covered by tests. Then, address immediate security risks by resolving the three leaked secrets found in the codebase. Finally, implement explicit, versioned database schema migrations to replace the current lack of a formal migration strategy.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.yaml (3).+9.9 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+8.9 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+6.8 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+10.8 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Shift coverage toward the domain: aim to cover aggregates/domain services above the web layer, since that's where the costly bugs are.+10.8 ptsMediumDomain vs controller coverage
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+10.8 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.+9.2 ptsMediumSchema migrations
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+4.6 ptsLowADR Quality

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 23 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 13% slop · 57% mixed · 30% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
dashboard/package-lock.json0.0SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml0.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml0.9SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
deploy/k8s/infrastructure.yaml4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/api-gateway.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/dashboard.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/data-ingestion.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/execution-engine.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/risk-manager.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/k8s/strategy-engine.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deploy/docker/Dockerfile.dashboard7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
deploy/k8s/configmap.yaml7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0109
src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cyclomatic 25)
src/Services/RiskManager/Services/RiskEvaluator.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cyclomatic 21)
src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MaCrossoverStrategy.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: MaCrossoverStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16)
src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MomentumStrategy.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: MomentumStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16)
src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs8.0Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
src/Services/ExecutionEngine/Workers/ExecutionWorker.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: ExecutionWorker.MonitorPendingOrdersAsync (cognitive 19)
src/Shared/QuantTrader.Indicators/Trend/SuperTrend.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: SuperTrend.Update (cognitive 18)
src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SystemController.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 72 of 75 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 75 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D35D36D38D39AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8C2ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8P9R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 126 of 188 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1558-c728-707d-9de0-2b93067a671f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings at 25.

SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cyclomatic 25)src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:182
RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cyclomatic 21)src/Services/RiskManager/Services/RiskEvaluator.cs:41
MaCrossoverStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16)src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MaCrossoverStrategy.cs:50
MomentumStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16)src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MomentumStrategy.cs:47

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings at 23.

SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cognitive 23)src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:182
RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cognitive 20)src/Services/RiskManager/Services/RiskEvaluator.cs:41
ExecutionWorker.MonitorPendingOrdersAsync (cognitive 19)src/Services/ExecutionEngine/Workers/ExecutionWorker.cs:123
SuperTrend.Update (cognitive 18)src/Shared/QuantTrader.Indicators/Trend/SuperTrend.cs:32
MomentumStrategy.ComputeSwingStop (cognitive 18)src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MomentumStrategy.cs:140

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs:115
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/DashboardController.cs:123
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SystemController.cs:127
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/PositionsController.cs:58

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: QuantTrader.Common · ×3

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 53 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 29.2%.

What to do

  1. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

83 test methods: 71 unit, 12 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 8 mock references across 83 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×8

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

30 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 4 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore
Deprecated: Azure.Identity · ×4
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions · ×30

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential · ×3deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:17

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with secrets.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 4 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 9197 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 projects, 180 .cs files, 11525 hand-written lines of code (9197 production / 2328 test), 66 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The QuantTrader project has a thin README presence but strong architecture and design documentation. The XML-doc coverage is below average for the main modules: [QuantTrader.Common] at 58%, [QuantTrader.Infrastructure] at 30%, and [QuantTrader.Indicators], [DataIngestion], [StrategyEngine], and [ExecutionEngine] all under 25%. Coverage for [ApiGateway] is high at 78% but the remaining modules are thin, leaving many undocumented.

XML-doc coverage: QuantTrader.Common · ×8src/Shared/QuantTrader.Common/QuantTrader.Common.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 3.0/10. — The QuantTrader project has a thin README presence but strong architecture and design documentation. The XML-doc coverage is below average for the main modules: [QuantTrader.Common] at 58%, [QuantTrader.Infrastructure] at 30%, and [QuantTrader.Indicators], [DataIngestion], [StrategyEngine], and [ExecutionEngine] all under 25%. Coverage for [ApiGateway] is high at 78% but the remaining modules are thin, leaving many undocumented.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 valuable / 1 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsrc/Services/ApiGateway/Workers/SimulationWorker.cs:24

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 16 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:20detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with secrets.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.1 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

198 finding(s): 0 critical, 47 high, 61 medium, 90 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×47deploy/docker/Dockerfile.dashboarddetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×3deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 47 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (18), infrastructure.yaml (9), api-gateway.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (47 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

46 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 22 medium, 2 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×22dashboard/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×22dashboard/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2dashboard/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 22 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 22 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 of 476 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs:44

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×6) — SetupWizard.tsx:146, SetupWizard.tsx:156, SetupWizard.tsx:261, …
  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×12) — ActivityFeed.tsx:131, ActivityFeed.tsx:141, RiskPage.tsx:241, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — StrategiesPage.tsx:84

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. (×2) — ConnectionHealthCard.tsx:44, SettingsPage.tsx:550

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `MaCrossoverStrategy` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_previousFastValue, _previousSlowValue; e.g. `_previousFastValue` at line 59). — MaCrossoverStrategy.cs:18

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

What to do

  • Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • No README at the repository root — newcomers have no entry point.

What to do

  • Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects.
  • Add a README to the 16 of 16 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Only 6/16 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy2.0 / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • There is no README, so nothing documents what the system is or how it works.

What to do

  • Add a README describing the system, how to build/run it, and keep it current.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

  • EF Core is used but neither migrations nor EnsureCreated were detected — confirm how the production schema is created and evolved.

What to do

  • Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.
P9 · Domain vs controller coverage1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

  • Domain coverage is 0% but the web/controller layer is at 25% — the trivial layer is better tested than the business rules. Coverage effort should concentrate where the invariants and decisions live (the domain), not on thin controllers/endpoints.

What to do

  • Shift coverage toward the domain: aim to cover aggregates/domain services above the web layer, since that's where the costly bugs are.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • dashboard/src/App.tsx:64 · dashboard/src/App.tsx:84 · dashboard/src/App.tsx:104 — App.tsx:64
  • dashboard/src/App.tsx:92 · dashboard/src/App.tsx:112 — App.tsx:92
  • dashboard/src/pages/PositionsPage.tsx:29 · dashboard/src/pages/StrategiesPage.tsx:16 — PositionsPage.tsx:29
  • dashboard/src/pages/PositionsPage.tsx:49 · dashboard/src/pages/StrategiesPage.tsx:35 · dashboard/src/pages/TradesPage.tsx:61 — PositionsPage.tsx:49
  • dashboard/src/pages/SettingsPage.tsx:410 · dashboard/src/pages/SettingsPage.tsx:493 — SettingsPage.tsx:410
  • dashboard/src/api/hooks/useRisk.ts:9 · dashboard/src/api/hooks/useSettings.ts:80 · dashboard/src/api/hooks/useSystem.ts:18 — useRisk.ts:9
  • dashboard/src/api/hooks/useSettings.ts:29 · dashboard/src/api/hooks/useSystem.ts:57 — useSettings.ts:29
  • dashboard/src/components/common/SetupWizard.tsx:93 · dashboard/src/components/common/SetupWizard.tsx:275 — SetupWizard.tsx:93

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — RiskPage.tsx:23, SettingsPage.tsx:40, DashboardPage.tsx:47, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — SettingsPage.tsx, RiskPage.tsx, SetupWizard.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 4 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 4 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×7) — PriceChart.tsx, ApiKeyForm.tsx, settings.ts, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in dashboard/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 115/120 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×5) — ServiceBusEventBus.cs:92, SystemController.cs:288, TradingHub.cs:38, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.7 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). A further 4 got runtime (rendered axe-core) evidence this scan: 1.1.1, 1.3.5, 1.4.12, 2.4.4. The other 41 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 41 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health69%Adequate — gated by R7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture82%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity30%Weak — gated by M1, M2, M4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness21%Critical — gated by D13, R4, P3, P5, P9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security40%Weak — gated by D31, D36, D38, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility54%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 32 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • AXH1 Runtime security headers — no data
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility (rendered) — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 9 event handler(s); a message-bus package
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 77 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×47
  • High IaC: DS-0002 deploy/docker/Dockerfile.dashboard — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/k8s/api-gateway.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/k8s/api-gateway.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/k8s/api-gateway.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0109 deploy/k8s/configmap.yaml — ConfigMap with secrets
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/k8s/dashboard.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/k8s/dashboard.yaml — Default security context configured
  • + 22 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×22
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — flatted: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — flatted: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — form-data: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — lodash: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — picomatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — rollup: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — ws: [GHSA redacted]
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×3
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:17 — hardcoded-credential detected.
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:27 — high-entropy-secret detected.
  • Leaked secret: signing-key deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:27 — signing-key detected.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: generic-api-key deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml:30 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.1 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 50 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×22
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — ajv: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — brace-expansion: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — esbuild: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — follow-redirects: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — js-yaml: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — lodash: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — picomatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — postcss: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — react-router: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×4
  • Deprecated: Azure.Identity — Azure.Identity 1.11.4 — Other
  • Deprecated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.1 — Other OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore >= 1.8.1
  • Deprecated: Polly.Extensions.Http — Polly.Extensions.Http 3.0.0 — Legacy Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.5.3 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×3
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deploy/helm/templates/deployment.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: QuantTrader.Common — QuantTrader.Common: abstractness 0.12, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: QuantTrader.Indicators — QuantTrader.Indicators: abstractness 0.10, instability 0.11, distance 0.79 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: QuantTrader.Infrastructure — QuantTrader.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.16, instability 0.08, distance 0.77 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.1 — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.1 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 13 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.7.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 13 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs:115 — src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs:115-128 | src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MeanReversionStrategy.cs:102-115
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MaCrossoverStrategy.cs:119 — src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MaCrossoverStrategy.cs:119-132 | src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MomentumStrategy.cs:111-124
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/DashboardController.cs:123 — src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/DashboardController.cs:123-131 | src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/DashboardController.cs:132-140
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:55 — src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:55-63 | src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:488-496
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cyclomatic 25) · ×1
  • SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cyclomatic 25) src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:182 — SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cyclomatic 21) src/Services/RiskManager/Services/RiskEvaluator.cs:41 — RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MaCrossoverStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • MaCrossoverStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16) src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MaCrossoverStrategy.cs:50 — MaCrossoverStrategy.Evaluate has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MomentumStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • MomentumStrategy.Evaluate (cyclomatic 16) src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MomentumStrategy.cs:47 — MomentumStrategy.Evaluate has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings (cognitive 23) src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SettingsController.cs:182 — SettingsController.VerifyExchangeSettings has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync (cognitive 20) src/Services/RiskManager/Services/RiskEvaluator.cs:41 — RiskEvaluator.EvaluateSignalAsync has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ExecutionWorker.MonitorPendingOrdersAsync (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • ExecutionWorker.MonitorPendingOrdersAsync (cognitive 19) src/Services/ExecutionEngine/Workers/ExecutionWorker.cs:123 — ExecutionWorker.MonitorPendingOrdersAsync has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SuperTrend.Update (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • SuperTrend.Update (cognitive 18) src/Shared/QuantTrader.Indicators/Trend/SuperTrend.cs:32 — SuperTrend.Update has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MomentumStrategy.ComputeSwingStop (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • MomentumStrategy.ComputeSwingStop (cognitive 18) src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/MomentumStrategy.cs:140 — MomentumStrategy.ComputeSwingStop has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SystemController.cs:127 — src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SystemController.cs:127-138 | src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/SystemController.cs:147-158
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/PositionsController.cs:58 — src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/PositionsController.cs:58-65 | src/Services/ApiGateway/Controllers/PositionsController.cs:87-94
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×2
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — @babel/core: [GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] dashboard/package-lock.json — axios: [GHSA redacted]
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 21 commit(s) sampled).
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 9k LoC across 16 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment src/Services/ApiGateway/Workers/SimulationWorker.cs:24 — "Realistic seed prices (approximate)" — trim - 'approximate' restates the intent; keep only the non-obvious WHY
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (21 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs:44 — 3 of 476 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: QuantTrader.StrategyEngine.Strategies.BreakoutStrategy.Evaluate @ src/Services/StrategyEngine/Strategies/BreakoutStrategy.cs:44, 327 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.9/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 49 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×30
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 8.0.2 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options — Microsoft.Extensions.Options 8.0.2 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: System.Text.Json — System.Text.Json 8.0.5 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Identity — Azure.Identity 1.11.4 → 1.21.0 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Messaging.ServiceBus — Azure.Messaging.ServiceBus 7.17.5 → 7.20.1 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Security.KeyVault.Secrets — Azure.Security.KeyVault.Secrets 4.6.0 → 4.11.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.28 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks — Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks 8.0.28 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 8.0.11 → 10.0.2 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.7.0 → 1.16.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.1 → 1.16.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 8.0.3 → 10.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: StackExchange.Redis — StackExchange.Redis 2.7.33 → 3.0.11 available.
  • Outdated: AspNetCore.HealthChecks.NpgSql — AspNetCore.HealthChecks.NpgSql 8.0.2 → 9.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: AspNetCore.HealthChecks.Redis — AspNetCore.HealthChecks.Redis 8.0.1 → 9.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting 8.0.1 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http — Microsoft.Extensions.Http 8.0.1 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: System.Reactive — System.Reactive 6.0.2 → 6.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: Websocket.Client — Websocket.Client 5.1.2 → 5.5.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 8.0.28 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.5.0 → 10.2.3 available.
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.0 → 10.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 6.12.2 → 8.10.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.8.0 → 18.7.0 available.
  • Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.5.3 → 2.9.3 available.
  • + 5 more in this group — see findings.md.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×8
  • Mock framework: Moq — DataIngestion.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — StrategyEngine.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — RiskManager.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — ExecutionEngine.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Indicators.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Integration.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — QuantTrader.TestInfrastructure references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — ApiGateway.Tests references Moq.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×8
  • XML-doc coverage: QuantTrader.Common src/Shared/QuantTrader.Common/QuantTrader.Common.csproj — QuantTrader.Common: 58 % XML-doc coverage (42/72).
  • XML-doc coverage: QuantTrader.Infrastructure src/Shared/QuantTrader.Infrastructure/QuantTrader.Infrastructure.csproj — QuantTrader.Infrastructure: 30 % XML-doc coverage (35/115).
  • XML-doc coverage: QuantTrader.Indicators src/Shared/QuantTrader.Indicators/QuantTrader.Indicators.csproj — QuantTrader.Indicators: 38 % XML-doc coverage (29/77).
  • XML-doc coverage: DataIngestion src/Services/DataIngestion/DataIngestion.csproj — DataIngestion: 36 % XML-doc coverage (25/69).
  • XML-doc coverage: StrategyEngine src/Services/StrategyEngine/StrategyEngine.csproj — StrategyEngine: 19 % XML-doc coverage (14/73).
  • XML-doc coverage: RiskManager src/Services/RiskManager/RiskManager.csproj — RiskManager: 52 % XML-doc coverage (16/31).
  • XML-doc coverage: ExecutionEngine src/Services/ExecutionEngine/ExecutionEngine.csproj — ExecutionEngine: 27 % XML-doc coverage (20/75).
  • XML-doc coverage: ApiGateway src/Services/ApiGateway/ApiGateway.csproj — ApiGateway: 78 % XML-doc coverage (81/104).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list QuantTrader.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json4artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .198artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .46artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019f1558-c728-707d-9de0-2b93067a671f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md