Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Dogfalo/materialize carries serious gaps (30%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (17%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (38%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.
Code Health
38%
Weak · gated by R1, R3, R7
Maturity
57%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
17% ⚠
Critical · gated by D8, D9, R6, R8, P2, P3
Security
42%
Weak · gated by D28, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 17% · 50% weightCode Health 38% · 27% weightSecurity 42% · 15% weightMaturity 57% · 8% weight
Raise Readiness 17 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 30 → ~45.
New since the last scan (45+)
- D2 · render (cognitive 34) js/datepicker.js
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D35 · Change coupling: nouislider.js ↔ nouislider.min.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.js
- D35 · Change coupling: nouislider.js ↔ package.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.js
- D35 · Change coupling: nouislider.min.js ↔ package.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.min.js
- D35 · Change coupling: collapsible.js ↔ range.js js/collapsible.js
- D35 · Change coupling: range.js ↔ scrollspy.js js/range.js
- D35 · Change coupling: range.js ↔ slider.js js/range.js
- D35 · Change coupling: dropdown.js ↔ range.js js/dropdown.js
- D35 · Change coupling: materialbox.js ↔ range.js js/materialbox.js
- D35 · Change coupling: modal.js ↔ range.js js/modal.js
- D35 · Change coupling: range.js ↔ tooltip.js js/range.js
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- R10 · Duplicated block (39 lines × 15 locations) js/autocomplete.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (37 lines × 4 locations) js/chips.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (36 lines × 4 locations) js/collapsible.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (35 lines × 6 locations) js/carousel.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (34 lines × 3 locations) js/datepicker.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (31 lines × 2 locations) js/slider.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (29 lines × 2 locations) js/tabs.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (28 lines × 2 locations) js/buttons.js
- R2 · Complex function render (cyclomatic 27, cognitive 34) js/datepicker.js
- R6 · Tooling
- R7 · Dead file (~975 LoC) js/datepicker.js
- R7 · Dead file (~960 LoC) js/cash.js
- R7 · Dead file (~717 LoC) js/carousel.js
- R7 · Dead file (~647 LoC) js/timepicker.js
- R7 · Dead file (~635 LoC) js/dropdown.js
- R7 · Dead file (~580 LoC) js/sidenav.js
- R8 · Unused dependency 'grunt'
- R8 · Unused dependency 'grunt-babel'
- R8 · Unused dependency 'grunt-banner'
- P2 · No structured logging
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.8
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
8.1
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
R10 · React / TS
Code Duplication
7.3
R2 · React / TS
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.5
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 27 | Medium |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 16 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, implement comprehensive logging using ILogger or Serilog to improve observability and enable health checks. Next, introduce static analysis and security scanning tools to identify vulnerabilities and performance issues early. Then, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports. Finally, configure linting and type checking in CI, and address the single missing automated test to ensure code coverage.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +14.6 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +14.6 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +17.3 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +17.3 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +17.3 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +15.9 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +14.6 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it. | +13.0 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| package-lock.json | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| js/dropdown.js | 5.9 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: _handleDropdownKeydown (cyclomatic 21) |
| js/datepicker.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: render (cyclomatic 27) |
| jade/page-contents/themes_content.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| jade/_head.jade | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| carousel.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| chips.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| scrollfire.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| scrollspy.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| collapsible.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| dropdown.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| pushpin.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| waves.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| tabs.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| badges.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| buttons.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| cards.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| forms.html | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| js/timepicker.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: setHand (cyclomatic 24) |
| js/range.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: range.js ↔ scrollspy.js |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 40 of 42 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 42 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D8D9D12D13D15D16D19D21D26D27D28D29D33D34D35D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P6R1R10R2R3R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 119 of 125 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
7 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was _scroll at 29.
_scroll (cyclomatic 29)js/carousel.js:462
render (cyclomatic 27)js/datepicker.js:394
setHand (cyclomatic 24)js/timepicker.js:487
renderTitle (cyclomatic 22)js/datepicker.js:563
_handleDropdownKeydown (cyclomatic 21)js/dropdown.js:257
What to do
- Resolve the 1 _scroll (cyclomatic 29) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with carousel.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 render (cyclomatic 27) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with datepicker.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 setHand (cyclomatic 24) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with timepicker.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
10 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was _scroll at 41.
_scroll (cognitive 41)js/carousel.js:462
setHand (cognitive 39)js/timepicker.js:487
render (cognitive 34)js/datepicker.js:394
renderTitle (cognitive 29)js/datepicker.js:563
_handleDropdownKeydown (cognitive 28)js/dropdown.js:257
What to do
- Resolve the 1 _scroll (cognitive 41) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with carousel.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 setHand (cognitive 39) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with timepicker.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 render (cognitive 34) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with datepicker.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — the solution has no test code.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The single README is a polished landing page with branding (MaterializeCSS logo + Materialize design), links to the docs site, Travis CI, npm version, CDNJS, Gitter chat, and an outline of topics yet clipped mid-Quickstart. It does not contain architecture or design documentation for the framework itself; its content is pure README marketing plus a link list.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The single README is a polished landing page with branding (MaterializeCSS logo + Materialize design), links to the docs site, Travis CI, npm version, CDNJS, Gitter chat, and an outline of topics yet clipped mid-Quickstart. It does not contain architecture or design documentation for the framework itself; its content is pure README marketing plus a link list.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
53 finding(s): 0 critical, 53 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key jade/page-contents/themes_content.html:492
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 15 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with _head.jade, badges.html, buttons.html. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
27 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 27 low.
Low: plaintext-http-link jade/_footer.html:76
What to do
- Resolve the 27 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with showcase_content.html (11), index.html (6), preview.html (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: nouislider.js↔nouislider.min.js 95%; nouislider.js↔package.js 83%; nouislider.min.js↔package.js 80%
Change coupling: nouislider.js ↔ nouislider.min.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.js
What to do
- Resolve the 10 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with range.js (3), nouislider.js (2), collapsible.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
165 finding(s): 19 critical, 79 high, 57 medium, 10 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 31 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (31). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 issue-level).
- Resolve the 19 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (19). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
- A CI pipeline exists but no build invocation (dotnet build / dotnet publish / a build step) was matched — changes may merge without being compiled.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
- Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline (e.g. dotnet build / dotnet publish) so every change is compiled before merge.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 51 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- js/autocomplete.js:13 · js/carousel.js:14 · js/characterCounter.js:4 · js/chips.js:13 — autocomplete.js:13
- js/chips.js:9 · js/datepicker.js:102 · js/materialbox.js:7 · js/timepicker.js:28 — chips.js:9
- js/collapsible.js:9 · js/modal.js:13 · js/slider.js:6 · js/tooltip.js:10 — collapsible.js:9
- js/carousel.js:12 · js/chips.js:11 · js/datepicker.js:104 · js/materialbox.js:9 — carousel.js:12
- js/datepicker.js:99 · js/materialbox.js:6 · js/timepicker.js:27 — datepicker.js:99
- js/slider.js:5 · js/tooltip.js:9 — slider.js:5
- js/tabs.js:7 · js/tapTarget.js:5 — tabs.js:7
- js/buttons.js:23 · js/modal.js:29 — buttons.js:23
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — carousel.js:462, datepicker.js:394, timepicker.js:487, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
- 8 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R5 · Dependency Freshness
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 3 application, 0 tooling and 15 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 15 test roots considered) (×7) — datepicker.js, cash.js, carousel.js, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 38% | Weak — gated by R1, R3, R7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Maturity | 57% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 17% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, R6, R8, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 42% | Weak — gated by D28, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — 15 test file(s) reach none of 33 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 67 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key jade/page-contents/themes_content.html:492
- Secret: generic-api-key jade/_head.jade:34
- Secret: generic-api-key carousel.html:24
- Secret: generic-api-key chips.html:24
- Secret: generic-api-key scrollfire.html:22
- Secret: generic-api-key scrollspy.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key collapsible.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key dropdown.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key pushpin.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key waves.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key tabs.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key badges.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key buttons.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key cards.html:21
- Secret: generic-api-key forms.html:21
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Warning — 27 finding(s)
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: nouislider.js ↔ nouislider.min.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.js
- Change coupling: nouislider.js ↔ package.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.js
- Change coupling: nouislider.min.js ↔ package.js extras/noUiSlider/nouislider.min.js
- Change coupling: collapsible.js ↔ range.js js/collapsible.js
- Change coupling: range.js ↔ scrollspy.js js/range.js
- Change coupling: range.js ↔ slider.js js/range.js
- Change coupling: dropdown.js ↔ range.js js/dropdown.js
- Change coupling: materialbox.js ↔ range.js js/materialbox.js
- Change coupling: modal.js ↔ range.js js/modal.js
- Change coupling: range.js ↔ tooltip.js js/range.js
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- _scroll (cyclomatic 29) js/carousel.js:462
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- render (cyclomatic 27) js/datepicker.js:394
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- setHand (cyclomatic 24) js/timepicker.js:487
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- renderTitle (cyclomatic 22) js/datepicker.js:563
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- _handleDropdownKeydown (cyclomatic 21) js/dropdown.js:257
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- _calculatePositioning (cyclomatic 18) js/tapTarget.js:177
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- textareaAutoResize (cyclomatic 17) js/forms.js:50
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _scroll (cognitive 41) js/carousel.js:462
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- setHand (cognitive 39) js/timepicker.js:487
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- render (cognitive 34) js/datepicker.js:394
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- renderTitle (cognitive 29) js/datepicker.js:563
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _handleDropdownKeydown (cognitive 28) js/dropdown.js:257
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _getDropdownPosition (cognitive 22) js/dropdown.js:388
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _handleChipsKeydown (cognitive 22) js/chips.js:165
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _calculatePositioning (cognitive 20) js/tapTarget.js:177
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- textareaAutoResize (cognitive 17) js/forms.js:50
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _updateTimeFromInput (cognitive 16) js/timepicker.js:410
Recommendation — 30 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/_footer.html:76
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/index/index_content.html:12
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/index/index_content.html:85
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/index/index_content.html:97
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:20
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:24
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:28
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:35
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:39
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:43
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:50
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:54
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:58
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:65
- Low: plaintext-http-link jade/showcase/showcase_content.html:69
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/masonry-template/index.html:36
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/masonry-template/index.html:151
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/masonry-template/preview.html:35
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/masonry-template/preview.html:169
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/parallax-template/index.html:37
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/parallax-template/index.html:152
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/parallax-template/preview.html:37
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/parallax-template/preview.html:152
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/starter-template/index.html:34
- Low: plaintext-http-link templates/starter-template/index.html:110
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 53 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 27 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 165 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |