Public report — EventSourcing, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 03-08-2026 @ 14:58 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Finaps/EventSourcing

No regression coverage not measureddormant codebasebounded contexts not declared
42% At Risk
Code Health 95% Exemplary Architecture 80% Adequate Domain Modelling 77% Adequate Performance 60% Adequate Maturity 43% Weak Security 37% Weak Readiness 36% Weak

Small · 4,234 LoC · 12 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (36%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

60/63dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
24findings with an exact file:lineof 75 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
63/105dimensions across the health lenses4234 LoC · 12 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

Finaps/EventSourcing carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Code Health (95%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (80%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (36%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (37%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing… (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Small (~4,234 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (95%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 95% ★ Exemplary Architecture 80% Adequate · gated by AX2 Maturity 43% Weak · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 36% Weak · gated by P2, P3 Security 37% Weak · gated by D29, D30, D36 Domain Modelling 77% Adequate · gated by DM2 Performance 60% Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 36% · 46% weightSecurity 37% · 25% weightMaturity 43% · 14% weightPerformance 60% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 77% · 4% weightArchitecture 80% · 2% weightCode Health 95% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 36 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~48.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 41%Tests 37%Generated 13%
New since the last scan (5+)

5 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,800–€14,000
Cost to rebuild€2,800–€14,000 (0.1 person-years (46–146 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 49% boilerplate · 32% straight-line · 19% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,400 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 36% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
+4.1 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
2
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+3.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+6.1 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 36%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (4,234 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 36%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch EventSourcing.Core Core EventSourcing.Cosmos Cosmos EventSourcing.Cosmos->EventSourcing.Core EventSourcing.EF EF EventSourcing.EF->EventSourcing.Core

Architecture — module dependency matrix

3 modules, 2 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…ps.EventSourcing.Core….EventSourcing.Cosmos…naps.EventSourcing.EF…ps.EventSourcing.Core1….EventSourcing.Cosmos2…naps.EventSourcing.EF31315

At a glance — Code Health · 95% · Exemplary

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 9.5 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 9.5 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.7 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.3 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.8 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 8.7 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.4

At a glance — Architecture · 80% · Adequate · gated by AX2

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.6 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 9.3 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 9.6 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0
The Ugly
AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 3.5

At a glance — Maturity · 43% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.2
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 36% · Weak · gated by P2, P3

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 8.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0
The Bad
P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 37% · Weak · gated by D29, D30, D36

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 3.6 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 1.1 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 77% · Adequate · gated by DM2

The Good
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0
The Ugly
DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0

At a glance — Performance · 60% · Adequate

The Bad
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.0 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 6.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components15High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection8High / Critical

Roadmap

First, implement comprehensive logging and observability across all services to improve system visibility. Next, integrate static application security testing into the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions from reaching production. Then, add health checks and immutable image tags to enable reliable deployments and instant rollbacks. Finally, maintain a changelog for each release and restrict the public API surface to ensure internal changes do not break consumers.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+4.1 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+3.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+6.1 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+6.1 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+3.0 ptsLowADR Quality
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.+5.8 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+5.8 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.+5.5 ptsMediumLibrary API & versioning

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 13 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 38% mixed · 62% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/publish.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js7.2MixedCyclomatic Complexity: validateDocumentLink (cyclomatic 22)
EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/BasketsController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/OrdersController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/ProductsController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
EventSourcing.Core/Services/ProjectionService/ProjectionUpdateService.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
EventSourcing.Core/Services/Validation/RecordValidation.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
EventSourcing.Cosmos/CosmosRecordTransaction.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
EventSourcing.EF/EntityFrameworkRecordStore.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
EventSourcing.EF/RecordContext.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
EventSourcing.Cosmos/CosmosRecordSerializer.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetSerializer
EventSourcing.Core/Records/Event.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
EventSourcing.Core/Services/AggregateService/AggregateService.cs9.5Near-cleanIL Efficiency: IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 60 of 63 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6P8PF1PF2PF3X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 24 of 75 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc821-e429-761d-b167-41002f4e16b6.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was validateDocumentLink at 22.

validateDocumentLink (cyclomatic 22)EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:348

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was upsertDocument at 19.

upsertDocument (cognitive 19)EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:711
validateDocumentLink (cognitive 18)EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:348
createDocument (cognitive 18)EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:639

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

12 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

132 test methods: 132 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 132 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

22 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 2 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: xunit · ×2
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging · ×22

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 22 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 3551 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.7.

TodoComment · ×5EventSourcing.Core/Services/ProjectionService/ProjectionUpdateService.cs:36
Dead code: GetSerializerEventSourcing.Cosmos/CosmosRecordSerializer.cs:62

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 projects, 132 source files, 6637 hand-written lines of code (3551 production / 3086 test), plus 1075 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 34 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Finaps.EventSourcing has strong README coverage: a single unified Finaps.EventSourcing README with an exhaustive table of contents (Installation, Basic Usage, Advanced Usage, Concepts) and two example projects (EventSourcing.Example). The core package documentation is complete at 100% XML-doc coverage for EventSourcing.Core, while EventSourcing.Cosmos and EventSourcing.EF are under coverage. The README itself is well written with a clear architecture description, installation instructions, usage examples, and an infrastructure setup section that explains how to configure Cosmos DB or Postgres via EventSourcingStartup.cs.

XML-doc coverage: EventSourcing.Core · ×4EventSourcing.Core/EventSourcing.Core.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — Finaps.EventSourcing has strong README coverage: a single unified Finaps.EventSourcing README with an exhaustive table of contents (Installation, Basic Usage, Advanced Usage, Concepts) and two example projects (EventSourcing.Example). The core package documentation is complete at 100% XML-doc coverage for EventSourcing.Core, while EventSourcing.Cosmos and EventSourcing.EF are under coverage. The README itself is well written with a clear architecture description, installation instructions, usage examples, and an infrastructure setup section that explains how to configure Cosmos DB or Postgres via EventSourcingStartup.cs.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

24 valuable / 1 redundant across 160 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentEventSourcing.Core/Records/Event.cs:22

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

89 % of calls cross a namespace and 7 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)3.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×5.github/workflows/publish.yml:12detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization · ×3EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/BasketsController.cs:13detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with BasketsController.cs, OrdersController.cs, ProductsController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities1.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 9 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.2 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 · ×4detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

20 of 20 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/StoredProcedures.cs.

Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 of 256 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetEventSourcing.Core/Services/AggregateService/AggregateService.cs:93

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `CosmosRecordStore` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_isDeleteAllEventsProcedureInitialized, _isDeleteAllSnapshotsProcedureInitialized, _isDeleteAggregateProcedureInitialized; e.g. `_isDeleteAllEventsProcedureInitialized` at line 121). — CosmosRecordStore.cs:8

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IRecordStore` declares 19 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRecordStore.cs:7

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `Order.BasketId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Order.cs:5

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 11 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 70/93 types (75%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.

What to do

  • On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • Only 0/92 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.

What to do

  • In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 49/62 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×13) — CosmosStoredProcedures.cs:15, CosmosStoredProcedures.cs:17, CosmosStoredProcedures.cs:19, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.7 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 16 suppression(s) across the 22882 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health95%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture80%Adequate — gated by AX2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity43%Weak — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness36%Weak — gated by P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security37%Weak — gated by D29, D30, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling77%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance60%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (4 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds)
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 16 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×9
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.2 — Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0 — System.Text.Json 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 — Azure.Identity 1.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Npgsql 6.0.4 — Npgsql 6.0.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×5
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:12 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:15 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: alirezanet/publish-nuget@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `alirezanet/publish-nuget@v3.0.4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/alirezanet/publish-nuget/commits/v3.0.4 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.4` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:26 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: alirezanet/publish-nuget@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `alirezanet/publish-nuget@v3.0.4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/alirezanet/publish-nuget/commits/v3.0.4 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.4` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: alirezanet/publish-nuget@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `alirezanet/publish-nuget@v3.0.4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/alirezanet/publish-nuget/commits/v3.0.4 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.4` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 — System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 — System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 23 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×5
  • TodoComment EventSourcing.Core/Services/ProjectionService/ProjectionUpdateService.cs:36 — // TODO: Make work with large data sets — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment EventSourcing.Core/Services/Validation/RecordValidation.cs:118 — // TODO: Make this work for the RecordName Attribute — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment EventSourcing.Cosmos/CosmosRecordTransaction.cs:176 — // TODO: Catch more known cases — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment EventSourcing.EF/EntityFrameworkRecordStore.cs:93 — // TODO: This works, but for performance reasons limit to projections where ProjectionFactory<TAggregate, TProjection> is defined — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment EventSourcing.EF/RecordContext.cs:28 — // TODO: Make this easier to manually configure — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×4
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 — Azure.Identity 1.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 — Azure.Identity 1.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.8.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.8.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.8.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.8.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×3
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/BasketsController.cs:13 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/OrdersController.cs:6 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization EventSourcing.Example/Controllers/ProductsController.cs:11 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.1 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 4.1.0 — CriticalBugs
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · validateDocumentLink (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • validateDocumentLink (cyclomatic 22) EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:348 — validateDocumentLink has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 20 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1
  • Dead code: GetSerializer EventSourcing.Cosmos/CosmosRecordSerializer.cs:62 — Method GetSerializer — no references found in solution.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · upsertDocument (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • upsertDocument (cognitive 19) EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:711 — upsertDocument has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · validateDocumentLink (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • validateDocumentLink (cognitive 18) EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:348 — validateDocumentLink has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · createDocument (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • createDocument (cognitive 18) EventSourcing.Cosmos/StoredProcedures/DocDbWrapperScript.js:639 — createDocument has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 7 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (2 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the test suite built and its tests PASSED, but the run produced no coverage data — `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` found no data collector, which is what a test project with no `coverlet.collector` PackageReference does. Nothing is wrong with the suite or the build; there is simply no coverage instrumentation wired up. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `EventSourcing.EF.Tests.Postgres` with 32 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 91 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.72 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 3551 LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment EventSourcing.Core/Records/Event.cs:22 — "ReSharper disable once InconsistentNaming" — delete - generated suppression, not explanatory
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 20 of 20 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 20 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget EventSourcing.Core/Services/AggregateService/AggregateService.cs:93 — 3 of 256 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Finaps.EventSourcing.Core.AggregateService.GetEventStream @ EventSourcing.Core/Services/AggregateService/AggregateService.cs:93, 323 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.8/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 27 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×22
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Core).
  • Outdated: System.Linq.Async — System.Linq.Async 6.0.1 → 7.0.1 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Core).
  • Outdated: Azure.Core — Azure.Core 1.24.0 → 1.60.0 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Azure.Cosmos — Microsoft.Azure.Cosmos 3.27.1 → 3.62.0 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 6.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options — Microsoft.Extensions.Options 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVariables — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVariables 6.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos.Tests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos.Tests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.2.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos.Tests).
  • Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.4.1 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos.Tests).
  • Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.4.5 → 3.1.5 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Cosmos.Tests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Example).
  • Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 6.0.4 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Example).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.3.1 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Example).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Example.Tests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 4.1.0 → 7.0.2 available (referenced by EventSourcing.EF).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.EF).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.EF).
  • Outdated: EFCore.CheckConstraints — EFCore.CheckConstraints 6.0.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by EventSourcing.EF.Tests.Postgres).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.EF.Tests.SqlServer).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost — Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost 6.0.5 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by EventSourcing.Example.Tests.Postgres).
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×4
  • XML-doc coverage: EventSourcing.Core EventSourcing.Core/EventSourcing.Core.csproj — EventSourcing.Core: 100 % XML-doc coverage (92/92).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventSourcing.Cosmos EventSourcing.Cosmos/EventSourcing.Cosmos.csproj — EventSourcing.Cosmos: 64 % XML-doc coverage (48/75).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventSourcing.Example EventSourcing.Example/EventSourcing.Example.csproj — EventSourcing.Example: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/69).
  • XML-doc coverage: EventSourcing.EF EventSourcing.EF/EventSourcing.EF.csproj — EventSourcing.EF: 82 % XML-doc coverage (33/40).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .8artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list EventSourcing.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json15artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fc821-e429-761d-b167-41002f4e16b6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 16 · Warnings: 23 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 27 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 14:58 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md