Public report — CLI-Anything, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 05:50 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

HKUDS/CLI-Anything

No baseline yet — first run coverage not measuredno automated testssingle-maintainer
35% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Architecture 97% Exemplary Maturity 75% Strong Security 44% Weak Code Health 29% Weak Readiness 22% Weak

Small · 3,914 LoC · 1 projects · rebuild ~0.6 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (22%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

47/49dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
135findings with an exact file:lineof 150 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
49/104dimensions across the health lenses3914 LoC · 1 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.

HKUDS/CLI-Anything carries serious gaps (35%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (97%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Maturity (75%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (22%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (29%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Small (~3,914 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.6 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (97%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 29% Weak · gated by D2, R1, R2, X1, X5 Architecture 97% ★ Exemplary Maturity 75% Strong Readiness 22% Weak · gated by D9, R6, P2, P3 Security 44% Weak · gated by D29, D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 22% · 47% weightCode Health 29% · 26% weightSecurity 44% · 14% weightMaturity 75% · 8% weightArchitecture 97% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 22 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~46.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 5%Plumbing 1%Tests 94%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €30,000–€150,000
Cost to rebuild€30,000–€150,000 (0.3–1.0 person-years (504–1,616 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 35% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 7% boilerplate · 3% straight-line · 90% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.6 person-years of build effort (about ~€92,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 22% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — desktop/game, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+13.6 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+13.6 pts · Medium effort · Observability
3
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
+13.6 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.6 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 22%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.6 person-years rebuild (3,914 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 22%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 6.0/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 5–11% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2 complexity, D4 duplication, D6 cohesion: averaging 6.0/10 across the code-quality signals
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.

At a glance — Code Health · 29% · Weak · gated by D2, R1, R2, X1, X5

The Good
D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 7.5 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 7.7 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 8.4 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Ugly
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 4.2 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 2.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 0.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 1.8 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 1.9

At a glance — Architecture · 97% · Exemplary

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 6.0

At a glance — Maturity · 75% · Strong

The Good
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 10.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 7.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0
The Bad
M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Weak · gated by D9, R6, P2, P3

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 9.8 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 8.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 4.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 3.4

At a glance — Security · 44% · Weak · gated by D29, D36

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 7.0 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Bad
D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 5.6
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.1 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D37 · .NET / C# Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components11High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures3High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the single missing test in the distribution module to ensure adequate coverage. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all services to improve observability and debugging capabilities. Integrate static application security testing and dependency scanning into the CI pipeline to identify vulnerabilities early. Additionally, configure linting and type-checking scripts in the build process to enforce code quality standards. Finally, document recovery time and objectives, and establish a tested restore procedure to ensure robust disaster recovery.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+13.6 ptsLowTest Distribution
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+13.6 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+13.6 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+12.8 ptsMediumTooling
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+12.3 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+11.3 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+11.3 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.+10.2 ptsMediumType Safety

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 47 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 2% slop · 17% mixed · 81% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json0.1SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/pr-labeler.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: pull-request-target-code-checkout
.github/workflows/publish-cli-hub.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/check-root-skills.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/pr-labeler-tests.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/export.py5.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
inkscape/agent-harness/cli_anything/inkscape/core/document.py6.3MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
macrocli/agent-harness/cli_anything/macrocli/backends/file_transform.py6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 55)
slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion (cyclomatic 24)
slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cyclomatic 31)
slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: BridgeMod.BuildGameState (cyclomatic 28)
sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js7.1Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: layoutVerticalStack (cyclomatic 25)
cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
docs/hub/index-modern.html7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
zotero/agent-harness/cli_anything/zotero/utils/zotero_sqlite.py7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/scripts/validate_root_skills.py7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: exec-detected
.github/workflows/check-codex-skill.yml7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
sketch/agent-harness/src/builder.js7.4Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: buildLayer (cyclomatic 28)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 47 of 49 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 49 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D9D12D13D17D20D21D26D28D29D33D36D37D38AX10AX3AX4AX5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6R1R10R2R3R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 135 of 150 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdac5-a998-747c-b329-0985421f80bf.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown at 55.

BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 55)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:672
BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cyclomatic 44)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:10
BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 43)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:133
BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown (cyclomatic 32)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:363
BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cyclomatic 31)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:24

+ 11 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 55) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cyclomatic 44) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 43) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

23 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown at 122.

BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cognitive 122)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:672
BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cognitive 73)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:133
BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cognitive 55)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:24
BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cognitive 54)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:10
BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown (cognitive 52)slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:363

+ 18 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cognitive 122) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cognitive 73) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cognitive 55) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs · ×3slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:0
TooManyMethods: BridgeModslay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with BridgeMod.Actions.cs, BridgeMod.Formatting.cs, BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with BridgeMod.Actions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

27 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×4slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:153
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×3slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:162
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×2slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:131
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×2slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:948
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:306

+ 13 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs (3), BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with BridgeMod.Formatting.cs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs, BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 0 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 0 mechanizable ADRs, 0 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

What to do

  1. Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 3914 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 5 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.0/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 2 flagged with a specific gap.

Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent in the visible textunimol_tools/agent-harness/docs/guides/02-QUICK-START.md
Decision/consequences are absent (no trade-offs or alternative paths for each problem)unimol_tools/agent-harness/docs/guides/05-TROUBLESHOOTING.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent in the visible… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 02-QUICK-START.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Decision/consequences are absent (no trade-offs or alternative paths for… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 05-TROUBLESHOOTING.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 189 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×3cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py:20detected by gitleaks finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with analytics.py, index-modern.html, zotero_sqlite.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

70 finding(s): 0 critical, 18 high, 38 medium, 14 low.

High: exec-detected · ×18.github/scripts/validate_root_skills.py:33detected by semgrep finding
Medium: use-defused-xml · ×323MF/agent-harness/cli_anything/threemf/core/parser.py:16detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 32 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with export.py (6), document.py (3), file_transform.py (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (32 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 18 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with deploy-pages.yml (5), pr-labeler.yml (4), publish-cli-hub.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is present but lists no reporting contact.

Disclosure policy has no reporting contact

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 3 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 5) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 6 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • sketch/agent-harness/tests/security.test.js:64 · sketch/agent-harness/tests/security.test.js:96 — security.test.js:64
  • sketch/agent-harness/tests/security.test.js:154 · sketch/agent-harness/tests/security.test.js:183 — security.test.js:154
  • sketch/agent-harness/tests/security.test.js:36 · sketch/agent-harness/tests/security.test.js:126 — security.test.js:36
  • sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:115 · sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:186 — layout.js:115

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — builder.js:190, layout.js:78, layout.js:133, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R5 · Dependency Freshness9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — builder.js:14

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×5) — BridgeMod.Actions.cs:278, BridgeMod.cs:203, BridgeMod.cs:249, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types1.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/1 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health29%Weak — gated by D2, R1, R2, X1, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture97%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity75%StrongSolid.
Readiness22%Weak — gated by D9, R6, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security44%Weak — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 56 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~64040 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 3914 LoC in a single project the codebase is trivially small despite having no bounded contexts declared, so boundaries are not needed.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — none of 5 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R4 Test Coverage — 2 test file(s) reach none of 4 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 28 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×18
  • High: exec-detected .github/scripts/validate_root_skills.py:33 — Detected the use of exec(). exec() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-codex-skill.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-root-skills.yml:27 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-root-skills.yml:30 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:72 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:88 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:101 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-labeler-tests.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-labeler-tests.yml:35 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: pull-request-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/pr-labeler.yml:16 — This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-labeler.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-labeler.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-labeler.yml:30 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-cli-hub.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-cli-hub.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-cli-hub.yml:46 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×3
  • Secret: generic-api-key cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key docs/hub/index-modern.html:2639 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key zotero/agent-harness/cli_anything/zotero/utils/zotero_sqlite.py:16 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
Warning — 112 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×32
  • Medium: use-defused-xml 3MF/agent-harness/cli_anything/threemf/core/parser.py:16 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/export.py:7 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/export.py:131 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/export.py:154 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/export.py:183 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml-parse calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/export.py:190 — The native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. Do not use this library to parse untrusted input. Instead the Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml`.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml calibre/agent-harness/cli_anything/calibre/core/metadata.py:91 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: missing-autoescape-disabled cli-anything-plugin/skill_generator.py:386 — Detected a Jinja2 environment without autoescaping. Jinja2 does not autoescape by default. This is dangerous if you are rendering to a browser because this allows for cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. If you are in a web context, enable autoescaping by setting 'autoescape=True.' You may also consider using 'jinja2.select_autoescape()' to only enable automatic escaping for certain file extensions.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml drawio/agent-harness/cli_anything/drawio/core/session.py:12 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml drawio/agent-harness/cli_anything/drawio/utils/drawio_xml.py:28 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args eez-studio/agent-harness/cli_anything/eez_studio/utils/eez_studio_backend.py:225 — Detected subprocess function 'run' with user controlled data. A malicious actor could leverage this to perform command injection. You may consider using 'shlex.quote()'.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml inkscape/agent-harness/cli_anything/inkscape/core/document.py:220 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml inkscape/agent-harness/cli_anything/inkscape/core/document.py:290 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml inkscape/agent-harness/cli_anything/inkscape/core/document.py:324 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml inkscape/agent-harness/cli_anything/inkscape/utils/svg_utils.py:7 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml kdenlive/agent-harness/cli_anything/kdenlive/utils/mlt_xml.py:6 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml krita/agent-harness/cli_anything/krita/core/export.py:12 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml libreoffice/agent-harness/cli_anything/libreoffice/core/importer.py:6 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: insecure-file-permissions libreoffice/agent-harness/cli_anything/libreoffice/utils/lo_backend.py:229 — These permissions `0o700` are widely permissive and grant access to more people than may be necessary. A good default is `0o644` which gives read and write access to yourself and read access to everyone else.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml libreoffice/agent-harness/cli_anything/libreoffice/utils/odf_utils.py:16 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml macrocli/agent-harness/cli_anything/macrocli/backends/file_transform.py:126 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml macrocli/agent-harness/cli_anything/macrocli/backends/file_transform.py:140 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 mailchimp/agent-harness/cli_anything/mailchimp/core/client.py:28 — Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead.
  • Medium: missing-autoescape-disabled mubu/agent-harness/skill_generator.py:383 — Detected a Jinja2 environment without autoescaping. Jinja2 does not autoescape by default. This is dangerous if you are rendering to a browser because this allows for cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. If you are in a web context, enable autoescaping by setting 'autoescape=True.' You may also consider using 'jinja2.select_autoescape()' to only enable automatic escaping for certain file extensions.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml musescore/agent-harness/cli_anything/musescore/core/instruments.py:83 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service.
  • + 7 more in this group — see findings.md.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:153 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:153-160 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:715-722
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:369 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:369-376 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:462-468
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:531 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:531-538 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:567-574
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:402 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:402-409 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:378-385
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×3
  • FileTooLong: plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 647 lines.
  • FileTooLong: plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 524 lines.
  • FileTooLong: plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 880 lines.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×3
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.13
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:162 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:162-171 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:724-733
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:218 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:218-227 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:228-237
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:799 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:799-807 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:821-830
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:131 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:131-145 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:133-147
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:761 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:761-775 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:783-797
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:948 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:948-959 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:1001-1012
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:223 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:223-234 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:341-352
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:306 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:306-314 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:505-513
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerActions.cs:61 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerActions.cs:61-69 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerActions.cs:94-102
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:735 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:735-740 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:751-756
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:252 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:252-257 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:519-524
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 55) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 55) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:672 — BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 55 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cyclomatic 44) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cyclomatic 44) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:10 — BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 44 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 43) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cyclomatic 43) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:133 — BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 43 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown (cyclomatic 32) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown (cyclomatic 32) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:363 — BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cyclomatic 31) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cyclomatic 31) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:24 — BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildGameState (cyclomatic 28) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildGameState (cyclomatic 28) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:42 — BridgeMod.BuildGameState has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · buildLayer (cyclomatic 28) · ×1
  • buildLayer (cyclomatic 28) sketch/agent-harness/src/builder.js:190 — buildLayer has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · layoutVerticalStack (cyclomatic 25) · ×1
  • layoutVerticalStack (cyclomatic 25) sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:78 — layoutVerticalStack has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion (cyclomatic 24) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion (cyclomatic 24) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:365 — BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatShopMarkdown (cyclomatic 24) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatShopMarkdown (cyclomatic 24) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:316 — BridgeMod.FormatShopMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · layoutHorizontalStack (cyclomatic 23) · ×1
  • layoutHorizontalStack (cyclomatic 23) sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:133 — layoutHorizontalStack has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · intrinsicSize (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • intrinsicSize (cyclomatic 22) sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:40 — intrinsicSize has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildCardSelectState (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildCardSelectState (cyclomatic 21) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:1054 — BridgeMod.BuildCardSelectState has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.ExecuteStartNewGame (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.ExecuteStartNewGame (cyclomatic 20) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:147 — BridgeMod.ExecuteStartNewGame has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatCardSelectMarkdown (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatCardSelectMarkdown (cyclomatic 20) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:576 — BridgeMod.FormatCardSelectMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatEventMarkdown (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatEventMarkdown (cyclomatic 18) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:248 — BridgeMod.FormatEventMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (0 author(s) across 0 commit(s) sampled).
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1097.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cognitive 122) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown (cognitive 122) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:672 — BridgeMod.FormatMultiplayerBattleMarkdown has cognitive complexity 122 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cognitive 73) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown (cognitive 73) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:133 — BridgeMod.FormatBattleMarkdown has cognitive complexity 73 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cognitive 55) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState (cognitive 55) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:24 — BridgeMod.BuildMultiplayerGameState has cognitive complexity 55 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cognitive 54) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown (cognitive 54) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:10 — BridgeMod.FormatAsMarkdown has cognitive complexity 54 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown (cognitive 52) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown (cognitive 52) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:363 — BridgeMod.FormatMapMarkdown has cognitive complexity 52 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildGameState (cognitive 49) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildGameState (cognitive 49) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:42 — BridgeMod.BuildGameState has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · layoutVerticalStack (cognitive 33) · ×1
  • layoutVerticalStack (cognitive 33) sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:78 — layoutVerticalStack has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · layoutHorizontalStack (cognitive 33) · ×1
  • layoutHorizontalStack (cognitive 33) sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:133 — layoutHorizontalStack has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatEventMarkdown (cognitive 29) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatEventMarkdown (cognitive 29) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:248 — BridgeMod.FormatEventMarkdown has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · buildLayer (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • buildLayer (cognitive 24) sketch/agent-harness/src/builder.js:190 — buildLayer has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.ExecuteStartNewGame (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.ExecuteStartNewGame (cognitive 23) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:147 — BridgeMod.ExecuteStartNewGame has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion (cognitive 22) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:365 — BridgeMod.ExecuteUsePotion has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatShopMarkdown (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatShopMarkdown (cognitive 22) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:316 — BridgeMod.FormatShopMarkdown has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · intrinsicSize (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • intrinsicSize (cognitive 22) sketch/agent-harness/src/layout.js:40 — intrinsicSize has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildCardSelectState (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildCardSelectState (cognitive 21) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:1054 — BridgeMod.BuildCardSelectState has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.HandleRequest (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.HandleRequest (cognitive 20) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:110 — BridgeMod.HandleRequest has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.CollectKeywordsFromState (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.CollectKeywordsFromState (cognitive 20) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:842 — BridgeMod.CollectKeywordsFromState has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.FormatCardSelectMarkdown (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.FormatCardSelectMarkdown (cognitive 18) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:576 — BridgeMod.FormatCardSelectMarkdown has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.StripRichTextTags (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.StripRichTextTags (cognitive 18) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Helpers.cs:35 — BridgeMod.StripRichTextTags has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildPlayerState (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildPlayerState (cognitive 18) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:377 — BridgeMod.BuildPlayerState has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildEnemyState (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildEnemyState (cognitive 18) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:547 — BridgeMod.BuildEnemyState has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BridgeMod.BuildHandSelectState (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • BridgeMod.BuildHandSelectState (cognitive 16) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:1209 — BridgeMod.BuildHandSelectState has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · build (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • build (cognitive 16) sketch/agent-harness/src/builder.js:326 — build has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D20 · ADR Quality · Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent in the visible text · ×1
  • Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent in the visible text unimol_tools/agent-harness/docs/guides/02-QUICK-START.md — Add a Context section explaining why Uni-Mol Tools CLI is needed (e.g. for rapid prototyping over full pipelines) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as model retraining cost and dataset versioning
D20 · ADR Quality · Decision/consequences are absent (no trade-offs or alternative paths for each problem) · ×1
  • Decision/consequences are absent (no trade-offs or alternative paths for each problem) unimol_tools/agent-harness/docs/guides/05-TROUBLESHOOTING.md — For each troubleshooting issue add a Consequences section noting the alternatives considered and why one path is preferred over others.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5].verdict | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 829.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: BridgeMod slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 2555 lines, 104 methods.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:436 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:436-453 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:469-491
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:84 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:84-100 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:83-101
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:230 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:230-247 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:292-309
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:202 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:202-217 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.cs:264-279
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:639 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:639-650 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:753-764 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:901-914
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:181 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerState.cs:181-194 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.StateBuilder.cs:185-198
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:46 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:46-57 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.MultiplayerActions.cs:22-34
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:296 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:296-305 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:378-388 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:462-471 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:627-636
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:97 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:97-107 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Actions.cs:120-130
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:778 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:778-786 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:801-809 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:824-832
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:320 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:320-325 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:368-374 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:461-466
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:522 — slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:522-528 | slay_the_spire_ii/agent-harness/bridge/plugin/BridgeMod.Formatting.cs:595-601
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · single-commit history · ×1
  • single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots: a single-commit clone exposes no history window, so the churn × complexity hotspot signal is unavailable — not scored for this run.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (0 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Disclosure policy has no reporting contact · ×1
  • Disclosure policy has no reporting contact — SECURITY.md is present but no reporting contact (email / URL / mailto) was found — a coordinated-disclosure policy must tell reporters where to send a report.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] sketch/agent-harness/package-lock.json — @babel/core 7.29.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.29.6
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .3artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .70artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .10artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fdac5-a998-747c-b329-0985421f80bf · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 28 · Warnings: 112 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 05:50 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md