Public report — policr-mini, published 6 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 06-08-2026 @ 01:29 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Hentioe/policr-Mini

39% At Risk

Small · 18,974 LoC · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (33%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

38/40dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
87findings with an exact file:lineof 97 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
40/106dimensions across the health lenses18974 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

Hentioe/policr-mini carries serious gaps (39%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (88%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (80%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (33%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Accessibility (34%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning).

For scale: Small (~18,974 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 33% · 46% weightAccessibility 34% · 25% weightMaturity 43% · 14% weightSecurity 54% · 8% weightCode Health 80% · 4% weightArchitecture 88% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 33 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 39 → ~45.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (65+)

65 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/controllers/api/chat_controller.ex
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini/chats.ex
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini_web/admin_v2/views/api/scheme_view.ex
  • D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile
  • D35 · Change coupling: admin.js ↔ Sidebar.js assets/src/admin.js
  • D35 · Change coupling: resp_ping_chain.ex ↔ resp_sync_chain.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_ping_chain.ex
  • D35 · Change coupling: pages.js ↔ router.ex assets/src/admin/pages.js
  • D35 · Change coupling: call_answer_chain.ex ↔ resp_ping_chain.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml
  • R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) admin/src/components/ActionButton.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) assets/src/admin/pages/Operations.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) admin/vite.config.mjs
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) assets/src/admin/pages/Operations.js
  • R4 · Test Coverage
  • AC6 · Low contrast Tailwind colour pair (4.4:1) admin/src/pages/tasks/Bee.tsx

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,800–€29,000
Cost to rebuild€5,800–€29,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (96–306 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 39% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€17,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs.
+6.7 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+7.3 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+7.3 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 33%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (18,974 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 33%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

36 modules, 22 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

(global)CapindeCapinde.GenerationCapinde.Payload…nde.Payload.Generated…inde.Payload.Manifest…icrMini.Seeds.SupportPolicrMini.StatsPolicrMini.WorkerPolicrMiniBot.Captcha…iniBot.ClassicCAPTCHA…crMiniBot.GridCAPTCHAPolicrMiniBot.Helper…rMiniBot.ImageCAPTCHA…MiniBot.MessageCaller…84a67ae76a1cbcd4b14d7PolicrMiniPolicrMiniWebPolicrMiniWeb.APIPolicrMiniWeb.API.V1PolicrMiniWeb.Admin…licrMiniWeb.Admin.APIPolicrMiniWeb.AdminV2…crMiniWeb.AdminV2.APIPolicrMiniWeb.Console…crMiniWeb.Console.API…licrMiniWeb.ConsoleV2PolicrMini.ChatsPolicrMini.CounterPolicrMini.InstancesPolicrMini.MnesiaPolicrMini.SchemaPolicrMiniBot…MiniWeb.ConsoleV2.APIPolicrMiniBot.RunnerPolicrMiniBot.Worker(global)1Capinde2Capinde.Generation3Capinde.Payload4…nde.Payload.Generated5…inde.Payload.Manifest6…icrMini.Seeds.Support7PolicrMini.Stats8PolicrMini.Worker9PolicrMiniBot.Captcha10…iniBot.ClassicCAPTCHA11…crMiniBot.GridCAPTCHA12PolicrMiniBot.Helper13…rMiniBot.ImageCAPTCHA14…MiniBot.MessageCaller15…84a67ae76a1cbcd4b14d716PolicrMini17PolicrMiniWeb18PolicrMiniWeb.API19PolicrMiniWeb.API.V120PolicrMiniWeb.Admin21…licrMiniWeb.Admin.API22PolicrMiniWeb.AdminV223…crMiniWeb.AdminV2.API24PolicrMiniWeb.Console25…crMiniWeb.Console.API26…licrMiniWeb.ConsoleV227PolicrMini.Chats28PolicrMini.Counter29PolicrMini.Instances30PolicrMini.Mnesia31PolicrMini.Schema32PolicrMiniBot33…MiniWeb.ConsoleV2.API34PolicrMiniBot.Runner35PolicrMiniBot.Worker3635412142222224121235148111

At a glance — Code Health · 80% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 88% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 43% · Weak · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 33% · Weak · gated by R4, P3

At a glance — Security · 54% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38

At a glance — Accessibility · 34% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection7High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration2High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by integrating automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to catch regressions early. Next, expand test coverage to include all production modules to ensure code quality. Then, address the single leaked secret in the configuration files to secure sensitive data. Maintain a changelog to track release history, and finally, add text alternatives for images and media to improve accessibility.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs.+6.7 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+7.3 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+7.3 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+6.7 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.+6.4 ptsMediumText alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+6.4 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.+6.3 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+6.1 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 24 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 58% mixed · 42% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex4.3MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: call_answer_chain.ex ↔ verification_controller.ex
assets/pnpm-lock.yaml4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
admin/pnpm-lock.yaml4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
mix.lock4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/publish.yml4.5MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml4.5MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
lib/policr_mini/chats.ex7.2MixedCognitive Complexity: Chats.get_pmodes (cognitive 17)
config/config.exs7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
assets/.npmrc7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age
assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22)
assets/src/admin/pages/Custom.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18)
lib/policr_mini_bot/verification_helper.ex7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: VerificationHelper.embarrass_request_user (cognitive 18)
lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: PermissionBusiness.has_permissions (cognitive 17)
lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_sync_chain.ex8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: RespSyncChain.handle (cognitive 30)
lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/controllers/api/chat_controller.ex8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
lib/policr_mini_web/admin_v2/views/api/scheme_view.ex8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
assets/src/admin/components/Sidebar.js8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: Sidebar.js ↔ pages.js
admin/src/types/server-data.d.ts8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: server-data.d.ts ↔ router.ex
admin/src/api.ts8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: api.ts ↔ router.ex

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 38 of 40 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 40 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC6AC7M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 87 of 97 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd4b0-6003-7eb0-b3dc-561092b88c77.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 22.

(anonymous) (cyclomatic 22)assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:217
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 18)assets/src/admin/pages/Custom.js:144
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 16)assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:172

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 31.

(anonymous) (cognitive 31)assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:217
RespSyncChain.handle (cognitive 30)lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_sync_chain.ex:19
VerificationHelper.embarrass_request_user (cognitive 18)lib/policr_mini_bot/verification_helper.ex:147
PermissionBusiness.has_permissions (cognitive 17)lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex:30
Chats.get_pmodes (cognitive 17)lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:647

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cognitive 31) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Scheme.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 RespSyncChain.handle (cognitive 30) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with resp_sync_chain.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 VerificationHelper.embarrass_request_user (cognitive 18) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with verification_helper.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: Chatslib/policr_mini/chats.ex:1
FileTooLong: policr_mini/chats.exlib/policr_mini/chats.ex:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (26 lines × 2)lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex:311
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/controllers/api/chat_controller.ex:79
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:246
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)lib/policr_mini_web/admin_v2/views/api/scheme_view.ex:6
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex:32

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: high-entropy-secretconfig/config.exs:20

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

33 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/policr_mini_bot/verification_helper.ex.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

PolicrMini 的 README 是一个清晰的项目介绍文档,涵盖了简介、新变化、技术介绍和关注我们部分,并且有一个部署教程文档。但整体质量受限于单一 README 文件(缺少架构/设计说明)和部署文档内容冗长、步骤重复且缺乏可运行示例,导致关键配置参数(如 TELEGRAM_API_ID, TELEGRAM_API_HASH, POLICR_MINI_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE 等)的设置指引模糊,读者无法直接复制到环境变量中。

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — PolicrMini 的 README 是一个清晰的项目介绍文档,涵盖了简介、新变化、技术介绍和关注我们部分,并且有一个部署教程文档。但整体质量受限于单一 README 文件(缺少架构/设计说明)和部署文档内容冗长、步骤重复且缺乏可运行示例,导致关键配置参数(如 TELEGRAM_API_ID, TELEGRAM_API_HASH, POLICR_MINI_DATABASE_POOL_SIZE 等)的设置指引模糊,读者无法直接复制到环境变量中。

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×7.github/workflows/publish.yml:19detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish.yml (6), .npmrc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

45 of 78 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/handle_self_permissions_change_chain.ex.

Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: Sidebar.js↔pages.js 94%; server-data.d.ts↔router.ex 83%; api.ts↔router.ex 76%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: call_answer_chain.ex ↔ verification_controller.exlib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex
Change coupling: Sidebar.js ↔ pages.js · ×9assets/src/admin/components/Sidebar.js

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

84 finding(s): 6 critical, 49 high, 25 medium, 4 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×42assets/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6assets/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2assets/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 42 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (34), mix.lock (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (42 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×7) — Message.tsx:13, Message.tsx:27, Message.tsx:13, …

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label htmlFor> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — Checkbox.tsx:20, Checkbox.tsx:20
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×3) — index.tsx:152, index.tsx:76, Adding.tsx:48

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. (×7) — Checkbox.tsx:18, Range.tsx:36, NavigationBar.tsx:29, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. (×2) — Bee.tsx:60, List.tsx:92

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
M1 · Documentation (README)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • The root README is 85 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.

What to do

  • Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README claims Telegex TG bot library but the evidence shows no such dependency

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Telegex TG bot library but the evidence shows no such dependency.
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
P3 · Security & performance tooling1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
R1 · Type Safety7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • admin/src/components/ActionButton.tsx:23 · admin/src/components/ActionButton.tsx:54 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ActionButton.tsx:23
  • console/src/components/ActionButton.tsx:32 · console/src/components/ActionButton.tsx:102 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ActionButton.tsx:32
  • admin/eslint.config.mjs:17 · console/eslint.config.mjs:17 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — eslint.config.mjs:17
  • admin/src/components/ActionButton.tsx:83 · console/src/components/ActionButton.tsx:147 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ActionButton.tsx:83
  • assets/src/admin/pages/Operations.js:256 · assets/src/admin/pages/Verifications.js:272 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — Operations.js:256
  • assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:492 · assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:525 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — Scheme.js:492
  • admin/vite.config.mjs:14 · console/vite.config.mjs:14 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — vite.config.mjs:14
  • assets/src/admin/pages/Operations.js:362 · assets/src/admin/pages/Verifications.js:390 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — Operations.js:362

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×3) — Scheme.js:217, Custom.js:144, Scheme.js:172

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • 0% of 140 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×7) — api.ts:17, api.ts:36, api.ts:64, …
  • Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in admin/src/components/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in admin/src/components/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. — Message.tsx:9

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — webpack.config.js:2
  • Declared in assets/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • assets/src/admin/components.js → assets/src/admin/components/PageHeader.js → assets/src/admin/components.js — components.js

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health80%StrongSolid.
Architecture88%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity43%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness33%Weak — gated by R4, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security54%Adequate — gated by D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility34%Weak — gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 66 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~1466 lines of test source are present (.exs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (1 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 60 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×42
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.24.1: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — @remix-run/router 1.15.3: [GHSA redacted] — @remix-run/router is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @remix-run/router to 1.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @remix-run/router 1.15.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.23.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.23.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against @remix-run/router 1.15.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml — @zag-js/core 0.38.0: [GHSA redacted] — @zag-js/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @zag-js/core to 0.82.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — axios 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares axios ^1.11.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.16.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so axios moves onto 1.16.0 or later; if the flagged 1.11.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin axios with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 29 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 1.11.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 29 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: assets/pnpm-lock.yaml, webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: assets/pnpm-lock.yaml, webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: assets/pnpm-lock.yaml, webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — cowboy 2.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.15.0. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.13.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.13.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — cowlib 2.15.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.15.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.15.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: assets/pnpm-lock.yaml, webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — defu 6.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — defu is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin defu to 6.1.5 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: admin/pnpm-lock.yaml, webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml — flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — form-data 4.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — glob 10.3.10: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml — glob 10.3.12: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — hackney 1.24.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against hackney 1.24.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — immutable 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 4.3.9 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against immutable 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml — immutable 4.3.5: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 4.3.9 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against immutable 4.3.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 4.3.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: admin/pnpm-lock.yaml, webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — json5 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 2.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • + 17 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×7
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:36 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age assets/.npmrc:1 — This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×6
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — @babel/traverse 7.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — loader-utils 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 2.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] webapps/pnpm-lock.yaml — seroval 1.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — seroval is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin seroval to 1.5.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against seroval 1.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.5.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.5.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against seroval 1.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — seroval 1.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — seroval is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin seroval to 1.5.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against seroval 1.3.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.5.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.5.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against seroval 1.3.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — tar 6.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.11, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.11; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/pnpm-lock.yaml — tar 7.4.3: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tar to 7.5.19 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tar 7.4.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against tar 7.4.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — serialize-javascript 5.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 5.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 5.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 5.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 5.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] assets/pnpm-lock.yaml — serialize-javascript 6.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/config.exs:20 — high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×1
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: call_answer_chain.ex ↔ verification_controller.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex — `lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex` (context policr_mini_bot) and `lib/policr_mini_web/controllers/admin/api/verification_controller.ex` (context policr_mini_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 73% of the time (8 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Warning — 28 finding(s)
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×9
  • Change coupling: Sidebar.js ↔ pages.js assets/src/admin/components/Sidebar.js — `assets/src/admin/components/Sidebar.js` and `assets/src/admin/pages.js` change together 94% of the time (15 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: server-data.d.ts ↔ router.ex admin/src/types/server-data.d.ts — `admin/src/types/server-data.d.ts` and `lib/policr_mini_web/router.ex` change together 83% of the time (10 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
  • Change coupling: api.ts ↔ router.ex admin/src/api.ts — `admin/src/api.ts` and `lib/policr_mini_web/router.ex` change together 76% of the time (13 of the 17 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
  • Change coupling: call_answer_chain.ex ↔ validation_terminaltor.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex — `lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex` and `lib/policr_mini_bot/worker/validation_terminaltor.ex` change together 75% of the time (18 of the 24 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: chain_handler.ex ↔ supervisor.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chain_handler.ex — `lib/policr_mini_bot/chain_handler.ex` and `lib/policr_mini_bot/supervisor.ex` change together 75% of the time (12 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: admin.js ↔ Sidebar.js assets/src/admin.js — `assets/src/admin.js` and `assets/src/admin/components/Sidebar.js` change together 67% of the time (18 of the 27 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: resp_ping_chain.ex ↔ resp_sync_chain.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_ping_chain.ex — `lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_ping_chain.ex` and `lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_sync_chain.ex` change together 67% of the time (10 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: pages.js ↔ router.ex assets/src/admin/pages.js — `assets/src/admin/pages.js` and `lib/policr_mini_web/router.ex` change together 62% of the time (10 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
  • Change coupling: call_answer_chain.ex ↔ resp_ping_chain.ex lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex — `lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex` and `lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_ping_chain.ex` change together 60% of the time (9 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:217 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18) assets/src/admin/pages/Custom.js:144 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:172 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 31) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 31) assets/src/admin/pages/Scheme.js:217 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RespSyncChain.handle (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • RespSyncChain.handle (cognitive 30) lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/resp_sync_chain.ex:19 — RespSyncChain.handle has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 15). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · VerificationHelper.embarrass_request_user (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • VerificationHelper.embarrass_request_user (cognitive 18) lib/policr_mini_bot/verification_helper.ex:147 — VerificationHelper.embarrass_request_user has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, match/switch 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PermissionBusiness.has_permissions (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • PermissionBusiness.has_permissions (cognitive 17) lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex:30 — PermissionBusiness.has_permissions has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Chats.get_pmodes (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • Chats.get_pmodes (cognitive 17) lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:647 — Chats.get_pmodes has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · VerificationHelper.embarrass_joined_user (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • VerificationHelper.embarrass_joined_user (cognitive 16) lib/policr_mini_bot/verification_helper.ex:50 — VerificationHelper.embarrass_joined_user has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, match/switch 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 16) assets/src/admin/pages/Custom.js:144 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: Chats lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: policr_mini/chats.ex lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:0 — FileTooLong — 549 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 6 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex:311 — lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex:311-336 | lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/call_answer_chain.ex:341-366 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/controllers/api/chat_controller.ex:79 — lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/controllers/api/chat_controller.ex:79-94 | lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/controllers/api/chat_controller.ex:115-130 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:246 — lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:246-258 | lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:566-578 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini_web/admin_v2/views/api/scheme_view.ex:6 — lib/policr_mini_web/admin_v2/views/api/scheme_view.ex:6-15 | lib/policr_mini_web/console_v2/views/api/scheme_json.ex:14-23 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex:32 — lib/policr_mini/businesses/permission_business.ex:32-39 | lib/policr_mini/chats.ex:649-656 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 33 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/policr_mini_bot/verification_helper.ex, lib/policr_mini/chats.ex, lib/policr_mini_bot/helper.ex, console/src/pages/control/index.tsx, console/src/pages/customize/index.tsx, lib/policr_mini_bot/chains/handle_self_joined_chain.ex, webapps/src/console/pages/Dashboard.tsx, console/src/components/ActionButton.tsx (+25 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 45 of 78 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 45 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .7artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .2artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .84artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fd4b0-6003-7eb0-b3dc-561092b88c77 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md