Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
JordanMarr/SqlHydra carries serious gaps (50%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Security (83%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (25%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (61%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 5 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~12,415 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
79%
Strong
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
61%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
25%
Weak · gated by D13, P3
Security
83%
Adequate · gated by D30
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 25% · 47% weightMaturity 61% · 26% weightCode Health 79% · 14% weightSecurity 83% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 25 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~70.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €13,000–€65,000
| Cost to rebuild | €13,000–€65,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 50% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€39,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 25% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sqlhydra-mssql.toml, ReaderExample.fs, DonaldExample.fs.
2
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
3
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 25%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sqlhydra-mssql.toml, ReaderExample.fs, DonaldExample.fs. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 13 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 8 | Medium |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 5 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Immediately resolve the five leaked secrets, starting with sqlhydra-mssql.toml, ReaderExample.fs, and DonaldExample.fs. Next, document your recovery time and objectives with a tested restore procedure, as a backup configuration alone does not constitute disaster recovery. Add a health check to your compose service and ensure your deployment process uses immutable image tags to simplify rollbacks. Maintain a changelog to track each release and create architecture decision records in a dedicated directory to document significant design choices and their consequences.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sqlhydra-mssql.toml, ReaderExample.fs, DonaldExample.fs. | +23.7 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +22.5 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding. | +20.7 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +20.7 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +3.7 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +6.5 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite. | +5.6 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists. | +5.0 pts | Medium | Documentation accuracy |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/SampleApp/DapperExample.fs | 5.7 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs | 7.0 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cyclomatic 87) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs | 7.1 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/NpgsqlExtensions.fs | 7.2 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) |
| src/SampleApp/sqlhydra-mssql.toml | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/SampleApp/ReaderExample.fs | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/SampleApp/DonaldExample.fs | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/SampleApp/DapperFSharpExample.fs | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: SqlEmitterBase.EmitSelectInto (cyclomatic 19) |
| src/SqlHydra.Cli/SqlServer/SqlServerSchemaProvider.fs | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 4) |
| src/SqlHydra.Cli/Npgsql/NpgsqlSchemaProvider.fs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: NpgsqlSchemaProvider.getSchema (cognitive 16) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitters.fs | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) |
| src/SqlHydra.Cli/MySql/MySqlSchemaProvider.fs | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/UpdateBuilders.fs | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlServerExtensions.fs | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| src/SqlHydra.Cli/TomlConfigParser.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: TomlConfigParser.read (cyclomatic 16) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/QueryContext.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: QueryContext.PrepareInsertCommand (cognitive 27) |
| src/SqlHydra.Cli/SchemaTemplate.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: SchemaTemplate.mkTable (cognitive 25) |
| src/SqlHydra.Query/Hydration.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: ColumnReadMethods.ConvertOracleProviderType (cognitive 21) |
| src/SqlHydra.Cli/SqlServer/SqlServerDataTypes.fs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 21 of 23 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 23 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D30D31D34D35M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 68 of 87 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D3 God Classes — evaluation did not complete — God Classes not included (check did not complete) — excluded from the score.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
6 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere at 87. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being SqlEmitterBase.EmitWhereInner at 23 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cyclomatic 87)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:485
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitSelect (cyclomatic 48)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1115
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitHaving (cyclomatic 34)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:803
SqlEmitterBase.EmitSelectInto (cyclomatic 19)src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs:196
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitJoinPredicate (cyclomatic 18)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1036
What to do
- Resolve the 1 LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cyclomatic 87) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 LinqExpressionVisitors.visitSelect (cyclomatic 48) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 LinqExpressionVisitors.visitHaving (cyclomatic 34) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere at 89.
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cognitive 89)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:485
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitSelect (cognitive 53)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1115
LinqExpressionVisitors.visitHaving (cognitive 43)src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:803
QueryContext.PrepareInsertCommand (cognitive 27)src/SqlHydra.Query/QueryContext.fs:266
SchemaTemplate.mkTable (cognitive 25)src/SqlHydra.Cli/SchemaTemplate.fs:31
What to do
- Resolve the 1 LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cognitive 89) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 LinqExpressionVisitors.visitSelect (cognitive 53) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 LinqExpressionVisitors.visitHaving (cognitive 43) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
38 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs:102
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/MySql/MySqlSchemaProvider.fs:42
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:805
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SchemaFilters.fs:21
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/Npgsql/NpgsqlSchemaProvider.fs:225
What to do
- Resolve the 7 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs (2), SqlEmitterBase.fs, InsertBuilders.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
- Resolve the 5 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with LinqExpressionVisitors.fs (3), MySqlSchemaProvider.fs, UpdateBuilders.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 5 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with SelectBuilders.fs (3), LinqExpressionVisitors.fs, UpdateBuilders.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
5 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/SampleApp/sqlhydra-mssql.toml:2
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with sqlhydra-mssql.toml, ReaderExample.fs, DonaldExample.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs (2×23=46)
Hotspot: src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fssrc/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor
18 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
SqlHydra's README is clear and complete for an F# tool: it states the supported databases, a step-by-step quick start (CLI install + wizard + query library), shows how to create a typed query context with AdventureWorks.QueryContextFactory, demonstrates a full type-safe selectTask expression, notes both Task/Async variants of every builder, and ends with What Gets Generated? plus an outline naming all the documented features. The body is clipped mid-What Gets Generated?, so the generated-file details and installation/run-on-TOML sections are present in the outline but not shown; the visible material is exemplary.
The quick start assumes a single database type (SQL Server) and omits TOML configuration for multiple databases, which is covered by the architecture docs.README.md
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
13 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 5 high, 4 medium, 2 low.
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.11
Critical CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.11.3
Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0
What to do
- Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 8 low.
Low IaC: DS-0017 src/.devcontainer/mssql/Dockerfile
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
- No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 79% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 61% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 25% | Weak — gated by D13, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 83% | Adequate — gated by D30 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~28848 lines of test source are present (.fs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's projects are MSBuild/NuGet projects, whose package licenses are exactly what this dimension reads, but no license could be resolved for them (the .NET license collector did not run, or restore failed). A gap in the analysis run, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant.
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution; this repository's .NET projects are all F# (.fsproj), which the C#/VB workspace does not load, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.fs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — God Classes not included (check did not complete)
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .fs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.fs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 462 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 12 finding(s)
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/SampleApp/sqlhydra-mssql.toml:2
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/SampleApp/ReaderExample.fs:8
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/SampleApp/DonaldExample.fs:10
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/SampleApp/DapperFSharpExample.fs:12
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/SampleApp/DapperExample.fs:10
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.11
- High CVE: Microsoft.Build.Tasks.Core 16.10.0
- High CVE: NuGet.Common 5.11.0
- High CVE: NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0
- High CVE: NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0
- Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0
Warning — 59 finding(s)
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs:102
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:588
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:607
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/InsertBuilders.fs:19
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlServerExtensions.fs:93
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/NpgsqlExtensions.fs:39
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/OracleExtensions.fs:42
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/MySql/MySqlSchemaProvider.fs:42
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:675
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:733
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:908
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/UpdateBuilders.fs:73
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:805
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs:169
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs:549
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs:644
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/UpdateBuilders.fs:119
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.11.3
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.60.3
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.20
- Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.7.0
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SchemaFilters.fs:21
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SqlServer/SqlServerSchemaProvider.fs:25
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/MySql/MySqlSchemaProvider.fs:56
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs:242
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/Npgsql/NpgsqlSchemaProvider.fs:225
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/NpgsqlExtensions.fs:68
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/NpgsqlExtensions.fs:80
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/MySql/MySqlDataTypes.fs:64
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitters.fs:127
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/SampleApp/DapperExample.fs:42
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs:583
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SqlServer/SqlServerSchemaProvider.fs:54
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/SelectBuilders.fs:346
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:273
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Query/NpgsqlExtensions.fs:11
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cyclomatic 87) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:485
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitSelect (cyclomatic 48) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1115
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitHaving (cyclomatic 34) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:803
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- SqlEmitterBase.EmitSelectInto (cyclomatic 19) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs:196
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitJoinPredicate (cyclomatic 18) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1036
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- TomlConfigParser.read (cyclomatic 16) src/SqlHydra.Cli/TomlConfigParser.fs:19
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- Hotspot: src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitWhere (cognitive 89) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:485
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitSelect (cognitive 53) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1115
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitHaving (cognitive 43) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:803
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- QueryContext.PrepareInsertCommand (cognitive 27) src/SqlHydra.Query/QueryContext.fs:266
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- SchemaTemplate.mkTable (cognitive 25) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SchemaTemplate.fs:31
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- ColumnReadMethods.ConvertOracleProviderType (cognitive 21) src/SqlHydra.Query/Hydration.fs:45
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- SqlEmitterBase.EmitSelectInto (cognitive 18) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitterBase.fs:196
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- NpgsqlSchemaProvider.getSchema (cognitive 16) src/SqlHydra.Cli/Npgsql/NpgsqlSchemaProvider.fs:7
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- LinqExpressionVisitors.visitJoinPredicate (cognitive 16) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:1036
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SqlServer/SqlServerDataTypes.fs:54
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 4) src/SqlHydra.Cli/SqlServer/SqlServerSchemaProvider.fs:108
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:514
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlEmitters.fs:83
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) src/SqlHydra.Query/LinqExpressionVisitors.fs:486
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) src/SqlHydra.Query/SqlServerExtensions.fs:11
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
Recommendation — 14 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0017 src/.devcontainer/mssql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0031 src/.devcontainer/mssql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0001 src/.devcontainer/postgresql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0002 src/.devcontainer/postgresql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0013 src/.devcontainer/postgresql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0017 src/.devcontainer/postgresql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/.devcontainer/postgresql/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0029 src/.devcontainer/postgresql/Dockerfile
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0
- Low CVE: NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The quick start assumes a single database type (SQL Server) and omits TOML configuration for multiple databases, which is covered by the architecture docs. README.md
D3 · God Classes
- God Classes not included (check did not complete)
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list src/SqlHydra.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 13 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 8 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |