Public report — KCloud-Platform-IoT, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
209findings with an exact file:lineof 221 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
52/116dimensions across the health lenses97783 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
KouShenhai/KCloud-Platform-IoT carries serious gaps (38%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (99%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (29%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (30%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint… (Tooling).
For scale: Medium (~97,783 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.1 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.7× (at 38% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~1.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€160,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 29% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~1.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 29%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Architecture — module dependency matrix
624 modules, 1219 dependencies — 16 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
51
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
33
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
29
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
19
High / Critical
A04:2021 — Insecure Design
5
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by increasing test coverage by adding tests for all currently unreached production modules. Next, improve dependency hygiene by removing unused packages, explicitly declaring all imports, and correctly categorizing type and test-only dependencies. Simultaneously, establish a proper testing and linting workflow by configuring a test runner and ESLint as scripts and integrating them into your CI pipeline. Finally, strengthen operational resilience by documenting disaster recovery procedures and maintaining a changelog to track release history.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 209 of 221 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 12 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Top hotspots: ui/src/access.ts (7×89=623); ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/ThingModelDrawer.tsx (9×27=243); ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/thingModel.tsx (10×17=170)
Hotspot: ui/src/access.ts · ×3ui/src/access.ts
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
264 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is laokou-common/laokou-common-security/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/security/config/OAuth2ModelMapper.java.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
142 finding(s): 0 critical, 142 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×18laokou-common/laokou-common-core/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/core/config/SystemSettingsProperties.java:58detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 18 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with kcloud_platform.sql (8), kcloud_platform_nacos.sql (4), application.properties (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×30.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding
Low: insecure-trust-manager · ×3laokou-common/laokou-common-i18n/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/i18n/util/SslUtils.java:64detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 30 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with node.js.yml (5), codeql.yml (4), static.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (30 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with SslUtils.java (2), nginx.conf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×9laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×11ui/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×9laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 9 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 11 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
Resolve the 9 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.
Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log · ×5laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java:172detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is present but lists no reporting contact.
Disclosure policy has no reporting contact
What to do
Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×20archive/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3archive/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×3archive/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×17archive/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×4archive/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 20 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (20). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. — index.tsx:8
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×6) — login.html:112, login.html:116, login.html:121, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — index.html:20, login.html:2, login.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×23) — index.tsx:131, index.tsx:132, index.tsx:149, …
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — login.html:122, login.html:122
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
outline:none/0 with no :focus rule in the same stylesheet removes the focus ring. Provide a visible :focus / :focus-visible style. (×2) — login.html:8, login.html:8
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
`OAuth2AuthenticatedExtPrincipal` is an aggregate/entity with 13 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OAuth2AuthenticatedExtPrincipal.java:45
`OperateLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 17 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OperateLogE.java:41
`DeptE` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — DeptE.java:42
`DictE` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — DictE.java:41
`DictItemE` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — DictItemE.java:41
`I18nMenuE` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — I18nMenuE.java:41
`LoginLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — LoginLogE.java:32
`MenuE` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — MenuE.java:40
`NoticeLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — NoticeLogE.java:32
`AdminOperateLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 17 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AdminOperateLogE.java:32
`OssE` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OssE.java:33
`RoleE` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — RoleE.java:43
`UserE` is an aggregate/entity with 15 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — UserE.java:42
`LoginLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 12 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — LoginLogE.java:37
`NoticeLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — NoticeLogE.java:37
`UserE` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — UserE.java:43
`ProductCategoryE` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — ProductCategoryE.java:42
`SourceE` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — SourceE.java:41
`ThingModelE` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — ThingModelE.java:42
`OssLogE` is an aggregate/entity with 12 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OssLogE.java:40
What to do
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
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ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.
`OperateEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — OperateEvent.java:34
`LoginEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — LoginEvent.java:34
`SendCaptchaEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — SendCaptchaEvent.java:29
`OssUploadEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — OssUploadEvent.java:31
What to do
Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 155 of 161 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.9 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/productCategory.tsx:185 · ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/thingModel.tsx:313 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — productCategory.tsx:185
ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/device.tsx:276 · ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/product.tsx:228 · ui/src/pages/IoT/Network/connection.tsx:234 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/dept.tsx:200 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 6 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — device.tsx:276
ui/src/pages/Sys/Base/i18nMenu.tsx:168 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/menu.tsx:307 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — i18nMenu.tsx:168
ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/dept.tsx:196 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/user.tsx:360 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — dept.tsx:196
ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/dept.tsx:296 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/user.tsx:486 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — dept.tsx:296
ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/DeviceDrawer.tsx:95 · ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/ProductCategoryDrawer.tsx:96 · ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/ProductDrawer.tsx:93 · ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/SourceDrawer.tsx:72 · +10 more site(s) not listed — the 14 copies are spread across 5 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — DeviceDrawer.tsx:95
ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/SourceDrawer.tsx:73 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/UserDrawer.tsx:127 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — SourceDrawer.tsx:73
ui/src/pages/Sys/Base/i18nMenu.tsx:266 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/dept.tsx:296 · ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/user.tsx:486 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — i18nMenu.tsx:266
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×6) — access.ts:1, ThingModelDrawer.tsx:43, ProFormNumber.tsx:62, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
10 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: ui/src/pages/Sys/Base/dict.tsx (838), ui/src/pages/Login/index.tsx (626), ui/src/pages/IoT/Network/ConnectionDrawer.tsx (622), ui/src/locales/en-US.ts (573), ui/src/locales/zh-CN.ts (573), ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/user.tsx (501) (+4 more).
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 101 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓
What to do
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
5 file(s) (~55 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — bigScreen
25 file(s) (~1797 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — edgeGatewayUI
88 file(s) (~18283 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — ui
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — editFrontmatter.js:10, editFrontmatter.js:6, index.tsx:1
Declared in archive/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 64 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~17435 lines of test source are present (.java) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Maven POM, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .java, .py, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Maven POM, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .go, .java, .py, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an Axon event-sourcing framework (@Aggregate/@CommandHandler/@EventSourcingHandler annotations))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:46— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v5.4.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v5.4.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.4.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:54— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v4.36.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4.36.3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`. Note that `v4.36.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:77— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.36.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4.36.3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`. Note that `v4.36.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/dependency-review-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/dependency-review-action@v5.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/dependency-review-action/commits/v5.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/maven.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/maven.yml:21— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v5.4.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v5.4.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.4.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/maven.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: codecov/codecov-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `codecov/codecov-action@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/codecov/codecov-action/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/node.js.yml:17— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/node.js.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v6.4.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v6.4.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v6.4.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/node.js.yml:31— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v6.4.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v6.4.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v6.4.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/node.js.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v6.4.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v6.4.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v6.4.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/node.js.yml:63— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: cpina/github-action-push-to-another-repository@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `cpina/github-action-push-to-another-repository@v1.7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/cpina/github-action-push-to-another-repository/commits/v1.7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/semgrep.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/stale.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/stale@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/stale@v10`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/stale/commits/v10 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/static.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v7.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/static.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/configure-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/configure-pages@v6.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/configure-pages/commits/v6.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v6.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/static.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v5.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v5.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/static.yml:42— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v5.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v5.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sync.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/Yikun/hub-mirror-action/commits/master --jq .sha`.
+ 5 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×20
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.27.1: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— html-minifier 3.5.21: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; html-minifier is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.7 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.19.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.19.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— http-proxy-middleware 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.7 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.3.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.3.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 1.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— ip 1.1.9: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; ip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— json5 0.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.0.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.5.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.5.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— linkify-it 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — linkify-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.2.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.2.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against linkify-it 2.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.0.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.0.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against linkify-it 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— lodash.template 4.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; lodash.template is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— node-forge 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted] — node-forge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.4.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.10.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.10.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 13 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against node-forge 0.10.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against node-forge 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— nth-check 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — nth-check is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— path-to-regexp 0.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.5.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.39, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.39; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— webpack-dev-middleware 3.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — webpack-dev-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.3.4 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.7.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.7.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— ws 6.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — ws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ws to 6.2.4 with an `overrides` entry).
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-cloud/laokou-monitor/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-cloud/laokou-nacos/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-common/laokou-common-testcontainers/docker/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-start/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-start/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-start/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 ui/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java:172— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java:188— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java:192— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java:194— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java:207— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— loader-utils 0.2.17: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.4.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.2.17, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.2.17; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×3
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— svgo 1.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.8.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Boundary-crossing change coupling: GatewayApp.java ↔ AsyncConfig.java laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/src/main/java/org/laokou/gateway/GatewayApp.java— `laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/src/main/java/org/laokou/gateway/GatewayApp.java` (context laokou-cloud) and `laokou-common/laokou-common-core/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/core/config/AsyncConfig.java` (context laokou-common) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/src/main/java/org/laokou/gateway/GatewayApp.java:60— laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/src/main/java/org/laokou/gateway/GatewayApp.java:60-66 | laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/logstash/LogtashApp.java:48-54 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:82— laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:82-88 | laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:139-145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:82` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:114— laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:114-120 | laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:146-152 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-common/laokou-common-redis/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/redis/config/NodeType.java:114` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/convertor/DeptConvertor.java:39— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/convertor/DeptConvertor.java:39-45 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/convertor/DeptConvertor.java:49-55 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/convertor/DeptConvertor.java:39` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/convertor/DictConvertor.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/convertor/DictConvertor.java:42-48 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/convertor/DictConvertor.java:53-59 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/convertor/DictConvertor.java:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/convertor/DictItemConvertor.java:44— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/convertor/DictItemConvertor.java:44-50 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/convertor/DictItemConvertor.java:57-63 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/convertor/DictItemConvertor.java:44` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:61— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:61-67 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:100-106 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:61` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/service/validator/ModifyMenuParamValidator.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/service/validator/ModifyMenuParamValidator.java:42-48 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/service/validator/SaveMenuParamValidator.java:40-46 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/convertor/MenuConvertor.java:47— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/convertor/MenuConvertor.java:47-53 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/convertor/MenuConvertor.java:62-68 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/convertor/MenuConvertor.java:47` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/role/convertor/RoleConvertor.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/role/convertor/RoleConvertor.java:42-48 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/role/convertor/RoleConvertor.java:104-110 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/role/convertor/RoleConvertor.java:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:45— laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:45-51 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:60-66 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:45` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:42-48 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:63-69 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:42` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/ability/DeviceDomainService.java:131— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/ability/DeviceDomainService.java:131-137 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/ability/ConnectionDomainService.java:190-196 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:44— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:44-50 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:75-81 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:44` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/service/validator/ModifySourceParamValidator.java:39— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/service/validator/ModifySourceParamValidator.java:39-45 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/service/validator/SaveSourceParamValidator.java:37-43 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:53— laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:53-59 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:70-76 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:53` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-oss/laokou-oss-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/oss/OssApp.java:53— laokou-service/laokou-oss/laokou-oss-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/oss/OssApp.java:53-59 | laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/SnowflakeIdApp.java:46-52 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-standalone/laokou-standalone-admin/laokou-standalone-admin-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/standalone/admin/StandaloneAdminApp.java:59— laokou-service/laokou-standalone/laokou-standalone-admin/laokou-standalone-admin-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/standalone/admin/StandaloneAdminApp.java:59-65 | laokou-service/laokou-standalone/laokou-standalone-auth/laokou-standalone-auth-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/standalone/auth/StandaloneAuthApp.java:58-64 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×17
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— bn.js 4.12.2: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 4.12.3 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— bn.js 5.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 5.2.3 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— follow-redirects 1.15.9: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— got 9.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — got is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.8.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.6.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.6.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— markdown-it 8.4.2: [GHSA redacted] — markdown-it is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 14.2.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.4.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.4.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against markdown-it 8.4.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 14.2.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 14.2.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against markdown-it 8.4.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— micromatch 3.1.10: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.0.8 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.1.10, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.1.10; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— qs 6.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.13.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.15.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.15.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.13.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— qs 6.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.14.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.15.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.15.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.14.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— qs 6.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— request 2.88.2: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; request is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-4970 KEdge-Gateway/go.mod— stdlib 1.26.2 (os): GO-2026-4970 — fixed in Go 1.26.5; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. (in 2 dependency files: KEdge-Gateway/go.mod, KEdge-Gateway/pkg/plugins/mqtt/go.mod) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.26.2: GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— tough-cookie 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — tough-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.1.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.5.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.5.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— uuid 3.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^14.0.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.4.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.4.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^14.0.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— vue-template-compiler 2.7.16: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; vue-template-compiler is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— webpack-dev-server 3.11.3: [GHSA redacted] — webpack-dev-server is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.2.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.11.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.11.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against webpack-dev-server 3.11.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against webpack-dev-server 3.11.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/convertor/OperateLogConvertor.java:92— laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/convertor/OperateLogConvertor.java:92-97 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/operateLog/convertor/OperateLogConvertor.java:54-59 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/service/validator/ModifyDeptParamValidator.java:37— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/service/validator/ModifyDeptParamValidator.java:37-42 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/service/validator/SaveDeptParamValidator.java:35-40 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/service/validator/ModifyDeptParamValidator.java:37` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/service/validator/ModifyDictItemParamValidator.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/service/validator/ModifyDictItemParamValidator.java:42-47 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/service/validator/SaveDictItemParamValidator.java:40-45 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/service/validator/ModifyDictItemParamValidator.java:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:80— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:80-85 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:76-81 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/operateLog/convertor/OperateLogConvertor.java:75— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/operateLog/convertor/OperateLogConvertor.java:75-80 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/operateLog/convertor/OperateLogConvertor.java:103-108 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/ossLog/convertor/OssLogConvertor.java:48— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/ossLog/convertor/OssLogConvertor.java:48-53 | laokou-service/laokou-oss/laokou-oss-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/oss/convertor/OssLogConvertor.java:34-39 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:59— laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:59-64 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:78-83 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:56— laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:56-61 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:72-77 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:73— laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:73-78 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:106-111 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:54— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:54-59 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/convertor/DeviceConvertor.java:70-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/convertor/SourceConvertor.java:41— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/convertor/SourceConvertor.java:41-46 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/convertor/SourceConvertor.java:57-62 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/convertor/ThingModelConvertor.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/convertor/ThingModelConvertor.java:42-47 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/convertor/ThingModelConvertor.java:58-63 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-mcp/laokou-mcp-client/laokou-mcp-client-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/mcp/client/McpClientApp.java:50— laokou-service/laokou-mcp/laokou-mcp-client/laokou-mcp-client-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/mcp/client/McpClientApp.java:50-55 | laokou-service/laokou-mcp/laokou-mcp-server/laokou-mcp-server-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/mcp/server/McpServerApp.java:38-43 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/config/http/VertxHttpServer.java:129— laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/config/http/VertxHttpServer.java:129-136 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/config/mqtt/VertxMqttServer.java:210-215 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 ui/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-start/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-common/laokou-common-testcontainers/docker/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-cloud/laokou-nacos/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-start/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 ui/Dockerfile:16— Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ui/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-start/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 laokou-cloud/laokou-monitor/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Change coupling: DeptDrawer.tsx ↔ MenuDrawer.tsx ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/DeptDrawer.tsx— `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/DeptDrawer.tsx` and `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/MenuDrawer.tsx` change together 77% of the time (10 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: MenuDrawer.tsx ↔ UserDrawer.tsx ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/MenuDrawer.tsx— `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/MenuDrawer.tsx` and `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/UserDrawer.tsx` change together 71% of the time (10 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: DeptDrawer.tsx ↔ UserDrawer.tsx ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/DeptDrawer.tsx— `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/DeptDrawer.tsx` and `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/UserDrawer.tsx` change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: dept.tsx ↔ menu.tsx ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/dept.tsx— `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/dept.tsx` and `ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/menu.tsx` change together 68% of the time (15 of the 22 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: StoragePolicy.java ↔ StorageTemplate.java laokou-common/laokou-common-oss/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/oss/model/enums/StoragePolicy.java— `laokou-common/laokou-common-oss/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/oss/model/enums/StoragePolicy.java` and `laokou-common/laokou-common-oss/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/oss/template/StorageTemplate.java` change together 64% of the time (9 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: TraceLogHandler.java ↔ TraceLogStorage.java laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-adapter/src/main/java/org/laokou/logstash/consumer/handler/TraceLogHandler.java— `laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-adapter/src/main/java/org/laokou/logstash/consumer/handler/TraceLogHandler.java` and `laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/logstash/support/TraceLogStorage.java` change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ElasticsearchIndexTemplate.java ↔ ElasticsearchSearchTemplate.java laokou-common/laokou-common-elasticsearch/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/elasticsearch/template/ElasticsearchIndexTemplate.java— `laokou-common/laokou-common-elasticsearch/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/elasticsearch/template/ElasticsearchIndexTemplate.java` and `laokou-common/laokou-common-elasticsearch/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/elasticsearch/template/ElasticsearchSearchTemplate.java` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: login.tsx ↔ notice.tsx ui/src/pages/Sys/Log/login.tsx— `ui/src/pages/Sys/Log/login.tsx` and `ui/src/pages/Sys/Log/notice.tsx` change together 59% of the time (16 of the 27 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: AdminApp.java ↔ AuthApp.java laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/AdminApp.java— `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/AdminApp.java` and `laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/AuthApp.java` change together 59% of the time (49 of the 83 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) laokou-common/laokou-common-context/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/context/util/UserConvertor.java:31— laokou-common/laokou-common-context/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/context/util/UserConvertor.java:31-38 | laokou-common/laokou-common-context/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/context/util/UserConvertor.java:50-57 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:57— laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:57-64 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/gatewayimpl/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:57-64 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:57` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:51— laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:51-58 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:72-79 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/UserConvertor.java:51` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/productCategory/service/validator/ModifyProductCategoryParamValidator.java:43— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/productCategory/service/validator/ModifyProductCategoryParamValidator.java:43-50 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/productCategory/service/validator/SaveProductCategoryParamValidator.java:40-47 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/productCategory/service/validator/ModifyProductCategoryParamValidator.java:43` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/service/validator/ModifyThingModelParamValidator.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/service/validator/ModifyThingModelParamValidator.java:42-49 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/service/validator/SaveThingModelParamValidator.java:40-47 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/service/validator/ModifyThingModelParamValidator.java:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:157— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:157-163 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/ability/DeviceDomainService.java:164-170 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/ability/ConnectionDomainService.java:200-206 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:157` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:49— laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:49-55 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:68-74 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:87-93 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/column/convertor/ColumnConvertor.java:49` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:46— laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:46-52 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:62-68 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:78-84 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/info/convertor/InfoConvertor.java:46` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:63— laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:63-69 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:96-102 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:129-135 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/template/convertor/TemplateConvertor.java:63` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/product/convertor/ProductConvertor.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/product/convertor/ProductConvertor.java:42-48 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/product/convertor/ProductConvertor.java:54-60 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/product/convertor/ProductConvertor.java:66-72 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/product/convertor/ProductConvertor.java:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×4
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— esbuild 0.14.7: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.25.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 KEdge-Gateway/go.mod— github.com/klauspost/compress 1.18.6 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C KEdge-Gateway get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line KEdge-Gateway/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5932 KEdge-Gateway/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.53.0 (golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp, golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet, golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor, +4 more): GO-2026-5932 — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace golang.org/x/crypto if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. Before doing either, check whether any affected package above is actually linked here: `go list -deps ./... | grep -F -e golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp` lists it whether your own code imports it or a dependency pulls it in — a module can be in the build list for one sub-package while the vulnerable one is never reached, in which case there is nothing to remove and tracking the advisory is the whole action.
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— highlight.js 9.18.5: [GHSA redacted] — highlight.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 10.4.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.18.5, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.18.5; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Hotspot: ui/src/access.ts ui/src/access.ts— ui/src/access.ts changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 89. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/ThingModelDrawer.tsx ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/ThingModelDrawer.tsx— ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/ThingModelDrawer.tsx changed 9 times in last 90 days, max complexity 27. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/thingModel.tsx ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/thingModel.tsx— ui/src/pages/IoT/Device/thingModel.tsx changed 10 times in last 90 days, max complexity 17. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
TooManyMethods: AuthA laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/model/AuthA.java:76— TooManyMethods — 38 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: OAuth2ModelMapper laokou-common/laokou-common-security/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/security/config/OAuth2ModelMapper.java:78— TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: FileUtils laokou-common/laokou-common-core/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/core/util/FileUtils.java:67— TooManyMethods — 34 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/service/validator/DictParamValidator.java:48— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/service/validator/DictParamValidator.java:48-55 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/service/validator/DictItemParamValidator.java:48-55 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/i18nMenu/service/validator/I18nMenuParamValidator.java:49-56 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/service/validator/DictParamValidator.java:48` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/command/query/LoginLogPageQryExe.java:55— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/command/query/LoginLogPageQryExe.java:55-62 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/noticeLog/command/query/NoticeLogPageQryExe.java:55-62 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/operateLog/command/query/OperateLogPageQryExe.java:55-62 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/command/query/LoginLogPageQryExe.java:55` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/AdminApp.java:64— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/AdminApp.java:64-71 | laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/GeneratorApp.java:60-67 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-start/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/IotApp.java:64-71 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:96— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/loginLog/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:96-101 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:72-77 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/LoginLogConvertor.java:91-96 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/noticeLog/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:69— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/noticeLog/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:69-74 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/noticeLog/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:81-86 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/convertor/NoticeLogConvertor.java:86-91 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:34— laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:34-39 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:50-55 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/convertor/ConnectionConvertor.java:67-72 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) laokou-common/laokou-common-mybatis-plus/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/mybatisplus/handler/CryptoTypeHandler.java:58— laokou-common/laokou-common-mybatis-plus/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/mybatisplus/handler/CryptoTypeHandler.java:58-67 | laokou-common/laokou-common-mybatis-plus/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/mybatisplus/handler/CryptoTypeHandler.java:73-82 | laokou-common/laokou-common-mybatis-plus/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/mybatisplus/handler/CryptoTypeHandler.java:88-97 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-common/laokou-common-mybatis-plus/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/mybatisplus/handler/CryptoTypeHandler.java:58` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:92— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:92-101 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/ability/DeviceDomainService.java:108-117 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/ability/ConnectionDomainService.java:99-108 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:92` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1059.
OAuth2ModelMapper.convertOAuth2AuthorizationGrantAuthorization (cognitive 20) laokou-common/laokou-common-security/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/security/config/OAuth2ModelMapper.java:126— OAuth2ModelMapper.convertOAuth2AuthorizationGrantAuthorization has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, ternaries 6 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
RedisOAuth2AuthorizationService.findByToken (cognitive 18) laokou-common/laokou-common-security/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/security/config/RedisOAuth2AuthorizationService.java:89— RedisOAuth2AuthorizationService.findByToken has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 24 floating ref(s) across 9 workflow file(s), 1 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 3 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (semgrep.yml, node.js.yml, go.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 5 sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/model/AuthA.java:419— laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/model/AuthA.java:419-430 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/model/AuthA.java:443-454 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/model/AuthA.java:419` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/service/validator/AuthorizationCodeAuthParamValidator.java:41— laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/service/validator/AuthorizationCodeAuthParamValidator.java:41-50 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/service/validator/UsernamePasswordAuthParamValidator.java:41-50 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:76— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:76-84 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/device/ability/DeviceDomainService.java:78-86 | laokou-service/laokou-network/laokou-network-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/network/connection/ability/ConnectionDomainService.java:83-91 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/tenant/ability/TenantDomainService.java:76` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:45— laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:45-53 | laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/gatewayimpl/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:45-53 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-common/laokou-common-log/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/log/rpc/IdGeneratorMapper.java:45` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 8) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/model/DeptA.java:65— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dept/model/DeptA.java:65-69 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dict/model/DictA.java:65-69 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/dictItem/model/DictItemA.java:65-69 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/i18nMenu/model/I18nMenuA.java:65-69 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/menu/model/MenuA.java:77-81 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/productCategory/model/ProductCategoryA.java:66-70 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/source/model/SourceA.java:65-69 | laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/iot/thingModel/model/ThingModelA.java:65-69 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 8 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 8 times.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/user/service/validator/ModifyUserParamValidator.java:42— laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/user/service/validator/ModifyUserParamValidator.java:42-46 | laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/user/service/validator/SaveUserParamValidator.java:44-48 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-app/src/main/java/org/laokou/admin/user/service/validator/ModifyUserParamValidator.java:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-cloud/laokou-gateway/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 5555`, so a request to `localhost:5555` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-cloud/laokou-monitor/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 5000`, so a request to `localhost:5000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-cloud/laokou-nacos/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8848`, so a request to `localhost:8848` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-common/laokou-common-testcontainers/docker/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 502`, so a request to `localhost:502` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-service/laokou-admin/laokou-admin-start/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 9990`, so a request to `localhost:9990` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-start/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 1111`, so a request to `localhost:1111` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-service/laokou-iot/laokou-iot-start/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 10005`, so a request to `localhost:10005` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 laokou-service/laokou-logstash/laokou-logstash-start/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 10003`, so a request to `localhost:10003` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 ui/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 443`, so a request to `localhost:443` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low: insecure-trust-manager laokou-common/laokou-common-i18n/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/i18n/util/SslUtils.java:64— Detected empty trust manager implementations. This is dangerous because it accepts any certificate, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks. Consider using a KeyStore and TrustManagerFactory instead. See https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2642777/trusting-all-certificates-using-httpclient-over-https for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: insecure-trust-manager laokou-common/laokou-common-i18n/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/i18n/util/SslUtils.java:67— Detected empty trust manager implementations. This is dangerous because it accepts any certificate, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks. Consider using a KeyStore and TrustManagerFactory instead. See https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2642777/trusting-all-certificates-using-httpclient-over-https for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: possible-nginx-h2c-smuggling ui/nginx/conf/nginx.conf:94— Conditions for Nginx H2C smuggling identified. H2C smuggling allows upgrading HTTP/1.1 connections to lesser-known HTTP/2 over cleartext (h2c) connections which can allow a bypass of reverse proxy access controls, and lead to long-lived, unrestricted HTTP traffic directly to back-end servers. To mitigate: WebSocket support required: Allow only the value websocket for HTTP/1.1 upgrade headers (e.g., Upgrade: websocket). WebSocket support not required: Do not forward Upgrade headers. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.28.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.20.3: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.6 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] archive/package-lock.json— elliptic 6.6.1: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 264 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: laokou-common/laokou-common-security/src/main/java/org/laokou/common/security/config/OAuth2ModelMapper.java, ui/src/pages/Sys/Base/dict.tsx, ui/src/pages/Login/index.tsx, laokou-service/laokou-auth/laokou-auth-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/auth/model/AuthA.java, laokou-service/laokou-generator/laokou-generator-domain/src/main/java/org/laokou/generator/model/Template.java, ui/src/app.tsx, laokou-service/laokou-snowflake-id/laokou-snowflake-id-infrastructure/src/main/java/org/laokou/snowflake/id/config/NacosSnowflakeIdGenerator.java, ui/src/pages/Sys/Permission/user.tsx (+256 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. Your release already signs its artifacts, so this is the remaining step rather than a new pipeline: attestation records HOW the artifact was built, which a signature over the finished file does not. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (the `cyclonedx-maven-plugin` bound to the package phase, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy· Disclosure policy has no reporting contact · ×1
Disclosure policy has no reporting contact — SECURITY.md is present but no reporting contact (email / URL / mailto) was found — a coordinated-disclosure policy must tell reporters where to send a report.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.java), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Maven POM, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fce8b-78a1-772b-948a-d91ef46d7942 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 89 · Warnings: 108 · Recommendations: 22 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 20:51 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.