Public report — logflare, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
197findings with an exact file:lineof 214 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
42/106dimensions across the health lenses71162 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Logflare/logflare carries serious gaps (37%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (99%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (27%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (32%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 5 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Medium (~71,162 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.9 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.7× (at 37% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.9 person-years of build effort (about ~€130,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs, server.key, client.key.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.9 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs, server.key, client.key. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs, server.key, client.key.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
156 modules, 44 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 62% · Adequate · gated by R1
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
25
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
18
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
14
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the five leaked secrets in config.exs, server.key, and client.key to immediately reduce security exposure. Next, establish a formal disaster recovery plan by codifying backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code, while documenting recovery time and point objectives. Simultaneously, improve code reliability by adding tests for the 20 unreached production modules and resolve the 50 high-severity static analysis findings, particularly in CI and Docker configurations. Finally, maintain a clear changelog to track release history and ensure proper versioning.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs, server.key, client.key.
Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with elixir-ci.yml (25), docker-base-runner-daily.yml (10), docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml (7).
The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 40 of 42 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 42 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 197 of 214 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Ingester.encode_metric_row at 39. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being Helpers.decode_facility at 25 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
Resolve the 1 Ingester.encode_metric_row (cyclomatic 39) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ingester.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 getLqlCompletionItems (cyclomatic 27) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with lql_language.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Ingester.encode_trace_row (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ingester.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Ingester.encode_metric_row (cognitive 38) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ingester.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 getLqlCompletionItems (cognitive 38) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with lql_language.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 DialectTranslation.traverse_convert_identifiers (cognitive 27) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with dialect_translation.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 16 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with backends.ex, ingest_event_queue.ex, clickhouse_adaptor.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
Resolve the 13 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with ingest_event_queue.ex, backends.ex, logs_search_lv.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.exs, server.key, client.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
26 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/logflare/lql/parser/helpers.ex.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×5
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Logflare's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture docs, and a dedicated website. The READMEs cover About, Integrations (OpenTelemetry/Vercel/Fly/GitHub Action/JS/Elixir), Learn more, and the self-hosting guide with limitations, configuration table, health checks, and migration notes. A separate architecture doc shows a drawio diagram of log ingestion per-source plus the SourceSup and Broadway pipeline, while the website uses Docusaurus 2 for installation, local dev, build, deployment, and self-hosting steps. The concepts docs cover rules, querying (with management API SQL, caveats), endpoints (API routes, parameter interpolation, sandboxed queries), alerts (query-based with cron scheduling, manual trigger), and much more. All the outlined sections are present in the visible text. Logflare's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture/concept docs, and a dedicated integrations page. The Vercel integration covers installation, log drain setup, and streaming to the dashboard; LQL with a detailed message/filtering table, metadata filtering, timestamp filtering, chart aggregations, and beyond-LQL sections; Access Tokens covering scopes, token creation/revoke, authentication headers, client-side public tokens, and rotation; a Supabase case study showing acquisition history and self-hosting work in progress; PostgreSQL and BigQuery ingestion with migration notes, streaming billing requirements, partitioning/retention, querying, and BYOB setup; and an alerts/Slack integration. The document is clear but the visible content ends at the Vercel install page (clipped) before LQL beyond metadata filtering and the full Access Tokens rotation section are shown.
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.6/10. — Logflare's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture docs, and a dedicated website. The READMEs cover About, Integrations (OpenTelemetry/Vercel/Fly/GitHub Action/JS/Elixir), Learn more, and the self-hosting guide with limitations, configuration table, health checks, and migration notes. A separate architecture doc shows a drawio diagram of log ingestion per-source plus the SourceSup and Broadway pipeline, while the website uses Docusaurus 2 for installation, local dev, build, deployment, and self-hosting steps. The concepts docs cover rules, querying (with management API SQL, caveats), endpoints (API routes, parameter interpolation, sandboxed queries), alerts (query-based with cron scheduling, manual trigger), and much more. All the outlined sections are present in the visible text. Logflare's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture/concept docs, and a dedicated integrations page. The Vercel integration covers installation, log drain setup, and streaming to the dashboard; LQL with a detailed message/filtering table, metadata filtering, timestamp filtering, chart aggregations, and beyond-LQL sections; Access Tokens covering scopes, token creation/revoke, authentication headers, client-side public tokens, and rotation; a Supabase case study showing acquisition history and self-hosting work in progress; PostgreSQL and BigQuery ingestion with migration notes, streaming billing requirements, partitioning/retention, querying, and BYOB setup; and an alerts/Slack integration. The document is clear but the visible content ends at the Vercel install page (clipped) before LQL beyond metadata filtering and the full Access Tokens rotation section are shown.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
15 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: private-key · ×12priv/telegraf/client.key:1detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 12 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with dev.exs (5), config.exs (3), client.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×50.github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:17detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with elixir-ci.yml (25), docker-base-runner-daily.yml (10), docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×9Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×5Dockerfile.runner:1detected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 9 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), Dockerfile.base (2), Dockerfile.runner (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.runner, Dockerfile.multi-step, Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
12 of 266 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/logflare_grpc/google/cloud/bigquery/storage/v1/storage.pb.ex.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×15mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]assets/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] · ×9mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 15 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (8), package-lock.json (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (8), package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — command_palette_hook.jsx:388
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. (×3) — LogEventsChart.jsx:271, LogEventsChart.jsx:280, command_palette_hook.jsx:160
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with @axe-core/playwright in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 3 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README omits the Supabase integration (logflare/supabase) that is present
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the Supabase integration (logflare/supabase) that is present.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety1.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
5 typed · 24 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/build.mjs, assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx, assets/js/LogEventsChart.jsx, assets/js/admin_dashboard_charts.jsx, assets/js/app.js, assets/js/billing.js (+18 more).
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:602 · assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:640 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — DevDashboard.jsx:602
assets/js/lql_language.js:374 · assets/js/lql_language.js:393 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — lql_language.js:374
assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:733 · assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:763 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — DevDashboard.jsx:733
assets/js/lql_language.js:223 · assets/js/lql_language.js:238 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — lql_language.js:223
assets/js/LogEventsChart.jsx:42 · assets/js/LogEventsChart.jsx:67 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — LogEventsChart.jsx:42
assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:400 · assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:408 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — DevDashboard.jsx:400
assets/js/lql_language.js:189 · assets/js/lql_language.js:228 · assets/js/lql_language.js:243 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — lql_language.js:189
assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:279 · assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:597 · assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:635 · assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx:673 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. — DevDashboard.jsx:279
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×3) — DevDashboard.jsx:313, lql_language.js:291, command_palette_hook.jsx:301
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
2 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: assets/js/DevDashboard.jsx (783), assets/js/lql_language.js (476).
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — DevDashboard.jsx, LogEventsChart.jsx, source_lv_hooks.js, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
25 file(s) (~4047 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: assets/js/app.js imports '../../deps/live_monaco_editor/priv/static/live_monaco_editor.esm', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — assets
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in assets/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 64 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~75916 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex, .js, .ts, .rs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Cargo manifest and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .mts, .rs, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .mts, .rs, .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .js, .ts, .rs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit); 1 value object(s)
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (10 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:17— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:46— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:69— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:71— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:75— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:80— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-base-runner-daily.yml:98— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:70— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/docker-ci-amd-and-arm.yml:91— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/docker-retag-versioned.yml:42— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:43— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:66— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:69— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:75— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:100— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:103— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/elixir-ci.yml:109— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dtolnay/rust-toolchain/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
+ 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×15
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— bandit 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.1. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against bandit 1.11.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.12.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.12.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against bandit 1.11.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— gun 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.4.0. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against gun 2.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against gun 2.2.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— hackney 1.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against hackney 1.25.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— immutable 5.1.5: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against immutable 5.1.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— mint 1.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.8.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— plug 1.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.19.2. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.19.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.19.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.19.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.8: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares postcss ^8.4.31, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 8.5.12, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so postcss moves onto 8.5.12 or later; if the flagged 8.5.8 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin postcss with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— postgrex 0.22.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.22.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.22.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— protobuf 0.15.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.16.1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— tesla 1.15.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.18.3. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against tesla 1.15.3: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— vite 6.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — vite is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin vite to 6.4.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against vite 6.4.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.4.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.4.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against vite 6.4.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.base— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile.base— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.multi-step— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.runner— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile.runner— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: DS-0002 cloudbuild/secret_setup.Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 cloudbuild/secret_setup.Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/config.exs:67— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key priv/telegraf/server.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key priv/telegraf/client.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key priv/keys/localhost.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/last9_adaptor.ex:76— hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: team_context.ex ↔ router.ex lib/logflare/teams/team_context.ex— `lib/logflare/teams/team_context.ex` (context logflare) and `lib/logflare_web/router.ex` (context logflare_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— vitest 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares vitest ^3.2.4, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 3.2.6, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so vitest moves onto 3.2.6 or later; if the flagged 3.2.4 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin vitest with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves.
TooManyMethods: Backends lib/logflare/backends.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 69 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: IngestEventQueue lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 64 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ClickHouseAdaptor lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 60 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Sources lib/logflare/sources.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 54 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Sql lib/logflare/sql.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 53 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ClickHouse lib/logflare/ecto/clickhouse.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 49 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Endpoints lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 49 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Combinators lib/logflare/lql/parser/combinators.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 47 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: RowBinaryEncoder lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/row_binary_encoder.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 45 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: BigQueryAdaptor lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/bigquery_adaptor.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 41 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Billing lib/logflare/billing.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 36 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ConnectionManager lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/connection_manager.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 34 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: SearchLV lib/logflare_web/live/search_live/logs_search_lv.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 34 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: SearchOperations lib/logflare/logs/search_operations.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Users lib/logflare/users/users.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Pipeline lib/logflare/sources/source/bigquery/pipeline.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 31 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
FileTooLong: backends/ingest_event_queue.ex lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1204 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: logflare/backends.ex lib/logflare/backends.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1017 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: search_live/logs_search_lv.ex lib/logflare_web/live/search_live/logs_search_lv.ex:0— FileTooLong — 930 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: logflare/sql.ex lib/logflare/sql.ex:0— FileTooLong — 904 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ecto/clickhouse.ex lib/logflare/ecto/clickhouse.ex:0— FileTooLong — 829 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex:0— FileTooLong — 785 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: logflare/endpoints.ex lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:0— FileTooLong — 761 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: adaptor/bigquery_adaptor.ex lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/bigquery_adaptor.ex:0— FileTooLong — 635 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: logflare/sources.ex lib/logflare/sources.ex:0— FileTooLong — 571 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: logs/search_operations.ex lib/logflare/logs/search_operations.ex:0— FileTooLong — 561 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: backend_transformer/postgres.ex lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/postgres.ex:0— FileTooLong — 559 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: parser/combinators.ex lib/logflare/lql/parser/combinators.ex:0— FileTooLong — 512 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: backend_transformer/bigquery.ex lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:0— FileTooLong — 506 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Change coupling: logs_search_lv.ex ↔ logs_search_lv_utils.ex lib/logflare_web/live/search_live/logs_search_lv.ex— `lib/logflare_web/live/search_live/logs_search_lv.ex` and `lib/logflare_web/live/search_live/logs_search_lv_utils.ex` change together 79% of the time (11 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: text_notification_server.ex ↔ email_notification_server.ex lib/logflare/source/text_notification_server.ex— `lib/logflare/source/text_notification_server.ex` and `lib/logflare/sources/source/email_notification_server.ex` change together 78% of the time (21 of the 27 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: clickhouse_adaptor.ex ↔ connection_manager.ex lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex— `lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex` and `lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/connection_manager.ex` change together 75% of the time (9 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: pipeline.ex ↔ webhook_adaptor.ex lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/postgres_adaptor/pipeline.ex— `lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/postgres_adaptor/pipeline.ex` and `lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/webhook_adaptor.ex` change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: client.ex ↔ discord_client.ex lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/client.ex— `lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/client.ex` and `lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/discord_client.ex` change together 69% of the time (11 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: marketing_controller.ex ↔ router.ex lib/logflare_web/controllers/marketing_controller.ex— `lib/logflare_web/controllers/marketing_controller.ex` and `lib/logflare_web/router.ex` change together 64% of the time (21 of the 33 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: clickhouse_adaptor.ex ↔ query_templates.ex lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex— `lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex` and `lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/query_templates.ex` change together 62% of the time (13 of the 21 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: cache.ex ↔ cache.ex lib/logflare/billing/cache.ex— `lib/logflare/billing/cache.ex` and `lib/logflare/sources/cache.ex` change together 60% of the time (9 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: slack_hook_server.ex ↔ webhook_notification_server.ex lib/logflare/sources/source/slack_hook_server/slack_hook_server.ex— `lib/logflare/sources/source/slack_hook_server/slack_hook_server.ex` and `lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/webhook_notification_server.ex` change together 60% of the time (9 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×9
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— cowboy 2.15.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 2.18.0. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.15.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.15.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— cowlib 2.16.1: EEF-[CVE redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace cowlib if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— decimal 2.4.1: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.0
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— earmark 1.4.46: EEF-[CVE redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace earmark if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— grpc 0.11.5: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.0. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against grpc 0.11.5: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— hpax 1.0.3: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.4
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— phoenix 1.7.23: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.7.24. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against phoenix 1.7.23: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— yaml 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— ymlr 2.0.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 5.1.6
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:72— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:72-84 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:441-453 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:157— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:157-169 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:278-290 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/spool/queue/pub_sub.ex:82— lib/logflare/backends/spool/queue/pub_sub.ex:82-94 | lib/logflare/backends/spool/storage/gcs.ex:56-68 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/logflare/logs/otel_metric.ex:117— lib/logflare/logs/otel_metric.ex:117-129 | lib/logflare/logs/otel_metric.ex:149-161 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/client.ex:45— lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/client.ex:45-57 | lib/logflare/sources/source/webhook_notification_server/discord_client.ex:62-74 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:262— lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:262-274 | lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:292-304 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:562— lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:562-575 | lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:623-636 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:997— lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:997-1010 | lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:1034-1047 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex:97— lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex:97-110 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller_v1.ex:195-208 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex` and `lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller_v1.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 37 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:300— lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:300-313 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:338-351 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/live/vercellogdrains_live/index.ex:84— lib/logflare_web/live/vercellogdrains_live/index.ex:84-97 | lib/logflare_web/live/vercellogdrains_live/index.ex:134-147 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/elastic_adaptor.ex:62— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/elastic_adaptor.ex:62-71 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/loki_adaptor.ex:114-123 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:61— lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:61-70 | lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/clickhouse.ex:62-71 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex` and `lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/clickhouse.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:87— lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:87-96 | lib/logflare/sql.ex:1160-1169 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:751— lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:751-760 | lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:788-797 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/otlp_adaptor/common.ex:36— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/otlp_adaptor/common.ex:36-51 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/sentry_adaptor.ex:90-105 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:1366— lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:1366-1381 | lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:1413-1428 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex:47— lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex:47-62 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller_v1.ex:56-71 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex` and `lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller_v1.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 37 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/http_based/pipeline.ex:33— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/http_based/pipeline.ex:33-44 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/webhook_adaptor.ex:322-333 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:551— lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:551-562 | lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:714-725 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/logflare/logs/search_queries.ex:205— lib/logflare/logs/search_queries.ex:205-216 | lib/logflare/logs/search_queries.ex:225-236 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/logflare/lql/parser.ex:93— lib/logflare/lql/parser.ex:93-103 | lib/logflare/lql/parser.ex:163-173 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:227— lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:227-237 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:249-259 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:388— lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:388-398 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/source_controller.ex:410-420 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:207— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:207-215 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:310-318 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/pipeline.ex:447— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/pipeline.ex:447-457 | lib/logflare/sources/source/bigquery/pipeline.ex:577-585 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/api/partner/user_controller.ex:41— lib/logflare_web/controllers/api/partner/user_controller.ex:41-49 | lib/logflare_web/live/billingaccount_live/estimate_usage_component.ex:12-20 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:446— lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:446-462 | lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/clickhouse.ex:421-437 | lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/postgres.ex:465-481 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex` and `lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/clickhouse.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:467— lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex:467-483 | lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/clickhouse.ex:442-458 | lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/postgres.ex:486-502 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/bigquery.ex` and `lib/logflare/lql/backend_transformer/clickhouse.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:529— lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:529-539 | lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:566-576 | lib/logflare/backends/ingest_event_queue.ex:627-637 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) lib/logflare_web/controllers/billing_controller.ex:110— lib/logflare_web/controllers/billing_controller.ex:110-120 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/billing_controller.ex:132-142 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/billing_controller.ex:153-163 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex:756— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor.ex:756-762 | lib/logflare/backends.ex:1231-1237 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/spool/producer_pipeline.ex:108— lib/logflare/backends/spool/producer_pipeline.ex:108-114 | lib/logflare/sources/source/bigquery/pipeline.ex:152-158 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/logflare/lql/parser/combinators.ex:332— lib/logflare/lql/parser/combinators.ex:332-337 | lib/logflare/lql/parser/combinators.ex:339-344 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex:30— lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex:30-36 | lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller_v1.ex:37-42 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller.ex` and `lib/logflare_web/controllers/cloudflare_controller_v1.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 37 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Ingester.encode_metric_row (cyclomatic 39) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:235— Ingester.encode_metric_row has cyclomatic complexity 39 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
getLqlCompletionItems (cyclomatic 27) assets/js/lql_language.js:291— getLqlCompletionItems has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
Ingester.encode_trace_row (cyclomatic 25) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:300— Ingester.encode_trace_row has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Ingester.encode_log_row (cyclomatic 17) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:197— Ingester.encode_log_row has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Hotspot: lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 39. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 4 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Ingester.encode_metric_row (cognitive 38) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:235— Ingester.encode_metric_row has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 38. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
getLqlCompletionItems (cognitive 38) assets/js/lql_language.js:291— getLqlCompletionItems has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
DialectTranslation.traverse_convert_identifiers (cognitive 27) lib/logflare/sql/dialect_translation.ex:1070— DialectTranslation.traverse_convert_identifiers has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 13, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
Ingester.encode_trace_row (cognitive 24) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:300— Ingester.encode_trace_row has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 24. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Ingester.encode_log_row (cognitive 16) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:197— Ingester.encode_log_row has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 16. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 79 floating ref(s) across 11 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 2 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (pages-build.yml, integration-supabase.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 10 sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:106— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:106-126 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:243-263 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:564— lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:564-582 | lib/logflare/endpoints.ex:726-744 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:176— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:176-192 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:413-429 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) lib/logflare/auth/cache.ex:13— lib/logflare/auth/cache.ex:13-27 | lib/logflare/billing/cache.ex:8-22 | lib/logflare/config_cat/cache.ex:10-24 | lib/logflare/partners/cache.ex:10-24 | lib/logflare/saved_searches/cache.ex:10-24 | lib/logflare/team_users/cache.ex:10-24 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 6 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 6 times.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:267— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:267-281 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/mapping_defaults.ex:515-529 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) lib/logflare_grpc/logs/server.ex:23— lib/logflare_grpc/logs/server.ex:23-34 | lib/logflare_grpc/metrics/server.ex:23-34 | lib/logflare_grpc/trace/server.ex:23-34 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 4) lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:219— lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:219-223 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:258-262 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:317-321 | lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/ingester.ex:326-330 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/logflare/lql/parser/helpers.ex, lib/logflare_web/live/endpoints/endpoints_versions_live.ex, lib/logflare_web/live/search_live/form_components.ex, lib/logflare_web/components/json_viewer_component.ex, lib/logflare_web/query_error_helpers.ex, lib/logflare_web/live/modal_live_helpers.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/query_templates.ex, lib/logflare/backends/adaptor/clickhouse_adaptor/query_connection_sup.ex, lib/logflare/lql/sandboxed.ex, lib/logflare/logs/log_event/day_bucket.ex, lib/logflare/backends/consolidated_sup_worker.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3 — If anonymized user #3 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: priv/repo/seeds.exs, lib/logflare/key_values.ex, lib/logflare/cluster/postgres_strategy.ex, lib/logflare_web/controllers/plugs/verify_api_access.ex, lib/logflare/sources/source/data.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #4 — If anonymized user #4 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: bench/clickhouse_encode_e2e.exs, bench/clickhouse_encoder_primitives.exs, bench/clickhouse_row_encoding.exs, lib/logflare/utils/deep_update.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #5 — If anonymized user #5 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: config/.credo.exs, lib/logflare/logs/source_parsers/syslog_parser.ex, lib/logflare/system_metrics/all_logs_logged/all_logs_logged.ex, lib/logflare/sources/source/email_notification_server.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .js, .ts, .rs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 2 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (26 single-owned of 265 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #6 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #7 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 12 of 266 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: lib/logflare_grpc/google/cloud/bigquery/storage/v1/storage.pb.ex, lib/logflare_grpc/opentelemetry/proto/metrics/v1/metrics.pb.ex, lib/logflare/logs/source_parsers/syslog_parser_helpers.ex (and 9 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, cosign/sigstore for container images, `cargo publish` from CI under crates.io trusted publishing (OIDC) rather than a long-lived token for crates) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cargo sbom` or `cargo cyclonedx` for the Cargo dependency graph — or `cargo auditable build`, which embeds it in the shipped binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex, .js, .ts, .rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`), or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`, or lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Cargo manifest and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fd4c0-e19b-7831-855a-f39c185e67a4 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 93 · Warnings: 106 · Recommendations: 13 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 01:47 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.