Public report — Hexagonal-Architecture, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 03-08-2026 @ 20:34 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

LordMoMA/Hexagonal-Architecture

52% At Risk
Code Health 99% Exemplary Architecture 69% Adequate Readiness 68% Adequate Maturity 53% Adequate Security 48% Weak Domain Modelling 48% Weak

Hobby · 1,278 LoC · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Domain Modelling (48%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

26/28dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
58findings with an exact file:lineof 70 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
28/102dimensions across the health lenses1278 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

LordMoMA/Hexagonal-Architecture is sound in substance but carries real gaps (52%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Code Health (99%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Domain Modelling (48%) — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change. Security (48%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern… (Rich vs anemic model); Make entity setters private/init-only (Encapsulated state); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Hobby (~1,278 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 99% ★ Exemplary Architecture 69% Adequate Maturity 53% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 68% Adequate Security 48% Weak · gated by D36, D38 Domain Modelling 48% Weak · gated by DM4, DM5
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Domain Modelling 48% · 46% weightSecurity 48% · 25% weightMaturity 53% · 14% weightReadiness 68% · 8% weightArchitecture 69% · 4% weightCode Health 99% · 2% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (17+)

17 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €560–€2,800
Cost to rebuild€560–€2,800 (0.1 person-years (9–30 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 52% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeHobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,700 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 48% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
+4.8 pts · Medium effort · Rich vs anemic model
2
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
+4.8 pts · Medium effort · Encapsulated state
3
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
+2.1 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
5 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 1 · DM4 anemic: 4 · DM2 primitive ids: 0
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

10 modules, 13 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…cture/internal/config…/internal/core/domain…e/internal/monitoring…e/internal/core/ports…ternal/adapters/cache…cture/internal/logger…l/adapters/repository…nternal/core/services…onal-Architecture/cmd…rnal/adapters/handler…cture/internal/config1…/internal/core/domain2…e/internal/monitoring3…e/internal/core/ports4…ternal/adapters/cache5…cture/internal/logger6…l/adapters/repository7…nternal/core/services8…onal-Architecture/cmd9…rnal/adapters/handler106215134238136

At a glance — Code Health · 99% · Exemplary

The Good
D1 · Go Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · Go Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · Go God Classes 10.0 D4 · Go Code Duplication 9.7

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Adequate

The Good
D35 · Go Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 53% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · Go Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · Go Bus Factor 8.6 D19 · Go Documentation Quality 9.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0
The Bad
D34 · Go Knowledge Freshness 5.6
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 4.0

At a glance — Readiness · 68% · Adequate

The Good
D13 · Go Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

At a glance — Security · 48% · Weak · gated by D36, D38

The Good
D28 · Go Secrets (history) 9.0 D33 · Go JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Bad
D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 5.0
The Ugly
D36 · Go Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · Go OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 48% · Weak · gated by DM4, DM5

The Good
DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0
The Ugly
DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 1.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection4High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, move business rules onto the aggregates and entities they govern to enforce invariants at the source rather than in anemic services. Next, encapsulate entity state by making setters private or init-only, ensuring all state changes occur through methods that enforce invariants. Then, create architecture decision records to document significant design choices and their consequences, keeping them discoverable alongside existing design documentation. Finally, reconcile the README with reality by removing claims about Kubernetes, Docker, and microservices that do not exist, and add a proper README to the project.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.+4.8 ptsMediumRich vs anemic model
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).+4.8 ptsMediumEncapsulated state
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+2.1 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with cd.yml (2), ci.yml (2).+1.9 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+3.5 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists; README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.+3.5 ptsMediumDocumentation accuracy
Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.+2.4 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Resolve the 32 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (30), go.mod (2).+2.3 ptsMediumOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 7 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 14% slop · 72% mixed · 14% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
internal/web/package-lock.json0.3SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
go.mod5.1MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/cd.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
internal/adapters/handler/webhook_handler.go7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The article link points to a specific Medium post ("Hexagonal Architecture Deep Dive with PostgreSQL, Redis and Go Practices") that has since become outdated; the README does not reflect the current state of the codebase or its changed structure.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D33D34D35D36D38DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 58 of 70 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc955-dc3b-7309-a920-3f71213d0620.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go:25

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is internal/adapters/repository/user.go.

Small-team knowledge concentration

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This is an excellent README for a Go-based hexagonal architecture project. It begins with a strong title and a link to the original article (a deep dive on PostgreSQL/Redis/Golang practices), then explains what Hexagonal Architecture is before diving into its components: Core Business Logic as independent use cases and Adapters of Primary and Secondary types, followed by an outline naming every component in the architecture's full design. The document is long at 7486 words (about 20k characters) and covers a wide range of topics including interfaces, dependencies, application structure, to-dos, pros/cons of GORM, Stripe integration, Redis parameters, observability, TPS optimization, load balancing, caching, asynchronous processing, horizontal scaling, and instrumentation. It is thorough, well-organized, and reflects the project's complexity.

The article link points to a specific Medium post ("Hexagonal Architecture Deep Dive with PostgreSQL, Redis and Go Practices") that has since become outdated; the README does not reflect the current state of the codebase or its changed structure.README.md

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-keyinternal/adapters/handler/webhook_handler.go:92detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×4.github/workflows/cd.yml:11detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with cd.yml (2), ci.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 of 6 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is internal/adapters/handler/webhook_handler.go.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

76 finding(s): 10 critical, 34 high, 25 medium, 7 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×32internal/web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9internal/web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2internal/web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]internal/web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6internal/web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 32 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (30), go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (32 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 9 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (8), go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `Message` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — model.go:3
  • `User` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — model.go:10
  • `BuyerInfo` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — model.go:23
  • `OrderInfo` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — model.go:30

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `User` exposes publicly writable state (ID, Email, Password, Membership). — model.go:10

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy4.0 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists
  • README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists
  • README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists; README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health99%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture69%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Maturity53%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness68%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Security48%Weak — gated by D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling48%Weak — gated by DM4, DM5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~259 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 49 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×32
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.20.11: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — ansi-html 0.0.7: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-html is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-html to 0.0.8 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — browserify-sign 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — browserify-sign is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin browserify-sign to 4.2.2 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — cross-spawn 6.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 6.0.6 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — cross-spawn 7.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.4.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.2.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — golang.org/x/net 0.7.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.17.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 17 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.7.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.7 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.19.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.19.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — ip 1.1.8: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; ip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip 1.1.8: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — lodash.template 4.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; lodash.template is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — node-forge 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted] — node-forge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.4.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.10.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.10.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 13 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against node-forge 0.10.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against node-forge 0.10.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — nth-check 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — nth-check is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.1.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — postcss 7.0.21: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.5.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.21, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.21; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against postcss 7.0.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.5.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.39, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.39; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • + 7 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×9
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — @babel/traverse 7.21.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — cipher-base 1.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — cipher-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cipher-base to 1.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto 0.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.52.0. This one row stands for the 20 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.5.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — loader-utils 1.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 1.2.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.2.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — sha.js 2.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — shell-quote 1.7.2: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.7.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — websocket-driver 0.6.5: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.6.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×4
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:11 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — serialize-javascript 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — svgo 1.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.8.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key internal/adapters/handler/webhook_handler.go:92 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical vulnerability · ×1
  • Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin elliptic to 6.6.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 10 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×6
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — @babel/helpers 7.21.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — @babel/runtime 7.9.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/runtime is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/runtime to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — @babel/runtime-corejs3 7.21.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/runtime-corejs3 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/runtime-corejs3 to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — bn.js 4.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 4.12.3 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/web/package-lock.json — bn.js 5.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — bn.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin bn.js to 5.2.3 with an `overrides` entry).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go:25 — internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go:25-37 | internal/adapters/handler/user_handler.go:69-82 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go:80 — internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go:80-93 | internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go:123-135 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 4 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (2 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
  • Small-team knowledge concentration — 3 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 3 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The article link points to a specific Medium post ("Hexagonal Architecture Deep Dive with PostgreSQL, Redis and Go Practices") that has since become outdated; the README does not reflect the current state of the codebase or its changed structure. · ×1
  • The article link points to a specific Medium post ("Hexagonal Architecture Deep Dive with PostgreSQL, Redis and Go Practices") that has since become outdated; the README does not reflect the current state of the codebase or its changed structure. README.md — Update the README's article link to the live repository or change it to point to the latest documentation branch so readers can find the most relevant content.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 3 of 6 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: internal/adapters/handler/webhook_handler.go, internal/adapters/handler/stripe_handler.go, internal/adapters/handler/message_handler.go. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-gomod` over the module graph — or Go's own build info, which already records the module set in the binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .4artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .76artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fc955-dc3b-7309-a920-3f71213d0620 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 49 · Warnings: 10 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 20:34 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md