Public report — Books, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 6,687 LoC · 1 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (32%)
Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (2 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS1513: } expected; CS1022: Type or namespace definition, or end-of-file expected
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
131findings with an exact file:lineof 149 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
67/108dimensions across the health lenses6687 LoC · 1 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
MarsonShine/Books carries serious risk (48%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (96%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Performance (92%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (50%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Small (~6,687 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (96%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€12,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS1513: } expected; CS1022: Type or namespace definition, or end-of-file expected.
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS1513: } expected; CS1022: Type or namespace definition, or end-of-file expected.
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
79 modules, 10 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 62% · Adequate · gated by D18
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
50
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
26
High / Critical
A04:2021 — Insecure Design
6
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
1
Medium
Roadmap
First, integrate a security scanning step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on vulnerabilities. Next, implement HTTP client resilience policies to prevent external dependencies from causing outages. Then, expand test coverage to include all production modules to ensure code quality. Finally, add health checks and a rolling update strategy to catch and roll back bad releases, while also maintaining a changelog for each release.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 63 of 67 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 67 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 131 of 149 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
Of 4 mechanizable ADRs, 4 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
22 test methods: 22 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Tests co-located / outside the solution
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 2 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 22 tests.
No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1 · ×2ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/06UnitTest/UnitTest1.cs:8
What to do
Resolve the 2 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is Fabulous-Adventures-In-Data-Structures/sourcecode/chapter 6/Permutations.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Resolve the 20 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AsyncLocalViaThreadLocal.cs, EventSourceKeywordsConsts.cs, Program2.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 warning-level).
Resolve the 18 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Program.cs (14), DefaultInterfaceMethod.cs (2), MyXmlGenerator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with SerializationPerformance.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
1 projects, 138 source files, 6687 hand-written lines of code (6635 production / 52 test), plus 22 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 0 inter-project edges (build failed).
Build failed
Monorepo: only 1 of 45 solutions was scored
Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository
What to do
Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The documentation is excellent for its purpose: a curated list of learning resources and a detailed README on TCP/IP protocol design that explains SMP, NUMA, MESI caching protocols, and data consistency with links to the original CSAPP material. The resource list (C# async, Clean Architecture, CSharpGuide, Linux/TCPIP, Java ThinkingInJava, TS) is well-organized and cross-references books; the TCP/IP README covers a deep architectural topic with a clear outline and references.
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The documentation is excellent for its purpose: a curated list of learning resources and a detailed README on TCP/IP protocol design that explains SMP, NUMA, MESI caching protocols, and data consistency with links to the original CSAPP material. The resource list (C# async, Clean Architecture, CSharpGuide, Linux/TCPIP, Java ThinkingInJava, TS) is well-organized and cross-references books; the TCP/IP README covers a deep architectural topic with a clear outline and references.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 5 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 1.7/10 (frequently incomplete). 5 flagged with a specific gap.
Title 'adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[werioeritrewtuphvxkjnvxm,npejup]iwourqwerhslkjmfpidjpiwoeyrwq[weriksdjfkxjnvkcxcnhjvhafj[poqwjrfkm]]' is a pure noise blob with no meaning; the document is an unrecognizable, repeated string of junk that is not an ADRWHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0001.txt
Title '0001_1' is a noise anchor with no content (no context/problem or decision), and the body is a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...] dump that is not an ADR but a corrupted, unmanageable blobWHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0001_1.txt
Title '0002' contains only random junk and no meaningful content (decision and consequences are present but buried in a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...]' pattern with no context or trade-offs)WHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0002.txt
Title '0003' contains only random junk and no meaningful content (decision and context are present but buried in a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...]] body; the visible text is uninformative), so it is an informative title plus an unusable, repetitive bodyWHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0003.txt
Title '0004' contains only random junk and no meaningful context or decisionWHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0004.txt
What to do
Resolve the 1 Title 'adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[werioeritrewt… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Title '0001_1' is a noise anchor with no content (no context/problem or… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001_1.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Title '0002' contains only random junk and no meaningful content… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0002.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
83 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 97 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×19.github/workflows/pages.yml:23detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization · ×7FunctionalCSharp/src/Demo/Examples/05/MakeTransferController.cs:12detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pages.yml (5), ftw.c (2), bufargs.c (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with MakeTransferController.cs (2), batch-calculate-parallel.yaml, batch-calculate.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: KSV-0014 · ×5Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×34Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: KSV-0003 · ×11Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 34 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with nginx-statefulset.yaml (7), batch-calculate-parallel.yaml (6), batch-calculate.yaml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (34 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with batch-calculate-parallel.yaml, batch-calculate.yaml, batch-job-template.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 11 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with batch-calculate-parallel.yaml (6), batch-calculate.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.
Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log · ×4ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/09Cancellation/CancellationRx.cs:55detected by semgrep finding
Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log · ×2CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/9.0/RecordIdentifierDemo.cs:29detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with CancellationRx.cs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with RecordIdentifierDemo.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
3 of 68 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/05ReactiveExtensions/Program.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no accessibility linting at author time and no automated accessibility check in tests or CI. Add your UI toolkit's own accessibility assertion to the test suite (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in the pipeline.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×8) — IValueMark.cs:17, IValueMark.cs:19, Introducer.cs:68, …
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`SomeMethod` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — Example.cs:39
`GetResultsAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — Introducer.cs:66
`Do` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — NullableRefferenceExample.cs:34
`DoStuff` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — NullableRefferenceExample.cs:40
`DisposeAndClear` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — NullableRefferenceExample.cs:71
`DisposeAndClear_DisallowNull` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — NullableRefferenceExample.cs:75
`OnVisitSyntaxNode` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — SerializingGenerator.cs:96
`LoadConfigurationData` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — FrozenTypes.cs:16
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×20) — LambdaImprovement.cs:32, Program.cs:13, ValueTuples.cs:31, …
`DoSomething` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. — Example.cs:44
`Caller` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. — ReadonlyAndRefStructs.cs:84
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
The root README is 118 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`pytest` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
A BenchmarkDotNet suite exists but no [MemoryDiagnoser] — allocations (the main way a library pressures its host's GC) aren't being measured.
What to do
Add [MemoryDiagnoser] to the benchmarks so allocation regressions are visible, not just time.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 46 use(s) across 6,731 production line(s) (~6.8/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
16 typed · 12 plain JS — the untyped files are ts/lib/TypeAssertion.js, ts/lib/anyType.js, ts/lib/declarefile.js, ts/lib/declaresynax.js, ts/lib/extensionGlobalVarious.js, ts/lib/fiveType.js (+6 more).
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
ts/lib/declarefile.js:11 · ts/src/declarefile.ts:12 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — declarefile.js:11
ts/lib/function.js:13 · ts/lib/function.js:23 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — function.js:13
ts/lib/function.js:31 · ts/src/function.ts:40 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — function.js:31
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
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R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 27 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
46 file(s) (~735 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
`async void` can't be awaited and its exceptions crash the process instead of propagating. Return `Task` — or, where the delegate contract requires void (timer/event/callback registrations), make this a thin void shim that awaits a Task-returning inner method inside try/catch so exceptions are contained. — ThreadChannelDemo.cs:11
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 1/24 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×22) — AsyncLocalViaThreadLocal.cs:14, AsyncLocalViaThreadLocal.cs:28, StockPrices.cs:17, …
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — AsyncStream.PartII.cs:16
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~1.5 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 45 suppression(s) across the 29755 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C2 Access Controls — Partial workspace load — the web/host project 'Net6WebDemo' present on disk did not load into the C# workspace (it failed to build/restore and was silently dropped), so its authorization signals were never scanned. The surviving documents carry no evidence for this control, but absence of evidence in an INCOMPLETE document set is not evidence the control is missing — the relevant middleware/attributes most plausibly live in the dropped project. This dimension is therefore Not-evidenced (excluded from the score) rather than asserting a confident negative. Restore/build that project (see diagnostics.md) so it loads and the dimension can be scored.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .go, .java, .py, .ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .go, .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .go, .java, .py, .ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 6635 LoC in a single project the codebase is trivially small despite the absence of declared bounded contexts.
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — none of 5 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .go, .java, .py, .ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 5 value object(s)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (2 CQRS handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pages.yml:23— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pages.yml:26— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/configure-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/configure-pages@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/configure-pages/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pages.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pages.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pages.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/12/12-5.c:53— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/17/17-4.c:31— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/4-22/ftw.c:52— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/4-22/ftw.c:91— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strtok-fn APUE/src/lib/bufargs.c:19— Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strtok-fn APUE/src/lib/bufargs.c:22— Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/lib/cliconn.c:50— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn APUE/src/lib/error.c:125— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-strcat-fn APUE/src/lib/errorlog.c:116— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcat or strncat used. This is an issue because strcat or strncat can lead to buffer overflow vulns. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/lib/nspipe.c:20— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/lib/ptyfork.c:21— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/lib/ptyopen.c:27— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: double-free APUE/src/lib/servaccept.c:73— Variable 'name' was freed twice. This can lead to undefined behavior.
High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn APUE/src/lib/servlisten.c:32— Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by bounding the copy to the destination's size and terminating it yourself — `snprintf(dst, sizeof dst, "%s", src)`, or `strncpy` followed by an explicit `dst[sizeof dst - 1] = '\0'` — since the bounds-checked `_s` variants are C11 Annex K, an optional annex that glibc and musl do not implement; where your toolchain does provide them (MSVC) or provides `strlcpy` (BSD, and glibc from 2.38), either is the shorter spelling of the same fix. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/09Cancellation/CancellationRx.cs:55— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/09Cancellation/CancellationRx.cs:58— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/09Cancellation/CancellationRx.cs:63— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/09Cancellation/CancellationRx.cs:69— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
D10 · Test Quality· No assertions (empty test) · ×2
No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1 ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/06UnitTest/UnitTest1.cs:8— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
No assertions (empty test): TestMethod1 docs/ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/06UnitTest/UnitTest1.cs:8— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-job-template.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-job-template.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-job-template.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-job-template.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-deployment.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-deployment.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-deployment.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0117 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-deployment.yaml— Prevent binding to privileged ports
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0117 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml— Prevent binding to privileged ports
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml:15— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Dead code: AsyncLocalViaThreadLocal CSharpGuide/async/AsyncLocalViaThreadLocal.cs:9— NamedType AsyncLocalViaThreadLocal — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EventSourceKeywordsConsts CSharpGuide/diagnostics/EventSourceDemo/EventSourceKeywordsConsts.cs:6— NamedType EventSourceKeywordsConsts — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Program2 CSharpGuide/diagnostics/MetricDemo/Program2.cs:5— NamedType Program2 — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Program3 CSharpGuide/diagnostics/MetricDemo/Program3.cs:5— NamedType Program3 — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Program4 CSharpGuide/diagnostics/MetricDemo/Program4.cs:5— NamedType Program4 — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CirCle CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/10.0/CirCle.cs:9— NamedType CirCle — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GlobalUsing CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/10.0/GlobalUsing.cs:8— NamedType GlobalUsing — no references found in solution.
Dead code: InternalUsing CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/10.0/Internal/InternalUsing.cs:3— NamedType InternalUsing — no references found in solution.
Dead code: LambdaImprovement CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/10.0/LambdaImprovement.cs:10— NamedType LambdaImprovement — no references found in solution.
Dead code: RecordPersonStruct CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/10.0/Structs/RecordPerson.cs:17— NamedType RecordPersonStruct — no references found in solution.
Dead code: DecompilerAsyncStream CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/8.0/DecompilerAsyncStream.cs:8— NamedType DecompilerAsyncStream — no references found in solution.
Dead code: NullableRefferenceExample CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/8.0/NullableRefferenceExample.cs:45— NamedType NullableRefferenceExample — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Ranges CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/8.0/Ranges.cs:17— NamedType Ranges — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SwitchExpression CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/8.0/SwitchExpression.cs:9— NamedType SwitchExpression — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Encrypts CSharpGuide/net8-guide/Encrypts/Encrypts.cs:12— NamedType Encrypts — no references found in solution.
Dead code: Metrics CSharpGuide/net8-guide/Metrics/Metrics.cs:11— NamedType Metrics — no references found in solution.
Dead code: FrozenTypes CSharpGuide/net8-guide/Performances/FrozenTypes.cs:13— NamedType FrozenTypes — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SearchValueTypes CSharpGuide/net8-guide/Performances/SearchValueTypes.cs:10— NamedType SearchValueTypes — no references found in solution.
Dead code: XxHashTypes CSharpGuide/net8-guide/Performances/XxHashTypes.cs:9— NamedType XxHashTypes — no references found in solution.
Dead code: MyRecord CSharpGuide/SourceGeneratorDemo/SourceGeneratorGuide/Program.cs:60— NamedType MyRecord — no references found in solution.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization FunctionalCSharp/src/Demo/Examples/05/MakeTransferController.cs:12— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization FunctionalCSharp/src/Demo/Examples/10/MakeTransferController.cs:7— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml:12— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml:9— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-job-template.yaml:15— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-deployment.yaml:18— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext Kubernetes/StatefulSet/nginx-statefulset.yaml:31— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/9.0/RecordIdentifierDemo.cs:29— Personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Under GDPR Article 5(1)(c) logs should carry the minimum needed to operate the system; prefer a pseudonymous identifier over the personal value itself.
Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-log CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/9.0/RecordIdentifierDemo.cs:34— Personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Under GDPR Article 5(1)(c) logs should carry the minimum needed to operate the system; prefer a pseudonymous identifier over the personal value itself.
TodoComment CSharpGuide/performance/SerializationPerformance.cs:13— // TODO — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 2), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS1513: } expected; CS1022: Type or namespace definition, or end-of-file expected.
Monorepo: only 1 of 45 solutions was scored — This repository contains 45 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `CSharpGuide/CSharpGuide.sln` — the other 44 (`AsyncInCSharp/AsyncInCSharp.sln`, `CSAPP/cpps/csapp/csapp.sln`, `CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/14.0/14.0.sln`, `CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/7.3/RefForeach.sln`, `CSharpGuide/LanguageVersions/9.0/openapi/openapi.sln`, `CSharpGuide/SourceGeneratorDemo/SourceGeneratorDemo.sln`, +38 more) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D18 · Solution Shape· Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository · ×1
Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository — The scored solution `CSharpGuide/CSharpGuide.sln` is not representative of this repository — it references only 159 of 1335 discovered C# files (12 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.
D20 · ADR Quality· Title 'adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[werioeritrewtuphvxkjnvxm,npejup]iwourqwerhslkjmfpidjpiwoeyrwq[weriksdjfkxjnvkcxcnhjvhafj[poqwjrfkm]]' is a pure noise blob with no meaning; the document is an unrecognizable, repeated string of junk that is not an ADR · ×1
Title 'adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[werioeritrewtuphvxkjnvxm,npejup]iwourqwerhslkjmfpidjpiwoeyrwq[weriksdjfkxjnvkcxcnhjvhafj[poqwjrfkm]]' is a pure noise blob with no meaning; the document is an unrecognizable, repeated string of junk that is not an ADR WHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0001.txt— Replace the entire body with a real architecture decision record: state the problem/context, the explicit decision (e.g. 'adopt XYZ framework for new services'), and its consequences/trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality· Title '0001_1' is a noise anchor with no content (no context/problem or decision), and the body is a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...] dump that is not an ADR but a corrupted, unmanageable blob · ×1
Title '0001_1' is a noise anchor with no content (no context/problem or decision), and the body is a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...] dump that is not an ADR but a corrupted, unmanageable blob WHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0001_1.txt— Delete the anchor title '0001_1' and replace with a real context/problem statement (e.g. why a design decision was needed) plus the explicit decision and its consequences
D20 · ADR Quality· Title '0002' contains only random junk and no meaningful content (decision and consequences are present but buried in a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...]' pattern with no context or trade-offs) · ×1
Title '0002' contains only random junk and no meaningful content (decision and consequences are present but buried in a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...]' pattern with no context or trade-offs) WHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0002.txt— Fix the title to an informative architecture decision, then replace the repetitive junk with real problem statement, explicit decision (e.g. which technology/layering), and consequences.
D20 · ADR Quality· Title '0003' contains only random junk and no meaningful content (decision and context are present but buried in a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...]] body; the visible text is uninformative), so it is an informative title plus an unusable, repetitive body · ×1
Title '0003' contains only random junk and no meaningful content (decision and context are present but buried in a repeated adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...]] body; the visible text is uninformative), so it is an informative title plus an unusable, repetitive body WHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0003.txt— Fix by replacing the entire garbled adajdal;djasdfposdfjkosijufsdijfnkljnckljxhcnqiwurq[...] with a real decision and context; delete the junk title
D20 · ADR Quality· Title '0004' contains only random junk and no meaningful context or decision · ×1
Title '0004' contains only random junk and no meaningful context or decision WHPerformanceDotNet/src/TPLDataflow/0004.txt— Replace with a real title (e.g. "Decide the default font size for all architectural diagrams") that states the problem and the explicit decision, then flesh out each of the four elements: Context/problem, Decision, Consequences/trade-offs, and an informative title.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected start of a property name or value, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 880.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 5 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×1
Medium CVE: GO-2022-0969 DesignPattern/DesignPatternGo/go.mod— stdlib 1.17.99 (net/http): GO-2022-0969 — fixed in Go 1.18.6; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 89 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.17.99: GO-2022-0969, GO-2022-1037, GO-2022-1038, GO-2022-1039, GO-2022-1095, GO-2022-1143, GO-2022-1144, GO-2023-1568, GO-2023-1569, GO-2023-1570, GO-2023-1571, GO-2023-1621, GO-2023-1702, GO-2023-1703, GO-2023-1704, GO-2023-1705, GO-2023-1751, GO-2023-1752, GO-2023-1753, GO-2023-1840, GO-2023-1878, GO-2023-1987, GO-2023-2041, GO-2023-2043, GO-2023-2102, GO-2023-2185, GO-2023-2186, GO-2023-2375, GO-2023-2382, GO-2024-2598, GO-2024-2599, GO-2024-2600, GO-2024-2609, GO-2024-2610, GO-2024-2687, GO-2024-2887, GO-2024-2888, GO-2024-2963, GO-2024-3105, GO-2024-3106, GO-2024-3107, GO-2025-3373, GO-2025-3420, GO-2025-3447, GO-2025-3503, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) CSharpGuide/performance/strings/Strings.cs:133— CSharpGuide/performance/strings/Strings.cs:133-147 | CSharpGuide/performance/strings/Strings.cs:165-179 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Low IaC: KSV-0003 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Memory not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0110 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate-parallel.yaml— Workloads in the default namespace
Low IaC: KSV-0003 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 Kubernetes/Job&CronJob/batch-calculate.yaml— Memory not limited
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .cs, .go, .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (2589 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, .go, .java, .py, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: Fabulous-Adventures-In-Data-Structures/sourcecode/chapter 6/Permutations.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Split CSharpGuide — A Catch-22 of 66k LoC spread over 38 unrelated namespaces is a classic sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: CSharpGuide.Extensions, CSharpGuide.Analysis, CSharpGuide.Rendering
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 3 of 68 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/05ReactiveExtensions/Program.cs, CSharpInDepth/Chapter_3_Generic/LinkedList_Demo.cs, ConcurrencyInCSharpCookbook/09Cancellation/CancellationRx.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution· Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
Tests co-located / outside the solution — 22 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
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Run 019fc8ae-4751-76a1-be69-3c1c36582c6a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 15 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 30 · Warnings: 94 · Recommendations: 22 · Info: 3 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 17:31 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.