Public report — MS.Microservice, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
119findings with an exact file:lineof 184 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
77/105dimensions across the health lenses27985 LoC · 33 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
MarsonShine/MS.Microservice is in a workable but fragile state (52%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (42%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Performance (53%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Make types internal by default (Library API & versioning); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup).
For scale: Medium (~27,985 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.6 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.6 person-years of build effort (about ~€81,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with https.key.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.6 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
11 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
157 modules, 165 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
14
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
4
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
3
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, refactor the library API by making types internal by default to ensure internal changes do not break consumers. Next, integrate a static application security testing step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Then, document recovery time and recovery point objectives alongside a tested restore procedure to establish a true disaster recovery plan. Finally, address the single leaked secret and the two deprecated dependencies to improve overall hygiene.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with https.key.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 73 of 77 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 77 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 119 of 184 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D22, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
8 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ExcelHelper.TryConvertValue at 25. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being AudioFileFormatDetector.DetectFormatFromStream at 19 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 ExcelHelper.TryConvertValue (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ExcelHelper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 AIRequestValidator.ValidateChatRequest (cyclomatic 24) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with AIRequestValidator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 QuestionGenerationHarness.RunAsync (cyclomatic 19) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with QuestionGenerationHarness.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 14 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.GenerateBatchAsync (cognitive 49) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 QuestionGenerationHarness.RunAsync (cognitive 36) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with QuestionGenerationHarness.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 RbacAuthorizationHandler.HandleAsync (cognitive 30) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with RbacAuthorizationHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4) · ×2src/MS.Microservice.Domain/Aggregates/IdentityModel/User.cs:13
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
1332 test methods: 1332 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with https.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
36 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessor.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The MS.Microservice project is well documented: a README with a version matrix and module table plus local-dev/docker commands; an extensive docs/README that serves as a navigation guide for the repository's knowledge graph (quick-start, architecture, observability, framework roadmap) and lists every listed section in its outline; and dedicated Swagger documentation. The README itself is thin but clear on build/run steps and defaults.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
78 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/CryptologyHelper.cs:9detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with CryptologyHelper.cs, https.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×2.github/workflows/dotnet-ci.yml:19detected by semgrep finding
Medium: var-in-href · ×12_layouts/default.html:79detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 12 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with default.html (10), AesCrypt.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dotnet-ci.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3.github/skills/baoyu-url-to-markdown/scripts/bun.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with bun.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — review.html:604, viewer.html:604
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — review.html:2, eval_review.html:2, viewer.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`EventTypeRegistry` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_eventTypes, _eventNames; e.g. `_eventTypes` at line 18). — SystemTextJsonEventSerializer.cs:8
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IRepositoryBase<T>` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRepositoryBase.cs:12
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No in-app HTTPS enforcement, but ForwardedHeaders / 127.0.0.1 binding indicates a reverse-proxy topology — adding UseHttpsRedirection in the app would be wrong in this layout. Verify the reverse proxy enforces TLS. — Program.cs:92
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: a dedicated audit read-model (an audit-log/-trail/-entry projection) over the sensitive event streams.
What to do
Surface the who-changed-what trail: project the sensitive event streams into a dedicated audit read-model (an audit-log/-trail/-entry type) and make sure appended events carry the acting user.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a documented retention period / data-expiry.
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.
`User.CreatorId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — User.cs:63
`User.UpdatorId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — User.cs:65
`User.FzId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — User.cs:69
`LogAggregateRoot.CreatorId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — LogAggregateRoot.cs:30
What to do
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
`Action` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Action.cs:6
`Role` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Role.cs:8
`LogAggregateRoot` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — LogAggregateRoot.cs:8
What to do
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
`Entity` exposes publicly writable state (Id). — Entity.cs:46
`Action` exposes publicly writable state (Name, Path). — Action.cs:6
`User` exposes publicly writable state (CreatedAt, UpdatedAt). — User.cs:13
`LogAggregateRoot` exposes publicly writable state (MethodName, Content, CreatedAt). — LogAggregateRoot.cs:8
What to do
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A placeholder string ("You are planning semantic visual details…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — PlanGeneratorClient.cs:181
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×12) — LogRepository.cs:24, LogRepository.cs:29, LogRepository.cs:34, …
A placeholder string ("mail@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — UserClaimHelper.cs:38
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`LogRepository` has 4 unfinished members out of 5 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — LogRepository.cs:13
`DeleteAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — LogRepository.cs:22, LogRepository.cs:27, UserRepository.cs:23, …
`FindAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — LogRepository.cs:32
`UpdateAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — LogRepository.cs:43
`SugarSerializeObject` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — SqlSugarSerializeService.cs:22
`CacheManager` has 4 unfinished members out of 5 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — CacheManager.cs:9
`ExistsAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — CacheManager.cs:16
`GetOrAddAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — CacheManager.cs:53
`RemoveAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — CacheManager.cs:58
`SetAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — CacheManager.cs:63
`InitDataProductTable` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — ActivationDbContextSeed.cs:30
`ValidateAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — ValidatorBehavior.cs:16
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×15) — CacheOptions.cs:8, NumberConverter.cs:33, OperationLogBuffer.cs:62, …
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 30 of 33 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.
680/843 types (81%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
No <Version>/<VersionPrefix>/GitVersion/MinVer detected. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes.
What to do
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version> or GitVersion/MinVer) and follow semver for breaking changes.
Only 12/17 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 17, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 141 use(s) across 28,409 production line(s) (~5.0/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
4 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
Only 125/502 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
What to do
Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. — Md5.cs:13
DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes. — DesCrypt.cs:67
`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — IServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:180
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (`System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32`) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key or a mutex name.
Replace DES/3DES (and bare RijndaelManaged) with AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()`.
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×3) — RetryExecutor.cs:94, LoggingHttpClientHandler.cs:69, CurrentUserResolver.cs:30
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` wastes a thread and, if the task needs a context this one is holding, deadlocks. `Dispose()` returns void by contract, so it cannot simply `await`: signal the work to stop first (cancel its token, set its stop flag) so the wait is short, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task cannot hang shutdown, and — where callers can use it — add an awaitable teardown (`DisposeAsync`/`StopAsync`) beside the synchronous one and let `Dispose()` remain the bounded fallback. — OperationLogBuffer.cs:124
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 139/209 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — ResourceHelper.cs:19, SingleflightManager.cs:20, IUnitOfWorkExtensions.cs:38, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×2) — AudioProcessor.cs:811, AudioProcessorExtensions.cs:341
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~1.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 153 suppression(s) across the 134809 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 28 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 3 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
NoWarnInCsproj MS.Microservice.Persistence/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/src/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar.csproj:4— NU1903 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Packages.props:5— NU1507 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:12— 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:12— EXTEXP0018 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×3
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] .github/skills/baoyu-url-to-markdown/scripts/bun.lock— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — @xmldom/xmldom is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @xmldom/xmldom to 0.8.13 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.8.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.8.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] .github/skills/baoyu-url-to-markdown/scripts/bun.lock— form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] .github/skills/baoyu-url-to-markdown/scripts/bun.lock— ws 8.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — ws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ws to 8.21.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ws 8.19.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.21.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.21.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ws 8.19.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D10 · Test Quality· No assertions (empty test) · ×2
No assertions (empty test): Test1 test/MS.Microservice.Core.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:5— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
No assertions (empty test): Test1 test/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure.Tests222/UnitTest1.cs:5— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
EmptyCatchBlock src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessor.cs:811— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
EmptyCatchBlock src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessorExtensions.cs:341— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-ci.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet-ci.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
Leaked secret: private-key docs/k8s/examples/fortune-https/https.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:79— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:82— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:83— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:114— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:117— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:120— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:131— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:148— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:154— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: var-in-href _layouts/default.html:163— Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use_ecb_mode src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/AesCrypt.cs:48— Usage of the insecure ECB mode detected. You should use an authenticated encryption mode instead, which is implemented by the classes AesGcm or ChaCha20Poly1305.
Medium: use_ecb_mode src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/AesCrypt.cs:72— Usage of the insecure ECB mode detected. You should use an authenticated encryption mode instead, which is implemented by the classes AesGcm or ChaCha20Poly1305.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Core/EventBus/EventBusManager.cs:33— // TODO：兼容多个相同类型的事件订阅 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Core/Net/Http/LogHttpClient.cs:15— // TODO: 日志单独配置化，可以单独控制是否记录日志 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Domain/Aggregates/IdentityModel/Repository/IRoleRepository.cs:3— // TODO: 待考虑 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Domain/Aggregates/MerchandiseAggregate/Enums/ThirdSystemEnum.cs:3— // TODO: 抽象成表，要在界面上交互 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Telemetry/Microsoft/Extensions/DependencyInjection/OpenTelemetryExtensions.cs:16— // TODO: 配置化 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Telemetry/Microsoft/Extensions/DependencyInjection/OpenTelemetryExtensions.cs:21— // TODO: 配置化 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Web/Application/BackgroundServices/BadPracticeBackgroundService.cs:32— // TODO：后台作业待配置化 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Web/Infrastructure/Authorizations/Handlers/RbacAuthorizationHandler.cs:141— //TODO:应用层 appservice — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/MS.Microservice.Web/Infrastructure/Extensions/IServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:201— // TODO — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Dead code: BytesToMD5String src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Summary/Md5.cs:36— Method BytesToMD5String — no references found in solution.
Dead code: FlushCallback src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Caching/OperationLogBuffer.cs:40— Method FlushCallback — no references found in solution.
Dead code: ProcessOperationGroupAsync src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Caching/OperationLogBuffer.cs:84— Method ProcessOperationGroupAsync — no references found in solution.
Dead code: InitDataProductTable src/MS.Microservice.Web/Infrastructure/ActivationDbContextSeed.cs:30— Method InitDataProductTable — no references found in solution.
Dead code: InitUserTable src/MS.Microservice.Web/Infrastructure/ActivationDbContextSeed.cs:322— Method InitUserTable — no references found in solution.
Dead code: TestEntityBaseLong test/MS.Microservice.Core.Tests/Domain/EntityBaseTests.cs:12— NamedType TestEntityBaseLong — no references found in solution.
Hotspot: MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIRequestValidator.cs MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIRequestValidator.cs— MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIRequestValidator.cs changed 6 times in last 90 days, max complexity 24. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.cs MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.cs— MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.cs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIOptionsValidator.cs MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIOptionsValidator.cs— MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIOptionsValidator.cs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 17. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs— src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 25. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
HackComment src/MS.Microservice.Core/Functional/Data/BinaryTree.cs:7— // hack — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
HackComment src/MS.Microservice.Core/Functional/Data/BinaryTree.cs:10— // hack — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
HackComment src/MS.Microservice.Core/Functional/Data/Bst.cs:16— // hack — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
HackComment src/MS.Microservice.Core/Functional/Data/Bst.cs:19— // hack — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
TooManyMethods: ExcelHelper src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 526 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 47 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: AudioProcessor src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessor.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 302 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 33 methods. The type holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group its members by. To reduce it, split it by area instead: give each cohesive family of members its own smaller type, so no one type has to be read whole to change one of them.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:253— src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:253-263 | src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:265-275 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessorExtensions.cs:40— src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessorExtensions.cs:40-50 | src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessorExtensions.cs:66-76 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessorExtensions.cs:40` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Off the main sequence: MS.Microservice.Logging.Core — MS.Microservice.Logging.Core: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 4 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: MS.Microservice.Swagger — MS.Microservice.Swagger: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4) src/MS.Microservice.Domain/Aggregates/IdentityModel/User.cs:13— User's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
Low cohesion: UserController (LCOM4 4) src/MS.Microservice.Web/Controller/UserController.cs:14— UserController's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
ExcelHelper.TryConvertValue (cyclomatic 25) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:797— ExcelHelper.TryConvertValue has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AIRequestValidator.ValidateChatRequest (cyclomatic 24) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIRequestValidator.cs:7— AIRequestValidator.ValidateChatRequest has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
QuestionGenerationHarness.RunAsync (cyclomatic 19) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.QuestionGeneration/Pipeline/QuestionGenerationHarness.cs:28— QuestionGenerationHarness.RunAsync has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
VisualPlanValidator.Validate (cyclomatic 18) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/Pipeline/VisualPlanValidator.cs:13— VisualPlanValidator.Validate has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.GenerateBatchAsync (cyclomatic 18) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.cs:34— SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.GenerateBatchAsync has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AIOptionsValidator.Validate (cyclomatic 17) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIOptionsValidator.cs:7— AIOptionsValidator.Validate has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ExcelHelper.TryConvertFromDouble (cyclomatic 17) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:727— ExcelHelper.TryConvertFromDouble has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
EntityHelper.EntityEquals (cyclomatic 16) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Domain/Entity/EntityHelper.cs:10— EntityHelper.EntityEquals has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Prerelease dependency: SqlSugarCore — SqlSugarCore resolves to 5.1.4.211-preview10, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.GenerateBatchAsync (cognitive 49) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.cs:34— SentenceImageBatchOrchestrator.GenerateBatchAsync has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
QuestionGenerationHarness.RunAsync (cognitive 36) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.QuestionGeneration/Pipeline/QuestionGenerationHarness.cs:28— QuestionGenerationHarness.RunAsync has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
RbacAuthorizationHandler.HandleAsync (cognitive 30) src/MS.Microservice.Web/Infrastructure/Authorizations/Handlers/RbacAuthorizationHandler.cs:47— RbacAuthorizationHandler.HandleAsync has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ExcelHelper.TryConvertValue (cognitive 28) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:797— ExcelHelper.TryConvertValue has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AIRequestValidator.ValidateChatRequest (cognitive 25) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIRequestValidator.cs:7— AIRequestValidator.ValidateChatRequest has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
VisualPlanRepairer.Repair (cognitive 23) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/Pipeline/VisualPlanRepairer.cs:12— VisualPlanRepairer.Repair has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
VisualPlanValidator.Validate (cognitive 23) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/Pipeline/VisualPlanValidator.cs:13— VisualPlanValidator.Validate has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WordImagePromptPipeline.FindOuterHintStart (cognitive 23) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/WordImagePromptPipeline.cs:166— WordImagePromptPipeline.FindOuterHintStart has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
AIOptionsValidator.Validate (cognitive 22) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIOptionsValidator.cs:7— AIOptionsValidator.Validate has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
EntityHelper.EntityEquals (cognitive 21) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Domain/Entity/EntityHelper.cs:10— EntityHelper.EntityEquals has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
QwenImageEditProvider.ParseMultimodalResponseAsync (cognitive 20) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Qwen/QwenImageEditProvider.cs:97— QwenImageEditProvider.ParseMultimodalResponseAsync has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
VisualPlanEnricher.Enrich (cognitive 18) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/Pipeline/VisualPlanEnricher.cs:13— VisualPlanEnricher.Enrich has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
SecretField.HideSensitiveInfo (cognitive 18) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/SecretField.cs:50— SecretField.HideSensitiveInfo has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ExcelHelper.ReadBody (cognitive 17) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:241— ExcelHelper.ReadBody has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ExcelHelper.TryConvertFromDouble (cognitive 17) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:727— ExcelHelper.TryConvertFromDouble has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
QwenSafePromptBuilder.BuildEventCard (cognitive 16) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/Images/Building/QwenSafePromptBuilder.cs:179— QwenSafePromptBuilder.BuildEventCard has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
RetryExecutor.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 16) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Common/Advance/Resilience/RetryExecutor.cs:24— RetryExecutor.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
RsaCrypt.DecodeRSAPublicKey (cognitive 16) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:42— RsaCrypt.DecodeRSAPublicKey has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ExcelHelper.TryReadNonFormulaCellValue (cognitive 16) src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:617— ExcelHelper.TryReadNonFormulaCellValue has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: The JSON value could not be converted to CodeHealth.Dimensions.Docs.Llm.CommentJudgement. Path: $.notable[3] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 722.
FileTooLong: Utils/ExcelHelper.cs src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Utils/ExcelHelper.cs:0— FileTooLong — 545 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
ClassTooLong: QuestionGenerationHarness MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.QuestionGeneration/Pipeline/QuestionGenerationHarness.cs:0— ClassTooLong — 419 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 11 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 2 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (1 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleChatProviderBase.cs:31— MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleChatProviderBase.cs:31-48 | MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleMediaProviderBase.cs:30-47 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleImageGenerationProviderBase.cs:60— MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleImageGenerationProviderBase.cs:60-83 | MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Qwen/QwenImageEditProvider.cs:103-117 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleImageGenerationProviderBase.cs:60` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:62— src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:62-76 | src/MS.Microservice.Core/Security/Cryptology/RsaCrypt.cs:188-201 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleChatProviderBase.cs:593— MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleChatProviderBase.cs:593-605 | MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleMediaProviderBase.cs:471-483 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleChatProviderBase.cs:593` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) MS.Microservice.Persistence/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/src/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/DbContext/BaseContext.cs:49— MS.Microservice.Persistence/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/src/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/DbContext/BaseContext.cs:49-54 | MS.Microservice.Persistence/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/src/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/DbContext/SqlSugarDbContext.cs:45-50 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `MS.Microservice.Persistence/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/src/MS.Microservice.Persistence.SqlSugar/DbContext/BaseContext.cs:49` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 28 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/Common/NAudio/AudioProcessor.cs, MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleChatProviderBase.cs, MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/OpenAICompatibleMediaProviderBase.cs, src/MS.Microservice.Infrastructure/FileSystem/NetworkShareAccessor.cs, MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIProductionServices.cs, MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIRequestValidator.cs, MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIServiceCollectionExtensions.cs, MS.Microservice.AI/src/MS.Microservice.AI.Core/AIOptions.cs (+20 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 27985 LoC spread over 33 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
Split MS.Microservice.Core — A generic catch-all name that is huge (6k LoC) and sprawls over 40 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: MS.Messaging, MS.Persistence, MS.Security
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 2 location(s) do not all need the same action: 1 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 1 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.
Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fc820-6c3c-766e-92c4-8c1ae1260f47 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 22 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 17 · Warnings: 92 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 66 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 14:56 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.