Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
MehrdadShirvani/AlibabaClone-Backend carries serious risk (48%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (87%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (83%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (63%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).
For scale: Small (~5,921 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (87%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
83%
Strong
Architecture
87%
Strong
Maturity
63%
Adequate
Readiness
26%
Weak · gated by D8, D9, P2, P3
Security
65%
Adequate · gated by D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 26% · 47% weightMaturity 63% · 26% weightSecurity 65% · 14% weightCode Health 83% · 8% weightArchitecture 87% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 48 → ~67.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 6%Plumbing 39%Generated 55%
New since the last scan (4+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,200–€11,000
| Cost to rebuild | €2,200–€11,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 48% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 37% boilerplate · 49% straight-line · 14% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€6,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 26%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
9.7
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
9.8
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
10.0
D39 · .NET / C#
IL Efficiency
9.5
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
X5 · Repo
Nullable reference types
9.9
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
9.9
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX2 · Repo
Stateful singletons
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 5 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 2 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 1 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, implement structured logging and health checks across all services to establish baseline observability. Next, integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent regressions from reaching production. Then, address the single missing automated test to improve code coverage. After that, resolve the issue of undetected tests to ensure proper test distribution. Finally, add readiness and liveness probes with a rolling update strategy to enable automatic rollback of bad releases.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +19.8 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +19.8 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +18.0 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +21.7 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +21.7 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +19.8 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it. | +7.1 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +3.3 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows/deploy.yml | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) |
| AlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Services/TransportationAggregates/TransportationRepository.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| AlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Services/PdfGenerator.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: Dead code: CellStyle |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The tech stack table and a brief architecture note are present but the full four-layer breakdown (Domain, Application, Infrastructure, Presentation) and key features sections are not shown due to clipping. |
| AlibabaClone.Application/Utils/PasswordHasher.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
| AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Program.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
| AlibabaClone.Application/Interfaces/IPersonService.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| AlibabaClone.Application/Mappers/Profiles/MappingProfile.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | IL Efficiency: IL efficiency: 6 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 54 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6C1C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 21 of 49 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
3 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 4)AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:30
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:72
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:151
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D5 · Coupling
4 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 14 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
14 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
Vulnerable: AutoMapper
Outdated: AutoMapper
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 14 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 3821 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8.
CommentedOutCodeAlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Services/TransportationAggregates/TransportationRepository.cs:31
Dead code: CellStyleAlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Services/PdfGenerator.cs:32
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D18 · Solution Shape
4 projects, 147 source files, 3821 hand-written lines of code (3821 production / 0 test), plus 7316 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 6 inter-project edges.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The Transportation Management App backend README is a solid one-page overview that introduces the project and states its purpose. It begins with an architecture note referencing Clean Architecture principles and links to the frontend, but it lacks any real documentation of the tech stack (the table is clipped mid-table), no architecture/design doc, and no coverage for the four main layers or the outlined features such as authentication, user management, scalability, testability, security, API design, or getting started. The visible content is thin compared to what an ideal README would show.
The tech stack table and a brief architecture note are present but the full four-layer breakdown (Domain, Application, Infrastructure, Presentation) and key features sections are not shown due to clipping.README.md
XML-doc coverage: AlibabaClone.WebAPI AlibabaClone.WebAPI/AlibabaClone.WebAPI.csproj
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The tech stack table and a brief architecture note are present but the… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
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D24 · Comment Value
4 valuable / 1 redundant across 39 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.
misleading comment AlibabaClone.Application/Utils/PasswordHasher.cs:9
redundant commentAlibabaClone.Application/Interfaces/IPersonService.cs:8
What to do
- Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with PasswordHasher.cs, Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with IPersonService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 4 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
100 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy.yml:15
What to do
- Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with deploy.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
1 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfile
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
1 of 12 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is AlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Seeders/DBInitializer.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D39 · IL Efficiency
6 of 223 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
IL efficiency: 6 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetAlibabaClone.Application/Mappers/Profiles/MappingProfile.cs:17
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX2 · Stateful singletons
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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C1 · Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
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C2 · Access Controls
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×8) — PdfGenerator.cs:22, PdfGenerator.cs:23, PdfGenerator.cs:66, …
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
- Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
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P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P8 · Schema migrations
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S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 0/22 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×22) — AccountController.cs:25, AccountController.cs:45, AccountController.cs:66, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 83% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 87% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 63% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Readiness | 26% | Weak — gated by D8, D9, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 65% | Adequate — gated by D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 43 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 3821 LoC the codebase is small despite four projects, so its size alone makes it not need explicit boundaries.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 9 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy.yml:15
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy.yml:18
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/deploy.yml:24
- High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/deploy.yml:29
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy.yml:33
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Vulnerable: AutoMapper
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Warning — 8 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D17 · Explicit Debt
- CommentedOutCode AlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Services/TransportationAggregates/TransportationRepository.cs:31
D17 · Explicit Debt
- Dead code: CellStyle AlibabaClone.Infrastructure/Services/PdfGenerator.cs:32
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Unpinned build actions
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Workflow token permissions not restricted
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:30
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:72
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:151
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value
- misleading comment AlibabaClone.Application/Utils/PasswordHasher.cs:9
- misleading comment AlibabaClone.WebAPI/Program.cs:92
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The tech stack table and a brief architecture note are present but the full four-layer breakdown (Domain, Application, Infrastructure, Presentation) and key features sections are not shown due to clipping. README.md
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment AlibabaClone.Application/Interfaces/IPersonService.cs:8
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D39 · IL Efficiency
- IL efficiency: 6 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget AlibabaClone.Application/Mappers/Profiles/MappingProfile.cs:17
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 19 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: AutoMapper
- Outdated: DotNetEnv
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design
- Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json
- Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore
- Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger
- Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Proxies
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools
- Outdated: QuestPDF
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: AlibabaClone.WebAPI AlibabaClone.WebAPI/AlibabaClone.WebAPI.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: AlibabaClone.Application AlibabaClone.Application/AlibabaClone.Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: AlibabaClone.Domain AlibabaClone.Domain/AlibabaClone.Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: AlibabaClone.Infrastructure AlibabaClone.Infrastructure/AlibabaClone.Infrastructure.csproj
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 5 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list AlibabaClone-Backend.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 1 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 2 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Name — 14 field(s)
- PersonDto.FirstName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/PersonDto.cs:10
- PersonDto.LastName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/PersonDto.cs:12
- PersonDto.EnglishFirstName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/PersonDto.cs:23
- PersonDto.EnglishLastName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/PersonDto.cs:24
- ProfileDto.FirstName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:5
- ProfileDto.LastName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:6
- CreateTravelerTicketDto.FirstName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/CreateTravelerTicketDto.cs:10
- CreateTravelerTicketDto.LastName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/CreateTravelerTicketDto.cs:12
- CreateTravelerTicketDto.EnglishFirstName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/CreateTravelerTicketDto.cs:23
- CreateTravelerTicketDto.EnglishLastName AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/CreateTravelerTicketDto.cs:24
- Person.FirstName AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:8
- Person.LastName AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:9
- Person.EnglishFirstName AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:16
- Person.EnglishLastName AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:17
Phone — 10 field(s)
- AccountDto.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/AccountDTO.cs:6
- PersonDto.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/PersonDto.cs:20
- ProfileDto.AccountPhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:7
- ProfileDto.PersonPhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:11
- AuthResponseDto.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Authentication/AuthResponseDto.cs:7
- LoginRequestDto.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Authentication/LoginRequestDto.cs:5
- RegisterRequestDto.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Authentication/RegisterRequestDto.cs:9
- CreateTravelerTicketDto.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/CreateTravelerTicketDto.cs:20
- Account.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Account.cs:9
- Person.PhoneNumber AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:14
Financial (card / IBAN) — 6 field(s)
- ProfileDto.IBAN AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:14
- ProfileDto.CardNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:16
- UpsertBankAccountDetailDto.IBAN AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/UpsertBankAccountDetailDto.cs:5
- UpsertBankAccountDetailDto.CardNumber AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/UpsertBankAccountDetailDto.cs:6
- BankAccountDetail.CardNumber AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/BankAccountDetail.cs:9
- BankAccountDetail.IBAN AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/BankAccountDetail.cs:10
Date of birth — 5 field(s)
- PersonDto.BirthDate AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/PersonDto.cs:22
- ProfileDto.BirthDate AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:12
- CreateTravelerTicketDto.BirthDate AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/CreateTravelerTicketDto.cs:22
- TravelerTicketDto.BirthDate AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Transportation/TravelerTicketDto.cs:8
- Person.Birthdate AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:12
Email — 4 field(s)
- AccountDto.Email AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/AccountDTO.cs:8
- EditEmailDto.NewEmail AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/EditEmailDto.cs:8
- ProfileDto.Email AlibabaClone.Application/DTOs/Account/ProfileDto.cs:8
- Account.Email AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Account.cs:11
Government ID (SSN / passport / tax) — 1 field(s)
- Person.PassportNumber AlibabaClone.Domain/Aggregates/AccountAggregates/Person.cs:15