Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Mygod/VPNHotspot carries serious gaps (31%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (94%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (92%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Domain Modelling (19%) — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change. Readiness (28%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Make entity setters private/init-only (Encapsulated state); Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern… (Rich vs anemic model); 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution).
For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (94%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
92% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
94% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
51%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
28%
Weak · gated by D9, P2, P4
Security
42%
Weak · gated by D29
Domain Modelling
19% ⚠
Critical · gated by DM4, DM5
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Domain Modelling 19% · 46% weightReadiness 28% · 25% weightSecurity 42% · 14% weightMaturity 51% · 8% weightCode Health 92% · 4% weightArchitecture 94% · 2% weight
Raise Domain Modelling 19 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 31 → ~42.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (13+)
- D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- D13 · Leaked secret: gcp-api-key mobile/google-services.json
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key mobile/src/main/rust/vpnhotspotd/src/shared/ipv4_forward_counter.rs
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- P2 · No structured logging
- DM4 · Anemic entity: ClientRecord mobile/src/main/java/be/mygod/vpnhotspot/room/ClientRecord.kt
- DM5 · Mutable entity: ClientRecord mobile/src/main/java/be/mygod/vpnhotspot/room/ClientRecord.kt
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
2
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with google-services.json.
3
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters). The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 21 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by encapsulating entity state through private or init-only setters, ensuring all state changes occur via methods that enforce invariants. Next, move business rules onto the aggregates and entities they govern to enforce invariants at the source rather than in anemic services. Address the single missing test case to improve test coverage, then adopt structured logging with ILogger or Serilog at meaningful points across the projects. Finally, automate deployment using Helm, Kubernetes manifests, or a pipeline stage to ensure releases are repeatable and reversible.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +8.2 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with google-services.json. | +6.9 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters). | +12.5 pts | Medium | Encapsulated state |
| Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services. | +12.0 pts | Medium | Rich vs anemic model |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Automate deployment (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or a pipeline deploy stage) so releases are repeatable and reversible. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets. | +5.4 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql.yml (9), test.yml (6), dependabot.yml (3). | +4.2 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| mobile/google-services.json | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: gcp-api-key |
| .github/workflows/codeql.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/test.yml | 4.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| mobile/src/main/rust/vpnhotspotd/src/shared/ipv4_forward_counter.rs | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| mobile/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity |
| mobile/src/main/java/be/mygod/vpnhotspot/ui/PreferenceComponents.kt | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The 'Features That Requires System App Installation' section lists features but does not state which of them actually require a system app (e.g. the recommended use with a real VPN/socksifier) and how to verify it. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 32 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 32 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D12D13D15D16D19D21D26D27D28D29D34AX5DM4DM5DM8M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 26 of 32 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
16 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ApConfigurationScreenKt.ApConfigurationScreen at 56.
What to do
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
28 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Routing.start at 82.
What to do
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
1 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)mobile/src/main/java/be/mygod/vpnhotspot/ui/PreferenceComponents.kt:252
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D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: gcp-api-keymobile/google-services.json:28
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with google-services.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The documentation is clear and complete for a complex VPN hotspot project: four README files cover the app's releases badge, Obtainium distribution, features requiring root, and an internal AOSP submodule pin; seven architecture/design docs describe the daemon ownership model, source map, hidden API audit, runtime maintenance rules, and per-module stub conventions. The outline is visible in every clipped section (features requiring system installation, Q & A on persistent changes, Obtainium channel link, failed-group cleanup, private-apis assumptions), so none are flagged as missing.
The 'Features That Requires System App Installation' section lists features but does not state which of them actually require a system app (e.g. the recommended use with a real VPN/socksifier) and how to verify it.README.md
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
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D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key mobile/src/main/rust/vpnhotspotd/src/shared/ipv4_forward_counter.rs:269
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with google-services.json, ipv4_forward_counter.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
21 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
Medium: exported_activitymobile/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:70
What to do
- Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql.yml (9), test.yml (6), dependabot.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with AndroidManifest.xml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `ClientRecord` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — ClientRecord.kt:16
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
- `ClientRecord` exposes public setter(s) (nickname, blocked, macLookupPending). — ClientRecord.kt:16
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- No Helm/Kubernetes/compose manifests or pipeline deploy stage found — releases appear manual, which is slower and riskier to reverse.
What to do
- Automate deployment (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or a pipeline deploy stage) so releases are repeatable and reversible.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 92% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 94% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 51% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 28% | Weak — gated by D9, P2, P4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 42% | Weak — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 19% | Critical — gated by DM4, DM5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — ~607 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 24 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:13
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:23
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:34
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:37
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:51
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:61
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:69
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:72
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:79
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml:15
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml:18
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:14
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:19
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:64
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:71
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key mobile/src/main/rust/vpnhotspotd/src/shared/ipv4_forward_counter.rs:269
- Secret: gcp-api-key mobile/google-services.json:28
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: gcp-api-key mobile/google-services.json:28
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
Warning — 3 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: exported_activity mobile/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:70
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) mobile/src/main/java/be/mygod/vpnhotspot/ui/PreferenceComponents.kt:252
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 4 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The 'Features That Requires System App Installation' section lists features but does not state which of them actually require a system app (e.g. the recommended use with a real VPN/socksifier) and how to verify it. README.md
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 2 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 21 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |