Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
NicklasWallgren/go-template is sound in substance but carries real gaps (47%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Domain Modelling (27%) — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change. Maturity (55%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Make entity setters private/init-only (Encapsulated state); Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern… (Rich vs anemic model); Define repositories per aggregate root (Repository granularity).
For scale: Small (~3,692 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
100% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
55%
Adequate · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
60%
Adequate · gated by P5
Security
61%
Adequate · gated by D29
Domain Modelling
27%
Weak · gated by DM4, DM5, DM7
Event-Driven
89% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Domain Modelling 27% · 46% weightMaturity 55% · 25% weightReadiness 60% · 14% weightSecurity 61% · 8% weightEvent-Driven 89% · 4% weightCode Health 100% · 2% weightArchitecture 100% · 1% weight
Raise Domain Modelling 27 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 47 → ~61.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (10+)
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,800–€24,000
| Cost to rebuild | €4,800–€24,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 47% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€15,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
2
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
3
Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters). The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Ugly
At a glance — Event-Driven
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 33 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 14 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by encapsulating entity state through private setters and invariant-enforcing methods to ensure data integrity. Next, move business rules directly into the aggregates and entities to enforce invariants at the source rather than in external services. Refactor the repository layer to define one repository per aggregate root, ensuring child entities are accessed only through their roots. Finally, invert domain-to-infrastructure dependencies by declaring interfaces in the domain layer and implementing them in infrastructure. Conclude by resolving the single orphaned file to maintain codebase freshness.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters). | +16.6 pts | Medium | Encapsulated state |
| Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services. | +16.5 pts | Medium | Rich vs anemic model |
| Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed. | +16.3 pts | Medium | Repository granularity |
| Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion). | +15.0 pts | Medium | Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +3.8 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +3.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +3.3 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. | +3.1 pts | Medium | Documentation Quality |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml | 1.7 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml | 1.8 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml | 1.9 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/main.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| deployment/docker/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| .github/dependabot.yml | 7.2 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown |
| adapters/driven/persistence/entity_repository.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 31 of 33 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 33 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D40D41AX5DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 48 of 58 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — evaluation did not complete — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) — excluded from the score.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
1 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)adapters/driven/persistence/entity_repository.go:101
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The README is an impressive ASCII art banner with a GitHub badge wall and a Go template project description that begins to outline the architecture (Hexagonal/Port/Adapter, DDD, Clean Architecture, SOLID, 12 Factor) before it clips mid-sentence. It names the features goose/migrations, swagger, and ends with a feature list that is itself clipped, so any listed section cannot be confirmed missing. The visible content is mostly aesthetic banner art plus a thin README; there are no prerequisites, quickstart, or full architecture docs to evaluate.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The README is an impressive ASCII art banner with a GitHub badge wall and a Go template project description that begins to outline the architecture (Hexagonal/Port/Adapter, DDD, Clean Architecture, SOLID, 12 Factor) before it clips mid-sentence. It names the features goose/migrations, swagger, and ends with a feature list that is itself clipped, so any listed section cannot be confirmed missing. The visible content is mostly aesthetic banner art plus a thin README; there are no prerequisites, quickstart, or full architecture docs to evaluate.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
14 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 3 medium, 0 low.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml:19
What to do
- Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4), reviewdog.yml (4), main.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with app.yaml, mariadb.yaml, rabbitmq.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
33 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 12 medium, 17 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 deployment/docker/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
Low IaC: DS-0026 deployment/docker/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, app.yaml, mariadb.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 17 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with rabbitmq.yaml (6), app.yaml (5), mariadb.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 12 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with app.yaml (5), rabbitmq.yaml (4), mariadb.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 9 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is adapters/driven/persistence/transaction/transaction.go.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D40 · Network Egress Confinement
0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).
No network policy
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
0/2 syscall-confinement controls present (seccomp, AppArmor/SELinux).
No seccomp profile
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `User` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — user.go:10
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
- `User` exposes publicly writable state (Name, Email, Age, Birthday, CreatedAt, UpdatedAt). — user.go:10
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
- The domain package `github.com/NicklasWallgren/go-template/domain/event` imports `pkg:adapters` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — entity_listener.go:7
- The domain package `github.com/NicklasWallgren/go-template/domain/users` imports `pkg:adapters` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — user_validator.go:6
- The domain package `github.com/NicklasWallgren/go-template/domain/users` imports `gorm.io/gorm` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — user_validator.go:10
- The domain package `github.com/NicklasWallgren/go-template/domain/validation` imports `gorm.io/gorm` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — validator.go:7
What to do
- Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
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DM7 · Repository granularity
- `Repository` leaks the infrastructure/framework type `DB` through its contract. A repository should be a persistence PORT over an aggregate ROOT — expose intention-revealing whole-aggregate operations (Save/FindByID) and keep framework types, query specifications and business logic out of its contract so callers can't bypass the aggregate's invariants. — repository.go:18
- `UserRepository` leaks the infrastructure/framework type `DB` through its contract. A repository should be a persistence PORT over an aggregate ROOT — expose intention-revealing whole-aggregate operations (Save/FindByID) and keep framework types, query specifications and business logic out of its contract so callers can't bypass the aggregate's invariants. — user_repository.go:18
What to do
- Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
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ED2 · Event/command shape
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ED3 · Event naming
- `EntityEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — entity_event.go:21
What to do
- Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
- `userService.CreateUser` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — user_service.go:134
What to do
- Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
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P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 55% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 60% | Adequate — gated by P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 61% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 27% | Weak — gated by DM4, DM5, DM7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 89% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~5303 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete)
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 15 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:33
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:46
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:57
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:71
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/main.yml:30
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:10
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:12
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:22
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/reviewdog.yml:24
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 deployment/docker/Dockerfile
- High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
Warning — 17 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml:19
- Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml:20
- Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml:20
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) adapters/driven/persistence/entity_repository.go:101
Recommendation — 24 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 deployment/docker/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployment/k8s/app/app.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/mariadb.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployment/k8s/infrastructure/rabbitmq.yaml
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete)
D40 · Network Egress Confinement
- No network policy
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
- No seccomp profile
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
- No AppArmor/SELinux confinement
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 14 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 33 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess. | 0 | — |