Public report — eShopOnWeb, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 17:10 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

NimblePros/eShopOnWeb

48% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Small · 7,982 LoC · 13 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Accessibility (34%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

66/70dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
54findings with an exact file:lineof 76 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
70/105dimensions across the health lenses7982 LoC · 13 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

NimblePros/eShopOnWeb is in a workable but fragile state (48%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Architecture (86%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Security (77%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (34%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Domain Modelling (49%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives); Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler) (Keyboard semantics); accessibility in the test suite you already have (A11y enforcement).

For scale: Small (~7,982 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (86%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Accessibility 34% · 46% weightDomain Modelling 49% · 25% weightMaturity 68% · 14% weightReadiness 70% · 8% weightCode Health 74% · 4% weightSecurity 77% · 2% weightArchitecture 86% · 1% weight

Raise Accessibility 34 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 48 → ~60.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 51%Tests 19%Generated 20%
New since the last scan (16+)

16 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D20 · The document is a request-only banner with no context/problem and no explicit decision; only the repository path '/decisions' is recorded docs/decisions/2025-04-24-document-decisions.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only implementation rationale is present docs/decisions/2025-04-25-just-the-docs-theme.md
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Web/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/PublicApi/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/toc.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/comment-on-pr.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_109 infra/core/security/keyvault.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_113 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_41 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_41 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_41 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_225 infra/core/host/appserviceplan.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_17 infra/core/host/appservice.bicep
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_88 infra/core/host/appservice.bicep

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,600–€23,000
Cost to rebuild€4,600–€23,000 (0.1 person-years (76–240 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 48% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 44% boilerplate · 40% straight-line · 16% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€14,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 34% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.7) — microservices, CQRS, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
+12.8 pts · Medium effort · Text alternatives
2
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
+12.8 pts · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics
3
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
+12.7 pts · Medium effort · A11y enforcement

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 34%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (7,982 LoC) · weakest lens: Accessibility 34%
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
13 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 0 · DM4 anemic: 6 · DM2 primitive ids: 7
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch ApplicationCore ApplicationCore BlazorShared BlazorShared ApplicationCore->BlazorShared BlazorAdmin BlazorAdmin BlazorAdmin->BlazorShared Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure->ApplicationCore PublicApi PublicApi PublicApi->ApplicationCore PublicApi->Infrastructure eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults AspireServiceDefaults PublicApi->eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults Web Web Web->ApplicationCore Web->BlazorAdmin Web->Infrastructure Web->eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults eShopWeb.AppHost AppHost eShopWeb.AppHost->BlazorAdmin eShopWeb.AppHost->PublicApi eShopWeb.AppHost->Web

Architecture — module dependency matrix

81 modules, 117 dependencies — 5 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

BlazorAdmin.ModelsBlazorShared…ft.eShopWeb.PublicApiBlazorAdmin.InterfacesBlazorShared.Models…ities.BasketAggregate…ementEndpoints.Models…azorShared.Interfaces…cationCore.InterfacesBlazorAdmin.Services…licationCore.Entities…frastructure.IdentityBlazorAdmin.Helpers…tities.BuyerAggregate…tities.OrderAggregate…blicApi.AuthEndpoints…CatalogBrandEndpoints….CatalogItemEndpoints….CatalogTypeEndpoints…leManagementEndpoints…erManagementEndpoints…opWeb.Web.Controllers…Pages.CatalogItemPage…rAdmin.Pages.RolePage…rAdmin.Pages.UserPage…OrderAggregate.Events…licationCore.Services…b.Infrastructure.Data…structure.Data.Config….PublicApi.Extensions…hopWeb.Web.ViewModels…derAggregate.Handlers…tructure.Data.Queries…Web.Features.MyOrders…Features.OrderDetails…pWeb.Web.Pages.BasketMediator.Internals…hopWeb.Web.InterfacesMediator…eShopWeb.Web.ServicesBlazorAdmin.Models1BlazorShared2…ft.eShopWeb.PublicApi3BlazorAdmin.Interfaces4BlazorShared.Models5…ities.BasketAggregate6…ementEndpoints.Models7…azorShared.Interfaces8…cationCore.Interfaces9BlazorAdmin.Services10…licationCore.Entities11…frastructure.Identity12BlazorAdmin.Helpers13…tities.BuyerAggregate14…tities.OrderAggregate15…blicApi.AuthEndpoints16…CatalogBrandEndpoints17….CatalogItemEndpoints18….CatalogTypeEndpoints19…leManagementEndpoints20…erManagementEndpoints21…opWeb.Web.Controllers22…Pages.CatalogItemPage23…rAdmin.Pages.RolePage24…rAdmin.Pages.UserPage25…OrderAggregate.Events26…licationCore.Services27…b.Infrastructure.Data28…structure.Data.Config29….PublicApi.Extensions30…hopWeb.Web.ViewModels31…derAggregate.Handlers32…tructure.Data.Queries33…Web.Features.MyOrders34…Features.OrderDetails35…pWeb.Web.Pages.Basket36Mediator.Internals37…hopWeb.Web.Interfaces38Mediator39…eShopWeb.Web.Services40122122121112226531212122111119951118110393232111111127122262232111111111111115111212111611112111275422+41 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 74% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 86% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 68% · Strong

At a glance — Readiness · 70% · Adequate · gated by P3

At a glance — Security · 77% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 49% · Adequate · gated by DM2

At a glance — Accessibility · 34% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration16High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection12High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures2High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components2High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by adding text alternatives for all images, media, and video content to ensure screen reader compatibility. Next, ensure all interactive controls are fully keyboard-operable and that links have valid hrefs. Enforce accessibility standards by integrating automated checks into your test suite and CI pipeline to prevent regressions. Finally, improve page structure by adding language attributes, titles, and landmarks, while also addressing visual safety through focus styles, reduced motion preferences, and sufficient color contrast.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.+12.8 ptsMediumText alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+12.8 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.+12.7 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+12.5 ptsMediumPage structure
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.+12.5 ptsMediumVisual & motion safety
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.+9.1 ptsMediumForms & labels
Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.+5.8 ptsMediumAggregate boundaries
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.+5.8 ptsMediumStrongly-typed ids

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 33 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 15% mixed · 85% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml2.5MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/comment-on-pr.yml3.0MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/toc.yml3.7MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/PublicApi/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Web/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep6.1Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_113
infra/core/host/appservice.bicep6.9Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_17
src/Web/appsettings.json7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/dependabot.yml7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
src/ApplicationCore/Constants/AuthorizationConstants.cs7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
tests/FunctionalTests/PublicApi/AuthEndpoints/AuthenticateEndpoint.cs7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
tests/FunctionalTests/Web/Controllers/AccountControllerSignIn.cs7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
infra/core/security/keyvault.bicep7.9Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_109
infra/core/host/appserviceplan.bicep7.9Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_225
src/ApplicationCore/Entities/BuyerAggregate/Buyer.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/Address.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/CatalogItemOrdered.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/Order.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/OrderItem.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/Infrastructure/Data/CatalogContext.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 66 of 70 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D20D21D24D25D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 54 of 76 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc89a-eb3f-7fdf-a43c-6a9ce743ddfb.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D24, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)src/PublicApi/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:15
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)src/BlazorShared/Models/CatalogItem.cs:79

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

13 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 37 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: CatalogItem (LCOM4 4)src/ApplicationCore/Entities/CatalogItem.cs:7

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

No mechanizable ADR was identified, so enforcement is not measured (scan coverage 100 %). Cycles found: 0.

What to do

  1. Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

102 test methods: 96 unit, 3 integration, 0 BDD, 3 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 skipped (1 with a documented reason), 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 102 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2
Skipped (documented): Cart_AddItem_ShowsExpectedTotaltests/EndToEndTests/Playwright/BasketTests.cs:9

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 69 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/BlazorAdmin/Services/HttpService.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

17 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 6800 LoC (0.5/KLoC) → score 9.0.

TodoComment · ×9src/ApplicationCore/Constants/AuthorizationConstants.cs:7
BarePragmaDisable · ×6src/ApplicationCore/Entities/BuyerAggregate/Buyer.cs:15
CommentedOutCode · ×2tests/FunctionalTests/PublicApi/AuthEndpoints/AuthenticateEndpoint.cs:1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 projects, 342 source files, 9319 hand-written lines of code (6800 production / 2519 test), plus 2557 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 44 inter-project edges (build failed).

Build did not complete in the analyzer

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 2 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 2.8/10 (frequently incomplete). 2 flagged with a specific gap.

The document is a request-only banner with no context/problem and no explicit decision; only the repository path '/decisions' is recordeddocs/decisions/2025-04-24-document-decisions.md
No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only implementation rationale is presentdocs/decisions/2025-04-25-just-the-docs-theme.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The document is a request-only banner with no context/problem and no… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 2025-04-24-document-decisions.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only implementation… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 2025-04-25-just-the-docs-theme.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Interface and implementation naming inconsistency: The interface is named with an 'I' prefix (ICatalogViewModelService) while the concrete implementation is named without the 'I' prefix (CatalogViewModelService). This is a common pattern, but the presence of both suggests a potential confusion or deviation from a strict 'I' prefix for all interfaces.
The interface ICatalogViewModelService and its implementation CatalogViewModelService are present. While this is a common pattern, the inconsistency in naming (one has 'I', the other doesn't) can be flagged if the codebase aims for strict consistency. However, this is a standard convention. Let's look for a more direct inconsistency.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 valuable / 1 redundant across 160 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsrc/Web/Configuration/ConfigureWebServices.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 conform / 0 violate across 2 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 13 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

95 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 80 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.8/10. — 95 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 80 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-keysrc/Web/appsettings.json:7detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×11.github/dependabot.yml:3detected by semgrep finding
Low: stacktrace-disclosuresrc/Web/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:63detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dotnetcore.yml (5), comment-on-pr.yml (3), toc.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with WebApplicationExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 13 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2src/PublicApi/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×13src/Web/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026src/PublicApi/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 13 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with sqlserver.bicep (4), Dockerfile (2), appservice.bicep (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 of 26 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: CatalogItemListPagedEndpoint.cs↔CreateCatalogItemEndpoint.cs 53%

Change coupling: CatalogItemListPagedEndpoint.cs ↔ CreateCatalogItemEndpoint.cssrc/PublicApi/CatalogItemEndpoints/CatalogItemListPagedEndpoint.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies (OSV).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×19) — Create.razor:31, Delete.razor:29, Details.razor:30, …
  • This interactive image has no accessible name. Add a non-empty alt (or aria-label) describing its action/destination — alt="" does not name an image button or link. — Index.cshtml:20

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — Index.cshtml:39

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×3) — Register.cshtml:14, Checkout.cshtml:78, _Layout.cshtml:7
  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — Index.cshtml:12, _Layout.cshtml:2
  • user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — Index.cshtml:15
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — ExternalLogins.cshtml:10
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — _Layout.cshtml:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — List.razor:39, NavMenu.razor:9

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • `.esh-catalog-send` sets color: #FFFFFF on background-color: #83D01B — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — catalog.component.css:55
  • `.esh-basket-checkout` sets color: #FFFFFF on background-color: #83D01B — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — basket.component.css:33
  • `.esh-basketstatus-badge` sets color: #FFFFFF on background-color: #83D01B — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — basket-status.component.css:13

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries4.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

  • `CatalogItem` references the aggregate root `CatalogType` directly (via `CatalogType`) — hold its `CatalogTypeId` instead. — CatalogItem.cs:14
  • `CatalogItem` references the aggregate root `CatalogBrand` directly (via `CatalogBrand`) — hold its `CatalogBrandId` instead. — CatalogItem.cs:16

What to do

  • Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `CatalogItem.CatalogTypeId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — CatalogItem.cs:13
  • `CatalogItem.CatalogBrandId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — CatalogItem.cs:15
  • `Basket.BuyerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Basket.cs:9
  • `BasketItem.CatalogItemId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — BasketItem.cs:10
  • `BasketItem.BasketId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — BasketItem.cs:11
  • `PaymentMethod.CardId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — PaymentMethod.cs:6
  • `Order.BuyerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Order.cs:22

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `CatalogBrand` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — CatalogBrand.cs:5
  • `CatalogType` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — CatalogType.cs:5
  • `Buyer` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Buyer.cs:7
  • `PaymentMethod` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — PaymentMethod.cs:3
  • `Order` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Order.cs:8
  • `OrderItem` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OrderItem.cs:3

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) — AuthenticateEndpoint.cs:37, Login.cshtml.cs:76, ConfigureCookieSettings.cs:14, …
  • `OnGet` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. — Logout.cshtml.cs:27
  • A test is skipped ("Intentional failure demo. Remove Skip to observe screenshot/video/trace artifacts.") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — BasketTests.cs:9

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 11 of 13 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.7 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 2) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 6/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 3 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:42
  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • `async void` can't be awaited and its exceptions crash the process instead of propagating. Return `Task` — or, where the delegate contract requires void (timer/event/callback registrations), make this a thin void shim that awaits a Task-returning inner method inside try/catch so exceptions are contained. (×2) — List.razor.cs:43, List.razor.cs:34

What to do

  • async void method: DetailsClick
X2 · Cancellation propagation5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 28/98 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×24) — CustomAuthStateProvider.cs:36, CustomAuthStateProvider.cs:50, Cookies.cs:15, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — GitHubClaimsHelper.cs:12

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — RevokeAuthenticationEvents.cs:27

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 6/8 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.7 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 26 suppression(s) across the 38516 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health74%StrongSolid.
Architecture86%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity68%StrongSolid.
Readiness70%Adequate — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security77%Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling49%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility34%Weak — gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 35 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice + CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — This is a dotnet-new template — at-rest encryption and key-vaulting are deferred to the application you build from it. Add ASP.NET Data Protection / column encryption + a key vault for your real data store when you productionise.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 event handler(s); 3 CQRS handler(s)
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X8 JS interop contract — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 16 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/comment-on-pr.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dawidd6/action-download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dawidd6/action-download-artifact/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/comment-on-pr.yml:33 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dawidd6/action-download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dawidd6/action-download-artifact/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/comment-on-pr.yml:40 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: irongut/CodeCoverageSummary@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `irongut/CodeCoverageSummary@v1.3.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/irongut/CodeCoverageSummary/commits/v1.3.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.3.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:49 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:64 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/toc.yml:13 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/toc.yml:15 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: technote-space/toc-generator@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `technote-space/toc-generator@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/technote-space/toc-generator/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.1 — AutoMapper 12.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/PublicApi/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Web/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Web/appsettings.json:7 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Warning — 42 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×13
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Web/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/PublicApi/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/toc.yml:0 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:0 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/comment-on-pr.yml:0 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_109 infra/core/security/keyvault.bicep:7 — Ensure that key vault allows firewall rules settings
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_113 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep:16 — Ensure that SQL server disables public network access
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_41 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep:99 — Ensure that the expiration date is set on all secrets
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_41 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep:107 — Ensure that the expiration date is set on all secrets
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_41 infra/core/database/sqlserver/sqlserver.bicep:115 — Ensure that the expiration date is set on all secrets
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_225 infra/core/host/appserviceplan.bicep:9 — Ensure the App Service Plan is zone redundant
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_17 infra/core/host/appservice.bicep:38 — Ensure the web app has 'Client Certificates (Incoming client certificates)' set
  • Medium IaC: CKV_AZURE_88 infra/core/host/appservice.bicep:77 — Ensure that app services use Azure Files
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×9
  • TodoComment src/ApplicationCore/Constants/AuthorizationConstants.cs:7 — // TODO: Don't use this in production — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/ApplicationCore/Constants/AuthorizationConstants.cs:10 — // TODO: Change this to an environment variable — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/BlazorAdmin/CustomAuthStateProvider.cs:15 — // TODO: Get Default Cache Duration from Config — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/PublicApi/Program.cs:49 — // TODO: Consider removing AutoMapper dependency (FastEndpoints already has its own Mapper support) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Web/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Logout.cshtml.cs:13 — //TODO : replace IMemoryCache by distributed cache if you are in multi-host scenario — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Web/Configuration/ConfigureCookieSettings.cs:13 — //TODO need to check that. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Web/Configuration/RevokeAuthenticationEvents.cs:8 — //TODO : replace IMemoryCache with a distributed cache if you are in multi-host scenario — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment tests/FunctionalTests/Web/Controllers/AccountControllerSignIn.cs:34 — // TODO: Move to a unit test — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment tests/FunctionalTests/Web/Controllers/AccountControllerSignIn.cs:35 — // TODO: Move regex to a constant in test project — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×6
  • BarePragmaDisable src/ApplicationCore/Entities/BuyerAggregate/Buyer.cs:15 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Required by Entity Framework — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/Address.cs:15 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Required by Entity Framework — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/CatalogItemOrdered.cs:22 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Required by Entity Framework — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/Order.cs:10 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Required by Entity Framework — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/OrderItem.cs:9 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Required by Entity Framework — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/Infrastructure/Data/CatalogContext.cs:11 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Required by Entity Framework — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×2
  • CommentedOutCode tests/FunctionalTests/PublicApi/AuthEndpoints/AuthenticateEndpoint.cs:1 — 8 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode tests/FunctionalTests/PublicApi/AuthEndpoints/AuthenticateEndpoint.cs:17 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults — eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: BlazorShared — BlazorShared: abstractness 0.21, instability 0.00, distance 0.79 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1107.
D20 · ADR Quality · The document is a request-only banner with no context/problem and no explicit decision; only the repository path '/decisions' is recorded · ×1
  • The document is a request-only banner with no context/problem and no explicit decision; only the repository path '/decisions' is recorded docs/decisions/2025-04-24-document-decisions.md — Replace with an actual ADR naming the problem it addresses (e.g. 'Decide on the data source strategy for eShopOnWeb') and state the decision, plus its consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only implementation rationale is present · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only implementation rationale is present docs/decisions/2025-04-25-just-the-docs-theme.md — Add a Context section explaining why a static theme was chosen over GitHub Pages or Jekyll's default (e.g. searchability, organization) and a Consequences section noting trade-offs like dependency on the just-the-docs gem
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: CatalogItemListPagedEndpoint.cs ↔ CreateCatalogItemEndpoint.cs src/PublicApi/CatalogItemEndpoints/CatalogItemListPagedEndpoint.cs — `src/PublicApi/CatalogItemEndpoints/CatalogItemListPagedEndpoint.cs` and `src/PublicApi/CatalogItemEndpoints/CreateCatalogItemEndpoint.cs` change together 53% of the time (8 of the 15 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 10 floating ref(s) across 3 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (3 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/PublicApi/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:15 — src/PublicApi/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:15-25 | src/Web/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:15-25 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/PublicApi/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:15` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/BlazorShared/Models/CatalogItem.cs:79 — src/BlazorShared/Models/CatalogItem.cs:79-85 | src/PublicApi/ImageValidators.cs:16-22 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BlazorShared/Models/CatalogItem.cs:79` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: CatalogItem (LCOM4 4) src/ApplicationCore/Entities/CatalogItem.cs:7 — CatalogItem's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository did not build in our analyzer environment (a C#/MSBuild compiler error), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. We did not read WHERE the failing diagnostic is, so this does not claim the fault is in your test code — a repository written for an older SDK band can compile for you and not for us. Run `dotnet build` on this commit; if it succeeds, the gap is ours. Committing the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces also lets us measure real coverage without building anything.
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test runner surfaced no tests · ×1
  • Test runner surfaced no tests — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 102 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 2 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/BlazorAdmin/Services/HttpService.cs, src/Web/Areas/Identity/Helpers/GitHubClaimsHelper.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Interface and implementation naming inconsistency · ×1
  • Interface and implementation naming inconsistency: The interface is named with an 'I' prefix (ICatalogViewModelService) while the concrete implementation is named without the 'I' prefix (CatalogViewModelService). This is a common pattern, but the presence of both suggests a potential confusion or deviation from a strict 'I' prefix for all interfaces. — Ensure all interfaces are consistently prefixed with 'I' and all implementations do not use the 'I' prefix, or adopt a consistent naming convention for both. (symbols: Microsoft.eShopWeb.Web.Services.CatalogViewModelService, Microsoft.eShopWeb.Web.Services.ICatalogViewModelService)
D21 · Naming Consistency · The interface ICatalogViewModelService and its implementation CatalogViewModelService are present. While this is a common pattern, the inconsistency in naming (one has 'I', the other doesn't) can be flagged if the codebase aims for strict consistency. However, this is a standard convention. Let's look for a more direct inconsistency. · ×1
  • The interface ICatalogViewModelService and its implementation CatalogViewModelService are present. While this is a common pattern, the inconsistency in naming (one has 'I', the other doesn't) can be flagged if the codebase aims for strict consistency. However, this is a standard convention. Let's look for a more direct inconsistency. — N/A (symbols: Microsoft.eShopWeb.Web.Services.CatalogViewModelService, Microsoft.eShopWeb.Web.Services.ICatalogViewModelService)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 6800 LoC across 13 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment src/Web/Configuration/ConfigureWebServices.cs:11 — "Add Mediator support for the services" — trim - AddWebServices already names this
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×1
  • Low: stacktrace-disclosure src/Web/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions.cs:63 — Stacktrace information is displayed in a non-Development environment. Accidentally disclosing sensitive stack trace information in a production environment aids an attacker in reconnaissance and information gathering. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/PublicApi/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 8 of 26 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: src/eShopWeb.AspireServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs, src/Web/Services/CatalogViewModelService.cs, src/Web/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Login.cshtml.cs (and 5 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 5 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — IntegrationTests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — UnitTests references NSubstitute.
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped (documented) · ×1
  • Skipped (documented): Cart_AddItem_ShowsExpectedTotal tests/EndToEndTests/Playwright/BasketTests.cs:9 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Intentional failure demo. Remove Skip to observe screenshot/video/trace artifacts.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build did not complete in the analyzer · ×1
  • Build did not complete in the analyzer — `dotnet build` reported 6 error(s) but no C# compiler diagnostic, so this is a build-environment gap rather than a code defect. The usual causes are a project that targets a platform this run cannot build (a Windows-only target framework on a Linux worker) or a build step that shells out to a tool the image does not carry. Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped. Semantic analysis is independent of this build and covers every project that loaded — but a project whose restore did not complete has no resolved references, so treat its results as absent rather than clean. Worth checking on your side too: a build that needs undeclared host tooling, or that cannot run off its own platform, is the same wall a new contributor hits.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .12artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list eShopOnWeb.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json2artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .16artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc89a-eb3f-7fdf-a43c-6a9ce743ddfb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 19 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 13 field(s)
  • User.Email src/BlazorAdmin/Models/User.cs:16
  • User.EmailConfirmed src/BlazorAdmin/Models/User.cs:17
  • UserDto.Email src/PublicApi/UserManagementEndpoints/UserDto.cs:9
  • UserDto.EmailConfirmed src/PublicApi/UserManagementEndpoints/UserDto.cs:10
  • InputModel.Email src/Web/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Login.cshtml.cs:41
  • RegisterModel._emailSender src/Web/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Register.cshtml.cs:19
  • InputModel.Email src/Web/Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/Register.cshtml.cs:43
  • ManageController._emailSender src/Web/Controllers/ManageController.cs:23
  • LoginViewModel.Email src/Web/ViewModels/Account/LoginViewModel.cs:9
  • RegisterViewModel.Email src/Web/ViewModels/Account/RegisterViewModel.cs:10
  • ResetPasswordViewModel.Email src/Web/ViewModels/Account/ResetPasswordViewModel.cs:9
  • IndexViewModel.IsEmailConfirmed src/Web/ViewModels/Manage/IndexViewModel.cs:9
  • IndexViewModel.Email src/Web/ViewModels/Manage/IndexViewModel.cs:13
Phone — 5 field(s)
  • User.PhoneNumber src/BlazorAdmin/Models/User.cs:18
  • User.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/BlazorAdmin/Models/User.cs:19
  • UserDto.PhoneNumber src/PublicApi/UserManagementEndpoints/UserDto.cs:11
  • UserDto.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/PublicApi/UserManagementEndpoints/UserDto.cs:12
  • IndexViewModel.PhoneNumber src/Web/ViewModels/Manage/IndexViewModel.cs:17
Address — 1 field(s)
  • Address.ZipCode src/ApplicationCore/Entities/OrderAggregate/Address.cs:13

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md