Public report — QuickStart, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 17:58 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Njabulo240/QuickStart

34% Provisional

Small · 2,378 LoC · 10 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (18%)

Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

59/63dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
64findings with an exact file:lineof 97 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
63/114dimensions across the health lenses2378 LoC · 10 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

Njabulo240/QuickStart carries serious risk (34%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (91%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (18%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (39%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Small (~2,378 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 18% · 46% weightSecurity 39% · 25% weightAccessibility 46% · 14% weightMaturity 46% · 8% weightCode Health 62% · 4% weightArchitecture 91% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 18 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 34 → ~47.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 9%Plumbing 91%
New since the last scan (33+)

33 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D22 · Inconsistent naming for 'get all' operations. One uses 'GetAccountsAync' (typo in Async) while the other uses 'GetAllCustomersAsync'.
  • D22 · Inconsistent naming for delete operations. One uses 'Delete...ForCustomer' while the other uses 'Delete...Async' directly.
  • D22 · Inconsistent naming for single-item retrieval. RoleService uses 'GetRoleById' while UserService uses 'GetUserById'.
  • D22 · Inconsistent method signatures for single-item retrieval. AccountService requires both customerId and id, while CustomerService only requires customerId (implying the current user's context or a different routing strategy).
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/add-account/add-account.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/update-customer/update-customer.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/roles/add-role/add-role.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 3 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/shared/modals/confirm-delete/confirm-delete.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/authentication/forgot-password/forgot-password.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/add-customer/add-customer.component.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/lists.component.ts
  • R4 · Test Coverage
  • R8 · Unused dependency '@fortawesome/fontawesome-free'
  • R8 · Unused dependency '@microsoft/signalr'
  • R8 · Unused dependency 'file-saver'
  • C2 · No authorization

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €500–€2,400
Cost to rebuild€500–€2,400 (0.1 person-years (8–25 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityLow — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 34% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 55% boilerplate · 36% straight-line · 9% branching logic
Dead frontend code~30 LoC unreachable (2 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,400 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 18% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×0.9) — service/app, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+12.8 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+12.8 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
+14.0 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 18%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,378 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 18%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Contracts Contracts Entities Entities Contracts->Entities EmailService EmailService LoggerService LoggerService LoggerService->Contracts QuickStart QuickStart QuickStart->LoggerService QuickStart.Presentation Presentation QuickStart->QuickStart.Presentation Repository Repository QuickStart->Repository Service Service QuickStart->Service Service.Contracts Contracts QuickStart.Presentation->Service.Contracts Repository->Contracts Repository->Entities Service->Contracts Service->EmailService Service->Service.Contracts Shared Shared Service.Contracts->Shared

Architecture — module dependency matrix

31 modules, 42 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

(global)EmailServiceEntities.ErrorModelEntities.ExceptionsEntities.IdentityEntities.ModelsQuickStart.Migrations…ickStart.Presentation…ntation.ActionFilters…ansferObjects.Account…nsferObjects.AuditLog…bjects.Authentication…nsferObjects.Customer…aTransferObjects.User…nsferObjects.UserRole…74feea9b604bdb993dac1Contracts…es.Exceptions.Account…ptions.Authentication…s.Exceptions.Customer…ceptions.Notification…ository.ConfigurationService.ContractsService.JwtFeaturesLoggerServiceQuickStart…sentation.ControllersRepositoryService…kStart.ContextFactoryQuickStart.Extensions(global)1EmailService2Entities.ErrorModel3Entities.Exceptions4Entities.Identity5Entities.Models6QuickStart.Migrations7…ickStart.Presentation8…ntation.ActionFilters9…ansferObjects.Account10…nsferObjects.AuditLog11…bjects.Authentication12…nsferObjects.Customer13…aTransferObjects.User14…nsferObjects.UserRole15…74feea9b604bdb993dac116Contracts17…es.Exceptions.Account18…ptions.Authentication19…s.Exceptions.Customer20…ceptions.Notification21…ository.Configuration22Service.Contracts23Service.JwtFeatures24LoggerService25QuickStart26…sentation.Controllers27Repository28Service29…kStart.ContextFactory30QuickStart.Extensions3131511223383231111216212616825233832311132111

At a glance — Code Health · 62% · Adequate · gated by X4

At a glance — Architecture · 91% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 46% · Weak · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 18% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 39% · Weak · gated by D30, D38, C2

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 46% · Weak · gated by AC2, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components63High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a CI workflow to build the project and run the test suite on every push or pull request. Next, integrate security and performance tooling, such as CodeQL or semgrep, into this pipeline to ensure security regressions fail the build. Then, increase test coverage by adding tests for all unreached production modules. Finally, configure eslint and TypeScript type-checking as package scripts and enforce them in CI to maintain code quality.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+12.8 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+12.8 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+14.0 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+14.0 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+14.0 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+13.5 ptsMediumTooling
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+12.5 ptsMediumObservability
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.+10.6 ptsMediumDependency Freshness

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 7% slop · 6% mixed · 87% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
QuickStartUI/package-lock.json0.2SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
QuickStartUI/.npmrc7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age
QuickStart/QuickStart/QuickStart.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: QuickStart
QuickStart/Contracts/Contracts.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Contracts
QuickStart/Entities/Entities.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Entities
QuickStart/LoggerService/LoggerService.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: LoggerService
QuickStart/QuickStart.Presentation/QuickStart.Presentation.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: QuickStart.Presentation
QuickStart/Repository/Repository.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Repository
QuickStart/Service/Service.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Service
QuickStart/Service.Contracts/Service.Contracts.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Service.Contracts
QuickStart/Shared/Shared.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Shared
QuickStart/EmailService/EmailService.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: EmailService
QuickStart/EmailService/EmailSender.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
QuickStart/QuickStart.Presentation/Controllers/RoleController.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
QuickStart/Service.Contracts/IAuditService.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 63 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses
D5D8D9D13D14D15D17D19D21D22D24D26D28D29D30D33D35D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6C1C2C3C5DM6GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 97 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8c7-3311-7ccd-a074-60d79f050e6e.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — absence of evidence here means the scan found no in-repo trace, not that the control does not exist.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D22, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D5 · Coupling8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Shared · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 11 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2378 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Matech QuickStart's README is a strong, well-written marketing document that describes the project purpose, architecture outline, installation options, and an initial deployment flow. It gives a clear mission statement ('empower developers with a comprehensive...foundation for building robust web applications') and a live demo link. However, it is a single README file (not a dedicated docs directory), so most of its content is contained in the one document rather than structured documentation; this makes it a thin README rather than a real documentation set. The visible portion is mostly marketing copy with an outline that promises many topics but none are shown or referenced in detail.

Low XML-doc coverage: QuickStart · ×10QuickStart/QuickStart/QuickStart.csproj
The README contains only one file, so most of the project's architecture, contracts, and service references (e.g. Repository, EmailService) are not documented anywhere else.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with QuickStart.csproj, Contracts.csproj, Entities.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The README contains only one file, so most of the project's… finding(s) in Documentation Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix in method names. Some methods use the standard 'Async' suffix (e.g., GetCustomerAsync), while others use the misspelled 'Aync' (e.g., GetAccountsAync).
Inconsistent naming for update operations. Some methods use 'Update' (e.g., UpdateCustomerAsync), while others use 'Update...For...Async' (e.g., UpdateAccountForCustomerAsync).
Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix for asynchronous methods. Some methods correctly use 'Async' (e.g., CreateCustomerAsync, GetAuditLogsAsync), while others do not (e.g., CreateRole).

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix in method names. Some methods use the… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for update operations. Some methods use 'Update'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix for asynchronous methods. Some… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 API inconsistencies across 7 exposed types.

Inconsistent naming for 'get all' operations. One uses 'GetAccountsAync' (typo in Async) while the other uses 'GetAllCustomersAsync'.
Inconsistent naming for delete operations. One uses 'Delete...ForCustomer' while the other uses 'Delete...Async' directly.
Inconsistent naming for single-item retrieval. RoleService uses 'GetRoleById' while UserService uses 'GetUserById'.
Inconsistent method signatures for single-item retrieval. AccountService requires both customerId and id, while CustomerService only requires customerId (implying the current user's context or a different routing strategy).

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for 'get all' operations. One uses 'GetAccountsAync'… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for delete operations. One uses… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for single-item retrieval. RoleService uses… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 valuable / 3 redundant across 5 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×3QuickStart/EmailService/EmailSender.cs:75

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with EmailSender.cs, RoleController.cs, IAuditService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: npm-missing-minimum-release-ageQuickStartUI/.npmrc:1detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with .npmrc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities3.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.0 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 · ×4detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

66 finding(s): 3 critical, 39 high, 16 medium, 8 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×38QuickStartUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3QuickStartUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]QuickStartUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6QuickStartUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2QuickStartUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 38 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (38). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. — header.component.html:18

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×21) — change-defualt-password.component.html:19, change-defualt-password.component.html:28, change-password.component.html:17, …
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×4) — forgot-password.component.html:22, add-customer.component.html:22, lists.component.html:14, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×5) — header.component.html:39, nav-item.component.html:4, change-defualt-password.component.html:7, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
C3 · Audit Trail10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

C5 · Data-Subject Rights4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether GDPR data-subject requests are supported in code — erasure, export/portability, consent.

Method: Roslyn scan: GDPR data-subject-rights corroboration (erasure/export/consent vocabulary co-occurring with subject-id store crossing or explicit GDPR pattern). Deterministic, gated by PII.

  • Corroborated rights: erasure ✓ · export ✗ · consent ✗. The missing right(s) would have to be fulfilled manually.

What to do

  • Implement data export/portability for a data subject (a machine-readable export of their personal data).
  • Track GDPR consent (lawful basis) alongside the personal data it authorises.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — RoleController.cs:19, RepositoryContext.cs:61

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
  • No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
  • Only 2/10 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 4/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 7, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:47 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:71 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — dashboard.component.ts:47
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/add-account/add-account.component.ts:68 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/add-customer/add-customer.component.ts:70 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — add-account.component.ts:68
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/update-customer/update-customer.component.ts:15 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/roles/update-role/update-role.component.ts:8 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — update-customer.component.ts:15
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/roles/add-role/add-role.component.ts:58 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/roles/update-role/update-role.component.ts:64 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — add-role.component.ts:58
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/shared/modals/confirm-delete/confirm-delete.component.ts:1 · QuickStartUI/src/app/shared/modals/error/error.component.ts:1 · QuickStartUI/src/app/shared/modals/success/success.component.ts:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — confirm-delete.component.ts:1
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/authentication/forgot-password/forgot-password.component.ts:51 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/authentication/reset-password/reset-password.component.ts:67 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — forgot-password.component.ts:51
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/add-customer/add-customer.component.ts:14 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/roles/add-role/add-role.component.ts:14 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — add-customer.component.ts:14
  • QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/lists/lists.component.ts:106 · QuickStartUI/src/app/pages/ui-components/users/users.component.ts:78 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — lists.component.ts:106

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • 0% of 54 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 3 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×2) — error.interceptor.ts, chat-message.ts

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in QuickStartUI/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 1/37 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AuditLogMiddleware.cs:45, AuditLogMiddleware.cs:68, SeedingUsers.cs:8, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×2) — ExceptionMiddlewareExtensions.cs:22, GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:32

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 9/10 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 1 suppression(s) across the 17443 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health62%Adequate — gated by X4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture91%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity46%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness18%Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security39%Weak — gated by D30, D38, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility46%Weak — gated by AC2, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 51 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .ts, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by navigability analysis, so tracing effort was not assessed — whatever else resolved (another language's projects) is not this repository's navigability. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .ts, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 53 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×38
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @angular/common 17.3.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 20.3.25. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/common 17.3.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 17.3.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler 17.3.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.20. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/compiler 17.3.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 17.3.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @angular/core 17.3.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.20. This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/core 17.3.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 17.3.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.24.1: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — body-parser 1.20.2: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — engine.io 6.4.1: [GHSA redacted] — engine.io is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin engine.io to 6.6.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against engine.io 6.4.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.6.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against engine.io 6.4.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — glob 10.3.12: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — immutable 4.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 4.3.9 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against immutable 4.3.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 4.3.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — launch-editor 2.6.1: [GHSA redacted] — launch-editor is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin launch-editor to 2.9.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against launch-editor 2.6.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.14.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.14.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against launch-editor 2.6.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — minimatch 9.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — node-forge 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — node-forge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin node-forge to 1.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against node-forge 1.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against node-forge 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.1.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — picomatch 4.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 4.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — piscina 4.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — piscina is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin piscina to 4.9.3 with an `overrides` entry).
  • + 13 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×9
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 12.0.0 — AutoMapper 12.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.1.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 5.1.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MimeKit 3.2.0 — MimeKit 3.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 6.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs 6.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0 — System.Text.Json 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0 — System.Text.Json 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — shell-quote 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — tar 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tar 6.2.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×1
  • High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age QuickStartUI/.npmrc:1 — This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — serialize-javascript 6.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 29 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · Low XML-doc coverage · ×10
  • Low XML-doc coverage: QuickStart QuickStart/QuickStart/QuickStart.csproj — QuickStart: 4 % XML-doc coverage (1/26).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Contracts QuickStart/Contracts/Contracts.csproj — Contracts: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Entities QuickStart/Entities/Entities.csproj — Entities: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/49).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: LoggerService QuickStart/LoggerService/LoggerService.csproj — LoggerService: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: QuickStart.Presentation QuickStart/QuickStart.Presentation/QuickStart.Presentation.csproj — QuickStart.Presentation: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/47).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Repository QuickStart/Repository/Repository.csproj — Repository: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/39).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Service QuickStart/Service/Service.csproj — Service: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/47).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Service.Contracts QuickStart/Service.Contracts/Service.Contracts.csproj — Service.Contracts: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Shared QuickStart/Shared/Shared.csproj — Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/99).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: EmailService QuickStart/EmailService/EmailService.csproj — EmailService: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/17).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×6
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @babel/helpers 7.24.4: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @babel/runtime 7.24.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/runtime is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/runtime to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — @sigstore/core 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @sigstore/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.2.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.1.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.1.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — ajv 8.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — follow-redirects 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.15.6 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against follow-redirects 1.15.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against follow-redirects 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×4
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.7.0 — Azure.Identity 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MailKit 3.2.0 — MailKit 3.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MimeKit 3.2.0 — MimeKit 3.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: Shared — Shared: abstractness 0.07, instability 0.00, distance 0.93 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
  • Off the main sequence: Entities — Entities: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 5 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: EmailService — EmailService: abstractness 0.25, instability 0.00, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×2
  • Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — esbuild 0.19.12: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.25.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] QuickStartUI/package-lock.json — esbuild 0.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.25.0 with an `overrides` entry).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming for 'get all' operations. One uses 'GetAccountsAync' (typo in Async) while the other uses 'GetAllCustomersAsync'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for 'get all' operations. One uses 'GetAccountsAync' (typo in Async) while the other uses 'GetAllCustomersAsync'. — Rename 'GetAccountsAync' to 'GetAllAccountsAsync' to match the 'GetAll...' pattern used by CustomerService. (signatures: Task<IEnumerable<AccountDto>> IAccountService.GetAccountsAync | Task<IEnumerable<CustomerDto>> ICustomerService.GetAllCustomersAsync)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming for delete operations. One uses 'Delete...ForCustomer' while the other uses 'Delete...Async' directly. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for delete operations. One uses 'Delete...ForCustomer' while the other uses 'Delete...Async' directly. — Standardize on 'Delete' followed by the resource name, e.g., 'DeleteAccountAsync' and 'DeleteCustomerAsync', removing the redundant 'ForCustomer' qualifier. (signatures: Task IAccountService.DeleteAccountForCustomerAsync | Task ICustomerService.DeleteCustomerAsync)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming for single-item retrieval. RoleService uses 'GetRoleById' while UserService uses 'GetUserById'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for single-item retrieval. RoleService uses 'GetRoleById' while UserService uses 'GetUserById'. — Standardize on 'GetById' or 'GetBy...' pattern. Since 'GetAll' is used elsewhere, 'GetById' is acceptable, but ensure all services use 'GetById' for single item lookups. (signatures: Task<UserRoleDto> IRoleService.GetRoleById(string roleId) | Task<UserDto> IUserService.GetUserById(string userId))
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent method signatures for single-item retrieval. AccountService requires both customerId and id, while CustomerService only requires customerId (implying the current user's context or a different routing strategy). · ×1
  • Inconsistent method signatures for single-item retrieval. AccountService requires both customerId and id, while CustomerService only requires customerId (implying the current user's context or a different routing strategy). — Align the signature. If the route is /customers/{id}, use GetCustomerAsync(id). If it's /customers/{customerId}/accounts/{id}, keep the current signature but ensure consistency with other services regarding context parameters. (signatures: Task<AccountDto> IAccountService.GetAccountAsync(Guid customerId, Guid id, bool trackChanges) | Task<CustomerDto> ICustomerService.GetCustomerAsync(Guid customerId, bool trackChanges))
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×3
  • redundant comment QuickStart/EmailService/EmailSender.cs:75 — "log an error message or throw an exception, or both." — delete - the 'or both' is already obvious from the code; the comment restates a decision that reads like boilerplate.
  • redundant comment QuickStart/QuickStart.Presentation/Controllers/RoleController.cs:19 — "throw new Exception("Exception");" — delete - the exception type and message are self-evident, and this line would be flagged as 'throw new Exception(...)' by a naming/structure check.
  • redundant comment QuickStart/Service.Contracts/IAuditService.cs:9 — "analysis" — delete - restates the Task keyword; no WHY behind it.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 29 commit(s) sampled).
D19 · Documentation Quality · The README contains only one file, so most of the project's architecture, contracts, and service references (e.g. Repository, EmailService) are not documented anywhere else. · ×1
  • The README contains only one file, so most of the project's architecture, contracts, and service references (e.g. Repository, EmailService) are not documented anywhere else. — Create a dedicated documentation directory for each major subsystem (Architecture/Docs markdown files), covering their purpose, interfaces, and usage.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix in method names. Some methods use the standard 'Async' suffix (e.g., GetCustomerAsync), while others use the misspelled 'Aync' (e.g., GetAccountsAync). · ×1
  • Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix in method names. Some methods use the standard 'Async' suffix (e.g., GetCustomerAsync), while others use the misspelled 'Aync' (e.g., GetAccountsAync). — Rename 'GetAccountsAync' to 'GetAccountsAsync' to match the standard asynchronous method naming convention used elsewhere in the codebase. (symbols: Service.AccountService.GetAccountsAync, Service.CustomerService.GetCustomerAsync, Service.AuditService.GetAuditLogsAsync, Service.CustomerService.GetAllCustomersAsync, Service.AccountService.GetAccountAsync)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for update operations. Some methods use 'Update' (e.g., UpdateCustomerAsync), while others use 'Update...For...Async' (e.g., UpdateAccountForCustomerAsync). · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for update operations. Some methods use 'Update' (e.g., UpdateCustomerAsync), while others use 'Update...For...Async' (e.g., UpdateAccountForCustomerAsync). — Standardize the naming pattern for update methods. Either use 'Update[Entity]Async' or 'Update[Entity]For[Context]Async' consistently across all services. (symbols: Service.CustomerService.UpdateCustomerAsync, Service.AccountService.UpdateAccountForCustomerAsync, Service.CustomerService.UpdateCustomerAsync)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix for asynchronous methods. Some methods correctly use 'Async' (e.g., CreateCustomerAsync, GetAuditLogsAsync), while others do not (e.g., CreateRole). · ×1
  • Inconsistent use of 'Async' suffix for asynchronous methods. Some methods correctly use 'Async' (e.g., CreateCustomerAsync, GetAuditLogsAsync), while others do not (e.g., CreateRole). — Rename 'CreateRole' to 'CreateRoleAsync' to maintain consistency with other asynchronous service methods. (symbols: Service.CustomerService.CreateCustomerAsync, Service.RoleService.CreateRole, Service.AuditService.GetAuditLogsAsync)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 2378 LoC across 10 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (29 commit(s) sampled).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (Vitest, Jest, Mocha, or the runtime's built-in runner (`node --test`, `bun test`, `deno test`)), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 3 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read — This repository has NuGet-managed production source (.cs), whose `<PackageReference>` dependencies are exactly what this dimension assesses — but `dotnet list package` returned no packages, so there was nothing to assess. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED. This is a gap in the analysis run (restore or project-load failed), not a verdict about this repository. Dependencies declared for the other ecosystems present here (.ts) are not read yet either.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.
D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list QuickStart/QuickStart.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json13artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .66artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc8c7-3311-7ccd-a074-60d79f050e6e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 28 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 14 field(s)
  • User.FirstName QuickStart/Entities/Identity/User.cs:7
  • User.LastName QuickStart/Entities/Identity/User.cs:8
  • Customer.FirstName QuickStart/Entities/Models/Customer.cs:12
  • Customer.LastName QuickStart/Entities/Models/Customer.cs:14
  • UserForRegistrationDto.FirstName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/UserForRegistrationDto.cs:7
  • UserForRegistrationDto.LastName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/UserForRegistrationDto.cs:8
  • CustomerDto.FirstName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Customer/CustomerDto.cs:6
  • CustomerDto.LastName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Customer/CustomerDto.cs:7
  • CustomerForManipulationDto.FirstName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Customer/CustomerForManipulationDto.cs:5
  • CustomerForManipulationDto.LastName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Customer/CustomerForManipulationDto.cs:6
  • UserDto.FirstName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserDto.cs:7
  • UserDto.LastName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserDto.cs:8
  • UserForUpdateDto.FirstName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserForUpdateDto.cs:6
  • UserForUpdateDto.LastName QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserForUpdateDto.cs:7
Email — 11 field(s)
  • EmailSender._emailConfig QuickStart/EmailService/EmailSender.cs:12
  • AuditLog.UserEmail QuickStart/Entities/Models/AuditLog.cs:6
  • AuthenticationService._emailSender QuickStart/Service/AuthenticationService.cs:23
  • ChangePasswordDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/ChangePasswordDto.cs:11
  • EmailConfirmationRequestDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/EmailConfirmationRequestDto.cs:5
  • ForgotPasswordDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/ForgotPasswordDto.cs:10
  • ResetPasswordDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/ResetPasswordDto.cs:11
  • UserForRegistrationDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Authentication/UserForRegistrationDto.cs:12
  • UserDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserDto.cs:9
  • UserDto.EmailConfirmed QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserDto.cs:10
  • UserForUpdateDto.Email QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/User/UserForUpdateDto.cs:8
Date of birth — 3 field(s)
  • Customer.DateOfBirth QuickStart/Entities/Models/Customer.cs:16
  • CustomerDto.DateOfBirth QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Customer/CustomerDto.cs:8
  • CustomerForManipulationDto.DateOfBirth QuickStart/Shared/DataTransferObjects/Customer/CustomerForManipulationDto.cs:7

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md