Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
OKTAYKIR/EventFlow.Example is sound in substance but carries real gaps (61%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (99%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (49%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (68%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene (Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: Hobby (~608 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
74%
Adequate · gated by X1
Architecture
99% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
68%
Strong
Readiness
49%
Adequate · gated by P3
Security
69%
Strong
Performance
71%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 49% · 46% weightMaturity 68% · 25% weightSecurity 69% · 14% weightPerformance 71% · 8% weightCode Health 74% · 4% weightArchitecture 99% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 49 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 61 → ~70.
Code composition — where the lines go
Plumbing 81%Tests 19%
New since the last scan (6+)
- D8 · Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml
- D30 · Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €200–€960
| Cost to rebuild | €200–€960 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 61% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 62% boilerplate · 38% straight-line · 0% branching logic |
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
2
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
3
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
9.9
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
9.1
D39 · .NET / C#
IL Efficiency
10.0
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X2 · Repo
Cancellation propagation
7.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
8.6
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 9 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, integrate a security scanning step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on regressions, ensuring code quality and safety standards are enforced automatically. Next, document recovery time and objectives alongside a tested restore procedure to establish a robust disaster recovery strategy. Then, address the four deprecated dependencies to improve hygiene and resolve the two vulnerable dependencies to mitigate risk. Finally, implement an approval gate for production deployments to ensure proper review before promotion.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +10.0 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +8.9 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +10.5 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +10.5 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +8.9 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 1 The README mentions Docker compose but does not link to it and no build… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. | +1.3 pts | Low | Documentation Quality |
| Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with ExampleAggregate.cs, ExampleCommand.cs. | +1.2 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dotnetcore.yml (4). | +1.0 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/Sagas/SagaLocator.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The README mentions Docker compose but does not link to it and no build status or PRs welcome badge is shown. |
| EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/ExampleAggregate.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
| EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/Commands/ExampleCommand.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
| EventFlow.Example/PublishCommand.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 42 of 45 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D35D39AX10AX3AX5AX8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5PF1PF2PF3X1X2X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 11 of 50 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
3 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D9 · Test Distribution
2 test methods: 2 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 2 tests.
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
16 outdated, 2 vulnerable, 4 deprecated packages.
Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App
Deprecated: EventStore.Client
Outdated: Autofac
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 14 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 608 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.
TodoCommentEventFlow.Example/Aggregates/Sagas/SagaLocator.cs:14
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D18 · Solution Shape
3 projects, 26 source files, 755 hand-written lines of code (608 production / 147 test), 3 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The single README for the EventFlow.Example project is a decent landing page with branding and an architecture diagram plus a Configuration example. It names all six concepts in the outline (Aggregates, Command bus and commands, Synchronous subscriber, Event store, In-memory read model, Snapshots) and begins documenting them before being cut by the scanner, so those sections are present but not shown. The README is thin on any deeper architecture or configuration guidance beyond the one-line docker-compose link; it does not yet cover the outlined docs paths (stack, contributing, license).
The README mentions Docker compose but does not link to it and no build status or PRs welcome badge is shown.README.md
XML-doc coverage: EventFlow.Example EventFlow.Example/EventFlow.Example.csproj
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The README mentions Docker compose but does not link to it and no build… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
2 naming inconsistencies across 129 sampled symbols.
Typo in the class name 'ExampleSnaphost' (missing 's' in 'Snapshot'). This typo is consistently applied to the type and its members, but the name itself is misspelled.
Typo in method name 'SetMagicNumer' (missing 'b' in 'Number').
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Typo in the class name 'ExampleSnaphost' (missing 's' in 'Snapshot').… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Typo in method name 'SetMagicNumer' (missing 'b' in 'Number'). finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D24 · Comment Value
10 valuable / 1 redundant across 38 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.
misleading comment EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/ExampleAggregate.cs:15
redundant commentEventFlow.Example/PublishCommand.cs:107
What to do
- Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with ExampleAggregate.cs, ExampleCommand.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with PublishCommand.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 3 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
97 % of calls cross a namespace and 22 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
- Improve Navigability — currently 8.6/10. — 97 % of calls cross a namespace and 22 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:22
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dotnetcore.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
9 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 3 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0
Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0
What to do
- Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D39 · IL Efficiency
0 of 2 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX8 · Test isolation
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×10) — ExampleAggregate.cs:24, PublishCommand.cs:70, PublishCommand.cs:71, …
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 3 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
- Only 1/3 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
- No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
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PF1 · Benchmark discipline
- A BenchmarkDotNet suite exists but no [MemoryDiagnoser] — allocations (the main way a library pressures its host's GC) aren't being measured.
What to do
- Add [MemoryDiagnoser] to the benchmarks so allocation regressions are visible, not just time.
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PF2 · Allocation hygiene
- No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.
What to do
- On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
What to do
- Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
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X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. — Program.cs:7
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 1/2 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — PublishCommand.cs:44
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 74% | Adequate — gated by X1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 99% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 68% | Strong | Solid. |
| Readiness | 49% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 69% | Strong | Solid. |
| Performance | 71% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 52 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — This is a dotnet-new template — authorization is deferred to the application you build from it. Add [Authorize]/policies (or imperative guards) when you wire up real users; until then there are no real endpoints to protect.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 608 LoC the codebase is tiny and single-purpose despite three projects, so explicit boundaries are unnecessary.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 2 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 1/3 markers (2 CQRS handler(s))
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 2 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 12 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0
- High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.7.2
- High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2
- High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.10.4
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:22
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:33
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnetcore.yml:39
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Vulnerable: MongoDB.Driver
Warning — 10 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Deprecated: EventStore.Client
- Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions
- Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Deprecated: xunit
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.2.0
- Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D17 · Explicit Debt
- TodoComment EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/Sagas/SagaLocator.cs:14
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value
- misleading comment EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/ExampleAggregate.cs:15
- misleading comment EventFlow.Example/Aggregates/Commands/ExampleCommand.cs:11
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test runner surfaced no tests
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The README mentions Docker compose but does not link to it and no build status or PRs welcome badge is shown. README.md
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Typo in the class name 'ExampleSnaphost' (missing 's' in 'Snapshot'). This typo is consistently applied to the type and its members, but the name itself is misspelled.
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Typo in method name 'SetMagicNumer' (missing 'b' in 'Number').
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment EventFlow.Example/PublishCommand.cs:107
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
Info — 19 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: Autofac
- Outdated: BenchmarkDotNet
- Outdated: coverlet.collector
- Outdated: EventFlow
- Outdated: EventFlow.Autofac
- Outdated: EventFlow.MongoDB
- Outdated: EventFlow.RabbitMQ
- Outdated: EventStore.Client
- Outdated: FluentAssertions
- Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions
- Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets
- Outdated: EventFlow.EventStores.EventStore
- Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk
- Outdated: MongoDB.Driver
- Outdated: xunit
- Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: EventFlow.Example EventFlow.Example/EventFlow.Example.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: EventStore EventStore/EventStore.csproj
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list EventFlowExamples.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 9 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |