Public report — hurl, published 27 Sep 2026. Concrete security findings (which rule fired, in which file, on which line; CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are REDACTED in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Public
Codebase survey Measured under the Code Assurance Index · rubric rubric-2026.09.15 (frozen) · verify this survey Filed cd_bf39048d54274a319a45282491fa2b99 Filed 27 September 2026, 10:27 UTC Public

Orange-OpenSource/hurl

Measured 27 September 2026, 09:24 UTC

59% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary

Medium · 68,446 LoC · rebuild ~0.5 person-years · weakest lens: Accessibility (44%)

Findings by grade

20 critical 37 serious 26 minor 41 could not be resolved — could be critical — see Limitations

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
27 September 2026, 09:24 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index does not certify, approve or guarantee this codebase; it records a reproducible number and the evidence it was computed from. The standard is authored by Canine Development, who also build Watchdog — its only implementation today. That is said here so the number is checked rather than believed.

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

43/47dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
67findings with an exact file:lineof 83 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
47/128dimensions across the health lenses68446 LoC — wide & deep
Chapters

Executive summary

The system holds an adequate overall standing of 59%, indicating a workable asset that carries real risk in specific areas. While the core architecture is robust and the codebase is relatively small, the business must address significant accessibility gaps to ensure compliance and broad user reach. The value tied up in this medium-sized system is modest, with a rebuild effort estimated at roughly half a person-year and a cost of approximately €74,000. This low barrier to change means that targeted improvements can yield high returns without requiring massive investment or operational disruption.

The most critical issue is trust boundaries in user experience, where the accessibility score of 44% exposes the business to legal liability and excludes a segment of users. This weakness is not merely a technical debt but a direct business risk, as non-compliant interfaces can lead to regulatory fines and reputational damage. The operational risk concentrates here because the rest of the system is stable, making this the primary lever for reducing overall exposure.

Conversely, the system demonstrates genuine strength in its architectural foundation and production readiness. The architecture score of 96% suggests that changes ripple predictably, reducing the cost of future maintenance. Similarly, the code health and maturity levels are solid, meaning new teams can pick up the work without excessive onboarding friction. These factors provide a stable platform for addressing the identified weaknesses without destabilizing the core business logic.

To focus first, the team should prioritize declaring the document language, adding a main landmark, and ensuring proper heading structure. These actions offer the highest leverage by immediately improving screen reader compatibility and SEO. By gating these accessibility invariants in the existing test suite, the business can prevent regressions with minimal effort. This approach secures the most value for the least cost, turning a compliance liability into a manageable operational task.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Accessibility 44% · 46% weightMaturity 69% · 25% weightCode Health 71% · 14% weightSecurity 71% · 8% weightReadiness 80% · 4% weightArchitecture 96% · 2% weight

Raise Accessibility 44 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 59 → ~71.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (50+)

50 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-07) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D2 · LocalCrate.collect_dependencies (cognitive 20) bin/update_crates.py
  • D2 · markdown.parse_markdown (cognitive 19) bin/docs/markdown.py
  • D2 · PseudoTerm.run (cognitive 19) integration/term.py
  • D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 7) integration/hurl/tests_failed/assert_bytearray/assert_bytearray.py
  • D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) integration/hurl/tests_failed/runner_errors/runner_errors.py
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 6) integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurlfmt/src/format/json.rs packages/hurlfmt/src/format/json.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/ast/option.rs packages/hurl_core/src/ast/option.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/ast/visit.rs packages/hurl_core/src/ast/visit.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurlfmt/src/linter/rewrite.rs packages/hurlfmt/src/linter/rewrite.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/http/curl_cmd.rs packages/hurl/src/http/curl_cmd.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/parser/error.rs packages/hurl_core/src/parser/error.rs
  • D15 · Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/http/client.rs packages/hurl/src/http/client.rs
  • D17 · FixmeComment contrib/sample/src/main.rs
  • D22 · Redundant serialization method. Both the collection (CookieStore) and the individual element (Cookie) expose a `to_netscape` method. While the scope differs, the naming suggests similar intent. More critically, `CookieStore` has `add_cookie(netscape_str: str)` which implies parsing, but lacks a corresponding `from_netscape` or `parse_netscape` method for bulk loading, creating an asymmetry with the `Cookie` type which has `from_netscape`.
  • D22 · Inconsistent return type for plural intent. `get_all` returns a single `Header` (likely the first or last), not a collection. This is confusingly named as it implies multiple results. `get` also returns a single `Header`.
  • D22 · Inconsistent naming convention for retrieval. `cookies()` (plural) returns a single `ResponseCookie` (likely the first or a specific one), while `get_cookie(name)` (singular with arg) returns a single `ResponseCookie`. The plural `cookies()` is misleading if it doesn't return a collection.
  • D22 · Semantic ambiguity between `contains` and `includes`. In many APIs, these are synonyms. If they have distinct behaviors (e.g., one for strings, one for lists), the naming is confusing. If they are synonyms, it's redundant.
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D29 · REDACTED
  • D30 · REDACTED
  • D31 · REDACTED
  • D31 · REDACTED
  • D36 · REDACTED
  • D36 · REDACTED
  • R6 · No test script
  • AC3 · <html> without a lang packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html
  • AC3 · Data table has no header cells packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/run.html
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/source.html
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/timeline.html
  • AC5 · Invalid value "{source_selected}" for aria-selected packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html
  • AC5 · Invalid value "{timeline_selected}" for aria-selected packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html
  • AC5 · Invalid value "{run_selected}" for aria-selected packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html
  • AC7 · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €25,000–€120,000
Cost to rebuild€25,000–€120,000 (0.2–0.8 person-years (410–1,302 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 59% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.5 person-years of build effort (about ~€74,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 44% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
+13.4 pts · Medium effort · Page structure
2
Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
+13.4 pts · Medium effort · ARIA correctness
3
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
+13.4 pts · Medium effort · A11y enforcement

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.5 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 44%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.5 person-years rebuild (68,446 LoC) · weakest lens: Accessibility 44%
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

379 modules, 596 dependencies. 2 dependency cycles across 25 modules, marked above the diagonal.

Showing the 40 most-connected modules; 339 more are not drawn.

Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
depends on →1 hurl.runner.xpath2 hurl.util.path3 hurl.util.term4 hurl.http.url5 hurl_core.reader6 hurl.http.cookie_store7 hurl.pretty.json8 hurl.http.header9 hurl.runner.value10 hurl_core.ast.section11 hurl_core.input12 hurl.http.request13 hurl.runner.variable14 hurl.util.logger15 hurl.http.request_spec16 hurlfmt.linter.rewrite17 hurl_core.ast.option18 hurl.http.response19 hurl_core.ast.core20 hurlfmt.format.json21 hurl_core.types22 hurl_core.ast.json23 hurl_core.ast.primitive24 hurl.runner.error25 hurl.runner.output26 hurl.runner.query27 hurl_core.ast.visit28 hurlfmt.linter.rules29 hurl.cli.options30 hurl.http.curl_cmd31 hurl_core.format.html32 hurlfmt.format.text33 hurl.http.client34 hurl.runner.result35 hurl.runner.runner_options36 hurl.json.result37 hurl.parallel.job38 hurl.runner.entry39 hurl.runner.hurl_file40 hurl.runner.options
1 hurl.runner.xpath
2 hurl.util.path
3 hurl.util.term
4 hurl.http.url1
5 hurl_core.reader1
6 hurl.http.cookie_store11
7 hurl.pretty.json1
8 hurl.http.header1
9 hurl.runner.value2
10 hurl_core.ast.section1159622
11 hurl_core.input2
12 hurl.http.request1111
13 hurl.runner.variable2
14 hurl.util.logger111116
15 hurl.http.request_spec21311
16 hurlfmt.linter.rewrite1121111
17 hurl_core.ast.option98635
18 hurl.http.response111111
19 hurl_core.ast.core42141017617
20 hurlfmt.format.json22
21 hurl_core.types511
22 hurl_core.ast.json1261
23 hurl_core.ast.primitive116138301
24 hurl.runner.error1
25 hurl.runner.output1111
26 hurl.runner.query3112
27 hurl_core.ast.visit21923182114117
28 hurlfmt.linter.rules11212514111
29 hurl.cli.options111121
30 hurl.http.curl_cmd2211132
31 hurl_core.format.html311162171
32 hurlfmt.format.text13152171
33 hurl.http.client1221113111
34 hurl.runner.result11211211211
35 hurl.runner.runner_options2242422
36 hurl.json.result11131214
37 hurl.parallel.job111111
38 hurl.runner.entry211111111111
39 hurl.runner.hurl_file11121111121
40 hurl.runner.options111511111
Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself
hurl.runner.xpathhurl.util.pathhurl.util.termhurl.http.urlhurl_core.readerhurl.http.cookie_storehurl.pretty.jsonhurl.http.headerhurl.runner.valuehurl_core.ast.sectionhurl_core.inputhurl.http.requesthurl.runner.variablehurl.util.loggerhurl.http.request_spechurlfmt.linter.rewritehurl_core.ast.optionhurl.http.responsehurl_core.ast.corehurlfmt.format.jsonhurl_core.typeshurl_core.ast.json…rl_core.ast.primitivehurl.runner.errorhurl.runner.outputhurl.runner.queryhurl_core.ast.visithurlfmt.linter.ruleshurl.cli.optionshurl.http.curl_cmdhurl_core.format.htmlhurlfmt.format.texthurl.http.clienthurl.runner.result…runner.runner_optionshurl.json.resulthurl.parallel.jobhurl.runner.entryhurl.runner.hurl_filehurl.runner.optionshurl.runner.xpath1hurl.util.path2hurl.util.term3hurl.http.url4hurl_core.reader5hurl.http.cookie_store6hurl.pretty.json7hurl.http.header8hurl.runner.value9hurl_core.ast.section10hurl_core.input11hurl.http.request12hurl.runner.variable13hurl.util.logger14hurl.http.request_spec15hurlfmt.linter.rewrite16hurl_core.ast.option17hurl.http.response18hurl_core.ast.core19hurlfmt.format.json20hurl_core.types21hurl_core.ast.json22…rl_core.ast.primitive23hurl.runner.error24hurl.runner.output25hurl.runner.query26hurl_core.ast.visit27hurlfmt.linter.rules28hurl.cli.options29hurl.http.curl_cmd30hurl_core.format.html31hurlfmt.format.text32hurl.http.client33hurl.runner.result34…runner.runner_options35hurl.json.result36hurl.parallel.job37hurl.runner.entry38hurl.runner.hurl_file39hurl.runner.options40111111211596222111121111162131111211119863511111142141017617225111261116138301111113112219231821141171121251411111112122111323111621711315217112211131111121121121122424221113121411111121111111111111121111121111511111+339 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 71% · Adequate · gated by R1 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 96% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Maturity · 69% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 80% · Strong ·

At a glance — Security · 71% · Adequate · gated by D29 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 44% · Weak · gated by AC3, AC5 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection31High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures6High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration3High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, fix structural and ARIA issues by ensuring proper HTML landmarks, valid roles, and removing hidden focusable elements. Next, integrate accessibility checks into your existing test suite and CI pipeline to prevent regressions. Finally, establish a consistent process for documenting architectural decisions by creating dated records of significant choices and their consequences.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+13.4 ptsMediumPage structure
Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.+13.4 ptsMediumARIA correctness
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.+13.4 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+1.9 ptsLowADR Quality
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).+1.9 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.+1.5 ptsMediumType Safety
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.+0.6 ptsLowBus Factor
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+0.6 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 29 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 52% mixed · 48% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9MixedSupply-chain Provenance & Signing: REDACTED
contrib/sample/src/main.rs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: FixmeComment
bin/update_crates.py8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: LocalCrate.collect_dependencies (cognitive 20)
bin/docs/markdown.py8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: markdown.parse_markdown (cognitive 19)
integration/term.py8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: PseudoTerm.run (cognitive 19)
integration/hurl/tests_failed/assert_bytearray/assert_bytearray.py8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 7)

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 20

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 37

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 26

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 41

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 43 of 47 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 47 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D9D12D13D14D15D16D17D19D20D21D22D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D43AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX10AX9M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R5R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 67 of 83 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a0e22e-6c6a-739d-b6b0-60c994968c58.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.py, .rs) and this repository declares a Cargo test suite (repository root, 161 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its crate dependencies. Nothing was read about its Python dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (go.mod, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a REDACTED) is simply not read here yet.
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over which project references which. That is a language-neutral question, but the project-reference graph is collected from MSBuild .csproj, Gradle and Maven builds only, and this repository commits none — so there was no graph to read, and re-running the same commit reads the same nothing. Its modules are declared as: npm/pnpm/yarn packages and workspaces (package.json, pnpm-workspace.yaml, lerna.json); Cargo crates and workspaces (Cargo.toml). A reader for that graph is the collector this check is missing. That is a COLLECTOR gap in this analyzer — no change to the scan image closes it — and not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the direction each project reference points. That is a language-neutral question, but the project-reference graph is collected from MSBuild .csproj, Gradle and Maven builds only, and this repository commits none — so there was no graph to read, and re-running the same commit reads the same nothing. Its modules are declared as: npm/pnpm/yarn packages and workspaces (package.json, pnpm-workspace.yaml, lerna.json); Cargo crates and workspaces (Cargo.toml). A reader for that graph is the collector this check is missing. That is a COLLECTOR gap in this analyzer — no change to the scan image closes it — and not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AX8 Test isolation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over which projects are test projects, and what they reference. That is a language-neutral question, but the project-reference graph is collected from MSBuild .csproj, Gradle and Maven builds only, and this repository commits none — so there was no graph to read, and re-running the same commit reads the same nothing. Its modules are declared as: npm/pnpm/yarn packages and workspaces (package.json, pnpm-workspace.yaml, lerna.json); Cargo crates and workspaces (Cargo.toml). A reader for that graph is the collector this check is missing. That is a COLLECTOR gap in this analyzer — no change to the scan image closes it — and not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
  • C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
  • C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
  • C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
  • ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
  • X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D22, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.5 / 10Stronggated by 3 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was LocalCrate.collect_dependencies at 20.

LocalCrate.collect_dependencies (cognitive 20)bin/update_crates.py:168
markdown.parse_markdown (cognitive 19)bin/docs/markdown.py:245
PseudoTerm.run (cognitive 19)integration/term.py:31

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 LocalCrate.collect_dependencies (cognitive 20) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with update_crates.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 markdown.parse_markdown (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with markdown.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 PseudoTerm.run (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with term.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Stronggated by 3 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 duplicated block group(s) detected. 3 of the 3 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.

Duplicated block (6 lines × 7)integration/hurl/tests_failed/assert_bytearray/assert_bytearray.py:9
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3)integration/hurl/tests_failed/runner_errors/runner_errors.py:14
Duplicated block (9 lines × 6)integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py:9

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (6 lines × 7) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with assert_bytearray.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with runner_errors.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (9 lines × 6) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with compressed.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

801 test methods: 786 unit, 15 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 789 `#[test]` function(s) across 161 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 2 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test. The Python suite contributes 12 test function(s) across 4 file(s) declaring at least one — every `def test…` in a file pytest or unittest would collect, which is those frameworks' own definition of a case; a parametrize table counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is read from file names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 92% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. 24 of 26 direct crates were graded against crates.io (0 not published there, 2 not resolved by a committed Cargo.lock). Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from Cargo.lock there.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

REDACTED scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 159 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository's Cargo.lock closed over its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]`. Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's crate dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs (30×47=1410); packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs (3×60=180); packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs (3×49=147)

Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs · ×10packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs:104

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with option.rs (2), mod.rs, options.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is integration/hurl/tests_ok/follow_redirect/follow_redirect.py. Counted over 10 of the 176 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted task-comment markers across 68446 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

FixmeCommentcontrib/sample/src/main.rs:143

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 FixmeComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository is well documented: 24 README files (each for its own directory) plus 54 architecture/design markdown docs cover the project's scope, installation/build, usage examples, contribution guidance, and license. The root README gives an overview, install/usage/contributing, and licence; the package-level READMEs are focused on their directories but each is clearly documented for its tier. A single clipped document (e.g., a Windows chocolatey installer guide) does not invalidate any of these elements. (14 of 25 sampled documents could not be assessed: 1 of 2 evaluation groups failed.)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API ConsistencyStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 190 exposed types.

Redundant serialization method. Both the collection (CookieStore) and the individual element (Cookie) expose a `to_netscape` method. While the scope differs, the naming suggests similar intent. More critically, `CookieStore` has `add_cookie(netscape_str: str)` which implies parsing, but lacks a corresponding `from_netscape` or `parse_netscape` method for bulk loading, creating an asymmetry with the `Cookie` type which has `from_netscape`.
Inconsistent return type for plural intent. `get_all` returns a single `Header` (likely the first or last), not a collection. This is confusingly named as it implies multiple results. `get` also returns a single `Header`.
Inconsistent naming convention for retrieval. `cookies()` (plural) returns a single `ResponseCookie` (likely the first or a specific one), while `get_cookie(name)` (singular with arg) returns a single `ResponseCookie`. The plural `cookies()` is misleading if it doesn't return a collection.
Semantic ambiguity between `contains` and `includes`. In many APIs, these are synonyms. If they have distinct behaviors (e.g., one for strings, one for lists), the naming is confusing. If they are synonyms, it's redundant.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Redundant serialization method. Both the collection (CookieStore) and… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent return type for plural intent. `get_all` returns a single… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming convention for retrieval. `cookies()` (plural)… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

31 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 3 medium, 19 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `docs/assets/cast/starwars.cast` — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.5 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 10 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is integration/hurl/tests_ok/ntlm/ntlm.py. Counted over 10 of the 176 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC3 · Page structure3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html:2
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×4) — packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html:2, packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/run.html:2, packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/source.html:2, …
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html:19

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • "{source_selected}" is not a valid value for aria-selected — allowed: true, false, undefined. — packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html:4
  • "{timeline_selected}" is not a valid value for aria-selected — allowed: true, false, undefined. — packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html:5
  • "{run_selected}" is not a valid value for aria-selected — allowed: true, false, undefined. — packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html:6

What to do

  • Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
AX10 · Code composition9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 1 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.4 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are contrib/npm/hurl/archive.js, contrib/npm/hurl/bin.js, contrib/npm/hurl/hurl.js, contrib/npm/hurl/hurlfmt.js, contrib/npm/hurl/install.js.

What to do

  • Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R5 · Dependency Freshness9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

  • Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 45 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health71%Adequate — gated by R1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture96%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity69%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness80%StrongSolid.
Security71%Adequate — gated by D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility44%Weak — gated by AC3, AC5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 77 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository commits no project file of a kind this check models. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository commits no project file of a kind this check models. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository commits no project file of a kind this check models. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~1430 lines of test source are present (.py, .rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rs suite was found but not re-run
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.py, .rs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a CS/VB/GO/SCALA/SWIFT/DART class graph, and this repository's production source is .c, .py, .rs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 28 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit); 58 value object(s)
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R4 Test Coverage — the JS/TS workspace (5 production file(s)) has no JavaScript/TypeScript test, but it is 0.28% of this repository's production source and the other 99.72% carries 1,430 line(s) of test code this pass cannot read — an incidental frontend's reachability is not the repository's test posture, so it is not scored as one
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 20 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×5
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC3 · Page structure · <html> without a lang · ×1
  • <html> without a lang packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html:2 — The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid value "{source_selected}" for aria-selected · ×1
  • Invalid value "{source_selected}" for aria-selected packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html:4 — "{source_selected}" is not a valid value for aria-selected — allowed: true, false, undefined.
AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid value "{timeline_selected}" for aria-selected · ×1
  • Invalid value "{timeline_selected}" for aria-selected packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html:5 — "{timeline_selected}" is not a valid value for aria-selected — allowed: true, false, undefined.
AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid value "{run_selected}" for aria-selected · ×1
  • Invalid value "{run_selected}" for aria-selected packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/nav.html:6 — "{run_selected}" is not a valid value for aria-selected — allowed: true, false, undefined.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
Serious — 37 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×10
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs:104 — packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs changed 30 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 47 in hurl::cli::options::config_file::parse_option at line 104. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl/src/cli/options/config_file/mod.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs:43 — packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 60 in hurl::runner::options::get_entry_options at line 43. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl/src/runner/options.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs:36 — packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 49 in hurl_core::parser::option::parse at line 36. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl_core/src/parser/option.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurlfmt/src/format/json.rs packages/hurlfmt/src/format/json.rs:312 — packages/hurlfmt/src/format/json.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 48 in EntryOption::to_json at line 312. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurlfmt/src/format/json.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/ast/option.rs packages/hurl_core/src/ast/option.rs:89 — packages/hurl_core/src/ast/option.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 47 in OptionKind::identifier at line 89. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl_core/src/ast/option.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/ast/visit.rs packages/hurl_core/src/ast/visit.rs:353 — packages/hurl_core/src/ast/visit.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 47 in hurl_core::ast::visit::walk_entry_option at line 353. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl_core/src/ast/visit.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurlfmt/src/linter/rewrite.rs packages/hurlfmt/src/linter/rewrite.rs:456 — packages/hurlfmt/src/linter/rewrite.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 47 in OptionKind::lint at line 456. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurlfmt/src/linter/rewrite.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/http/curl_cmd.rs packages/hurl/src/http/curl_cmd.rs:431 — packages/hurl/src/http/curl_cmd.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 39 in ClientOptions::curl_args at line 431. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl/src/http/curl_cmd.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl_core/src/parser/error.rs packages/hurl_core/src/parser/error.rs:137 — packages/hurl_core/src/parser/error.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 35 in ParseError::fixme at line 137. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl_core/src/parser/error.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: packages/hurl/src/http/client.rs packages/hurl/src/http/client.rs:396 — packages/hurl/src/http/client.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max cyclomatic complexity 33 in Client::configure at line 396. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-06-28..2026-09-26, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-28 03:04:41 +00:00' --until='2026-09-26 03:04:41 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- packages/hurl/src/http/client.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
AC3 · Page structure · Page without a main landmark · ×4
  • Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/run.html:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/source.html:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/timeline.html:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC3 · Page structure · Data table has no header cells · ×1
  • Data table has no header cells packages/hurl/src/report/html/resources/report.html:19 — A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope).
AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
  • Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
D17 · Explicit Debt · FixmeComment · ×1
  • FixmeComment contrib/sample/src/main.rs:143 — // FIXME: Call is not public — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · LocalCrate.collect_dependencies (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • LocalCrate.collect_dependencies (cognitive 20) bin/update_crates.py:168 — LocalCrate.collect_dependencies has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (13 pts), loops 3 (7 pts) (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · markdown.parse_markdown (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • markdown.parse_markdown (cognitive 19) bin/docs/markdown.py:245 — markdown.parse_markdown has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (16 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PseudoTerm.run (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • PseudoTerm.run (cognitive 19) integration/term.py:31 — PseudoTerm.run has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (13 pts), error handling 1 (3 pts), loops 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Redundant serialization method. Both the collection (CookieStore) and the individual element (Cookie) expose a `to_netscape` method. While the scope differs, the naming suggests similar intent. More critically, `CookieStore` has `add_cookie(netscape_str · ×1
  • Redundant serialization method. Both the collection (CookieStore) and the individual element (Cookie) expose a `to_netscape` method. While the scope differs, the naming suggests similar intent. More critically, `CookieStore` has `add_cookie(netscape_str: str)` which implies parsing, but lacks a corresponding `from_netscape` or `parse_netscape` method for bulk loading, creating an asymmetry with the `Cookie` type which has `from_netscape`. — Rename `CookieStore.to_netscape` to `to_netscape_string` or `serialize_netscape` to distinguish it from the single-item serialization. Add `CookieStore.from_netscape` or `CookieStore.add_cookies` to mirror the `Cookie` parsing capability for consistency in the cookie domain. (signatures: CookieStore.to_netscape(): String | Cookie.to_netscape(): String)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent return type for plural intent. `get_all` returns a single `Header` (likely the first or last), not a collection. This is confusingly named as it implies multiple results. `get` also returns a single `Header`. · ×1
  • Inconsistent return type for plural intent. `get_all` returns a single `Header` (likely the first or last), not a collection. This is confusingly named as it implies multiple results. `get` also returns a single `Header`. — Rename `get_all` to `get_first` or `get_one` to accurately reflect that it returns a single `Header`. If multiple headers are needed, provide a method returning `Vec<Header>` or an iterator, e.g., `get_all_values` or `iter_all`. (signatures: HeaderVec.get(name: str): Header | HeaderVec.get_all(name: str): Header)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming convention for retrieval. `cookies()` (plural) returns a single `ResponseCookie` (likely the first or a specific one), while `get_cookie(name)` (singular with arg) returns a single `ResponseCookie`. The plural `cookies()` is misleading if it doesn't return a collection. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming convention for retrieval. `cookies()` (plural) returns a single `ResponseCookie` (likely the first or a specific one), while `get_cookie(name)` (singular with arg) returns a single `ResponseCookie`. The plural `cookies()` is misleading if it doesn't return a collection. — Rename `Response.cookies()` to `Response.first_cookie()` or `Response.get_cookie()` (removing the argument version if it's redundant, or keeping it as `get_cookie_by_name`). If `cookies()` is meant to return all, it should return a collection. (signatures: Response.cookies(): ResponseCookie | Response.get_cookie(name: str): ResponseCookie)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Semantic ambiguity between `contains` and `includes`. In many APIs, these are synonyms. If they have distinct behaviors (e.g., one for strings, one for lists), the naming is confusing. If they are synonyms, it's redundant. · ×1
  • Semantic ambiguity between `contains` and `includes`. In many APIs, these are synonyms. If they have distinct behaviors (e.g., one for strings, one for lists), the naming is confusing. If they are synonyms, it's redundant. — Clarify the distinction. If both apply to strings, remove one. If `includes` is for collections and `contains` for strings, rename to `contains_string` and `includes_item` or similar to avoid confusion. (signatures: Value.starts_with(other: Value): Result | Value.ends_with(other: Value): Result | Value.contains(other: Value): Result | Value.includes(other: Value): Result)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 7) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 7) integration/hurl/tests_failed/assert_bytearray/assert_bytearray.py:9 — integration/hurl/tests_failed/assert_bytearray/assert_bytearray.py:9-14 | integration/hurl/tests_failed/error_format_long/error_format_long.py:92-97 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/bytes/bytes.py:9-14 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/bytes/bytes.py:19-24 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/rawbytes/rawbytes.py:9-14 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/rawbytes/rawbytes.py:31-36 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/very_verbose/very_verbose.py:36-41 — there are 7 copies across 5 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 7 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) integration/hurl/tests_failed/runner_errors/runner_errors.py:14 — integration/hurl/tests_failed/runner_errors/runner_errors.py:14-19 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/rawbytes/rawbytes.py:19-26 | integration/hurl/tests_pty/binary_output/binary_output.py:9-16 — before extracting anything, compare `integration/hurl/tests_ok/rawbytes/rawbytes.py` and `integration/hurl/tests_pty/binary_output/binary_output.py` as WHOLE FILES: 83% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 6) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 6) integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py:9 — integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py:9-17 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py:22-30 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py:35-43 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py:59-68 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/encoding/encoding.py:9-17 | integration/hurl/tests_ok/very_verbose/very_verbose.py:46-54 — `integration/hurl/tests_ok/compressed/compressed.py` and `integration/hurl/tests_ok/encoding/encoding.py` are one unit implemented once per sibling directory, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 1 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 10 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
R1 · Type Safety · Type Safety · ×1
  • Type Safety — 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are contrib/npm/hurl/archive.js, contrib/npm/hurl/bin.js, contrib/npm/hurl/hurl.js, contrib/npm/hurl/hurlfmt.js, contrib/npm/hurl/install.js.
R6 · Tooling · No test script · ×1
  • No test script — test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
Minor — 26 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: integration/hurl/tests_ok/follow_redirect/follow_redirect.py. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 1 of 10 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 10 of the 176 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: integration/hurl/tests_ok/ntlm/ntlm.py. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-c333d88a1ab9460da5bad7df9c667f0e/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .5artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-c333d88a1ab9460da5bad7df9c667f0e/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .31artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update1artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .3artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a0e22e-6c6a-739d-b6b0-60c994968c58 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md