service-bid-platform — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

PanGan21/service-bid-platform carries serious gaps (43%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (98%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (22%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (46%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Small (~7,535 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 82% Strong Architecture 98% ★ Exemplary Maturity 46% Weak · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 22% ⚠ Critical · gated by R6, P1, P3, P5 Security 91% ★ Exemplary Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 53% Adequate · gated by AC4

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 22% · 46% weightMaturity 46% · 25% weightAccessibility 53% · 14% weightCode Health 82% · 8% weightSecurity 91% · 4% weightArchitecture 98% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 22 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 43 → ~58.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (39+)

39 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D4 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) demo/auction.go
D4 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) demo/bid.go
D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) integration-test/helper.go
D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) integration-test/helper.go
D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) demo/helper.go
D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/events/request/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go
D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/app/app.go
D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) integration-test/helper.go
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go
D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go
D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go
D35 · Change coupling: repository.go ↔ routes.go services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/repository.go
D35 · Change coupling: routes.go ↔ request.go services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go
R10 · Duplicated block (21 lines × 2 locations) clients/frontend/src/components/MyAuctions.tsx
R10 · Duplicated block (21 lines × 2 locations) clients/frontend/src/components/MyServiceRequests.tsx
R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 3 locations) clients/frontend/src/components/MyRejectedRequests.tsx
R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) clients/frontend/src/components/NewServiceRequests.tsx
R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) clients/frontend/src/components/UpdatePendingAuction.tsx

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,000–€15,000

Cost to rebuild	€3,000–€15,000 (0.1 person-years (50–159 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 43% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code	~11 LoC unreachable (1 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€9,100 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 22% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+17.6 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+17.6 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

+17.6 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 22%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (7,535 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 22%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 82% · Strong

The Good

D1 · Go Cyclomatic Complexity 9.3 D2 · Go Cognitive Complexity 9.3 D3 · Go God Classes 10.0 D4 · Go Code Duplication 8.3 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.8

The Ugly

R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 4.7

At a glance — Architecture · 98% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · Go Change Coupling 9.7 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 46% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

The Good

D15 · Go Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · Go Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.5

The Bad

M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0

The Ugly

D34 · Go Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Critical · gated by R6, P1, P3, P5

The Good

D13 · Go Secret Scanning 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 8.5

The Ugly

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 3.4

At a glance — Security · 91% · Exemplary

The Good

D28 · Go Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 7.8 D31 · Go IaC & Container Security 8.5 D33 · Go JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 53% · Adequate · gated by AC4

The Good

AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 10.0 AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 10.0 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0

The Bad

AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.2

The Ugly

AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	12	Medium
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	6	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow that builds and tests every change to ensure code quality. Next, integrate static security analysis into the build process to prevent security regressions from reaching production. Then, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure code and documentation to ensure resilience. Finally, add linting and type checking to the CI pipeline, and implement approval gates for production deployments to enforce safety and governance.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+17.6 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+17.6 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+17.6 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.	+17.0 pts	Medium	Tooling
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.	+6.7 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.	+9.1 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.	+6.9 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.	+6.8 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 29 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 66% mixed · 34% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
scripts/Dockerfile	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go	7.1	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
Dockerfile.demo	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfile.integration	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Dockerfile.service	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
demo/main.go	7.4	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: main.main (cyclomatic 28)
integration-test/helper.go	7.4	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go	7.4	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
demo/auction.go	7.5	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (20 lines × 3)
demo/bid.go	7.5	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)
services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 6)
services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 3)
services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
api-gateway/nginx.conf	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-ssl-version
services/user-service/internal/service/user.go	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-of-sha1
demo/helper.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 36 of 38 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 38 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5R1R10R2R3R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 56 of 63 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fafcc-97b3-7e83-8f89-62b98357be1c.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — evaluation did not complete — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) — excluded from the score.

Repo exclusion declarations: 6 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was main.main at 28.

main.main (cyclomatic 28)demo/main.go:12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was main.main at 27.

main.main (cognitive 27)demo/main.go:12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

33 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×4services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go:60

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×4services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:24

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×3integration-test/helper.go:145

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×3services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:125

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×2services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:106

+ 12 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with app.go (2), controller.go, helper.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with controller.go (3), auction_postgres.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with helper.go (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The service-bid-platform project has a strong README and clients frontend README covering both the backend and the React web frontend. The main document is a cohesive README with an overview, getting started (docker-compose up --build for the backend, yarn install/yarn start for the frontend), a detailed project structure breakdown, an auction-mechanics section explaining Vickrey auctions and RBAC, and a license. The clients README covers Create React App bootstrapping, available scripts (`yarn start`, `yarn test`, `yarn build`, `eject`), and links to documentation, with the outline visible beyond the clip marker. Both documents are well written for their audience.

The overview mentions microservices architecture but does not state which specific services or how they interconnect in terms of API contracts or data flow.README.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 The overview mentions microservices architecture but does not state… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 10 low.

Medium: missing-ssl-version · ×2api-gateway/nginx.conf:22detected by semgrep finding

Low: cookie-missing-httponly · ×10demo/auction.go:27detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 10 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with request.go (4), auction.go (2), bid.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nginx.conf, user.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 1 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4Dockerfile.demodetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: DS-0001scripts/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026scripts/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.demo, Dockerfile.integration, Dockerfile.service. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

30 of 30 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go.

Dormant codebase

What to do

Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: repository.go↔routes.go 60%; routes.go↔request.go 56%

Change coupling: repository.go ↔ routes.go · ×2services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/repository.go

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — AssignedAuction.tsx:31, Home.tsx:85

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×10) — index.tsx:12, AdminBoard.tsx:34, AdminBoard.tsx:49, …

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 14 of 15 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.9 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
No test surface was found — a `_test.go` file beside the code it tests is where this ecosystem separates tests, and none is present.

What to do

Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README claims a React frontend while the evidence shows only a single client (frontend) with no claim of an omitted project
README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README claims a React frontend while the evidence shows only a single client (frontend) with no claim of an omitted project; README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R10 · Code Duplication4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

clients/frontend/src/components/AssignedAuctions.tsx:21 · clients/frontend/src/components/ClosedAuctions.tsx:20 · clients/frontend/src/components/InProgressAuctions.tsx:21 — AssignedAuctions.tsx:21
clients/frontend/src/components/MyAuctions.tsx:20 · clients/frontend/src/components/OpenAuctions.tsx:20 — MyAuctions.tsx:20
clients/frontend/src/components/MyServiceRequests.tsx:11 · clients/frontend/src/components/NewServiceRequests.tsx:16 — MyServiceRequests.tsx:11
clients/frontend/src/components/MyRejectedRequests.tsx:12 · clients/frontend/src/components/MyServiceRequests.tsx:8 · clients/frontend/src/components/NewServiceRequests.tsx:13 — MyRejectedRequests.tsx:12
clients/frontend/src/services/auction.ts:93 · clients/frontend/src/services/request.ts:7 — auction.ts:93
clients/frontend/src/components/CreateBid.tsx:73 · clients/frontend/src/components/CreateServiceRequest.tsx:105 · clients/frontend/src/components/Login.tsx:83 — CreateBid.tsx:73
clients/frontend/src/components/NewServiceRequests.tsx:25 · clients/frontend/src/components/OpenAuctions.tsx:29 — NewServiceRequests.tsx:25
clients/frontend/src/components/UpdatePendingAuction.tsx:100 · clients/frontend/src/components/UpdateRequestStatus.tsx:103 — UpdatePendingAuction.tsx:100

What to do

Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R7 · Dead Code9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Unreachable from the 2 application, 1 tooling and 1 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered) — auth-header.ts
Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×2) — auction.ts:110, auction.ts:117

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Declared in clients/frontend/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness	4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	82%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	98%	Exemplary	Solid.
Maturity	46%	Weak — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	22%	Critical — gated by R6, P1, P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	91%	Exemplary	Solid.
Domain Modelling	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Accessibility	53%	Adequate — gated by AC4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~1594 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete)
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (a message-bus package)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — 1 test file(s) reach none of 35 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 4 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×4

High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.demo — Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.integration — Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.service — Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 scripts/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'

Warning — 41 finding(s)

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×4

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go:60 — services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go:60-72 | services/auction-service/internal/app/app.go:60-72 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/app/app.go:53 — services/request-service/internal/app/app.go:53-65 | services/user-service/internal/app/app.go:52-64 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go:130 — services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go:130-142 | services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go:191-203 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) integration-test/helper.go:184 — integration-test/helper.go:184-196 | integration-test/helper.go:223-235 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×4

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:24 — services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:24-33 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:24-33 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go:136 — services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go:136-145 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:97-106 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:198 — services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:198-207 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:301-310 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:220 — services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:220-229 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:243-252 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) integration-test/helper.go:145 — integration-test/helper.go:145-161 | integration-test/helper.go:262-278 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) integration-test/helper.go:223 — integration-test/helper.go:223-239 | demo/helper.go:126-142 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) demo/helper.go:44 — demo/helper.go:44-60 | demo/helper.go:85-101 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:125 — services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:125-131 | services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:190-196 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:314 — services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:314-320 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:380-386 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go:62 — services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go:62-68 | services/user-service/internal/routes/http/user/controller.go:114-120 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×2

Medium: missing-ssl-version api-gateway/nginx.conf:22 — This server configuration is missing the 'ssl_protocols' directive. By default, this server will use 'ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2', and versions older than TLSv1.2 are known to be broken. Explicitly specify 'ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3' to use secure TLS versions. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
Medium: use-of-sha1 services/user-service/internal/service/user.go:66 — Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2

Change coupling: repository.go ↔ routes.go services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/repository.go — `services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/repository.go` and `services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go` change together 60% of the time (18 of the 30 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: routes.go ↔ request.go services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go — `services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go` and `services/request-service/internal/service/request.go` change together 56% of the time (15 of the 27 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:106 — services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:106-121 | services/request-service/internal/repository/request/request_postgres.go:167-182 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:295 — services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:295-310 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:357-372 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:62 — services/bidding-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:62-75 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:142-155 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/events/request/controller.go:33 — services/bidding-service/internal/routes/events/request/controller.go:33-46 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/events/request/controller.go:33-46 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:99 — services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:99-110 | services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:148-159 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:24 — services/request-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:24-35 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:24-35 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) · ×2

Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:122 — services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:122-131 | services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:148-157 | services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:177-186 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:108 — services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:108-117 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:189-198 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:300-309 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×2

Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:16 — services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:16-24 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:16-24 | services/user-service/internal/routes/http/routes.go:18-26 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:59 — services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:59-67 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:120-128 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:440-448 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go:119 — services/bidding-service/internal/routes/http/bid/controller.go:119-127 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:80-88 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:186 — services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:186-195 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:290-298 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main.main (cyclomatic 28) · ×1

main.main (cyclomatic 28) demo/main.go:12 — main.main has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1

dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 30 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.main (cognitive 27) · ×1

main.main (cognitive 27) demo/main.go:12 — main.main has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1

Medium IaC: DS-0001 scripts/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) demo/auction.go:18 — demo/auction.go:18-37 | demo/request.go:75-94 | demo/user.go:45-64 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) demo/bid.go:22 — demo/bid.go:22-41 | demo/request.go:23-42 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 6) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go:63 — services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go:63-77 | services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go:103-117 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:41-55 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:102-116 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:206-220 | services/auction-service/internal/repository/auction/auction_postgres.go:422-436 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) demo/main.go:88 — demo/main.go:88-102 | demo/main.go:116-130 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go:27 — services/bidding-service/internal/app/app.go:27-37 | services/request-service/internal/app/app.go:25-35 | services/auction-service/internal/app/app.go:27-37 | services/user-service/internal/app/app.go:24-34 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go:81 — services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go:81-91 | services/bidding-service/internal/repository/bid/bid_postgres.go:121-131 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:159 — services/request-service/internal/routes/http/request/controller.go:159-167 | services/auction-service/internal/routes/http/auction/controller.go:272-279 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.

Recommendation — 16 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×10

Low: cookie-missing-httponly demo/auction.go:27 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'HttpOnly' flag. The 'HttpOnly' flag for cookies instructs the browser to forbid client-side scripts from reading the cookie which mitigates XSS attacks. Set the 'HttpOnly' flag by setting 'HttpOnly' to 'true' in the Cookie. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-secure demo/auction.go:27 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'Secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the cookie's Secure flag on the cookie value your language's API exposes — and set it to a condition, not a constant, where the same handler also serves plaintext requests. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-httponly demo/bid.go:36 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'HttpOnly' flag. The 'HttpOnly' flag for cookies instructs the browser to forbid client-side scripts from reading the cookie which mitigates XSS attacks. Set the 'HttpOnly' flag by setting 'HttpOnly' to 'true' in the Cookie. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-secure demo/bid.go:36 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'Secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the cookie's Secure flag on the cookie value your language's API exposes — and set it to a condition, not a constant, where the same handler also serves plaintext requests. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-httponly demo/request.go:37 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'HttpOnly' flag. The 'HttpOnly' flag for cookies instructs the browser to forbid client-side scripts from reading the cookie which mitigates XSS attacks. Set the 'HttpOnly' flag by setting 'HttpOnly' to 'true' in the Cookie. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-secure demo/request.go:37 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'Secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the cookie's Secure flag on the cookie value your language's API exposes — and set it to a condition, not a constant, where the same handler also serves plaintext requests. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-httponly demo/request.go:84 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'HttpOnly' flag. The 'HttpOnly' flag for cookies instructs the browser to forbid client-side scripts from reading the cookie which mitigates XSS attacks. Set the 'HttpOnly' flag by setting 'HttpOnly' to 'true' in the Cookie. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-secure demo/request.go:84 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'Secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the cookie's Secure flag on the cookie value your language's API exposes — and set it to a condition, not a constant, where the same handler also serves plaintext requests. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-httponly demo/user.go:54 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'HttpOnly' flag. The 'HttpOnly' flag for cookies instructs the browser to forbid client-side scripts from reading the cookie which mitigates XSS attacks. Set the 'HttpOnly' flag by setting 'HttpOnly' to 'true' in the Cookie. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: cookie-missing-secure demo/user.go:54 — A session cookie was detected without setting the 'Secure' flag. The 'secure' flag for cookies prevents the client from transmitting the cookie over insecure channels such as HTTP. Set the cookie's Secure flag on the cookie value your language's API exposes — and set it to a condition, not a constant, where the same handler also serves plaintext requests. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The overview mentions microservices architecture but does not state which specific services or how they interconnect in terms of API contracts or data flow. · ×1

The overview mentions microservices architecture but does not state which specific services or how they interconnect in terms of API contracts or data flow. README.md — Add a brief note on the service-to-service contract (e.g. REST endpoints, gRPC, GraphQL) and how clients access each microservice.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 scripts/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1

Dormant codebase — 30 of 30 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 30 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) · ×1

OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	12	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	6	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fafcc-97b3-7e83-8f89-62b98357be1c · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

PanGan21/service-Bid-Platform

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

At a glance — Code Health · 82% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 98% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 46% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Critical · gated by R6, P1, P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 91% · Exemplary

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 53% · Adequate · gated by AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts