Executive summary
Predidit/KazumiRules falls short of our standard for production because the project has no automated tests and we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 45.7 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and two of its three critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.
Production Readiness, at 28.8, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is having someone learn and document the file no active contributor knows, worth about 6.5 points. Adding automated tests would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 16.9 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 58.3.
Two pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. The project has no automated tests, so a change can break it without warning. Adding automated tests and pinning each tool to an exact version would close both risks.
The product code is 273 lines, too few for a meaningful rebuild estimate.
If Production Readiness rose from 28.8 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 45.7 to about 58.3.
Fixed since the last survey: 3 findings
- Secret Scanning · Leaked secret: http-authorization-credential xfdmnext.json
- Secret Scanning · Leaked secret: http-authorization-credential xfdmnext.json
- Secrets (history) · High secret: WD-SECRET-0002 xfdmnext.json
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 1 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with update_index.dart.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with update_index.dart. | +6.5 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.5 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +16.9 pts | High | Code Coverage |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +7.4 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`dart test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it. | +3.4 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +1.9 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Enable measurement for Architecture & structure. | unlocks measurement | Low | Architecture & structure |
| Enable measurement for Slice cohesion. | unlocks measurement | Low | Slice cohesion |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 23 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.5, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 23 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 5 of 11 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.dart) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.dart) had no cognitive complexity computed for it: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
- D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.dart) was not read by duplication detection: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D30 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
- D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — no dependency manifest this pass reads for licence data (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so it declares no third-party dependency closure to grade. A gap in the analyzer, NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: a manifest in an ecosystem outside that list, or third-party code copied into the tree, is not read — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (723 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .dart, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 2 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
- D20 ADR Quality — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The ADR expectation is gated on whether a repository ships a deployable product. Our repo-kind classifier reads .NET project files and the host and package markers of the other ecosystems it knows (a Go `package main`, a Cargo binary, a package.json `bin`, `start` script or application dev server such as Vite or Next, Python console scripts or a Django/WSGI entry point, a Spring Boot / WAR / Gradle application build, a Rack or Rails app, a Composer project, an OTP release or escript, a Dockerfile, a Procfile, a Platform.sh `.platform/routes.yaml`, and the corresponding published-package manifests, including an OTP `*.app.src`, a Drupal module's `*.info` and a Claude Code `.claude-plugin/plugin.json`), and found none here, so we could not tell what kind of repository this is and did not assess its ADR log. This is a gap in our analyzer, not a finding about this repository. No manifest, project file or entry point of any ecosystem it reads exists in this tree.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Project size and spread are measured over build units (a .NET project, a Maven or Gradle module, an npm, Deno or JSR package, a Go module, a Cargo crate, a Python, Composer, Bundler, RubyGems, Mix, rebar3, sbt, SwiftPM or pub package, an OTP application, an Xcode project or XcodeGen spec, or a checkout that declares no build at all) whose source a code model reads. This repository's production source is in a language no model reads, or in units whose build tool D26 does not recognise. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository's projects are cohesive.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and no container it models, or knows cannot hold a captive, was found in this repository's source, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — neither a .NET project nor a language model of this repository's code reached it — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
- P1 CI/CD gates — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Which of the two it is cannot be settled from this dimension's evidence; the coverage dimensions report whether a suite exists at all. You can widen what we reach: name the test runner explicitly in the pipeline step (your stack's test command, or a job named for the suite) so the gate is unambiguous to a reader and to this pass.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found. Whether there is anything here to recover could NOT be determined: persistence is detected from deployment/container manifests and from dependency manifests, and neither was readable by this pass, so a data store this code opens directly — a file, an embedded database — would not be visible to it. The blindness is this analyzer's, not a finding that the repository holds no data. You can widen what we reach: keep the deployment/container manifest or a dependency manifest in this repository — or a link to the ops repo that holds the DR evidence — so the persistence probe has something to read.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. No function of a language this check models was read, so there was no async code to examine. That is a limit of the analyzer on this repository, not a finding about it.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift, Dart and Elixir syntax only, and no C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift, Dart or Elixir was loaded for this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
Dimensions
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets. 2 detection(s) were excluded as holding no minted credential in material that runs: a name, reference or comparison rather than a value, a readable phrase or pattern, a value that declares itself fake, or development, test, example, mock or demo material.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 273 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 2 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 2 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
1 of 2 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is script/update_index.dart.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with update_index.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched — changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`dart test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
- Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is built before merge.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X3 · Exception handling
X5 · Nullable reference types
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 98.7 | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 69.0 | Checked 3 of 7 | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 38.4 | Weak — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 28.8 | Weak — gated by D8, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 100.0 | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 87 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an Isar, ObjectBox, Floor or Hive entity, or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Drift, Isar, Hive, Realm, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server another machine can reach (no HttpServer or shelf server bound beyond loopback, no dart_frog route, no Serverpod endpoint, no Conduit, Alfred or Angel application) and keeps no data in a hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a Flutter app or pub package is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; hiding a screen authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an ObjectBox/Floor @Entity, an Isar @collection, a Hive @HiveType or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an ObjectBox/Floor @Entity, an Isar @collection, a Hive @HiveType or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an ObjectBox/Floor @Entity, an Isar @collection, a Hive @HiveType or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — cyclomatic complexity not measured — .dart exposed no member bodies
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
- D14 License Compliance — No dependency manifest found — no declared dependency closure to grade for licences
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .dart — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — No runnable or published unit to look for an example in, and no multi-project root README to look for a map in; the other documentation kinds are withheld (see the gaps), so documentation quality is not applicable here.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — cognitive complexity not measured — .dart exposed no member bodies
- D20 ADR Quality — Repository kind not determined
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — no production declarations to compare.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .dart, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — D26 measured no build unit over this repository's .dart source. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.dart) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .dart not exposed to the token comparison
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — no manifest declares this repository's modules, and its source holds 1 production component(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production components are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Dart source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for classes extending benchmark_harness's `BenchmarkBase`, `AsyncBenchmarkBase` or `PerfBenchmarkBase` (directly or through a base of your own), `benchmark(…)` calls under the pub `benchmark` package, Flutter's `benchmarkWidgets`, `watchPerformance` or `traceAction` in a test importing flutter_test, integration_test or flutter_driver, or benchmark_harness, benchmark or web_benchmarks in a pubspec.yaml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface: 2 Dart file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source and disabled TLS certificate validation, and none was found. This repository serves no HTTP of its own — no server framework among its pubspec dependencies, no `HttpServer` bound and no shelf, dart_frog or serverpod import in its production source or `bin/`, no web build target — so HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags and input validation are N/A here, as they are for a C# library or worker. If this codebase starts serving HTTP, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Dart was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller (Dio, or package:http's Abortable requests) — package:http's get and post, HttpClient and Firebase or gRPC stubs offer their callers no token to take
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Dart isolates share no mutable memory: a value sent to another isolate arrives as a copy, and callbacks within one isolate run one at a time on its event loop, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Dart was read, and it logs through none: package:logging, package:logger, talker and dart:developer take one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. Sentry's structured logs (`Sentry.logger`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 3 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No automated tests
Serious — 1 finding(s)
- REDACTED
Minor — 7 finding(s)
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- Orphaned file script/update_index.dart:1
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- CI build step not evidenced
- No SAST
- Duplicated predicate script/check_deprecated_rules.dart:30
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-db980f0e1bb64affa07d5fd1342887da/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=525" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-db980f0e1bb64affa07d5fd1342887da/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-db980f0e1bb64affa07d5fd1342887da/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet). | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet). | 0 | — |