Fitness management application built with DDD and CQRS
Public report — no-days-off-app, published 20 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 20-06-2026 @ 05:18 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

QuinntyneBrown/no-Days-Off-App

No regression coverage not measured
42% At Risk
Code Health 78% Strong Domain Modelling 77% Adequate Architecture 73% Adequate Maturity 65% Adequate Security 39% Weak Readiness 26% Weak

Hobby · 1,713 LoC · 1 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (26%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

64/64dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0
114findings with an exact file:lineof 134 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
64/109dimensions across the health lenses1713 LoC · 1 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

QuinntyneBrown/no-days-off-app carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (39%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); missing tooling (eslint (Tooling).

For scale: Hobby (~1,713 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 78% Strong Architecture 73% Adequate · gated by AX2 Maturity 65% Adequate · gated by D34 Readiness 26% Weak · gated by R4, R6, P1, P3 Security 39% Weak · gated by D38, C1 Domain Modelling 77% Adequate · gated by DM2
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 26% · 46% weightSecurity 39% · 25% weightMaturity 65% · 14% weightArchitecture 73% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 77% · 4% weightCode Health 78% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~55.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 11%Plumbing 76%Tests 14%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €530–€2,500
Cost to rebuild€530–€2,500 (0.1 person-years (9–27 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeHobby · 74% boilerplate · 13% straight-line · 13% branching logic
Dead frontend code~58 LoC unreachable (3 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
+14.9 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates
2
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+14.9 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage
3
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
+14.7 pts · Medium effort · Tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+15.9 pts/run over 4 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +15.9 pts/run over 4 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 42 ▲ 5 over 4 runs.

025507510019 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityDomain Modelling

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch ctx:ApiGateway ApiGateway ApiGateway ctx:ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults ctx:ApiGateway->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:Shared Shared Shared ctx:ApiGateway->ctx:Shared ctx:Athletes Athletes Api · Infrastructure ctx:Core Core Core ctx:Athletes->ctx:Core ctx:Athletes->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:Core->ctx:Shared ctx:Communication Communication Api · Infrastructure ctx:Communication.Core Communication.Core Core ctx:Communication->ctx:Communication.Core ctx:Communication->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:Communication.Core->ctx:Shared ctx:Dashboard Dashboard Api · Infrastructure ctx:Dashboard.Core Dashboard.Core Core ctx:Dashboard->ctx:Dashboard.Core ctx:Dashboard->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:Dashboard.Core->ctx:Shared ctx:Exercises Exercises Api · Infrastructure ctx:Exercises->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:Identity Identity Api · Infrastructure ctx:Identity->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:Media Media Api · Infrastructure ctx:Media->ctx:ServiceDefaults ctx:AppHost AppHost AppHost ctx:AppHost->ctx:ApiGateway ctx:AppHost->ctx:Athletes ctx:AppHost->ctx:Communication ctx:AppHost->ctx:Dashboard ctx:AppHost->ctx:Exercises ctx:AppHost->ctx:Identity ctx:AppHost->ctx:Media ctx:Workouts Workouts Api · Infrastructure ctx:AppHost->ctx:Workouts ctx:Workouts->ctx:ServiceDefaults __more__ +5 more contexts

At a glance — Code Health · 78% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 10.0 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 8.2 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 8.8 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 8.7
The Ugly
R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 4.1

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Adequate · gated by AX2

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.5
The Ugly
AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 3.5

At a glance — Maturity · 65% · Adequate · gated by D34

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0
The Bad
D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 5.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 1.6

At a glance — Readiness · 26% · Weak · gated by R4, R6, P1, P3

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 7.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 2.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 3.4

At a glance — Security · 39% · Weak · gated by D38, C1

The Good
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 7.1 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0
The Bad
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 5.0 C3 · Repo Audit Trail 6.0
The Ugly
D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 4.2 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.5

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 77% · Adequate · gated by DM2

The Good
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0
The Ugly
DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components62High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration16High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures4High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry); Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+14.9 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+14.9 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+14.7 ptsMediumTooling
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+14.2 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+14.2 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.+10.5 ptsMediumObservability
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+10.5 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+8.5 ptsMediumData Protection

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 12 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 8% slop · 92% mixed · 0% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/Web/package-lock.json0.2SlopJS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [CVE redacted]
src/ApiGateway/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Communication/Communication.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Dashboard/Dashboard.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Exercises/Exercises.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Identity/Identity.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Media/Media.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Workouts/Workouts.Api/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/appsettings.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Dashboard/Dashboard.Api/appsettings.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Identity/Identity.Api/appsettings.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 64 of 64 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 64 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D26D28D29D31D33D34D35D38AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6C1C2C3DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3P1P2P3P4P5R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 114 of 134 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement—◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019ee377-36e0-74fa-9b0c-e6ecbbb47c04.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 4 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 test methods: 11 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests
Tests co-located / outside the solution

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 skipped (3 with a documented reason), 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 11 tests.

Skipped (documented): Gateway_HealthCheck_ReturnsHealthy · ×3tests/NoDaysOff.IntegrationTests/ApiGatewayTests.cs:8

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 38 packages use a banned license.

Licenses scanned

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Identity/Identity.Api/Program.cs, held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com.

Knowledge silo · ×16src/Identity/Identity.Api/Program.cs
Off-boarding risk: quinntynebrown@gmail.com

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 Knowledge silo finding(s) in Bus Factor — start with Program.cs (4), Athlete.cs, AthletesController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1713 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 projects, 68 .cs files, 1713 hand-written lines of code (1713 production / 0 test), 0 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).

Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository
Build status unknown
Shared (Production)src/Shared/Shared.csproj

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×3src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/appsettings.json:12detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 8 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×8src/ApiGateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×8src/ApiGateway/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [CVE redacted] · ×8src/Web/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding
Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] · ×4src/Web/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 of 16 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Controllers/AthletesController.cs.

Orphaned knowledge · ×13src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Controllers/AthletesController.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 13 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Athlete.cs, AthletesController.cs, AuthController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

66 finding(s): 1 critical, 22 high, 39 medium, 4 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×22src/Web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/Web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×27src/Web/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 27 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (27). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 22 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `RedisMessageBus` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_disposed; e.g. `_disposed` at line 71). — RedisMessageBus.cs:11

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit marker (IAuditable / AddAuditing) was found, but no structural mechanism (an EF SaveChanges interceptor, an immutable audit-log type, or [Audited] usage) — the trail's completeness can't be confirmed from the source.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `AggregateRoot.TenantId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TenantId { Int32 Value }`). — AggregateRoot.cs:17
  • `DomainEvent.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EventId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEvent.cs:9

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/layouts/main-layout/main-layout.ts:19 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/login/login.ts:15 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/register/register.ts:15 — main-layout.ts:19
  • src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/login/login.ts:9 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/register/register.ts:9 — login.ts:9
  • src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/athlete-detail/athlete-detail.ts:11 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/messages/messages.ts:9 — athlete-detail.ts:11
  • src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/button/ndo-button.component.ts:6 · src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/snackbar/ndo-snackbar.component.ts:21 — ndo-button.component.ts:6
  • src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/chip/ndo-chip.component.ts:2 · src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/nav-item/ndo-nav-item.component.ts:2 · src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/stat-card/ndo-stat-card.component.ts:2 — ndo-chip.component.ts:2
  • src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/input/ndo-input.component.ts:11 · src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/stat-card/ndo-stat-card.component.ts:9 · src/Web/projects/components/src/lib/toolbar/ndo-toolbar.component.ts:12 — ndo-input.component.ts:11
  • src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/dialogs/body-part-dialog.ts:6 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/dialogs/log-weight-dialog.ts:6 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/exercises/exercises.ts:9 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/forgot-password/forgot-password.ts:5 — body-part-dialog.ts:6
  • src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/dialogs/athlete-dialog.ts:9 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/dialogs/body-part-dialog.ts:8 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/dialogs/log-weight-dialog.ts:8 · src/Web/projects/no-days-off/src/app/pages/reset-password/reset-password.ts:8 — athlete-dialog.ts:9

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — main-layout.ts, athlete-detail.ts, register.ts, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 26 file(s) (~1240 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — api
  • Unreachable from the 0 application, 2 tooling and 19 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (0 application, 2 tooling, 19 test roots considered) (×3) — public-api.ts, app.ts, main.ts
  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×3) — ndo-bottom-nav.component.ts:68, ndo-button.component.ts:116, ndo-card.component.ts:45

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in src/Web/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 4/5 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. — RedisMessageBus.cs:59

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~1.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health78%StrongStrongest area.
Architecture73%Adequate — gated by AX2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity65%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness26%Weak — gated by R4, R6, P1, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security39%Weak — gated by D38, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling77%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 40 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — single shared-core project — no cross-context coupling to assess
  • D27 Navigability — Navigability unmeasured — symbol resolution incomplete
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — Not applicable
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
  • D39 IL Efficiency — IL metrics not applicable
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 1/3 markers (a message-bus package)
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM not available — accuracy is the Tier-2 layer and needs a reachable model.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — npm is not installed — dependency freshness not measured; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 42 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×22
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @hono/node-server: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — express-rate-limit: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — fast-uri: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — fast-uri: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — immutable: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — path-to-regexp: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — picomatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — piscina: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — tar: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — tar: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — undici: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — undici: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — undici: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — undici: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — ws: [GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×8
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/ApiGateway/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Communication/Communication.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Dashboard/Dashboard.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Exercises/Exercises.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Identity/Identity.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Media/Media.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/Workouts/Workouts.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×8
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×3
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/appsettings.json:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Dashboard/Dashboard.Api/appsettings.json:5 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key src/Identity/Identity.Api/appsettings.json:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — vitest: [GHSA redacted]
Warning — 62 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×27
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @hono/node-server: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — ajv: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — brace-expansion: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — brace-expansion: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — hono: [GHSA redacted]
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.
D16 · Bus Factor · Knowledge silo · ×16
  • Knowledge silo src/Identity/Identity.Api/Program.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Controllers/AthletesController.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Shared/Messaging/UdpMessageBus.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Identity/Identity.Core/Aggregates/User/User.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Shared/Authentication/AuthenticationExtensions.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Media/Media.Core/Features/UploadMediaFile/UploadMediaFileCommand.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/NoDaysOff.AppHost/Program.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Program.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Athletes/Athletes.Core/Aggregates/Athlete/Athlete.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/NoDaysOff.ServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Identity/Identity.Core/Features/Auth/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommandHandler.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Identity/Identity.Api/Controllers/AuthController.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Exercises/Exercises.Api/Controllers/ExercisesController.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Shared/Messaging/RedisMessageBus.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/ApiGateway/Program.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Communication/Communication.Api/Controllers/NotificationsController.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by quinntynebrown@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×13
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Controllers/AthletesController.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Shared/Messaging/UdpMessageBus.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Identity/Identity.Core/Aggregates/User/User.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Shared/Authentication/AuthenticationExtensions.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Media/Media.Core/Features/UploadMediaFile/UploadMediaFileCommand.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Athletes/Athletes.Core/Aggregates/Athlete/Athlete.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/NoDaysOff.ServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Identity/Identity.Core/Features/Auth/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommandHandler.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Identity/Identity.Api/Controllers/AuthController.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Exercises/Exercises.Api/Controllers/ExercisesController.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Shared/Messaging/RedisMessageBus.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/ApiGateway/Program.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Communication/Communication.Api/Controllers/NotificationsController.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×4
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] src/Web/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [CVE redacted]
D18 · Solution Shape · Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository · ×1
  • Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository — The scored solution `NoDaysOff.sln` is not representative of this repository — it references only 71 of 246 discovered C# files (29 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. Commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces (anywhere in the repo), or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 19 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×8
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/ApiGateway/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Athletes/Athletes.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Communication/Communication.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Dashboard/Dashboard.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Exercises/Exercises.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Identity/Identity.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Media/Media.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Workouts/Workouts.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: quinntynebrown@gmail.com — If quinntynebrown@gmail.com becomes unavailable, 16 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner — the largest single-person knowledge concentration (weighted toward the domain core). Pair, review, or document these before any departure.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · single shared-core project · ×1
  • single shared-core project — no cross-context coupling to assess — single shared-core project — no cross-context coupling to assess Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D27 · Navigability · Navigability unmeasured · ×1
  • Navigability unmeasured — symbol resolution incomplete — 90 % of sampled invocations could not be resolved to a symbol (the workspace likely loaded without all references) — the indirection fractions would be computed over an unrepresentative slice, so navigability is reported as not measured rather than a misleading score.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL metrics not applicable · ×1
  • IL metrics not applicable — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D7 · Architectural Integrity · No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1
  • No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.
Info — 11 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped (documented) · ×3
  • Skipped (documented): Gateway_HealthCheck_ReturnsHealthy tests/NoDaysOff.IntegrationTests/ApiGatewayTests.cs:8 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires Aspire test host setup
  • Skipped (documented): Gateway_UnauthorizedRequest_Returns401 tests/NoDaysOff.IntegrationTests/ApiGatewayTests.cs:17 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires Aspire test host setup
  • Skipped (documented): Gateway_AuthenticatedRequest_RoutesToService tests/NoDaysOff.IntegrationTests/ApiGatewayTests.cs:25 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Requires Aspire test host setup
D14 · License Compliance · Licenses scanned · ×1
  • Licenses scanned — 38 packages scanned; 3 distinct SPDX licenses.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build status unknown · ×1
  • Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shared (Production) · ×1
  • Shared (Production) src/Shared/Shared.csproj — 68 .cs files, 2135 LoC (1552 significant)
D9 · Test Distribution · Unit tests · ×1
  • Unit tests — 11 unit test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · Integration tests · ×1
  • Integration tests — 0 integration test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · BDD tests · ×1
  • BDD tests — 0 BDD test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · E2E tests · ×1
  • E2E tests — 0 end-to-end test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
  • Tests co-located / outside the solution — 11 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .5artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .16artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** .12artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .66artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019ee377-36e0-74fa-9b0c-e6ecbbb47c04 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 16 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 8 field(s)
  • CurrentUserService.Email src/Shared/Authentication/CurrentUserService.cs:30
  • ICurrentUserService.Email src/Shared/Authentication/ICurrentUserService.cs:9
  • LoginRequestDto.Email src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/AuthResponseDto.cs:10
  • RegisterRequestDto.Email src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/AuthResponseDto.cs:14
  • UserDto.Email src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/UserDto.cs:5
  • UserAuthenticatedMessage.Email src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserAuthenticatedMessage.cs:22
  • UserCreatedMessage.Email src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserCreatedMessage.cs:22
  • UserUpdatedMessage.Email src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserUpdatedMessage.cs:22
Name — 8 field(s)
  • RegisterRequestDto.FirstName src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/AuthResponseDto.cs:16
  • RegisterRequestDto.LastName src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/AuthResponseDto.cs:17
  • UserDto.FirstName src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/UserDto.cs:6
  • UserDto.LastName src/Shared/Contracts/Identity/UserDto.cs:7
  • UserCreatedMessage.FirstName src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserCreatedMessage.cs:25
  • UserCreatedMessage.LastName src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserCreatedMessage.cs:28
  • UserUpdatedMessage.FirstName src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserUpdatedMessage.cs:25
  • UserUpdatedMessage.LastName src/Shared/Messaging/Messages/Identity/UserUpdatedMessage.cs:28

Issues: 42 · Warnings: 62 · Recommendations: 19 · Info: 11 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 20-06-2026 @ 05:18 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md