Public report — rss-bridge, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 01:56 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

RSS-Bridge/rss-Bridge

coverage not measuredno automated tests
35% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Code Health 100% Exemplary Maturity 79% Strong Security 22% Critical Readiness 17% Critical

Hobby · weakest lens: Readiness (17%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

33/37dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
68findings with an exact file:lineof 78 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
37/90dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

RSS-Bridge/rss-bridge carries serious gaps (35%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Maturity (79%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (17%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (22%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 79% Strong Readiness 17% ⚠ Critical · gated by D9, P2, P3, P5, P6 Security 22% ⚠ Critical · gated by D28, D29, D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 17% · 50% weightSecurity 22% · 27% weightMaturity 79% · 15% weightCode Health 100% · 8% weight

Raise Readiness 17 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~50.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (35+)

35 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-02) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
  • D20 · No consequences/trade-offs section describing the cost of running a bridge ecosystem (e.g. maintenance burden, API integration effort) and what happens if bridges break docs/01_General/01_Project-goals.md
  • D20 · The decision is a list of contribution options with no explicit decision (what counts as 'contribute') and no consequences/trade-offs docs/01_General/02_Contribute.md
  • D20 · Only the decision "PHP 7.4 (or higher)" is present; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs docs/01_General/03_Requirements.md
  • D20 · Only welcome and a one-line RSS feed description are shown; no context/problem or decision is visible docs/01_General/04_Screenshots.md
  • D20 · The visible content is a bare table listing public RSS-bridge instances with status and contact, offering no context/problem or explicit decision; the body ends in clip marker mid-table row docs/01_General/06_Public_Hosts.md
  • D20 · Title '01_Installation' is a stub; no context/problem and no decision body visible within the link docs/03_For_Hosts/01_Installation.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "02_Updating" is informative docs/03_For_Hosts/02_Updating.md
  • D20 · Title is a numbered document reference rather than the decision (no decision statement) docs/03_For_Hosts/04_Heroku_Installation.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a bare configuration dump with only enable/disable examples docs/03_For_Hosts/05_Whitelisting.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences; only a bare list of auth types with a documentation link docs/03_For_Hosts/06_Authentication.md
  • D20 · The body is primarily configuration-section documentation (parameters by type with values and descriptions), with no context/problem framing or consequences/trade-offs docs/03_For_Hosts/08_Custom_Configuration.md
  • D20 · The body is a boilerplate template with no context/problem and no explicit decision; it repeats the same policy across four identical lines (fix one issue per PR, coding style, commit naming) rather than conveying any real ADR docs/04_For_Developers/02_Pull_Request_policy.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a bare listing of folders with links are present docs/04_For_Developers/03_Folder_structure.md
  • D20 · Decision is a one-line removal with no context (why caching was removed) and no consequences/trade-offs docs/04_For_Developers/05_Debug_mode.md
  • D20 · The body is an endless repetition of 'How to get started' and 'This will give you an example workflow', with no context/problem and no explicit decision; the only substantive content is a numbered codespaces walkthrough that reads like a How-To rather than an ADR docs/04_For_Developers/06_Github_Codespaces_Tutorial.md
  • D20 · No context/problem (why a development environment setup) and no consequences/trade-offs docs/04_For_Developers/07_Development_Environment_Setup.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a boilerplate code example with only one line of rationale docs/05_Bridge_API/01_How_to_create_a_new_bridge.md
  • D20 · Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent (only four-steps process description with no problem framing) docs/05_Bridge_API/02_BridgeAbstract.md
  • D20 · No real context/problem and no explicit decision (which feed types to support, what data to extract) are stated; only boilerplate template present docs/05_Bridge_API/03_FeedExpander.md
  • D20 · The body is a class-constant reference with no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs docs/05_Bridge_API/05_XPathAbstract.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a one-line file-creation instruction with an example docs/07_Cache_API/01_How_to_create_a_new_cache.md
  • D20 · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the interface declaration is shown docs/07_Cache_API/02_CacheInterface.md
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key bridges/TwitchBridge.php
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tests.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tests.yml
  • D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
  • D31 · High IaC: DS-0029 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: DS-0001 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
  • P2 · No structured logging
  • P5 · No DR/backup evidence

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+21.3 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+21.3 pts · Medium effort · Observability
3
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
+21.3 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · — · —

The Good
D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 79% · Strong

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · .NET / C# ADR Conformance 10.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 3.8

At a glance — Readiness · 17% · Critical · gated by D9, P2, P3, P5, P6

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 3.0

At a glance — Security · 22% · Critical · gated by D28, D29, D36

The Good
D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.8
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.1 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection25High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures16High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration6High / Critical

Roadmap

First, address the missing test coverage by resolving the one finding in test distribution. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to improve observability. Then, introduce static application security testing, such as CodeQL, to enhance security and performance tooling. After that, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure as code, ensuring clear RTO/RPO documentation. Finally, maintain an accurate changelog with versioned entries for each release to ensure release hygiene.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+21.3 ptsLowTest Distribution
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+21.3 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+21.3 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+21.3 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.+19.3 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+14.9 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 25 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dockerbuild.yml (6), lint.yml (5), prhtmlupload.yml (5).+6.7 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 15 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with SoundcloudBridge.php (3), Formula1Bridge.php (2), GiphyBridge.php (2).+6.4 ptsMediumSecrets (history)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 39 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 3% slop · 41% mixed · 56% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.devcontainer/Dockerfile3.0SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml4.5MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/lint.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/prhtmlupload.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/prhtmlgenerator.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php5.1MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/documentation.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
bridges/Formula1Bridge.php5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
lib/TwitterClient.php5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
bridges/RainbowSixSiegeBridge.php5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
bridges/GiphyBridge.php5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/tests.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
bridges/AppleAppStoreBridge.php7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
bridges/TwitchBridge.php7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
bridges/Arte7Bridge.php7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
bridges/FurAffinityBridge.php7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
docs/01_General/01_Project-goals.md8.5Near-cleanADR Quality: No consequences/trade-offs section describing the cost of running a bridge ecosystem (e.g. maintenance burden, API integration effort) and what happens if bridges break
docs/01_General/02_Contribute.md8.5Near-cleanADR Quality: The decision is a list of contribution options with no explicit decision (what counts as 'contribute') and no consequences/trade-offs
docs/01_General/03_Requirements.md8.5Near-cleanADR Quality: Only the decision "PHP 7.4 (or higher)" is present; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 33 of 37 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 37 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D7D9D12D13D15D16D19D20D21D25D26D27D28D29D31D34D35D36AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 68 of 78 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd9ef-3eba-7df2-a5eb-64793522edd5.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 9 mechanizable ADRs, 9 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

RSS-Bridge's documentation is clear and complete for its audience: an official hosted instance with links to GitHub releases, irc, and daux.io gh-pages compilation; a README that directs readers to project goals, contribution, requirements, hosting, and faq docs; and bridge-specific content (Vk2Bridge, TwitterV2Bridge) that explains prerequisites, configuration steps, and the access-token workflow. The architecture/design docs are also present but not shown in this summary.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — RSS-Bridge's documentation is clear and complete for its audience: an official hosted instance with links to GitHub releases, irc, and daux.io gh-pages compilation; a README that directs readers to project goals, contribution, requirements, hosting, and faq docs; and bridge-specific content (Vk2Bridge, TwitterV2Bridge) that explains prerequisites, configuration steps, and the access-token workflow. The architecture/design docs are also present but not shown in this summary.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 27 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 3.8/10 (frequently incomplete). 22 flagged with a specific gap.

No consequences/trade-offs section describing the cost of running a bridge ecosystem (e.g. maintenance burden, API integration effort) and what happens if bridges breakdocs/01_General/01_Project-goals.md
The decision is a list of contribution options with no explicit decision (what counts as 'contribute') and no consequences/trade-offsdocs/01_General/02_Contribute.md
Only the decision "PHP 7.4 (or higher)" is present; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offsdocs/01_General/03_Requirements.md
Only welcome and a one-line RSS feed description are shown; no context/problem or decision is visibledocs/01_General/04_Screenshots.md
The visible content is a bare table listing public RSS-bridge instances with status and contact, offering no context/problem or explicit decision; the body ends in clip marker mid-table rowdocs/01_General/06_Public_Hosts.md

+ 17 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No consequences/trade-offs section describing the cost of running a… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 01_Project-goals.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The decision is a list of contribution options with no explicit decision… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 02_Contribute.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Only the decision "PHP 7.4 (or higher)" is present; no context/problem… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 03_Requirements.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 conform / 0 violate across 27 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 16 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×15bridges/AppleAppStoreBridge.php:127detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with SoundcloudBridge.php (3), Formula1Bridge.php (2), GiphyBridge.php (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

25 finding(s): 0 critical, 25 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×25.github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:26detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 25 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dockerbuild.yml (6), lint.yml (5), prhtmlupload.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, 2 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×3.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×2.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 27) — reach 50 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.

What to do

  • Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
  • Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity79%StrongSolid.
Readiness17%Critical — gated by D9, P2, P3, P5, P6Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security22%Critical — gated by D28, D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 54 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~1120 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 44 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×25
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:26 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dockerbuild.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/documentation.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/documentation.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/documentation.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:33 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lint.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlgenerator.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlgenerator.yml:40 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlgenerator.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlgenerator.yml:75 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlupload.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlupload.yml:30 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlupload.yml:38 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlupload.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/prhtmlupload.yml:60 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tests.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tests.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×15
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/AppleAppStoreBridge.php:127 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/Formula1Bridge.php:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/TwitchBridge.php:230 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key lib/TwitterClient.php:19 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key lib/TwitterClient.php:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/RainbowSixSiegeBridge.php:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/Arte7Bridge.php:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/Formula1Bridge.php:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/GiphyBridge.php:78 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/FurAffinityBridge.php:582 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/RainbowSixSiegeBridge.php:11 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/GiphyBridge.php:30 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php:17 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php:17 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key bridges/SoundcloudBridge.php:17 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3
  • High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
Warning — 25 finding(s)
D20 · ADR Quality · No consequences/trade-offs section describing the cost of running a bridge ecosystem (e.g. maintenance burden, API integration effort) and what happens if bridges break · ×1
  • No consequences/trade-offs section describing the cost of running a bridge ecosystem (e.g. maintenance burden, API integration effort) and what happens if bridges break docs/01_General/01_Project-goals.md — Add a Consequences section covering operational costs, the need for ongoing bridge development/updates, and fallback options when no bridge exists
D20 · ADR Quality · The decision is a list of contribution options with no explicit decision (what counts as 'contribute') and no consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • The decision is a list of contribution options with no explicit decision (what counts as 'contribute') and no consequences/trade-offs docs/01_General/02_Contribute.md — State the concrete decision (e.g. what counts as contributing to RSS-Bridge) and its consequences (e.g. how contributions are reviewed, accepted, or rejected; the value of community input vs. maintainers' decisions)
D20 · ADR Quality · Only the decision "PHP 7.4 (or higher)" is present; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • Only the decision "PHP 7.4 (or higher)" is present; no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs docs/01_General/03_Requirements.md — Add a Context section explaining why PHP 7.4 was chosen over newer versions and a Consequences section on migration effort and compatibility
D20 · ADR Quality · Only welcome and a one-line RSS feed description are shown; no context/problem or decision is visible · ×1
  • Only welcome and a one-line RSS feed description are shown; no context/problem or decision is visible docs/01_General/04_Screenshots.md — Add the problem motivating this (e.g. need for Twitter bridge/rss feed integration) and the explicit decision (how Atom feeds are generated/advertised) with consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · The visible content is a bare table listing public RSS-bridge instances with status and contact, offering no context/problem or explicit decision; the body ends in clip marker mid-table row · ×1
  • The visible content is a bare table listing public RSS-bridge instances with status and contact, offering no context/problem or explicit decision; the body ends in clip marker mid-table row docs/01_General/06_Public_Hosts.md — Add a Context section explaining why an RSS bridge instance exists (e.g. feed aggregation, reliability) and a Decision section stating what the bridge's purpose is, plus Consequences noting operational/monetary trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · Title '01_Installation' is a stub; no context/problem and no decision body visible within the link · ×1
  • Title '01_Installation' is a stub; no context/problem and no decision body visible within the link docs/03_For_Hosts/01_Installation.md — Replace with an explicit problem statement (e.g. why installation of RSS-Bridge matters) and a concrete decision (e.g. which OS/arch it supports or required dependencies), plus consequences/trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "02_Updating" is informative · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the title "02_Updating" is informative docs/03_For_Hosts/02_Updating.md — State what needs updating (e.g. outdated design system, deprecated API) and its impact, then document the changes made and any new trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · Title is a numbered document reference rather than the decision (no decision statement) · ×1
  • Title is a numbered document reference rather than the decision (no decision statement) docs/03_For_Hosts/04_Heroku_Installation.md — Rename to something like '04_Heroku_Deployment' or add a one-line Decision line stating that RSS Bridge can be deployed on Heroku for free with the specified interval choice
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a bare configuration dump with only enable/disable examples · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a bare configuration dump with only enable/disable examples docs/03_For_Hosts/05_Whitelisting.md — Add why whitelisting bridges matters (security, compliance) and the consequences of enabling all/allowing untrusted ones
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences; only a bare list of auth types with a documentation link · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences; only a bare list of auth types with a documentation link docs/03_For_Hosts/06_Authentication.md — State the problem (e.g. securing API endpoints) and the decision (which auth type is used where), plus any trade-offs such as token storage or rate limiting
D20 · ADR Quality · The body is primarily configuration-section documentation (parameters by type with values and descriptions), with no context/problem framing or consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • The body is primarily configuration-section documentation (parameters by type with values and descriptions), with no context/problem framing or consequences/trade-offs docs/03_For_Hosts/08_Custom_Configuration.md — Add a Context/Problem section explaining why RSS-Bridge needs custom configurations and an Admin Consequences section on the trade-off of requiring login for all requests
D20 · ADR Quality · The body is a boilerplate template with no context/problem and no explicit decision; it repeats the same policy across four identical lines (fix one issue per PR, coding style, commit naming) rather than conveying any real ADR · ×1
  • The body is a boilerplate template with no context/problem and no explicit decision; it repeats the same policy across four identical lines (fix one issue per PR, coding style, commit naming) rather than conveying any real ADR docs/04_For_Developers/02_Pull_Request_policy.md — Replace each repeated rule with an actual Context/Problem section explaining why this decision matters and a Decision body stating what is fixed/how it is done, plus Consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a bare listing of folders with links are present · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a bare listing of folders with links are present docs/04_For_Developers/03_Folder_structure.md — Add a Context section explaining why the folder structure matters (e.g. separation of controllers, bridges, caches) and a Consequences section noting that vendor files must live in a separate repo and not be conflated with RSS-Bridge
D20 · ADR Quality · Decision is a one-line removal with no context (why caching was removed) and no consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • Decision is a one-line removal with no context (why caching was removed) and no consequences/trade-offs docs/04_For_Developers/05_Debug_mode.md — Add the problem that caching caused stale data or performance issues under load, and document the trade-offs of removing it from production
D20 · ADR Quality · The body is an endless repetition of 'How to get started' and 'This will give you an example workflow', with no context/problem and no explicit decision; the only substantive content is a numbered codespaces walkthrough that reads like a How-To rather than an ADR · ×1
  • The body is an endless repetition of 'How to get started' and 'This will give you an example workflow', with no context/problem and no explicit decision; the only substantive content is a numbered codespaces walkthrough that reads like a How-To rather than an ADR docs/04_For_Developers/06_Github_Codespaces_Tutorial.md — Replace the repeated 'How to get started' boilerplate with a Context section (why Codespaces matters for RSS-Bridge development) and a Decision section stating the adopted tooling, plus consequences/trade-offs
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem (why a development environment setup) and no consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • No context/problem (why a development environment setup) and no consequences/trade-offs docs/04_For_Developers/07_Development_Environment_Setup.md — Add why this setup matters (e.g. rapid doc edits without local server) and the trade-offs of using docker-compose over manual editing
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a boilerplate code example with only one line of rationale · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a boilerplate code example with only one line of rationale docs/05_Bridge_API/01_How_to_create_a_new_bridge.md — Add why bridges are needed (e.g. to consume external feeds like BearBlog) and the consequences of adding new bridges (maintainer burden, CI/CD cost)
D20 · ADR Quality · Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent (only four-steps process description with no problem framing) · ×1
  • Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are absent (only four-steps process description with no problem framing) docs/05_Bridge_API/02_BridgeAbstract.md — Add a Context section explaining why bridges exist (e.g. decoupling feed data from presentation) and a Consequences section on trade-offs such as the optional caching timeout requiring careful configuration
D20 · ADR Quality · No real context/problem and no explicit decision (which feed types to support, what data to extract) are stated; only boilerplate template present · ×1
  • No real context/problem and no explicit decision (which feed types to support, what data to extract) are stated; only boilerplate template present docs/05_Bridge_API/03_FeedExpander.md — Replace the empty MySiteBridge class with an actual bridge that addresses a concrete problem (e.g. parsing feeds hidden by normal means as in usage example), including a rationale for the decision and consequences
D20 · ADR Quality · The body is a class-constant reference with no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs · ×1
  • The body is a class-constant reference with no context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs docs/05_Bridge_API/05_XPathAbstract.md — Add a Context section explaining why XPath-based bridges are needed (e.g. existing BridgeAbstract constants plus the new feed-title/icon/enclosure constants) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as requiring an HTML/XML source URL, parsing complexity, and encoding handling
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a one-line file-creation instruction with an example · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only a one-line file-creation instruction with an example docs/07_Cache_API/01_How_to_create_a_new_cache.md — Add the problem (e.g. high-latency cache) motivating the new cache type and its trade-offs such as memory usage or configuration complexity
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the interface declaration is shown · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; only the interface declaration is shown docs/07_Cache_API/02_CacheInterface.md — Add a Context section explaining why a unified CacheInterface is needed (e.g. decoupling persistence/cache) and a Consequences section on trade-offs such as TTL management complexity or cache-invalidation friction
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .16artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .25artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .6artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0—

Run 019fd9ef-3eba-7df2-a5eb-64793522edd5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 44 · Warnings: 25 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 01:56 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md