Public report — ViennaNET, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
66findings with an exact file:lineof 203 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
53/96dimensions across the health lenses35752 LoC · 111 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Raiffeisen-DGTL/ViennaNET carries serious risk (50%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (90%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Maturity (43%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Security (46%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality (ADR Quality); Reconcile the README with reality (Documentation accuracy).
For scale: Medium (~35,752 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.4 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (90%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Business logic 14%Plumbing 52%Tests 33%Generated 0%
New since the last scan (100+)
159 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€55,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 43% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — microservices, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 43%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Maturity first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
167 modules, 222 dependencies — 3 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
39
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
11
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by establishing architecture documentation, specifically creating a single document per significant decision with clear context and consequences, while ensuring all design documents are stored in a consistent location. Simultaneously, address the gap in ADR quality by resolving the missing architecture decision records. Next, reconcile the README with the actual codebase by removing references to non-existent Docker configurations and microservices that do not exist. Then, clean up the codebase by removing the three largest orphaned files. Finally, enforce access controls by ensuring every handler implements authorization checks, either through guard methods or attribute-based security.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 52 of 53 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 53 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 66 of 203 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 CustomRollingFileAppender.RollOverRenameFiles (cognitive 43) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with CustomRollingFileAppender.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CustomRollingFileAppender.InitializeFromOneFile (cognitive 27) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with CustomRollingFileAppender.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Log4NetConfigurationApplier.GetFileAppender (cognitive 25) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Log4NetConfigurationApplier.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
+ 8 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 7 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Unstable project ViennaNET.Messaging.RabbitMQQueue.DefaultConfiguration finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Unstable project ViennaNET.Orm.DB2.Lnx finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
917 test methods: 917 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 922 tests.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 7 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
111 projects, 894 source files, 53351 hand-written lines of code (35752 production / 17599 test), plus 141 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 515 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
What to do
Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 of 111 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
81 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 8.6/10. — 81 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×11.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:36detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with default.yml (7), codeql-analysis.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
172 of 172 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs.
Largest orphaned file · ×3src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with CustomRollingFileAppender.cs, IRedisDatabase.cs, RedisDatabase.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IRedisDatabase` declares 48 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRedisDatabase.cs:12
`IRedisServer` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IRedisServer.cs:13
`ISilentRedisServer` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ISilentRedisServer.cs:13
`IWorkSheet` declares 20 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IWorkSheet.cs:5
`ICompanyHostBuilder` declares 25 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ICompanyHostBuilder.cs:13
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.
What to do
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×12) — EntityFactoryServiceStubBuilder.cs:127, EntityFactoryServiceStubBuilder.cs:132, EntityFactoryServiceStubBuilder.cs:223, …
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`ExecuteFuture` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — NhQueryProviderProxy.cs:59
`ExecuteFutureValue` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — NhQueryProviderProxy.cs:64
`SetResultTransformerAndAdditionalCriteria` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — NhQueryProviderProxy.cs:69
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — NPoiExcelFile.cs:199, Log4NetConfigurationApplier.cs:168
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 61 of 111 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.1 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Only 27/70 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 70, 0 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` wastes a thread and, if the task needs a context this one is holding, deadlocks. `Dispose()` returns void by contract, so it cannot simply `await`: signal the work to stop first (cancel its token, set its stop flag) so the wait is short, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task cannot hang shutdown, and — where callers can use it — add an awaitable teardown (`DisposeAsync`/`StopAsync`) beside the synchronous one and let `Dispose()` remain the bounded fallback. — Polling.cs:129
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×2) — RabbitMQQueueMessageAdapter.cs:431, VaultConfigurationProvider.cs:54
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 37/69 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AsyncParallelForeach.cs:24, AsyncParallelForeach.cs:56, HttpResponseMessageExtensions.cs:41, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — Logger.cs:31
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×7) — EventCollector.cs:107, EventCollector.cs:119, RedisConnectionChecker.cs:66, …
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 9 suppression(s) across the 123952 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 43 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 integration event(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0 — System.Text.Json 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 25 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0 — System.Text.Json 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 25 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: NHibernate 5.5.1 — NHibernate 5.5.1 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 23 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 25 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 26 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.1.0 — System.Net.Http 4.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 15 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.3 — System.Text.Json 8.0.3 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 19 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.3 — System.Text.Json 8.0.3 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 19 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Npgsql 8.0.2 — Npgsql 8.0.2 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.IO.Packaging 8.0.0 — System.IO.Packaging 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.IO.Packaging 8.0.0 — System.IO.Packaging 8.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 6.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs 6.0.1 — System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs 6.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.3 — Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.2 — System.Text.Json 7.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:39— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:44— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/autobuild` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/autobuild` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:58— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: gittools/actions/gitversion/setup@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `gittools/actions/gitversion/setup@v0.9.7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/gittools/actions/commits/v0.9.7 --jq .sha`. `gittools/actions/gitversion/setup` is hosted INSIDE the `gittools/actions` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `gittools/actions/gitversion/setup` path in `uses:` and query only `gittools/actions`. Note that `v0.9.7` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/default.yml:66— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: gittools/actions/gitversion/execute@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `gittools/actions/gitversion/execute@v0.9.7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/gittools/actions/commits/v0.9.7 --jq .sha`. `gittools/actions/gitversion/execute` is hosted INSIDE the `gittools/actions` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `gittools/actions/gitversion/execute` path in `uses:` and query only `gittools/actions`. Note that `v0.9.7` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
EmptyCatchBlock src/ViennaNET.Logging/Logger.cs:31— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×15
Medium CVE: log4net 2.0.17 — log4net 2.0.17 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 26 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 — Azure.Identity 1.10.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3 — Azure.Identity 1.10.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 — Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 — BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 — BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 — BouncyCastle.Cryptography 2.2.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 — SixLabors.ImageSharp 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: KubernetesClient 12.1.1 — KubernetesClient 12.1.1 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.0.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 7.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.0.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.SimpleInjector.Extensions — ViennaNET.SimpleInjector.Extensions: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.Orm.DB2.NHibernateDriver — ViennaNET.Orm.DB2.NHibernateDriver: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 6 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.Utils — ViennaNET.Utils: abstractness 0.03, instability 0.00, distance 0.97 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 58 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.HttpClient — ViennaNET.HttpClient: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.13, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 7 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.Extensions.Http — ViennaNET.Extensions.Http: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.WebApi.Configurators.Swagger — ViennaNET.WebApi.Configurators.Swagger: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: ViennaNET.Logging — ViennaNET.Logging: abstractness 0.21, instability 0.06, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 17 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
BareSuppressMessage src/ViennaNET.Extensions.Mediator/DependencyInjection/MediatorServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:39— SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
BareSuppressMessage src/ViennaNET.Extensions.Mediator/DependencyInjection/MediatorServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:117— SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
BareSuppressMessage src/ViennaNET.Extensions.Mediator/Mediator.cs:7— SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
BareSuppressMessage src/ViennaNET.Extensions.Mediator/Mediator.cs:27— SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
BareSuppressMessage src/ViennaNET.KasperskyScanEngine.Client/Models/ScanRequestBase.cs:15— SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
TooManyMethods: RedisDatabase src/ViennaNET.Redis/Implementation/Default/RedisDatabase.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 356 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 76 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: SilentRedisDatabase src/ViennaNET.Redis/Implementation/Silent/SilentRedisDatabase.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 150 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 54 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: CompanyHostBuilder src/ViennaNET.WebApi/CompanyHostBuilderActions.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 191 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 32 methods, declared across 3 files: ViennaNET.WebApi/CompanyHostBuilderActions.cs (20), ViennaNET.WebApi/CompanyHostBuilder.cs (7), ViennaNET.WebApi/CompanyHostBuilderErrorHandler.cs (5). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Logger src/ViennaNET.Logging/Logger.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 113 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 31 methods. The type holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group its members by. To reduce it, split it by area instead: give each cohesive family of members its own smaller type, so no one type has to be read whole to change one of them.
TodoComment src/ViennaNET.ArcSight/SyslogRfc3164MessageSerializer.cs:8— //TODO: remove when https://github.com/emertechie/SyslogNet/pull/17 will be merged
TodoComment src/ViennaNET.WebApi/CompanyHostBuilder.cs:128— // TODO: нужно доработать, сделать корректные интерфейсы — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
BarePragmaDisable src/ViennaNET.Extensions.Http/ClientOptionsBase.cs:21— #pragma warning disable CS8618 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/ViennaNET.KasperskyScanEngine.Client/Models/ScanRequestBase.cs:16— #pragma warning disable S1694 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
CustomRollingFileAppender.InitializeFromOneFile (cyclomatic 17) src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs:993— CustomRollingFileAppender.InitializeFromOneFile has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 170 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1186.
CustomRollingFileAppender.RollOverRenameFiles (cognitive 43) src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs:1538— CustomRollingFileAppender.RollOverRenameFiles has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
CustomRollingFileAppender.InitializeFromOneFile (cognitive 27) src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs:993— CustomRollingFileAppender.InitializeFromOneFile has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Log4NetConfigurationApplier.GetFileAppender (cognitive 25) src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/Log4NetConfigurationApplier.cs:137— Log4NetConfigurationApplier.GetFileAppender has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ApplicationContextProvider.RegisterBoundedContexts (cognitive 17) src/ViennaNET.Orm/Factories/ApplicationContextProvider.cs:65— ApplicationContextProvider.RegisterBoundedContexts has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
Validator.CheckDependsOnMembers (cognitive 16) src/ViennaNET.Validation/Validators/Validator.cs:129— Validator.CheckDependsOnMembers has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ValidatorAsync.CheckDependsOnMembers (cognitive 16) src/ViennaNET.Validation/Validators/ValidatorAsync.cs:108— ValidatorAsync.CheckDependsOnMembers has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Code128.Encode (cognitive 16) src/ViennaNET.Word/Barcode/Code128.cs:202— Code128.Encode has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
OpenXmlExcelProcessor.ProcessUrl (cognitive 16) src/ViennaNET.Excel/Impls/OpenXmlExcelProcessor.cs:115— OpenXmlExcelProcessor.ProcessUrl has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 951.
ClassTooLong: CustomRollingFileAppender src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs:0— ClassTooLong — 429 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 25 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 11 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 1 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): default.yml: dotnet nuget push ./nupkgs/**/*.nupkg -s $NUGET_URL -k ${{secrets.NUGETKEY}} --skip-duplicate --no-symbols. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueMessageAdapter.cs:337— src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueMessageAdapter.cs:337-355 | src/ViennaNET.Messaging.ActiveMQQueue/ActiveMQQueueMessageAdapter.cs:331-349 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueMessageAdapter.cs:337` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueConfiguration.cs:116— src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueConfiguration.cs:116-133 | src/ViennaNET.Messaging.ActiveMQQueue/ActiveMqQueueConfiguration.cs:93-110 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/ViennaNET.WebApi.Configurators.HttpClients.Jwt/JwtHttpClientsConfigurator.cs:28— src/ViennaNET.WebApi.Configurators.HttpClients.Jwt/JwtHttpClientsConfigurator.cs:28-39 | src/ViennaNET.WebApi.Configurators.HttpClients.NoAuthentication/NoAuthenticationHttpClientsConfigurator.cs:30-41 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/ViennaNET.WebApi.Configurators.HttpClients.Jwt/JwtHttpClientsConfigurator.cs:28` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueMessageAdapter.cs:476— src/ViennaNET.Messaging.MQSeriesQueue/MqSeriesQueueMessageAdapter.cs:476-486 | src/ViennaNET.Messaging.ActiveMQQueue/ActiveMQQueueMessageAdapter.cs:466-477 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the test suite built and its tests PASSED, but the run produced no coverage data — `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` found no data collector, which is what a test project with no `coverlet.collector` PackageReference does. Nothing is wrong with the suite or the build; there is simply no coverage instrumentation wired up. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Largest orphaned file · ×3
Largest orphaned file src/ViennaNET.Logging/Log4NetImpl/CustomRollingFileAppender.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Largest orphaned file src/ViennaNET.Redis/IRedisDatabase.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Largest orphaned file src/ViennaNET.Redis/Implementation/Default/RedisDatabase.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Thin analysable surface across projects — 25 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `ViennaNET.Orm.DB2.NHibernateDriver` with 10 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 83 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.34 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 35752 LoC spread over 111 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
Dormant codebase — 172 of 172 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 172 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
IL efficiency: 2 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/ViennaNET.ArcSight/Validation/ExtensionsRule.cs:7— 2 of 2157 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: ViennaNET.ArcSight.Validation.ExtensionsRule..ctor @ src/ViennaNET.ArcSight/Validation/ExtensionsRule.cs:7, 2139 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by ViennaNET.WebApi).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly — Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly 8.0.4 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.HttpClient).
Outdated: Polly — Polly 8.2.0 → 8.7.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.HttpClient).
Outdated: log4net — log4net 2.0.17 → 3.3.2 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Logging).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 8.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Logging).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Logging).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 8.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Logging).
Outdated: FluentNHibernate — FluentNHibernate 3.3.0 → 3.4.1 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Orm).
Outdated: NHibernate — NHibernate 5.5.1 → 5.7.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Orm).
Outdated: SimpleInjector.Packaging — SimpleInjector.Packaging 5.0.0 → 5.5.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Orm.DefaultConfiguration).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions — Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtensions 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis).
Outdated: StackExchange.Redis — StackExchange.Redis 2.7.33 → 3.1.3 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis).
Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 7.5.1 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Security.Jwt).
Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 7.5.1 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Security.Jwt).
Outdated: coverlet.msbuild — coverlet.msbuild 6.0.2 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.9.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.20.70 → 4.20.72 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: NUnit — NUnit 4.1.0 → 4.6.1 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: NUnit.Analyzers — NUnit.Analyzers 4.1.0 → 4.14.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: NUnit3TestAdapter — NUnit3TestAdapter 4.5.0 → 6.2.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: NunitXml.TestLogger — NunitXml.TestLogger 3.1.20 → 8.0.0 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Redis.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.Bcl.AsyncInterfaces — Microsoft.Bcl.AsyncInterfaces 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Mediator.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.ArcSight.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Orm.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Console — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Console 8.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by ViennaNET.Orm.Tests).
+ 27 more in this group — see findings.md.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fc802-d288-7722-9bb6-7c924502bdab · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 42 · Warnings: 95 · Recommendations: 13 · Info: 53 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 14:24 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.