Public report of RemyDuijkeren/NodaMoney, published 21 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 00:00 UTC · Survey ID cd_e2264fb35930437db61dc1b8a24517a0
RemyDuijkeren/NodaMoney
Measured 21 October 2026, 23:57 UTC, at code version b27ca99
CAI scoreAdequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Down 13 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 6,345 lines of product code in 21 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.2 person-years · Weakest lens: Maturity, 45
Findings by how serious they are
23 critical79 serious86 minor
1 dimension is left out of the score. Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. It counts neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists it with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
21 October 2026, 23:57 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
72of 76 dimensions measured by tools. The other 4 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
166of 188 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 22 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
76dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 6,345 lines of product code in 21 projects.
RemyDuijkeren/NodaMoney scores 63 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, while five of its six lenses score higher still: Architecture and Performance at 100, both rated Exemplary, Code Health at 83 and Production Readiness at 70, both rated Strong, and Security and Compliance at 77, rated Adequate.
The score is lower than those five because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Maturity, which scores 45 and is rated Weak. Its Documentation accuracy dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Maturity can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor and to reconcile the README with reality: README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md links to `_[MethodNameUnderTest]`, but `tests/NodaMoney.Tests/_[MethodNameUnderTest]` does not exist, and if Maturity rose to 70, the score would rise from 63 to about 74.
23 findings are critical: 20 in Static Analysis (SAST), one in Explicit Debt, one in Project dependency cycles and one in Test Quality.
The product code is 6,345 lines, which would take an estimated 0.2 person-years, around €22,000, to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
These 2 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Coupling · Off the main sequence: NodaMoney(net10.0)
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit
Rebuild cost: about €22,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€7,300 to €37,000, for 122 to 391 hours of work, about 0.2 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.9 at a score of 63. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 6,345 lines of product code, of which 24% is declarations and boilerplate, 28% straight logic and 48% logic with branches
Comment lines
The estimate prices 3,963 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 6,345 lines but aren't priced as work.
How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.
Raises the score by about 12 points · Low effort · Bus Factor
2
Reconcile the README with reality: README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md links to `_[MethodNameUnderTest]`, but `tests/NodaMoney.Tests/_[MethodNameUnderTest]` does not exist.
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Files that change often carry extra risk · Combined risk
One file is changed often and is hard to read, which makes it the likeliest place for a mistake. It also has under half its code tested, or was written almost entirely by one person, so a mistake there is less likely to be caught, or only one person knows the code well enough to avoid it. A change to this file therefore carries more risk than the overall score suggests.
Based on: Churn × Complexity Hotspots (1 file) · Code Coverage (6 files under half tested) · Bus Factor (0 files written almost entirely by one person) · The files: CurrencyInfo.cs
What to do: Add tests to these files and have a second person review every change to them, starting with CurrencyInfo.cs.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €22,000 to build again, about 0.2 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Maturity, at 45 (Weak). Maturity is about how well the project explains and looks after itself, which decides whether a new developer, or a new supplier, can take over. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Maturity also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Maturity grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Maturity actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 12 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 Bus Factor findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
7 modules, with 7 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 3 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
NodaMoney.DependencyInjection uses NodaMoney.Context, so a change to NodaMoney.Context can break NodaMoney.DependencyInjection, while a change to NodaMoney.DependencyInjection can't break NodaMoney.Context.
Position
Below the diagonal: NodaMoney.DependencyInjection uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
NodaMoney.Serialization uses NodaMoney.Context, so a change to NodaMoney.Context can break NodaMoney.Serialization, while a change to NodaMoney.Serialization can't break NodaMoney.Context.
Position
Below the diagonal: NodaMoney.Serialization uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
NodaMoney.Serialization uses NodaMoney, so a change to NodaMoney can break NodaMoney.Serialization, while a change to NodaMoney.Serialization can't break NodaMoney.
Position
Below the diagonal: NodaMoney.Serialization uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
20
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
9
Medium
Roadmap
First, reconcile the README files with the actual project state to eliminate installation instructions for missing packages and broken test links. Next, address the off-boarding risk by ensuring knowledge transfer for critical components, then document significant design decisions in a dedicated ADR folder to preserve architectural context. Finally, resolve the identified documentation quality issue regarding deserialization plans and improve the overall value of code comments to reduce redundancy and enhance clarity.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.
Reconcile the README with reality: README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md links to `_[MethodNameUnderTest]`, but `tests/NodaMoney.Tests/_[MethodNameUnderTest]` does not exist.
Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.csproj (4), NodaMoney.csproj, NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.Tests.csproj.
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Test Quality: Assertions commented out: WhenDecimalDigitIsLowerThenMinusOne_ThenCreatingShouldThrow
src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs
8.2
Near-clean
Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/NodaMoney/Currency.cs
8.2
Near-clean
Explicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 23
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 79
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 86
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 1
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 72 of 76 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 1.0 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 166 of 188 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/Currency.Serializable.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/DotNetCompatibility.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/Money.Serializable.cs`, … (+1 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 2 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 42.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Money.ParseCurrencySymbol at 40. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being CurrencyInfo.Format at 20 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Money.ParseCurrencySymbol (cyclomatic 40), CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact (cyclomatic 33), Money.CompareTo (cyclomatic 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.7 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 8 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Money.CompareTo (cognitive 44), CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact (cognitive 41), Money.ParseCurrencySymbol (cognitive 38). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 8 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.2 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D3 · God Classes8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with Money.FiveMostUsedCurrencies.cs, FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with CurrencyRegistry.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (20–27 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with MoneyJsonConverter.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with FastMoney.Convertible.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Resolve the 4 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ExtendedMoney.cs, FastMoney.Comparable.cs, Money.Serializable.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CRAP 42 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with Money.Parsable.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CRAP 37 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CurrencyInfo.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
3808 test methods: 3808 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
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D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
7 skipped (7 with a documented reason), 3 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 763 tests.
Resolve the 1 Assertions commented out finding(s) in Test Quality — start with InitiateInternallyACurrency.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with CompareMoney.cs, CreateMoney.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 7 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.csproj (4), NodaMoney.csproj, NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.Tests.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 Outdated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.csproj (4), NodaMoney.csproj (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with packages.lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 174 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 19 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 139 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over the committed REDACTED.lock.json` and nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with CurrencyInfo.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D16 · Bus Factor2.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
25 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs. Counted over 33 of the 44 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
BareSuppressMessage repeated 10 times in 6 filessrc/NodaMoney/Exchange/ExchangeRate.cs:106
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with InitializingMoneyBenchmarks.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 18 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CurrencyInfo.cs (7), CurrencyRegistry.cs (3), FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
Resolve the 11 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Money.NumericInterfaces.cs (3), CurrencyInfo.cs (2), AllCurrencies.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
21 projects, 875 source files, 16726 hand-written lines of code (6345 production / 10381 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 16 inter-project edges.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The repository's root README (NodaMoney) is clear and well written: it explains what the library does (currency-as-first-class citizen with safe arithmetic, rounding, parsing/formatting), contrasts decimal with NodaMoney's domain concepts, names inspirations (JodaMoney/JodaTime), lists everything it provides, and gives install/build commands. The docs/ README documents that directory rather than the repository root, so its overview/installation is internal-focused and clipped; the features/cldr/, proposals/, and tests/NodaMoney.Tests/ directories each document their own subdirectories and are well written for their audiences. The XML-doc coverage (4/5 NodaMoney.DependencyInjection) reflects the per-package documentation quality of those packages rather than the repository's root.
Documentation: contradicts the codedocs/plans/2026-09-02-1035-fix-deserialization-money-context-plan.md
Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with 2026-09-02-1035-fix-deserialization-money-context-plan.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
1 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Inconsistent pluralization of currency names in test method names. 'CreateEuros', 'CreateDollars', 'CreateYuan', and 'CreateYens' use plural forms (or inconsistent singular/plural usage for Yuan/Yen), while 'CreatePonds' uses a non-standard plural form for 'Pound'. The concept is creating money instances for specific currencies, but the naming convention for the currency identifier varies between singular/plural and standard/non-standard forms.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D24 · Comment ValueStrong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
60 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 89 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
20 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 17 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 6 file(s) — `src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs` (lines 341–342, line 345), `src/NodaMoney/Currency.Serializable.cs` (line 38, line 43), `src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs` (lines 7–331, line 333, line 336, …), `src/NodaMoney/DotNetCompatibility.cs` (lines 6–28), `src/NodaMoney/Money.Serializable.cs` (line 117, line 133), … (+1 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 3 of those file(s) — `src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/Price.cs` — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them. In 4 of those file(s) — `src/NodaMoney/Currency.Serializable.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/DotNetCompatibility.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/Money.Serializable.cs` — the break is at a TYPE DECLARATION (a C# primary constructor semgrep's grammar cannot parse), so the loss is wider than the named lines: rules scoped to that type see no type to scope to and are blind over its whole body, while rules matching statements keep working there. Absence of a type-scoped finding in those types is not evidence of anything. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 17 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 33 of the 44 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D39 · IL Efficiency9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 5 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
The namespaces NodaMoney ↔ NodaMoney.Context ↔ NodaMoney.Exchange depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is NodaMoney → NodaMoney.Exchange (NodaMoney.ExtendedMoney → NodaMoney.Exchange.ExchangeRate, 2 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — src/NodaMoney/ExtendedMoney.cs:1
What to do
Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — src/NodaMoney/Context/CashDenominationRounding.cs:7, src/NodaMoney/Context/CashDenominationRounding.cs:12
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
`Round` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — src/NodaMoney/Context/CashDenominationRounding.cs:12
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×34) — src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:15, src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs:241, src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.Comparable.cs:135, …
A test is skipped ("Names contains countries at the moment") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Iso4127Spec/CompareNodaMoneyWithIso4127.cs:43
A test is skipped ("Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. (×3) — tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:14, tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:24, tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:37
A test is skipped ("This test is not working. Can't fix this without Newtonsoft dependency.") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/NewtonsoftJsonSerializerSpec/DeserializeMoney.cs:9
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 3 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:33
README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:34
docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/README.md:29
docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/README.md:30
tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md links to `_[MethodNameUnderTest]`, but `tests/NodaMoney.Tests/_[MethodNameUnderTest]` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md:76
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it; docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it; tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md links to `_[MethodNameUnderTest]`, but `tests/NodaMoney.Tests/_[MethodNameUnderTest]` does not exist.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
The guard on line 373 rejects `code` and line 374 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(code)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `code`, and on that path `code` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows the empty case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` for the empty case, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition. — src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:374
The guard on line 997 rejects `code` and line 998 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(code)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `code`, and on that path `code` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows the empty case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` for the empty case, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition. — src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:998
What to do
Each finding names the throw and the test in its own condition that is true of a NON-null value. Confirm from the two, then throw the exception that describes what was actually wrong: `ArgumentException` for a value that arrived empty, or the .NET 8 helpers that spell the whole guard in one line and pick the type for you — `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty(s)` / `ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(s)` for strings, `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(x)` followed by `ArgumentOutOfRangeException.ThrowIfZero(x.Count)` for a collection. Splitting the two conditions is usually clearer than picking one exception for both: they are different failures and the caller may want to handle them differently.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.
Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.5 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 13 suppression(s) across the 28840 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
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Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 43 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (6,345 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 6 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured: of the 17 type(s) found, none both holds instance state and has two or more methods whose shared use of it could be read (10 with fewer than two methods, 5 stateless, 1 stub-like, 1 holding only inherited state), so LCOM4 is undefined for every type in this repository. Not scored — the metric does not apply here, and this is not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (25 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 41 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X2 Cancellation propagation — no async method does work a token could cancel
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Namespace dependency cycle src/NodaMoney/ExtendedMoney.cs:1— The namespaces NodaMoney ↔ NodaMoney.Context ↔ NodaMoney.Exchange depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is NodaMoney → NodaMoney.Exchange (NodaMoney.ExtendedMoney → NodaMoney.Exchange.ExchangeRate, 2 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.
Assertions commented out: WhenDecimalDigitIsLowerThenMinusOne_ThenCreatingShouldThrow tests/NodaMoney.Tests/CurrencyInfoSpec/InitiateInternallyACurrency.cs:53— The test body contains commented-out assertion calls and no live one — it runs, verifies nothing, and still passes. Restore the assertions or delete the test; a green test that checks nothing is worse than an absent one.
WriteOnlyPrivateField tests/Benchmark/InitializingMoneyBenchmarks.cs:10— private Currency _euro — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs:9— // TODO: Handling of Ambiguous Currency Symbols when formatting/parsing? Add configurable policy enforcement to
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:9— // TODO: Add support for the following properties? Or use MoneyContext for this? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:20— // TODO: Should we use internal sealed class CurrencyData to store the data? CultureInfo has a similar structure called
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:23— // TODO: add Country/Region info? The default country in which the currency is used. Allows localization by region. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:61— // TODO: use MoneyContext for this? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:506— // TODO: check if Money.Currency and this is equal, and also check IFormatProvider? What to do if not equal? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:513— // TODO: allow custom format with currency sign ($)? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs:9— // TODO: allow duplicates with priority? (e.g. non ISO-4217 currencies). For now we don't allow.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs:254— // TODO: Move to resource file? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs:307— // TODO: new symbol since July 18, 2014 => see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_lari
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs:139— // TODO: Do we need to check for Context, because we are not rounding — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs:184— // TODO: Do we need to check for Context, because we are not rounding — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs:236— // TODO: cast could throw OverFlowException if outside min-max values of long! — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.cs:20— // TODO add interface IMoney or IMonetary or IMonetaryAmount? Using the interface will cause boxing! — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/Money.Formattable.cs:84— // TODO: optimize to use Span — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:58— // TODO: serialize non-ISO-4217 currencies with same code as ISO-4217 currencies, like "XXX;NON-ISO 234.25" or something else?
TodoComment src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:59— // TODO: code is now overall unique, so no need for non-ISO-4217 indicator
Deprecated: xunit tests/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.Tests/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection.Tests.csproj:33— xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
Deprecated: xunit tests/NodaMoney.Tests/NodaMoney.Tests.csproj:45— xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/Currency.cs:14— #pragma warning disable RCS1181 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/MinorUnit.cs:12— #pragma warning disable RCS1181 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/Money.cs:15— #pragma warning disable RCS1181 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/Money.Comparable.cs:143— #pragma warning disable RCS1238 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/Serialization/CurrencyJsonConverter.cs:8— #pragma warning disable CA1704 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:11— #pragma warning disable CA1704 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
BarePragmaDisable src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:118— #pragma warning disable CA1704 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
No assertions: CompareProfile tests/NodaMoney.Tests/MoneyComparableSpec/CompareMoney.cs:11— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: TweakDecimalScale tests/NodaMoney.Tests/MoneySpec/CreateMoney.cs:272— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
TooManyMethods: Money src/NodaMoney/Money.FiveMostUsedCurrencies.cs— TooManyMethods — 712 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 138 methods, declared across 11 files: NodaMoney/Money.FiveMostUsedCurrencies.cs (25), NodaMoney/Money.BinaryOperators.cs (21), NodaMoney/Money.Constructors.cs (16), NodaMoney/Money.cs (15), +7 more file(s). The bar is 30 methods; this is 108 over it, 4.60× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: FastMoney src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs— TooManyMethods — 406 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 94 methods, declared across 6 files: NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs (28), NodaMoney/FastMoney.Convertible.cs (25), NodaMoney/FastMoney.Constructors.cs (14), NodaMoney/FastMoney.cs (11), +2 more file(s). The bar is 30 methods; this is 64 over it, 3.13× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NodaMoney/Context/CashDenominationRounding.cs:7— A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NodaMoney/Context/CashDenominationRounding.cs:12— A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard· Argument guard throws the exception its own condition disproves · ×2
Argument guard throws the exception its own condition disproves src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:374— The guard on line 373 rejects `code` and line 374 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(code)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `code`, and on that path `code` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows the empty case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` for the empty case, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition.
Argument guard throws the exception its own condition disproves src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:998— The guard on line 997 rejects `code` and line 998 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(code)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `code`, and on that path `code` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows the empty case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` for the empty case, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition.
Money.ParseCurrencySymbol (cyclomatic 40) src/NodaMoney/Money.Parsable.cs:336— Money.ParseCurrencySymbol has cyclomatic complexity 40 (threshold 15). Of this number, 35 points are the body's own statements and 5 belong to 2 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact (cyclomatic 33) src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:560— CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Money.CompareTo (cyclomatic 17) src/NodaMoney/Money.Comparable.cs:123— Money.CompareTo has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
CurrencyInfo.ParseFormatSpecifier (cyclomatic 16) src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:911— CurrencyInfo.ParseFormatSpecifier has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: CurrencyInfo.Format (cyclomatic 20) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
Hotspot: src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:493— src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs changed 5 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 20 in CurrencyInfo.Format at line 493. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 4 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-07-12..2026-10-10, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-12 15:33:52 +08:00' --until='2026-10-10 15:33:52 +08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt· BareSuppressMessage repeated 10 times in 6 files · ×1
BareSuppressMessage repeated 10 times in 6 files src/NodaMoney/Exchange/ExchangeRate.cs:106— The identical BareSuppressMessage (`SuppressMessage`) appears 10 times in 6 files — one decision applied repeatedly (e.g. the same rule silenced on every overload of a fluent API), not 10 independent debts. Decide it once — at the type or project level, or by fixing the underlying pattern — rather than occurrence-by-occurrence. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
XxxComment tests/NodaMoney.Tests/MoneyRoundingSpec/DivisionMultiplicationWithRemainder.cs:8— // XXX does not do rounding — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Money.CompareTo (cognitive 44) src/NodaMoney/Money.Comparable.cs:123— Money.CompareTo has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact (cognitive 41) src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:560— CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Money.ParseCurrencySymbol (cognitive 38) src/NodaMoney/Money.Parsable.cs:336— Money.ParseCurrencySymbol has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Of this number, 36 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to 2 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
CurrencyInfo.ParseFormatSpecifier (cognitive 33) src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:911— CurrencyInfo.ParseFormatSpecifier has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
FastMoney.TryBuildMoneyFromTicks (cognitive 24) src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.Convertible.cs:34— FastMoney.TryBuildMoneyFromTicks has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Money.TryParseCurrencyInfo (cognitive 20) src/NodaMoney/Money.Parsable.cs:213— Money.TryParseCurrencyInfo has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
MoneyJsonConverter.ParseMoneyFromJsonObject (cognitive 19) src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:119— MoneyJsonConverter.ParseMoneyFromJsonObject has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
IntegerRounding.TryRound (cognitive 18) src/NodaMoney/IntegerRounding.cs:28— IntegerRounding.TryRound has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. Note what this body is, though: it carries an aggressive-inlining request, so its author has asked in the source for this body to be inlined into every caller. Each part pulled out of it becomes a call the runtime has to decide to inline again, against a size budget — so the split can quietly turn one inlined body into several real calls, on the path the marker exists to protect. The measurement stands — a hot path is not a licence to be unreadable — but the move that pays here is to lift the COLD parts out first (argument validation, fallback and error paths, one-off setup) and leave the kernel whole. Where the kernel itself has to be divided, ask for the extracted parts to be inlined as well, and measure the result rather than assuming the division is free.
MethodTooLong: CurrencyRegistry.InitializeCurrencies src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs:255— MethodTooLong — InitializeCurrencies runs 311 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 211 over it, 3.11× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
Duplicated block (20–27 lines × 2) src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:64— src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:64-90 | src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyTypeConverter.cs:31-50 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyJsonConverter.cs:64` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.Convertible.cs:113— src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.Convertible.cs:113-117 | src/NodaMoney/Money.Convertible.cs:156-160 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
CRAP 42: Money.ParseCurrencySymbol src/NodaMoney/Money.Parsable.cs:336— Cyclomatic 40 with 90.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 37: CurrencyInfo.FormatCompact src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:560— Cyclomatic 33 with 84.7% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NodaMoney/Context/CashDenominationRounding.cs:12— `Round` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs:15— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs:241— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.Comparable.cs:135— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.Formattable.cs:78— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:161— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:167— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:173— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:179— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:185— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:191— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:197— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:221— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:227— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:233— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:239— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:245— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:251— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:252— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:258— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:276— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:282— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:288— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:294— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:300— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs:306— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Disabled test tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Iso4127Spec/CompareNodaMoneyWithIso4127.cs:43— A test is skipped ("Names contains countries at the moment") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it.
Disabled test tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:14— A test is skipped ("Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it.
Disabled test tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:24— A test is skipped ("Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it.
Disabled test tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:37— A test is skipped ("Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it.
Disabled test tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/NewtonsoftJsonSerializerSpec/DeserializeMoney.cs:9— A test is skipped ("This test is not working. Can't fix this without Newtonsoft dependency.") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it.
README/code drift README.md:33— README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift README.md:34— README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift docs/README.md:29— docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift docs/README.md:30— docs/README.md installs the package `NodaMoney.DependencyInjection` (`dotnet add package NodaMoney.DependencyInjection # optional DI integration`), but no project or props file references it. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md:76— tests/NodaMoney.Tests/README.md links to `_[MethodNameUnderTest]`, but `tests/NodaMoney.Tests/_[MethodNameUnderTest]` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder src/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection/packages.lock.json:72— Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 5.0.0 — Other,Legacy. It is resolved transitively in src/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection/packages.lock.json: no project of this repository references it directly, so the move is on the reference that pulls it in.
Deprecated: Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives src/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection/packages.lock.json:80— Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives 5.0.0 — Other,Legacy. It is resolved transitively in src/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection/packages.lock.json: no project of this repository references it directly, so the move is on the reference that pulls it in.
Deprecated: System.Runtime.CompilerServices.Unsafe src/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection/packages.lock.json:115— System.Runtime.CompilerServices.Unsafe 5.0.0 — Other,Legacy. It is resolved transitively in src/NodaMoney.DependencyInjection/packages.lock.json: no project of this repository references it directly, so the move is on the reference that pulls it in.
Duplicated predicate src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.cs:179— `Context.EnforceZeroCurrencyMatching || other.Context.EnforceZeroCurrencyMatching` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.cs, src/NodaMoney/Money.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate src/NodaMoney/Serialization/CurrencyTypeConverter.cs:15— `sourceType == typeof(string) || base.CanConvertFrom(context, sourceType)` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/NodaMoney/Serialization/CurrencyTypeConverter.cs, src/NodaMoney/Serialization/MoneyTypeConverter.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 25 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs, src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs, src/NodaMoney/FastMoney.BinaryOperators.cs, src/NodaMoney/Money.Parsable.cs, src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs, src/NodaMoney/Money.NumericInterfaces.cs, src/NodaMoney/Money.BinaryOperators.cs, src/NodaMoney/Money.cs (+17 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Documentation: contradicts the code docs/plans/2026-09-02-1035-fix-deserialization-money-context-plan.md— The deserialization Money Context plan (fix #119) is a documentation-only draft that references an implementation-ready fix and the 2.8 benchmark but does not yet describe how ambient context will be used in any serialization technology. Add a short summary of the proposed ambient-context deserialization path for each supported format, or link to the PR/commit where it is implemented.
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent pluralization of currency names in test method names. 'CreateEuros', 'CreateDollars', 'CreateYuan', and 'CreateYens' use plural forms (or inconsistent singular/plural usage for Yuan/Yen), while 'CreatePonds' uses a non-standard plural form for 'Pound'. The concept is creating money instances for specific currencies, but the naming convention for the currency identifier varies between singular/plural and standard/non-standard forms. · ×1
Inconsistent pluralization of currency names in test method names. 'CreateEuros', 'CreateDollars', 'CreateYuan', and 'CreateYens' use plural forms (or inconsistent singular/plural usage for Yuan/Yen), while 'CreatePonds' uses a non-standard plural form for 'Pound'. The concept is creating money instances for specific currencies, but the naming convention for the currency identifier varies between singular/plural and standard/non-standard forms. — Standardize to singular currency names for consistency with other tests in the codebase (e.g., CreateEuro, CreateDollar, CreateYuan, CreateYen, CreatePound) or consistently use plurals if that is the established pattern for this specific test class, but 'Ponds' is not a standard plural for Pound. (symbols: NodaMoney.Tests.MoneyFiveMostUsedCurrenciesSpec.CreateEuros, NodaMoney.Tests.MoneyFiveMostUsedCurrenciesSpec.CreateDollars, NodaMoney.Tests.MoneyFiveMostUsedCurrenciesSpec.CreateYuan, NodaMoney.Tests.MoneyFiveMostUsedCurrenciesSpec.CreateYens, NodaMoney.Tests.MoneyFiveMostUsedCurrenciesSpec.CreatePonds)
IL efficiency: 4 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs:256— 4 of 442 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: NodaMoney.CurrencyRegistry.InitializeCurrencies @ src/NodaMoney/CurrencyRegistry.cs:256, 4835 IL instructions; that pulled this dimension to 9.8/10. These bodies are far past the JIT's inline budget, so splitting them does not make them inlinable — what moves the number is emitting less: collapsing LINQ chains and closures on hot paths, and interpolation built eagerly where it is only sometimes used.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No release approval gate — The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~0.5 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 13 suppression(s) across the 28840 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
Skipped (documented): WhenCompareCurrencies_ThenTheyShouldHaveTheSameEnglishName tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Iso4127Spec/CompareNodaMoneyWithIso4127.cs:43— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Names contains countries at the moment
Skipped (documented): WhenSerializingYen_ThenThisShouldSucceed tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:14— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter
Skipped (documented): WhenSerializingEuro_ThenThisShouldSucceed tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:24— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter
Skipped (documented): WhenSerializingArticle_ThenThisShouldSucceed tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/BinaryFormatterSpec/SerializeMoney.cs:37— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Not supported in .NET 8.0 or greater. See https://aka.ms/binaryformatter
Skipped (documented): WhenDeserializingV1_ThenThisShouldSucceed tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/NewtonsoftJsonSerializerSpec/DeserializeMoney.cs:9— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: This test is not working. Can't fix this without Newtonsoft dependency.
Skipped (documented): WhenDeserializingWithInvalidJSONV1_ThenThisShouldFail tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/NewtonsoftJsonSerializerSpec/DeserializeMoney.cs:18— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: This test is not working. Can't fix this without Newtonsoft dependency.
Skipped (documented): WhenDeserializingWithNestedV1_ThenThisShouldSucceed tests/NodaMoney.Tests/Serialization/NewtonsoftJsonSerializerSpec/DeserializeMoney.cs:27— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: This test is not working. Can't fix this without Newtonsoft dependency.
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 6 file(s) — `src/NodaMoney/Context/MoneyContext.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/Currency.Serializable.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/CurrencyInfo.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/DotNetCompatibility.cs`, `src/NodaMoney/Money.Serializable.cs`, … (+1 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a160e6-0680-7de6-a928-e50444fb028e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 23 · Warnings: 79 · Recommendations: 68 · Info: 18 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 21-10-2026 @ 23:57 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.