Distributed microservices social network with Blazor frontend
Public report — distributed_minispace, published 20 Jun 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 3,961 LoC · 6 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Accessibility (36%)
Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (29 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsGrantedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsRevokedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'profileImageUrl' of 'Student.Student(Guid, string, DateTime, string, string, string, string, DateTime?, bool, bool, State, IEnumerable<Guid>, IEnumerable<Guid>, string, IEnumerable<Education>, IEnumerable<Work>, IEnumerable<Language>, IEnumerable<Interest>, bool, string, string, string, string, string, bool, string, DateTime?)'; CS1503: Argument 1: cannot convert from 'System.Guid' to 'string'; CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'emailNotifications' of 'Student.Update(string, string, string, bool, string, string, string, string, DateTime?)'
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
283findings with an exact file:lineof 310 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
59/92dimensions across the health lenses3961 LoC · 6 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
SaintAngeLs/distributed_minispace carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (36%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Security (44%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives); Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler) (Keyboard semantics); accessibility in the toolchain (A11y enforcement).
For scale: Small (~3,961 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€13,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 36% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsGrantedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsRevokedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'profileImageUrl' of 'Student.Student(Guid, string, DateTime, string, string, string, string, DateTime?, bool, bool, State, IEnumerable<Guid>, IEnumerable<Guid>, string, IEnumerable<Education>, IEnumerable<Work>, IEnumerable<Language>, IEnumerable<Interest>, bool, string, string, string, string, string, bool, string, DateTime?)'; CS1503: Argument 1: cannot convert from 'System.Guid' to 'string'; CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'emailNotifications' of 'Student.Update(string, string, string, bool, string, string, string, string, DateTime?)'.
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsGrantedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsRevokedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'profileImageUrl' of 'Student.Student(Guid, string, DateTime, string, string, string, string, DateTime?, bool, bool, State, IEnumerable<Guid>, IEnumerable<Guid>, string, IEnumerable<Education>, IEnumerable<Work>, IEnumerable<Language>, IEnumerable<Interest>, bool, string, string, string, string, string, bool, string, DateTime?)'; CS1503: Argument 1: cannot convert from 'System.Guid' to 'string'; CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'emailNotifications' of 'Student.Update(string, string, string, bool, string, string, string, string, DateTime?)'.
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 36%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 6.5/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 4–8% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2 complexity, D4 duplication, D6 cohesion: averaging 6.5/10 across the code-quality signals
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+22.8 pts/run over 3 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +22.8 pts/run over 3 runs
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
At a glance — Code Health · 46% · Weak · gated by D3, D4, D18, X4, X5
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
44
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
22
High / Critical
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video; Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href; Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 59 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 59 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 283 of 310 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct, and component-wrapped fields (e.g. a <TextField>) are skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — only literal inline colours and in-repo <style>-block CSS are read; external stylesheets, CSS-in-JS, computed/runtime/theme colour, and image contrast are all out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the markup itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
Resolve the 4 _dataApiKeydownHandler (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with bootstrap.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 _clearMenus (cyclomatic 16) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with bootstrap.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ExceptionToMessageMapper.Map (cyclomatic 18) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ExceptionToMessageMapper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 17 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 4 toggle (cognitive 28) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with bootstrap.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 _dataApiKeydownHandler (cognitive 23) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with bootstrap.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 _clearMenus (cognitive 20) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with bootstrap.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 16 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with ChatPage.razor, ChatsAll.razor, CreateEvent.razor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with bootstrap.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 33 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 12 Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ChatPage.razor (2), PostDetails.razor (2), ProfileComponent.razor (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 10 Duplicated block (19 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with PostCard.razor (2), EmailVerification.razor, GalleryComponent.razor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 9 Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ChatsAll.razor (2), EventsComponent.razor, NotificationsComponent.razor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Off the main sequence: MiniSpace.Services.Identity.Core
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4)MiniSpace.Services.Identity/src/MiniSpace.Services.Identity.Core/Entities/User.cs:8
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Improve Code Coverage — currently 5.0/10. — Line coverage 5.7%.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
360 test methods: 360 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests
Tests co-located / outside the solution
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with localhost.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
162 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is MiniSpace.Web/src/Astravent.Web.Wasm/Areas/Identity/IdentityService.cs, held by voznesenskijandrej5@gmail.com.
Small-team knowledge concentration
Off-boarding risk: voznesenskijandrej5@gmail.com
What to do
Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 3961 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
51 finding(s): 0 critical, 51 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×20MiniSpace.APIGateway.Nuar/src/MiniSpace.APIGateway/ntrada-async.yml:44detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 20 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with ntrada.docker.yml (4), ntrada-async.docker.yml (3), ntrada-async.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×21MiniSpace.APIGateway.Nuar/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×2MiniSpace/compose/host-prometheus/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×21MiniSpace.APIGateway.Nuar/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 21 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (21). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
Resolve the 21 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (21). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
233 of 332 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is MiniSpace.Web/src/Astravent.Web.Wasm/Areas/Identity/IdentityService.cs.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives2.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, and video has a captions track. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. Add a <track kind="captions"> (or confirm captions are provided another way). (×14) — AboutApp.razor:4, ForgotPassword.razor:71, ResetPassword.razor:71, …
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×11) — GalleryComponent.razor:75, GalleryComponent.razor:92, ProfileComponent.razor:218, …
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, fieldsets have a legend, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×7) — ChatPage.razor:100, FooterComponent.razor:50, ChatPage.razor:100, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language and title, expose a main landmark and a sane heading order, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×6) — new_message.html:2, new_message.html:2, index.html:2, …
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×10) — FriendsRequests.razor:45, SentRequests.razor:44, FooterComponent.razor:33, …
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×2) — _Host.cshtml:0, _Host.cshtml:0
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×25) — BlockedListComponent.razor:43, GalleryComponent.razor:47, GalleryComponent.razor:80, …
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, and no aria-hidden on a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible, never computed or runtime colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
outline:none/0 in an inline style removes the keyboard focus ring with no chance of a :focus replacement. Keep a visible focus indicator. (×6) — new_message.html:181, new_message.html:182, new_message.html:183, …
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IIdentityContext` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IIdentityContext.cs:6
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.
What to do
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.
What to do
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P9 · Domain vs controller coverage1.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.
Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.
Domain coverage is 4% — the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.
What to do
Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. — Program.cs:122
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 6/37 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — Program.cs:24, Program.cs:128, IdentityService.cs:63, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. (×25) — DisableTwoFactorHandler.cs:23, EnableTwoFactorHandler.cs:23, GenerateTwoFactorSecretHandler.cs:23, …
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
1/6 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria — partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 28 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (3,961 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size
D27 Navigability — Navigability unmeasured — symbol resolution incomplete
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D39 IL Efficiency — IL metrics not applicable
D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (3 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot))
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): a message-bus package; 2 CQRS handler(s)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM not available — accuracy is the Tier-2 layer and needs a reachable model.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
X8 JS interop contract — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
No assertions: Test1 MiniSpace.Services.Friends/tests/MiniSpace.Services.Friends.E2ETests/UnitTest1.cs:5— Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
No assertions: RemoveMediaFile_WithExisting_ShouldNotThrowException MiniSpace.Services.Posts/tests/MiniSpace.Services.Posts.Core.UnitTests/Entities/PostTest.cs:75— Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
No assertions: RemoveMediaFile_WithNotExisting_ShouldThrowMediaFileNotFoundException MiniSpace.Services.Posts/tests/MiniSpace.Services.Posts.Core.UnitTests/Entities/PostTest.cs:87— Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
Change coupling: EventsService.cs ↔ IEventsService.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/EventsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/EventsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/IEventsService.cs` change together 66% of the time (43 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: INotificationsService.cs ↔ NotificationsService.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Notifications/INotificationsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Notifications/INotificationsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Notifications/NotificationsService.cs` change together 61% of the time (14 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: IEventsService.cs ↔ AddEventModel.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/IEventsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/IEventsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Models/Events/AddEventModel.cs` change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: EventsService.cs ↔ AddEventModel.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/EventsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/EventsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Models/Events/AddEventModel.cs` change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: IStudentsService.cs ↔ StudentsService.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Students/IStudentsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Students/IStudentsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Students/StudentsService.cs` change together 59% of the time (36 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: CommentsService.cs ↔ ICommentsService.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Comments/CommentsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Comments/CommentsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Comments/ICommentsService.cs` change together 59% of the time (10 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: CustomHttpClient.cs ↔ IHttpClient.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/HttpClients/CustomHttpClient.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/HttpClients/CustomHttpClient.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/HttpClients/IHttpClient.cs` change together 58% of the time (11 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: IIdentityService.cs ↔ IdentityService.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Identity/IIdentityService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Identity/IIdentityService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Identity/IdentityService.cs` change together 57% of the time (34 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: IOrganizationsService.cs ↔ OrganizationsService.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Organizations/IOrganizationsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Organizations/IOrganizationsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Organizations/OrganizationsService.cs` change together 57% of the time (26 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: EventsService.cs ↔ SearchEvents.cs MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/EventsService.cs— `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Areas/Events/EventsService.cs` and `MiniSpace.Web/src/MiniSpace.Web/Data/Events/SearchEvents.cs` change together 57% of the time (13 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 29), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsGrantedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'OrganizerRightsRevokedHandler' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?); CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'profileImageUrl' of 'Student.Student(Guid, string, DateTime, string, string, string, string, DateTime?, bool, bool, State, IEnumerable<Guid>, IEnumerable<Guid>, string, IEnumerable<Education>, IEnumerable<Work>, IEnumerable<Language>, IEnumerable<Interest>, bool, string, string, string, string, string, bool, string, DateTime?)'; CS1503: Argument 1: cannot convert from 'System.Guid' to 'string'; CS7036: There is no argument given that corresponds to the required parameter 'emailNotifications' of 'Student.Update(string, string, string, bool, string, string, string, string, DateTime?)'.
Monorepo: only 1 of 83 solutions was scored — This repository contains 83 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `MiniSpace.Services.Students/MiniSpace.Services.Students.sln` — the other 82 (`MiniSpace.APIGateway.Nuar/MiniSpace.APIGateway.sln`, `MiniSpace.APIGateway.Nuar/src/MiniSpace.APIGateway/MiniSpace.APIGateway.sln`, `MiniSpace.APIGateway.Ocelot/src/MiniSpace.APIGateway.Ocelot/MiniSpace.APIGateway.Ocelot.sln`, `MiniSpace.APIGateway/MiniSpace.APIGateway.sln`, `MiniSpace.APIGateway/src/MiniSpace.APIGateway/MiniSpace.APIGateway.sln`, `MiniSpace.Services.Comments/MiniSpace.Services.Comments.sln`, +76 more) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D18 · Solution Shape· Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository · ×1
Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository — The scored solution `MiniSpace.Services.Students/MiniSpace.Services.Students.sln` is not representative of this repository — it references only 267 of 2885 discovered C# files (9 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.
Off the main sequence: MiniSpace.Services.Identity.Core — MiniSpace.Services.Identity.Core: abstractness 0.20, instability 0.00, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 4) MiniSpace.Services.Identity/src/MiniSpace.Services.Identity.Core/Entities/User.cs:8— User's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.APIGateway.Nuar/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.APIGateway.Ocelot/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.APIGateway/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Comments/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Communication/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Email/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Events/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Friends/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Identity/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.MediaFiles/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Notifications/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Organizations/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Posts/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Reactions/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Reports/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Services.Students/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Web/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace.Web2/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace/compose/host-prometheus/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace/compose/prometheus/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 MiniSpace/compose/rabbitmq/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor· Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
Small-team knowledge concentration — 162 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 11 active author(s), not 162 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
Off-boarding risk: voznesenskijandrej5@gmail.com — If voznesenskijandrej5@gmail.com becomes unavailable, 161 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner — the largest single-person knowledge concentration (weighted toward the domain core). Pair, review, or document these before any departure.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· small single-context codebase (3,961 production LoC) · ×1
small single-context codebase (3,961 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size — small single-context codebase (3,961 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
Navigability unmeasured — symbol resolution incomplete — 55 % of sampled invocations could not be resolved to a symbol (the workspace likely loaded without all references) — the indirection fractions would be computed over an unrepresentative slice, so navigability is reported as not measured rather than a misleading score.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Not applicable · ×1
Not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)· Not applicable · ×1
Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities· Not applicable · ×1
Not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
Dormant codebase — 233 of 332 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 233 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Not applicable · ×1
Not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
D39 · IL Efficiency· IL metrics not applicable · ×1
IL metrics not applicable — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D7 · Architectural Integrity· No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1
No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.
D9 · Test Distribution· Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
Tests co-located / outside the solution — 360 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
0
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Run 019ee37b-ad0c-70e2-98bd-89c7cf3d3fe5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 31 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 45 · Warnings: 216 · Recommendations: 37 · Info: 12 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 20-06-2026 @ 05:23 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.