Public report — watermill, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 20:13 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

ThreeDotsLabs/watermill

66% At Risk

Small · 14,817 LoC · rebuild ~0.3 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (47%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

27/28dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 1 LLM-assisted, advisory
39findings with an exact file:lineof 45 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
28/100dimensions across the health lenses14817 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ThreeDotsLabs/watermill is sound in substance but carries real gaps (66%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Event-Driven (100%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (47%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Small (~14,817 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 47% · 46% weightMaturity 72% · 25% weightSecurity 84% · 14% weightCode Health 92% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 2% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 47 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 66 → ~76.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (24+)

24 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 7) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 4) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) _examples/pubsubs/sql/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/exactly-once-delivery-counter/server/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) components/cqrs/command_processor.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) components/cqrs/command_processor.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) components/cqrs/event_processor.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) dev/update-examples-deps/main.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/server-sent-events/server/http.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) _examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] tools/mill/go.mod
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] tools/mill/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5774 go.mod
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 tools/mill/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 tools/mill/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] tools/mill/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 tools/mill/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3955 dev/validate-examples/go.mod

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €16,000–€83,000
Cost to rebuild€16,000–€83,000 (0.2–0.5 person-years (274–869 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.9× (at 66% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€49,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 47% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.7) — CQRS, event-driven integration, event sourcing × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+16.1 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup
2
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
+15.8 pts · Medium effort · Release Hygiene
3
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
+9.1 pts · Medium effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 47%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.3 person-years rebuild (14,817 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 47%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

33 modules, 35 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

delayed-messagesdelayed-requeuedocs…act_middleware_godocsexactly-once-delivery…reeDotsLabs/watermill…ev/consolidate-gomods…/update-examples-deps…dev/validate-examples…bs/watermill/internal…watermill/pubsub/syncreceiving-ack.go…abs/watermill/message…example/server/common…rmill/components/cqrs…mill/components/delay…mill/components/fanin…/components/forwarder…ll/components/metrics…l/components/requeuer…ll/internal/publisher…l/internal/subscriber…age/router/middleware…message/router/plugin…ll/message/subscriber…mill/pubsub/gochannelsqlite…ng-example/server/api…le/server/crm-service…er/newsletter-service…mponents/requestreplymainmain.godelayed-messages1delayed-requeue2docs3…act_middleware_godocs4exactly-once-delivery5…reeDotsLabs/watermill6…ev/consolidate-gomods7…/update-examples-deps8…dev/validate-examples9…bs/watermill/internal10…watermill/pubsub/sync11receiving-ack.go12…abs/watermill/message13…example/server/common14…rmill/components/cqrs15…mill/components/delay16…mill/components/fanin17…/components/forwarder18…ll/components/metrics19…l/components/requeuer20…ll/internal/publisher21…l/internal/subscriber22…age/router/middleware23…message/router/plugin24…ll/message/subscriber25…mill/pubsub/gochannel26sqlite27…ng-example/server/api28…le/server/crm-service29…er/newsletter-service30…mponents/requestreply31main32main.go334110295232108251431181258233111181424126

At a glance — Code Health · 92% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 72% · Strong

At a glance — Readiness · 47% · Weak · gated by P5

At a glance — Security · 84% · Strong

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components8High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection5High / Critical

Roadmap

First, codify disaster recovery by documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures in IaC, as persistence guards alone are insufficient. Second, stamp versions in build manifests or tag releases with semver to ensure traceability. Third, add an approval gate to deployment pipelines to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Fourth, record significant architectural decisions in a structured document. Finally, add a testing section to the root README to clarify how to run the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+16.1 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+15.8 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+9.1 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+4.0 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+4.7 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+4.6 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pr-examples.yml (3), postgres.go.+1.2 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod.+0.6 ptsLowOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 21 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 5% slop · 52% mixed · 43% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
tools/mill/go.mod1.9SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/pr-examples.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go7.2MixedCyclomatic Complexity: main.main (cyclomatic 34)
_examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go7.2MixedCyclomatic Complexity: main.main (cyclomatic 16)
tools/pq/backend/postgres.go7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: string-formatted-query
_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)
dev/update-examples-deps/main.go7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: main.main (cognitive 19)
_examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
components/cqrs/command_processor.go7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
message/router/middleware/randomfail.go7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used
go.mod7.9MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5774
dev/validate-examples/go.mod7.9MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: GO-2025-3955
dev/consolidate-gomods/main.go8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: main.main (cognitive 19)
message/router/middleware/retry.go8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: Retry.Middleware (cognitive 17)
dev/validate-examples/main.go8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: main.validate (cognitive 16)
components/requestreply/backend_pubsub.go8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: PubSubBackend.ListenForNotifications (cognitive 16)
_examples/pubsubs/sql/main.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 3)
_examples/real-world-examples/exactly-once-delivery-counter/server/main.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)
components/cqrs/event_processor.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
_examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 27 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D38AX5ED1ED4ES1M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 39 of 45 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc942-86a2-7357-93c1-4d1b99e8e25f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 12 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was main.main at 34.

main.main (cyclomatic 34)_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:25
main.main (cyclomatic 16)_examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:24

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 main.main (cyclomatic 34) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with main.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 main.main (cyclomatic 16) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with main.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was main.main at 47.

main.main (cognitive 19) · ×2dev/update-examples-deps/main.go:17
main.main (cognitive 47)_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:25
Retry.Middleware (cognitive 17)message/router/middleware/retry.go:74
main.main (cognitive 16)_examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:24
main.validate (cognitive 16)dev/validate-examples/main.go:74

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 main.main (cognitive 19) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with main.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 main.main (cognitive 47) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with main.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Retry.Middleware (cognitive 17) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with retry.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

17 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×2_examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go:30
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2_examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:86
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×2_examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go:53
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2_examples/real-world-examples/server-sent-events/server/http.go:351
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:29

+ 8 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×4.github/workflows/pr-examples.yml:13detected by semgrep finding
Medium: math-random-usedmessage/router/middleware/randomfail.go:4detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pr-examples.yml (3), postgres.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with randomfail.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

trivy and checkov found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 of 31 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is tools/mill/cmd/googlecloud.go.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 1 critical, 1 high, 6 medium, 0 low.

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]tools/mill/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]tools/mill/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 · ×4tools/mill/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5774 · ×2go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ES1 · Fold determinism10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether Apply/When folds reconstruct state purely from the event (no DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random or IO) so replay is reproducible.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 29 of 42 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.4 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health92%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity72%StrongSolid.
Readiness47%Weak — gated by P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security84%StrongSolid.
Event-Driven100%ExemplarySolid.
Event Sourcing100%ExemplarySolid.
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~9509 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .py, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 13 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit)
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES2 Immutable events — no persisted event types detected — immutability check not applicable
  • ES3 PII in the event store — no persisted event types detected — PII-in-events check not applicable
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 6 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×4
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-examples.yml:13 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-examples.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-examples.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: string-formatted-query tools/pq/backend/postgres.go:85 — String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. Note what is being interpolated here — this line has TWO interpolations, and they take different remedies. the statement interpolates into a position where SQL expects a table, view or schema NAME, and a name cannot be bound as a query parameter in any driver — the statement has to be planned before the parameter is known. The OTHER one lands in a value position (after a comparison, or in an `IN`/`VALUES` list), where parameter binding is available and is the fix: bind it as a placeholder rather than formatting it into the string. Do not read the identifier half as excusing the value half — leaving a value in the format string is the ordinary injection this rule reports. For the name, the control that IS available: check it against a fixed allow-list of the identifiers this code may address (or derive it from one) before it reaches the statement, and where the name is genuinely dynamic, pass it through the driver's identifier-quoting helper rather than into the format string. If the name can only ever come from configuration you control, say so at the call site — that is the review this row is asking for.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] tools/mill/go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto 0.51.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/mill get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line tools/mill/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.51.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] tools/mill/go.mod — google.golang.org/grpc 1.81.0: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/grpc is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/mill get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.82.1`, which updates the require line tools/mill/go.mod already holds for it).
Warning — 34 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×4
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 tools/mill/go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.43.0 (go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage, go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation): GO-2026-5158 — go.opentelemetry.io/otel is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/mill get go.opentelemetry.io/otel@v1.44.0`, which updates the require line tools/mill/go.mod already holds for it).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] tools/mill/go.mod — golang.org/x/net 0.54.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/mill get golang.org/x/net@v0.55.0`, which updates the require line tools/mill/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.54.0: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 tools/mill/go.mod — golang.org/x/text 0.37.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/mill get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line tools/mill/go.mod already holds for it). (in 2 dependency files: tools/mill/go.mod, tools/pq/go.mod)
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3955 dev/validate-examples/go.mod — stdlib 1.25.0 (net/http): GO-2025-3955 — fixed in Go 1.25.1; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. (in 4 dependency files) This one row stands for the 39 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.25.0: GO-2025-3955, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.main (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • main.main (cognitive 19) dev/update-examples-deps/main.go:17 — main.main has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 4 (nesting depth added 11). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 19 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 28). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
  • main.main (cognitive 19) dev/consolidate-gomods/main.go:13 — main.main has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 3 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×2
  • Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5774 go.mod — github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.2.5 (github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware): GO-2026-5774 — upgrade to 5.3.0. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.2.5: GO-2026-5774, GO-2026-5775, GO-2026-5777.
  • Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 tools/mill/go.mod — github.com/klauspost/compress 1.18.6 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C tools/mill get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line tools/mill/go.mod already holds for it).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) _examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go:30 — _examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go:30-45 | _examples/pubsubs/nats-jetstream/main.go:42-57 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:103 — _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:103-118 | _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-requeue/main.go:77-92 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:103` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:86 — _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:86-98 | _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-requeue/main.go:77-89 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:86` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) components/cqrs/command_processor.go:207 — components/cqrs/command_processor.go:207-219 | components/cqrs/event_processor.go:199-211 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/cqrs/command_processor.go:207` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go:53 — _examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go:53-62 | _examples/real-world-examples/transactional-events/main.go:46-55 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go:53` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) dev/update-examples-deps/main.go:151 — dev/update-examples-deps/main.go:151-160 | dev/update-examples-deps/main.go:165-174 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `dev/update-examples-deps/main.go:151` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/server-sent-events/server/http.go:351 — _examples/real-world-examples/server-sent-events/server/http.go:351-359 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/api/http.go:123-131 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/server-sent-events/server/http.go:351` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) _examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go:19 — _examples/pubsubs/nats-core/main.go:19-28 | _examples/pubsubs/nats-jetstream/main.go:19-27 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/pubsubs/nats-jetstream/main.go:19` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main.main (cyclomatic 34) · ×1
  • main.main (cyclomatic 34) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:25 — main.main has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 14 of the 34 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function literals inside it that branch (lines 101, 122, 143, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main.main (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • main.main (cyclomatic 16) _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:24 — main.main has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Of this number, 14 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1060.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.main (cognitive 47) · ×1
  • main.main (cognitive 47) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:25 — main.main has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 47 (nesting depth added 14). Most of this is not in the body itself: 15 of the 47 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function literals inside it that branch (lines 101, 122, 143, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Retry.Middleware (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • Retry.Middleware (cognitive 17) message/router/middleware/retry.go:74 — Retry.Middleware has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, boolean chains 3, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 5). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 75). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.main (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • main.main (cognitive 16) _examples/real-world-examples/delayed-messages/main.go:24 — main.main has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 1 (nesting depth added 1). Of this number, 14 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.validate (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • main.validate (cognitive 16) dev/validate-examples/main.go:74 — main.validate has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 3, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 4). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 3 function literals inside it that branch (lines 137, 95, 122). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PubSubBackend.ListenForNotifications (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • PubSubBackend.ListenForNotifications (cognitive 16) components/requestreply/backend_pubsub.go:126 — PubSubBackend.ListenForNotifications has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 167). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1
  • Medium: math-random-used message/router/middleware/randomfail.go:4 — `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:29 — _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:29-46 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:29-46 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 7) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 7) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:102 — _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:102-118 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:123-139 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:144-160 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:186-202 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:229-245 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:250-266 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:271-287 — all 7 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:102` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 4) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:91 — _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:91-107 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:123-139 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:316-331 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:347-363 — there are 4 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 4 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:91` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) _examples/pubsubs/sql/main.go:58 — _examples/pubsubs/sql/main.go:58-72 | _examples/real-world-examples/persistent-event-log/main.go:74-88 | _examples/real-world-examples/transactional-events/main.go:72-86 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/exactly-once-delivery-counter/server/main.go:71 — _examples/real-world-examples/exactly-once-delivery-counter/server/main.go:71-85 | _examples/real-world-examples/exactly-once-delivery-counter/worker/main.go:133-147 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:164 — _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:164-177 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:206-219 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:291-304 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:164` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) components/cqrs/command_processor.go:224 — components/cqrs/command_processor.go:224-237 | components/cqrs/event_processor.go:216-229 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/cqrs/command_processor.go:224` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) components/cqrs/event_processor.go:340 — components/cqrs/event_processor.go:340-351 | components/cqrs/event_processor_group.go:226-237 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/cqrs/event_processor.go:340` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:110 — _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:110-120 | _examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/newsletter-service/main.go:334-344 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `_examples/real-world-examples/consumer-groups/crm-service/main.go:110` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Recommendation — 3 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 18 of 31 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: tools/mill/cmd/googlecloud.go, message/router/middleware/deduplicator.go, components/requestreply/backend_pubsub.go (and 15 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (codecov.yml) and a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .5artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .0artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .8artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc942-86a2-7357-93c1-4d1b99e8e25f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md