ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example

Executive summary

ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example scores 55 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged. Watchdog judged it as a template, sample or demo, meant to be read or copied, so the dimensions about building, releasing and running a product don't apply, and its lenses are rated against a lower bar. The score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Accessibility, which scores 43 and is rated Adequate. Its Visual & motion safety dimension scores 1 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Accessibility can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 3 Deprecated module finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene and to keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1, and if Accessibility rose to 70, the score would rise from 55 to about 64.

86 findings are critical: 65 in Dependency Vulnerabilities, 14 in Static Analysis (SAST), five in IaC & Container Security, one in CQS / query purity and one in Forms & labels.

Watchdog couldn't measure 27 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Internal API Consistency and Navigability, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 3,792 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €7,700, to rebuild.

Code Health 77 Strong Architecture 80 Strong Maturity 69 Strong Production Readiness 56 Adequate, capped by Security & performance tooling Security and Compliance 74 Adequate, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities Domain Modelling 100 ★ Exemplary Accessibility 43 Adequate, capped by Visual & motion safety

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Accessibility 43 · counts for 46%Production Readiness 56 · counts for 25%Maturity 69 · counts for 14%Security and Compliance 74 · counts for 8%Code Health 77 · counts for 4%Architecture 80 · counts for 2%Domain Modelling 100 · counts for 1%

If Accessibility rose from 43 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 55 to about 64.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Product code 66%Tests 34%

New since the last survey: 3 findings

These 3 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026.

Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/src/assets/main.css

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding

This critical or serious finding was in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026, and is gone from this one.

Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED

Rebuild cost: about €7,700 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€2,600 to €13,000, for 43 to 135 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	High, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.8 at a score of 55. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 3,792 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 3 Deprecated module finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

Raises the score by about 4 points · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.

Raises the score by about 8 points · Medium effort · Visual & motion safety

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · A11y enforcement

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €7,700 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Accessibility, at 43 (Weak). Accessibility is about whether the interface is built so that everyone can use it, including people who can't see the screen or can't use a mouse. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Accessibility also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Accessibility grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Accessibility actions in Top priorities.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 3 Deprecated module finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 4 points for low effort, because it clears the 3 Dependency Hygiene findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

48 modules, with 28 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 8 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	3 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/decorator	4 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/errors	9 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/domain/hour	26 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/auth	27 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/app/command	28 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/app/query	29 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/domain/training	31 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/app	32 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/app/command	33 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/app/query	38 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/app
1 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/c4
2 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/client
3 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/decorator
4 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/errors
5 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/logs
6 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/metrics
7 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/server
8 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/server/httperr
9 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/domain/hour
10 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings
11 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/users
12 web.src
13 web.src.repositories
14 web.src.repositories.auth
15 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.ApiClient
16 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.api.DefaultApi
17 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.model.DateHours
18 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.model.Error
19 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.model.Hour
20 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.model.HourUpdate
21 web.src.repositories.clients.trainer.src.model.ModelDate
22 web.src.repositories.clients.trainings.src.ApiClient
23 web.src.repositories.clients.trainings.src.api.DefaultApi
24 web.src.repositories.clients.trainings.src.model.Error
25 web.src.repositories.clients.trainings.src.model.PostTraining
26 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common/auth		1
27 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/app/command	1		5
28 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/app/query	1		2
29 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/domain/training		5
30 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/adapters			14			2
31 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/app					4	2
32 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/app/command	2						12
33 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/app/query	1			1
34 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer								1
35 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/ports						1		3
36 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainer/service								1
37 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/adapters							3		1	1
38 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/app									6	2
39 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/ports							1			1	2
40 github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/trainings/service									3		1

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Strong ·

The Good

D1 · Go Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · Go Cognitive Complexity 9.7 D3 · Go God Classes 10.0 D4 · Go Code Duplication 9.1 D17 · Go Explicit Debt 9.9 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0

The Ugly

X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0

At a glance — Architecture · 80% · Strong ·

The Good

D5 · Go Coupling 10.0 D6 · Go Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D23 · Go Boundary Type-Coupling 10.0 D26 · Go Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · Go Change Coupling 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 6.5 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 6.5

At a glance — Maturity · 69% · Strong ·

The Good

D15 · Go Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · Go Bus Factor 10.0 D19 · Go Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0

The Bad

D34 · Go Knowledge Freshness 4.1 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0

At a glance — Readiness · 56% · Adequate · gated by P3 ·

The Good

D9 · Go Test Distribution 9.7 D11 · Go Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · Go Dependency Hygiene 7.3 D13 · Go Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · Go License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0 P2 · Repo Observability 9.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 3.0

At a glance — Security · 74% · Adequate · gated by D30 ·

The Good

D28 · Go Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · Go IaC & Container Security 6.9 D43 · Go Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · Go Platform End-of-Life 10.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 8.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0

The Bad

D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 5.1

The Ugly

D30 · Go Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 43% · Adequate · gated by AC6 ·

The Good

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 6.3 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0

The Bad

AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.7 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

The Ugly

AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 1.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	99	High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration	23	High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection	17	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, address immediate visual and motion safety issues by ensuring visible focus styles, respecting reduced motion preferences, and correcting low-contrast colors. Next, enforce accessibility standards by integrating linting tools and automated testing into the CI pipeline to catch regressions early. Simultaneously, resolve deprecated dependencies and fix structural HTML elements like language attributes and landmarks to improve compliance. Finally, integrate static analysis and security scanning into the continuous integration process to automatically block builds that introduce new vulnerabilities or code quality issues.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 3 Deprecated module finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+4.5 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.	+7.8 pts	Medium	Visual & motion safety
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.	+4.8 pts	Medium	A11y enforcement
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.	+2.8 pts	Medium	Page structure
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.	+2.6 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Resolve the 7 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with REDACTED (2), hour_firestore_repository.go, hour_mysql_repository.go.	+1.2 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.	+2.3 pts	Medium	Forms & labels
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+1.3 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 30 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 7% slop · 26% mixed · 67% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	1.3	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.5	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.7	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.6	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	6.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go	7.3	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
internal/common/metrics/dummy.go	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
internal/trainer/adapters/hour_repository_test.go	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
internal/trainings/adapters/trainings_firestore_repository.go	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings (cognitive 19)

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 86

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 67

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 51

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 28

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 60 of 63 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D19D21D23D26D28D29D30D31D34D35D43D44AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX10AX2AX3AX5AX9DM1DM11DM12DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6S1X14X15X2X26X28X3X30

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 169 of 204 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1603f-6239-7566-b3a3-43e2fa40e42d.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Go module (REDACTED/go.sum), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its npm package dependencies. Nothing was read about its Go dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (REDACTED), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — mysql Pulling mysql Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: users-grpc Skipped - No image to be pulled firestore-component-tests Skipped - No image to be pulled trainer-http Skipped - No image to be pulled trainings-http Skipped - No image to be pulled web Skipped - No image to be pulled mysql Pulling mysql Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm two tells a construction that PRODUCES a measurement from one that merely passes it along, and this repository's frontend does not compute that fact. A measurement built independently in two places would not appear above.
DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Some of this repository's production types come from a frontend that does not bind comparison operands to the members they read, which arm one needs, and those types were not walked for this dimension. The counts above speak for the languages that declare it.
ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check decides whether a handler's mutation is safe to re-run by recognising its persistence writes (a database save, a repository write, an event publish) and its guards. Those markers are .NET member names, so in this repository's language a write such as `repository.save(order)` is not recognised and a same-named call on an unrelated library type could be. The handlers were found; their idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Go is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Go is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, TypeScript/JavaScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's Go is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart and Ruby source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart or Ruby was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Go is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations: 2 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (REDACTED, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 function(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.7 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 function(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings at 19.

TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings (cognitive 19)internal/trainings/adapters/trainings_firestore_repository.go:194

What to do

Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings (cognitive 19). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.1 / 10Stronggated by 10 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

10 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×4internal/trainings/ports/http.go:110

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2internal/common/client/grpc.go:24

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)internal/trainer/ports/http.go:64

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)internal/common/server/http.go:68

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)internal/common/decorator/metrics.go:20

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 4 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with http.go, cancel_training.go, make_hours_available.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with grpc.go, approve_training_reschedule.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with http.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 production modules (Go), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 1 module(s) off the main sequence.

Off the main sequence: github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 17 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

49 test methods: 48 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e. The Go suite contributes 49 test case(s) across 13 `_test.go` file(s) declaring at least one — every `func Test…(t *testing.T)` that `go test` would collect, plus the suite methods a testify-style runner reaches; a table-driven case list counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is INFERRED from file names, paths and build constraints, not declared: 10 of those file(s) use Go's external test package (`package x_test`), which is a visibility boundary rather than a pyramid tier and was not read as one.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). Go (3 modules): measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

24 outdated, 3 author-deprecated direct Go module(s), 0 pinning or checksum defect(s). Whether any of these modules is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — proxy.golang.org publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this module graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED and go.sum there.

Deprecated module: github.com/golang/protobuf · ×3

Outdated: cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata · ×24

What to do

Resolve the 3 Deprecated module finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 19 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 19 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 1 product package.json manifest(s). Its 7 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's npm package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Go module (REDACTED/go.sum), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 12 of the 67 production source files in this repository: 54 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 1 have no attributable history left to measure.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 deducted task-comment markers across 3792 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×4internal/common/metrics/dummy.go:6

What to do

Resolve the 4 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with hour_firestore_repository.go (2), dummy.go, hour_repository_test.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Wild Workouts's root README is a well-written narrative that explains what the project is (an example Go DDD project showing how to build easy-to-develop/maintain applications) and its purpose (uncovering current implementation issues via over a dozen articles), while the terraform/README.md documents the directory it lives in, covering setup, required software, and deployments. Both are strong; the only visible gap is that the root README does not mention installation, build, or contribution guidance, which would fall under the repository's single root README rather than these two files.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — Wild Workouts's root README is a well-written narrative that explains what the project is (an example Go DDD project showing how to build easy-to-develop/maintain applications) and its purpose (uncovering current implementation issues via over a dozen articles), while the terraform/README.md documents the directory it lives in, covering setup, required software, and deployments. Both are strong; the only visible gap is that the root README does not mention installation, build, or contribution guidance, which would fall under the repository's single root README rather than these two files.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No domain types leak across context boundaries (2 contexts).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 6 build units (Go) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

17 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 3 medium, 0 low. 11 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `web/public/index.html` (line 15) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 11 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 finding(s): 16 critical, 49 high, 29 medium, 5 low.

REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 47 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (45), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (47 issue-level).
Resolve the 15 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (14), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 13 medium, 5 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 13 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 of 13 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go. Counted over 13 of the 67 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×7internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go:1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 7 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with REDACTED (2), hour_firestore_repository.go, hour_mysql_repository.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 6 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels6.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — web/src/pages/ScheduleTraining.vue:55

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

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AC3 · Page structure5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — web/public/index.html:2

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

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AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

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AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

`.ww-spinner` moves (`animation: ww-spin 0.7s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/src/assets/main.css:370

What to do

Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.

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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 10 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

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AX10 · Code composition6.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity6.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

`com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/users.HttpServer.GetCurrentUser` is a read (query) handler but its body writes persistent state — a query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica. — internal/users/http.go:16

What to do

Keep query handlers read-only — move the writes/event-publishes into a command handler so reads stay safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

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DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests — searched for: `microservice`, `service-mesh`, `istio`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:21

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No explicit version was found for the Go module library declared by `REDACTED`. This check read a `/vN` major-version suffix on the REDACTED module path, and a CHANGELOG/CHANGES/HISTORY/NEWS/RELEASES file with a semver heading, or release tooling (changesets, release-please, semantic-release, goreleaser, cargo-release, bump2version, standard-version, git-cliff) in the library's directory or at the repository root, or a semver release tag (or a Drupal `8.x-1.2` release tag) in the repository. A version computed where none of those can see is invisible here. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes. — REDACTED

What to do

Declare the version where the ecosystem expects it, or keep a CHANGELOG with semver release headings, and follow semver for breaking changes.

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P2 · Observability9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add a health-check endpoint (a /healthz handler) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Only what this repository's own non-C# files could be read for was assessed — and because this repository commits the configuration that serves its own HTTP surface, that configuration could be read in full for the security response headers it sets. Nothing else in this dimension was assessed: the transport, cookie, input-validation and crypto controls are read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository’s language, so their absence here is not a finding about this repository.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. This is reported because `firebase.json` configures this repository's static hosting, including its response headers, so the configuration that would carry these headers is in this repository and was read in full. (−2.0 on this card.) — docker/firestore-emulator/firebase.json:1

What to do

Set security response headers on the surface this repository serves: an `add_header` directive per header in the nginx/Caddy/Apache config, a `_headers` / `vercel.json` / `netlify.toml` entry for a static host, or `helmet()` in the HTTP server. `Content-Security-Policy` is the one that pays for itself first — it is what contains an injected script once one reaches the page — followed by `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and a frame policy (`X-Frame-Options: DENY`, or CSP `frame-ancestors`). Where the app is served from a build container, the header configuration belongs in the image beside the built assets, so it ships with them rather than depending on where it lands.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on a context.Context (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/1 functions that make a cancellable request (net/http, net.Dial) accept a context.Context or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a cancelled request, a shutdown, an expired deadline. Take `ctx context.Context` as the first parameter and build the request with it (`http.NewRequestWithContext`, `DialContext`); where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
`waitForPort` calls `DialContext(…)` but takes no context.Context and reaches none its caller controls, so its caller cannot cancel the request once it has started. Take `ctx context.Context` as the first parameter and build the request with it: `http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, …)`, `(&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, …)`. — internal/common/client/net.go:9

What to do

Thread a context.Context through functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness	4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 45 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	77%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	80%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	69%	Strong	Solid.
Readiness	56%	Adequate — gated by P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	74%	Adequate — gated by D30	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Accessibility	43%	Adequate — gated by AC6	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control

Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Go imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — mysql Pulling mysql Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: users-grpc Skipped - No image to be pulled firestore-component-tests Skipped - No image to be pulled trainer-http Skipped - No image to be pulled trainings-http Skipped - No image to be pulled web Skipped - No image to be pulled mysql Pulling mysql Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~1911 lines of test source are present (.go) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.go), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — no repository writes detected — no operation to judge against the one-aggregate rule
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (2 CQRS handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — Not assessed, and this one is on us: 1 command handler(s) or message consumer(s) were found here, but this check does not yet recognise persistence writes in this repository's language. Idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out — this is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Go source (service entry point: internal/common/server/http.go:26 (chi.NewRouter())
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a `func BenchmarkXxx(b *testing.B)` in any `_test.go` file, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: allocation awareness is rated where code engineers for it — at least 400 production lines that ship benchmarks or already use allocation-aware idioms (8 or more). This repository's Go code has 4,348 production line(s), 0 such use(s) and no benchmarks, so there is no allocation work to rate. The card is reward-only: its absence costs nothing.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Go has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X12 Unreachable branch — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X13 Undrained process stream — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — Not applicable: this check looks for a pattern guard or `case` label that increments, decrements or assigns while the switch is deciding whether it matches, and in this repository's languages none can. Go's `++`, `--` and assignments are STATEMENTS, not expressions, so none of them can appear in a `case` expression or anywhere else in a condition, and a type switch's cases are types. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X25 Inert configuration knob — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Go's type system has no nullable and non-nullable types — every pointer, map, slice and interface is nil-able at every position, there is no switch that turns null checking on, and the compiler produces no nullability warning for an operator to silence. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 86 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×47

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+ 22 more in this group — see findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×15

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×5

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2

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AC2 · Forms & labels · <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×1

<textarea> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/ScheduleTraining.vue:55 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.

AX9 · CQS / query purity · Query handler writes persistent state · ×1

Query handler writes persistent state: com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/users.HttpServer.GetCurrentUser internal/users/http.go:16 — `com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/users.HttpServer.GetCurrentUser` is a read (query) handler but its body writes persistent state — a query must stay side-effect-free so reads are safe to retry, cache, and route to a read replica.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical vulnerability · ×1

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Serious — 67 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×27

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+ 2 more in this group — see findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×13

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D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×4

TodoComment internal/common/metrics/dummy.go:6 — // todo - add some implementation! — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment internal/trainer/adapters/hour_repository_test.go:133 — // todo - enable after fix of https://github.com/googleapis/google-cloud-go/issues/2604
TodoComment internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go:118 — // todo - we will clean it up later with CQRS :-) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go:135 — // todo - we will clean it up later with CQRS :-) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×4

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/trainings/ports/http.go:110 — internal/trainings/ports/http.go:110-120 | internal/trainings/ports/http.go:135-145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/trainer/app/command/cancel_training.go:27 — internal/trainer/app/command/cancel_training.go:27-37 | internal/trainer/app/command/schedule_training.go:27-37 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/trainer/app/command/cancel_training.go:27` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/trainer/app/command/make_hours_available.go:27 — internal/trainer/app/command/make_hours_available.go:27-37 | internal/trainer/app/command/make_hours_unavailable.go:27-37 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/trainer/app/command/make_hours_available.go:27` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/trainings/app/command/reject_training_reschedule.go:27 — internal/trainings/app/command/reject_training_reschedule.go:27-37 | internal/trainings/app/command/request_training_reschedule.go:32-42 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/trainings/app/command/reject_training_reschedule.go:27` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated module · ×3

Deprecated module: github.com/golang/protobuf — `github.com/golang/protobuf` is required at v1.5.4 in REDACTED, and its author has DEPRECATED the module: "Use the "google.golang.org/protobuf" module instead." A deprecation is declared by the author in the module's own REDACTED and applies to the whole module, not to one release, so moving to a newer version of it does not clear this. Follow the replacement the notice names.
Deprecated module: github.com/golang/protobuf — `github.com/golang/protobuf` is required at v1.5.4 in internal/users/REDACTED, and its author has DEPRECATED the module: "Use the "google.golang.org/protobuf" module instead." A deprecation is declared by the author in the module's own REDACTED and applies to the whole module, not to one release, so moving to a newer version of it does not clear this. Follow the replacement the notice names.
Deprecated module: github.com/golang/protobuf — `github.com/golang/protobuf` is required at v1.5.4 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, and its author has DEPRECATED the module: "Use the "google.golang.org/protobuf" module instead." A deprecation is declared by the author in the module's own REDACTED and applies to the whole module, not to one release, so moving to a newer version of it does not clear this. Follow the replacement the notice names.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×2

REDACTED
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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) internal/common/client/grpc.go:24 — internal/common/client/grpc.go:24-32 | internal/common/client/grpc.go:47-55 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) internal/trainings/app/command/approve_training_reschedule.go:51 — internal/trainings/app/command/approve_training_reschedule.go:51-59 | internal/trainings/app/command/reschedule_training.go:56-64 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/trainings/app/command/approve_training_reschedule.go:51` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

AC3 · Page structure · Page without a main landmark · ×1

Page without a main landmark web/public/index.html:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×1

Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/src/assets/main.css:370 — `.ww-spinner` moves (`animation: ww-spin 0.7s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.

AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1

Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 10 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings (cognitive 19) · ×1

TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings (cognitive 19) internal/trainings/adapters/trainings_firestore_repository.go:194 — TrainingsFirestoreRepository.RemoveAllTrainings has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (14 pts), loops 3 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) internal/trainer/ports/http.go:64 — internal/trainer/ports/http.go:64-79 | internal/trainer/ports/http.go:91-106 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/common/server/http.go:68 — internal/common/server/http.go:68-75 | internal/users/fixtures.go:66-73 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/common/server/http.go:68` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) internal/common/decorator/metrics.go:20 — internal/common/decorator/metrics.go:20-29 | internal/common/decorator/metrics.go:45-54 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/common/decorator/metrics.go:20` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) internal/trainings/app/command/cancel_training.go:51 — internal/trainings/app/command/cancel_training.go:51-59 | internal/trainings/app/command/reject_training_reschedule.go:40-48 | internal/trainings/app/command/request_training_reschedule.go:45-53 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 3 call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `internal/trainings/app/command/cancel_training.go:51` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Function without context.Context · ×1

Function without context.Context: waitForPort internal/common/client/net.go:9 — `waitForPort` calls `DialContext(…)` but takes no context.Context and reaches none its caller controls, so its caller cannot cancel the request once it has started. Take `ctx context.Context` as the first parameter and build the request with it: `http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, …)`, `(&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, …)`.

Minor — 26 finding(s)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×7

Orphaned file internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file internal/trainer/adapters/hour_mysql_repository.go:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file internal/trainer/domain/hour/hour.go:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file internal/users/fixtures.go:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file internal/common/server/http.go:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file internal/trainer/ports/grpc.go:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×5

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×5

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 7 of 13 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 13 of the 67 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: internal/trainer/domain/hour/hour.go, internal/users/fixtures.go, internal/trainer/adapters/hour_firestore_repository.go, internal/trainer/adapters/hour_mysql_repository.go, REDACTED, internal/trainer/ports/grpc.go, internal/common/server/http.go. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×1

README/code drift README.md:21 — README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests — searched for: `microservice`, `service-mesh`, `istio`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

P10 · Library API & versioning · No explicit versioning · ×1

No explicit versioning REDACTED — No explicit version was found for the Go module library declared by `REDACTED`. This check read a `/vN` major-version suffix on the REDACTED module path, and a CHANGELOG/CHANGES/HISTORY/NEWS/RELEASES file with a semver heading, or release tooling (changesets, release-please, semantic-release, goreleaser, cargo-release, bump2version, standard-version, git-cliff) in the library's directory or at the repository root, or a semver release tag (or a Drupal `8.x-1.2` release tag) in the repository. A version computed where none of those can see is invisible here. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1

No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1

No security response headers detected docker/firestore-emulator/firebase.json:1 — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. This is reported because `firebase.json` configures this repository's static hosting, including its response headers, so the configuration that would carry these headers is in this repository and was read in full. (−2.0 on this card.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all functions that make a request accept a context.Context · ×1

Not all functions that make a request accept a context.Context — Only 0/1 functions that make a cancellable request (net/http, net.Dial) accept a context.Context or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a cancelled request, a shutdown, an expired deadline. Take `ctx context.Context` as the first parameter and build the request with it (`http.NewRequestWithContext`, `DialContext`); where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.

Minor — 25 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×24

Outdated: cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata — `cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata` is required at v0.9.0 in REDACTED, but v0.10.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata@v0.10.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: cloud.google.com/go/firestore — `cloud.google.com/go/firestore` is required at v1.25.0 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, but v1.28.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get cloud.google.com/go/firestore@v1.28.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: cloud.google.com/go/firestore — `cloud.google.com/go/firestore` is required at v1.25.0 in internal/users/REDACTED, but v1.28.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get cloud.google.com/go/firestore@v1.28.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: cloud.google.com/go/firestore — `cloud.google.com/go/firestore` is required at v1.25.0 in internal/trainings/REDACTED, but v1.28.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get cloud.google.com/go/firestore@v1.28.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: firebase.google.com/go/v4 — `firebase.google.com/go/v4` is required at v4.21.0 in REDACTED, but v4.22.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get firebase.google.com/go/v4@v4.22.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: firebase.google.com/go/v4 — `firebase.google.com/go/v4` is required at v4.21.0 in internal/users/REDACTED, but v4.22.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get firebase.google.com/go/v4@v4.22.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 — `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` is required at v5.3.2 in REDACTED, but v5.5.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@v5.5.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 — `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` is required at v5.3.2 in internal/users/REDACTED, but v5.5.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@v5.5.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 — `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` is required at v5.3.2 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, but v5.5.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@v5.5.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 — `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` is required at v5.3.2 in internal/trainings/REDACTED, but v5.5.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@v5.5.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql — `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql` is required at v1.10.0 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, but v1.10.1 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql@v1.10.1 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/krzysztofreczek/go-structurizr — `github.com/krzysztofreczek/go-structurizr` is required at v0.1.2 in tools/c4/REDACTED, but v0.1.64 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/krzysztofreczek/go-structurizr@v0.1.64 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/sirupsen/logrus — `github.com/sirupsen/logrus` is required at v1.10.1 in internal/trainings/REDACTED, but v1.10.2 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/sirupsen/logrus@v1.10.2 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/sirupsen/logrus — `github.com/sirupsen/logrus` is required at v1.10.1 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, but v1.10.2 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/sirupsen/logrus@v1.10.2 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/sirupsen/logrus — `github.com/sirupsen/logrus` is required at v1.10.1 in REDACTED, but v1.10.2 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/sirupsen/logrus@v1.10.2 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: github.com/sirupsen/logrus — `github.com/sirupsen/logrus` is required at v1.10.1 in internal/users/REDACTED, but v1.10.2 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get github.com/sirupsen/logrus@v1.10.2 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/api — `google.golang.org/api` is required at v0.293.0 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, but v0.307.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/api@v0.307.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/api — `google.golang.org/api` is required at v0.293.0 in internal/trainings/REDACTED, but v0.307.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/api@v0.307.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/api — `google.golang.org/api` is required at v0.293.0 in REDACTED, but v0.307.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/api@v0.307.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/api — `google.golang.org/api` is required at v0.293.0 in internal/users/REDACTED, but v0.307.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/api@v0.307.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/grpc — `google.golang.org/grpc` is required at v1.83.1 in internal/trainings/REDACTED, but v1.84.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.84.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/grpc — `google.golang.org/grpc` is required at v1.83.1 in REDACTED, but v1.84.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.84.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/grpc — `google.golang.org/grpc` is required at v1.83.1 in internal/users/REDACTED, but v1.84.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.84.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.
Outdated: google.golang.org/grpc — `google.golang.org/grpc` is required at v1.83.1 in internal/trainer/REDACTED, but v1.84.0 is the module's current release — so this build is missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.84.0 && go mod tidy` and commit the updated REDACTED and go.sum.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common — github.com/ThreeDotsLabs/wild-workouts-go-ddd-example/internal/common: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.00, distance 0.83 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7356d14ab5f24b36843922fd2f6c03d9/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7356d14ab5f24b36843922fd2f6c03d9/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	17	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	99	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	23	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a1603f-6239-7566-b3a3-43e2fa40e42d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Strong ·

At a glance — Architecture · 80% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 69% · Strong ·

At a glance — Readiness · 56% · Adequate · gated by P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 74% · Adequate · gated by D30 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 43% · Adequate · gated by AC6 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts