Public report of ThreeMammals/Ocelot, published 23 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 23 October 2026, 09:17 UTC · Survey ID cd_8040608ecfda4a6ca1aaaa2f89ecece5

ThreeMammals/Ocelot

Measured 23 October 2026, 09:10 UTC, at code version f774f94

No regression since the last survey Code coverage: not measuredSupply-chain provenance & signing: not measuredIL efficiency: not measured

A regression is a drop of 0.5 points or more in the score, or of 2.5 or more out of 10 in a dimension, since the last survey.

Code coverage is not measured: Suite not runnable in-image and no committed report.

Supply-chain provenance & signing is not measured: Supply-chain provenance is not scored (this pipeline releases no artifact), but its build steps or GitHub Actions workflows have integrity defects, or nothing watches its dependency set for published advisories.

IL efficiency is not measured: The target did not build.

CAI score 45out of 100 At risk Down 5 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Architecture 84 Strong Maturity 65 Adequate Code Health 60 Adequate Performance 54 Adequate Production Readiness 43 Weak Security and Compliance 37 Weak

A small codebase: 18,583 lines of product code in 63 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.4 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 37

Findings by how serious they are

78 critical 325 serious 123 minor

8 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
23 October 2026, 09:10 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

76of 79 dimensions measured by tools. The other 3 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
506of 526 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 20 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
79dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 18,583 lines of product code in 63 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

ThreeMammals/Ocelot scores 45 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Security and Compliance, which scores 37 and is rated Weak. Its Web-Security Posture dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Security and Compliance can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning and to stop accepting every TLS certificate: remove the always-true validation callback so the platform verifies the chain, hostname and expiry, and if Security and Compliance rose to 70, the score would rise from 45 to about 52.

78 findings are critical: 26 in Explicit Debt, 20 in Static Analysis (SAST), 18 in IaC & Container Security, six in Secrets (history), three in REDACTED Scanning, two in Web-Security Posture, one in Async correctness, one in Change Coupling and one in Project dependency cycles.

Watchdog couldn't measure 5 dimensions in this code, among them Test Reliability, Dependency Hygiene and Naming Consistency, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 18,583 lines, which would take an estimated 0.4 person-years, around €61,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 60 Adequate Architecture 84 Strong Maturity 65 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 43 Weak, capped by REDACTED Scanning, Security & performance tooling and Outbound HTTP resilience Security and Compliance 37 Weak, capped by Static Analysis (SAST), IaC & Container Security, Data Protection and Web-Security Posture Performance 54 Adequate, capped by Async & latency hygiene

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 37 · counts for 46%Production Readiness 43 · counts for 25%Performance 54 · counts for 14%Code Health 60 · counts for 8%Maturity 65 · counts for 4%Architecture 84 · counts for 2%

If Security and Compliance rose from 37 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 45 to about 52.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 8%Supporting code 19%Tests 74%
New since the last survey: 93 findings

These 93 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 9 October 2026.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 21 findings

These 21 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 9 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Coupling · Off the main sequence: Ocelot(net8.0)
  • Code Coverage · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: Ocelot.Tracing.OpenTracing
  • Explicit Debt · TodoComment src/DownstreamRouteFinder/Finder/DiscoveryDownstreamRouteFinder.cs
  • Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium: REDACTED samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/Controllers/ValuesController.cs
  • Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: AuthenticateAsync src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: ProcessRoutesAsync src/Multiplexer/MultiplexingMiddleware.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: ProcessRouteAsync src/Multiplexer/MultiplexingMiddleware.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SetErrorResponse src/Responder/Middleware/ResponderMiddleware.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: WhenIDoActionMultipleTimes testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: WhenIDoActionForTime testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GivenIHaveAToken REDACTED
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GivenIHaveATokenWithUrlPath REDACTED
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GivenToken REDACTED
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GenerateTokenAsync REDACTED
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: WatchWhenIGetUrlOnTheApiGateway testing/Steps/TimeoutSteps.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: PreErrorResponderMiddleware samples/Metadata/MyMiddlewares.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: ResponderMiddleware samples/Metadata/MyMiddlewares.cs
  • Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its CancellationToken: StopAsync src/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPoller.cs
  • Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) testing/PortFinder.cs
Rebuild cost: about €61,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€20,000 to €100,000, for 338 to 1,073 hours of work, about 0.4 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 45. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 18,583 lines of product code
Comment linesThe estimate prices 16,264 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 18,583 lines but aren't priced as work.

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning
2
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: remove the always-true validation callback so the platform verifies the chain, hostname and expiry.
If one self-signed certificate must be trusted, pin it by public key or thumbprint on the single handler that needs it and reject all others — never process-wide.
Raises the score by about 6 points · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED, REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Low effort · Static Analysis (SAST)

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €61,000 to build again, about 0.4 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 37 (Weak). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 5 points for low effort, because it clears the 3 REDACTED Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Ocelot Ocelot Ocelot.Testing Testing Ocelot.Testing->Ocelot

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

60 modules, with 210 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 20 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 20 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 Values2 Configuration.File3 Responses4 ServiceDiscovery.Providers5 DownstreamRouteFinder.UrlMatcher6 Infrastructure.RequestData7 Logging8 Configuration.Repository9 Request.Middleware10 Middleware11 Errors12 RequestId.Middleware13 Configuration.Parser14 Infrastructure15 Infrastructure.Claims16 ServiceDiscovery17 Authorization18 Configuration.Validator19 Configuration.Creator20 Configuration21 Cache22 Claims23 DependencyInjection24 DownstreamRouteFinder.Finder25 DownstreamUrlCreator26 Headers27 LoadBalancer.Interfaces28 Multiplexer29 PathManipulation30 QualityOfService31 QueryStrings32 RateLimiting33 Security34 Administration35 LoadBalancer36 LoadBalancer.Creators37 Requester38 Responder39 LoadBalancer.Balancers40 Requester.Middleware
1 Values
2 Configuration.File2
3 Responses2
4 ServiceDiscovery.Providers3
5 DownstreamRouteFinder.UrlMatcher22
6 Infrastructure.RequestData22
7 Logging4
8 Configuration.Repository62122
9 Request.Middleware11
10 Middleware1121124
11 Errors1111
12 RequestId.Middleware1111
13 Configuration.Parser232
14 Infrastructure31313
15 Infrastructure.Claims21
16 ServiceDiscovery23216
17 Authorization1421142
18 Configuration.Validator8221
19 Configuration.Creator4102251113911
20 Configuration5811
21 Cache1222
22 Claims212
23 DependencyInjection1222
24 DownstreamRouteFinder.Finder322129
25 DownstreamUrlCreator331112
26 Headers84243146
27 LoadBalancer.Interfaces1415
28 Multiplexer1211219
29 PathManipulation22212
30 QualityOfService616
31 QueryStrings212112
32 RateLimiting1216
33 Security21122
34 Administration122
35 LoadBalancer3211147
36 LoadBalancer.Creators55510
37 Requester27651
38 Responder321
39 LoadBalancer.Balancers74145
40 Requester.Middleware1111
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 Values2 Configuration.File3 Responses4 ServiceDiscovery.Providers5 DownstreamRouteFinder.UrlMatcher6 Infrastructure.RequestData7 Logging8 Configuration.Repository9 Request.Middleware10 Middleware11 Errors12 RequestId.Middleware13 Configuration.Parser14 Infrastructure15 Infrastructure.Claims16 ServiceDiscovery17 Authorization18 Configuration.Validator19 Configuration.Creator20 Configuration21 Cache22 Claims23 DependencyInjection24 DownstreamRouteFinder.Finder25 DownstreamUrlCreator26 Headers27 LoadBalancer.Interfaces28 Multiplexer29 PathManipulation30 QualityOfService31 QueryStrings32 RateLimiting33 Security34 Administration35 LoadBalancer36 LoadBalancer.Creators37 Requester38 Responder39 LoadBalancer.Balancers40 Requester.MiddlewareValues1Configuration.File2Responses3ServiceDiscovery.Providers4DownstreamRouteFinder.UrlMatcher5Infrastructure.RequestData6Logging7Configuration.Repository8Request.Middleware9Middleware10Errors11RequestId.Middleware12Configuration.Parser13Infrastructure14Infrastructure.Claims15ServiceDiscovery16Authorization17Configuration.Validator18Configuration.Creator19Configuration20Cache21Claims22DependencyInjection23DownstreamRouteFinder.Finder24DownstreamUrlCreator25Headers26LoadBalancer.Interfaces27Multiplexer28PathManipulation29QualityOfService30QueryStrings31RateLimiting32Security33Administration34LoadBalancer35LoadBalancer.Creators36Requester37Responder38LoadBalancer.Balancers39Requester.Middleware4022322224621221111211241111111123231313212321614211428221410225111391158111222212122232212933111284243146141512112192221261621211212162112212232111475551027651321741451111+20 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate ·

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 9.7 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 8.9 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.3 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 7.1 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 7.2 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 7.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 7.4 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 7.8
The Bad
X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 6.4 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 6.6
The Ugly
D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 4.6 X1 · Repo Async correctness 4.9

At a glance — Architecture · 84% · Strong ·

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.8 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 9.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 7.5 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0
The Bad
D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 5.9 AX10 · Repo Code composition 6.8

At a glance — Maturity · 65% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 9.7 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.2 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 8.6 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.5 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.7
The Bad
D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 6.4
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 43% · Weak · gated by D13, P3, P7 ·

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 9.9 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0
The Bad
P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
D13 · .NET / C# REDACTED Scanning 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 1.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 37% · Weak · gated by D29, D31, C1, S1 ·

The Good
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0
The Bad
C4 · Repo Data Retention 6.5
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 4.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 2.5 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 0.1 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 0.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 3.5

At a glance — Performance · 54% · Adequate · gated by PF3 ·

The Good
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 10.0
The Bad
PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.4
The Ugly
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 2.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2025 — Injection33High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration31High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures10High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately fix the TLS validation logic to reject untrusted certificates and resolve the three leaked secrets in configuration files. Encrypt sensitive data at rest using a secure key management solution and integrate static analysis into the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions. Finally, address the medium-severity issues in the Dockerfiles to harden the container infrastructure.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.+5.0 ptsLowREDACTED Scanning
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: remove the always-true validation callback so the platform verifies the chain, hostname and expiry. If one self-signed certificate must be trusted, pin it by public key or thumbprint on the single handler that needs it and reject all others — never process-wide.+6.2 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED, REDACTED.+2.8 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED.+2.7 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+4.4 ptsMediumData Protection
Resolve the 8 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (2).+2.1 ptsLowIaC & Container Security
Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2).+1.7 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED.+1.7 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 160 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 6% slop · 46% mixed · 48% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED0.0SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED1.3SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.1SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.3SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED2.4SlopIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED2.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.5SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED3.7SlopIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
manual/Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj4.9MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/Ocelot.csproj4.9MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
REDACTED5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.5MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
src/RateLimiting/RateLimiting.cs5.8MixedExplicit Debt: FileScopedPragmaDisable
src/WebSockets/WebSocketsProxyMiddleware.cs5.8MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
unit/DependencyInjection/ConfigurationBuilderExtensionsTests.cs5.8MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED5.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 78

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 325

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 123

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 8

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 76 of 79 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 79 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D43D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C1C2C4GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6P7PF1PF2PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 506 of 526 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a16806-a7d9-7d1b-ae6d-4a97530c09ca.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (.github/codecov.yml) and a coverage step in CI (`coverlet`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The suite could not be built/run in-image and no machine-readable report was present in the working tree at scan time, so the number could not be read — it is excluded from the score rather than treated as unmeasured-by-the-team. To have it read, commit the lcov/Cobertura artifact your CI produces (a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so only a committed report reaches it — `git add -f` that one file if it is gitignored), or make the suite runnable in-image. For context only, test code is ≈ 100% of production LoC (44,683 test / 18,297 production) — a rough proxy, NOT a coverage measurement. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura artifact your CI produces (a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so only a committed report reaches it — `git add -f` that one file if it is gitignored), or make the suite runnable in-image, and the real number is read.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 5514 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: /usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/NuGet.targets(521,5): error MSB3202: The project file "src/Ocelot/Ocelot.csproj" was not found. [samples/ServiceFabric/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln].
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its NuGet package dependencies. Nothing was read about its Python dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D18 Solution Shape — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
  • D18 Solution Shape — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. A scan loads every live solution in the repository into one workspace. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects the projects of `Ocelot.slnx`, `Ocelot.Samples.slnx`, `samples/ServiceFabric/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln`, `samples/Kubernetes/OcelotKube.sln`, `samples/Eureka/OcelotEureka.sln`, `samples/GraphQL/OcelotGraphQL.sln`; 3 further solution(s) found in this tree (`samples/Eureka/OcelotEureka.sln`, `samples/GraphQL/OcelotGraphQL.sln`, `samples/Kubernetes/OcelotKube.sln`) could not be added to it — their project list could not be read, or none of their projects opened — so their code is not represented in the headline. (This is a count of the solutions discovery found and could not show to be covered by the analyzed ones — not a claim about how many solution files the repository contains.) If one of them is an archived or vendored tree, declaring it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — excludes it from discovery the same way generated code is. You can widen what we reach: if one of these solutions is live code, check that it opens on its own (`dotnet build <solution>`); if it is archived or vendored, declare it so.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • D28 Secrets (history) — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. D28's config-credential rule (WD-SECRET-0002) parses each committed `.json` config as a document and reads credential-named values; `REDACTED`, `manual/ocelot.json`, `manual/ocelot.identityserver4.json` did not parse (JSON5, a template, several concatenated documents), so a credential bound there is UNMEASURED by that rule. gitleaks still scanned the same files as text.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (osv) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; nuget was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that nuget is free of known-vulnerable dependencies.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/Configuration/File/AggregateRouteConfig.cs`, `src/DownstreamRouteFinder/UrlMatcher/PlaceholderNameAndValue.cs`, `src/Errors/RequestTimedOutError.cs` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. `dotnet build` exited 1 with a compiler/MSBuild diagnostic, so there were no assemblies to read IL from. The build itself is D18's row, with the ask; nothing further is charged here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (manual/docker-compose.yaml). compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref 05cbeb4d-68f0-46d5-887c-4f5de26a7f12::mudmmtuwgap1vmeja7t3dakpg: "/unit": not found; runtime evidence skipped.
  • ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads a handler's ENTRY METHODS to decide whether its mutation is safe to re-run. On these types it walked none of them, yet the same write oracle finds a persistent write in the type — so the mutation is there and the limit is in our entry-point recognition, not in the repository. Known shapes: a handler contract method implemented as an EXPLICIT INTERFACE IMPLEMENTATION, and a STATIC handler method (the Wolverine default).
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 140 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 180.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 14 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 54.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.7 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.Map at 18. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being RateLimitOptionsCreator.Create at 16 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 1 file carries no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of its over-threshold methods was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: src/Configuration/Creator/RateLimitOptionsCreator.cs (RateLimitOptionsCreator.Create at 16). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.

ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.Map (cyclomatic 18)src/Responder/ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs:8

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.Map (cyclomatic 18). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10.
  2. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ClaimsAuthorizer.Authorize at 30.

ClaimsAuthorizer.Authorize (cognitive 30)src/Authorization/ClaimsAuthorizer.cs:24
SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.MapAggregateContent (cognitive 24)src/Multiplexer/SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.cs:16
UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.Create (cognitive 20)src/Configuration/Creator/UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.cs:23
StreamHttpContent.CopyAsync (cognitive 19)src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:38

What to do

  1. Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with ClaimsAuthorizer.Authorize (cognitive 30), SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.MapAggregateContent (cognitive 24), UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.Create (cognitive 20). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Stronggated by 3 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: AcceptanceSteps · ×3testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with AcceptanceSteps.cs, DownstreamRouteBuilder.cs, ConcurrentSteps.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected. 1 of the 1 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.

Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:7

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DownstreamHostBuilder.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

63 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.8 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 66 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: AcceptanceSteps (LCOM4 4)testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:30

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with AcceptanceSteps.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5514 test methods: 5514 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Stronggated by 13 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 skipped (4 with a documented reason), 10 zero-assertion, 1 synchronised by a fixed sleep, 2 depending on a live external host, 1 mock references across 1838 tests.

No assertions: PostConfigure_NullOptions_DoesNothing · ×10unit/Authorization/RouteClaimsRequirementBindingTests.cs:22
Depends on a live external host: If_two_delegating_handlers_are_defined_then_these_should_be_call_in_order · ×2unit/Requester/MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs:57
Fixed-sleep synchronisation: StopAsync_Should_wait_for_running_timer_callback_to_completeunit/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPollerTests.cs:182
Skipped (documented): ShouldClearCacheRegionViaAdministrationAPI · ×4acceptance/Administration/CacheManagerTests.cs:19
Mock framework: Moq

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with OcelotBuilderTests.cs (2), RouteClaimsRequirementBindingTests.cs, FileConfigurationPollerTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Depends on a live external host finding(s) in Test Quality — start with MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Fixed-sleep synchronisation finding(s) in Test Quality — start with FileConfigurationPollerTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 284 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 42 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 208 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over the committed `packages.lock.json` and nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's NuGet package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs. Counted over 91 of the 415 production source files in this repository: 323 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 1 have no attributable history left to measure.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

162 deducted debt markers + 19 dead symbols across 18297 LoC in the .NET projects (2.7/KLoC) → score 4.6.

WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×15acceptance/Core/LoadTests.cs:15
NoWarnInCsproj · ×10unit/Ocelot.UnitTests.csproj:17
FileScopedPragmaDisablesrc/RateLimiting/RateLimiting.cs:13
TodoComment · ×93acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:143
CommentedOutCode · ×26acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:95

+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED (2), MyServiceDiscoveryProvider.cs (2), DiscoverySteps.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 10 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Ocelot.UnitTests.csproj (2), Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj (2), Ocelot.Benchmarks.csproj (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 FileScopedPragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with RateLimiting.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  4. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

63 projects, 2295 source files, 62970 hand-written lines of code (18297 production / 44673 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 90 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish). Measured across 6 solutions loaded as one workspace: `Ocelot.slnx`, `Ocelot.Samples.slnx`, `samples/ServiceFabric/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln`, `samples/Kubernetes/OcelotKube.sln`, `samples/Eureka/OcelotEureka.sln`, `samples/GraphQL/OcelotGraphQL.sln`.

Solution references a project that does not exist · ×2samples/ServiceFabric/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln
Solution references 2 projects that do not exist · ×2samples/Kubernetes/OcelotKube.sln

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Solution references a project that does not exist finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln, OcelotGraphQL.sln. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Solution references 2 projects that do not exist finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with OcelotKube.sln, OcelotEureka.sln. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Ocelot's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture/Docs markdown, and the docs/releasenotes.rst release notes. The repository root README gives an overview (About + Install; Documentation; Features; Release Radar; Repository Structure; Quick Overview; Where to Find Things; Getting Started; Contributing; Notes) plus a Docker build guide for the docker/ directory, while the docs/README and samples directories each document their own subdirectories without referencing the repository root. The XML-doc coverage is low (0-16% across 43 documents), reflecting an internal documentation effort rather than a full project doc set. The Ocelot documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: it contains two long building/devprocess.rst and releaseprocess.rst files that describe Gitflow branching, GitHub workflows, the development/release lifecycle, and the NuGet package repository with links to every PR milestone; a dedicated docs/features/ directory covering authentication, authorization, caching, claims transformation, configuration, delegation handlers, aggregation, and BFF patterns; and an extensive features/administration.rst on IdentityServer4 integration. The XML-doc coverage figures are below 5% for most Ocelot packages (0-16%), reflecting the documentation's focus on human-readable prose rather than generated API docs. Ocelot's documentation is strong for its own features (dependency injection, error handling, GraphQL samples) and covers many architecture/Docs markdown files. The READMEs are mostly focused on their directories with no root-level overview, installation, or contribution guidance; the XML-doc coverage reflects a project-wide lack of comprehensive documentation.

Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.ManualTest(net8.0) · ×14manual/Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 14 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj, Ocelot.csproj, Ocelot.Testing.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment ValueStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

54 valuable / 0 redundant across 200 sampled comments.

What to do

  1. Improve Comment Value — currently 8.6/10. — 54 valuable / 0 redundant across 200 sampled comments.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 21 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

88 % of calls cross a namespace and 26 % go through an interface, but 84 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Pass-through layersrc/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketOptionsProxy.cs:7

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Pass-through layer finding(s) in Navigability — start with ClientWebSocketOptionsProxy.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

33 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 13 medium, 0 low. 16 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 21 file(s) — `acceptance/Administration/CacheManagerTests.cs` (lines 28–32), `acceptance/Aggregation/AggregateTests.cs` (line 526), `acceptance/LoadBalancer/LoadBalancerTests.cs` (line 47), `acceptance/QualityOfService/QualityOfServiceTests.cs` (line 633), `src/Configuration/File/AggregateRouteConfig.cs` (line 3), … (+16 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 9 of those file(s) — `acceptance/Aggregation/AggregateTests.cs`, `src/Configuration/File/AggregateRouteConfig.cs`, `src/DownstreamRouteFinder/UrlMatcher/PlaceholderNameAndValue.cs`, `src/Errors/RequestTimedOutError.cs`, `testing/Authentication/AuthenticationTokenRequestEventArgs.cs`, … (+4 more) — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them. In 2 of those file(s) — `testing/ServiceHandler.cs`, `unit/DownstreamRouteFinder/DownstreamRouteFinderTests.cs` — the break is at a TYPE DECLARATION (a C# primary constructor semgrep's grammar cannot parse), so the loss is wider than the named lines: rules scoped to that type see no type to scope to and are blind over its whole body, while rules matching statements keep working there. Absence of a type-scoped finding in those types is not evidence of anything. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 16 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (osv). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (osv), and the findings above are real and complete for them. nuget was not scanned (nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

31 finding(s): 8 critical, 10 high, 12 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 12 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 10 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 8 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

30 of 92 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is testing/ServiceHandler.cs. Counted over 92 of the 415 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×30testing/ServiceHandler.cs:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

  1. Resolve the 30 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ServiceHandler.cs, REDACTED, CircuitBreaker.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (30 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs↔ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs 50%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs ↔ ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cssrc/Requester/HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 22 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `QualityOfServiceFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_logger; e.g. `_logger` at line 71). — src/QualityOfService/QualityOfServiceFactory.cs:10
  • `Placeholders` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_placeholders; e.g. `_placeholders` at line 65). — src/Infrastructure/Placeholders.cs:12

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • The namespaces Ocelot.Administration ↔ Ocelot.Cache ↔ Ocelot.Configuration ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.ChangeTracking ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Creator ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.File ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Parser ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Repository ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Validator ↔ Ocelot.DownstreamRouteFinder.UrlMatcher ↔ Ocelot.Errors ↔ Ocelot.Infrastructure ↔ Ocelot.Infrastructure.RequestData ↔ Ocelot.Logging ↔ Ocelot.Middleware ↔ Ocelot.Request.Creator ↔ Ocelot.Request.Mapper ↔ Ocelot.Request.Middleware ↔ Ocelot.Responses ↔ Ocelot.ServiceDiscovery depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Ocelot.Administration → Ocelot.Configuration.File (Ocelot.Administration.FileConfigurationController → Ocelot.Configuration.File.FileConfiguration, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:4

What to do

  • Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.
AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IOcelotBuilder` declares 19 members under just 12 distinct name(s): `Services`, `Configuration`, `MvcCoreBuilder`, `AddConfigurationDelegate`, `AddConfigurationPoller`, `AddConfigurationDiscoveryPoller`, `AddConfigurationPoller`, `AddDelegatingHandler`, `AddDelegatingHandler`, `AddSingletonDefinedAggregator`, `AddTransientDefinedAggregator`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddConfigPlaceholders`, `AddQualityOfService`, `AddQualityOfService`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. That is an OVERLOAD SET, not 19 separate responsibilities: a caller binds to 12 operation(s) and uses the overload it selected, so the Interface-Segregation harm does NOT apply on the caller's side and splitting this into role-interfaces would scatter one operation without relieving anything. The burden that does remain is the IMPLEMENTER's — all 19 signatures must be written and kept in step. Reduce it by collapsing overloads (optional or default parameters, or an options object) rather than by segregating the interface. — src/DependencyInjection/IOcelotBuilder.cs:15

What to do

  • Collapse overload sets (optional/default parameters, or an options object) — these interfaces are wide in SIGNATURES, not in responsibilities, so segregating them would relieve no caller.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:32

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A test is skipped with reason "TODO: Requires redevelopment after deprecation of Ocelot.Administration.IdentityServer4 package." — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten. — acceptance/Administration/CacheManagerTests.cs:19
  • A test is skipped with reason "TODO Require redevelopment and cleaning up old Auth code" — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten. — acceptance/Aggregation/AggregateTests.cs:246
  • A test is skipped with reason "TODO Actually testing the Kestrel web server requires setting up a Windows user to run under using "setspn" command." — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten. — acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:72
  • A test is skipped with reason "TODO: HTTP/2 (SSL) vs WebSocket is unsupported scenario by Ocelot Core currently, unfortunately..." — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten. — acceptance/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketTests.cs:122
  • `Create` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — src/Configuration/Creator/UpstreamHeaderTemplatePatternCreator.cs:23
  • `CreateContentReadStreamAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:32
  • `WithDefaultKestrelServerOptions` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — testing/ServiceHandler.cs:148
  • `WithoutServices` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — REDACTED:29
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×14) — manual/Actions/Basic.cs:21, manual/Actions/Basic.cs:22, manual/Actions/Basic.cs:41, …
  • 11 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:49

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 19 of 21 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy9.7 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README.md names `src/Routing/`, but no file or folder `src/Routing` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:210
  • README.md links to `[Ocelot`, but `[Ocelot` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:258
  • README.md links to `Retry`, but `Retry` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:259
  • README.md links to `See`, but `See` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:263
  • REDACTED names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Kubernetes`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — REDACTED:70
  • docs/features/qualityofservice.rst names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Polly`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/features/qualityofservice.rst:318
  • docs/features/servicediscovery.rst names the project `Ocelot.Discovery.Consul`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/features/servicediscovery.rst:24
  • docs/features/servicediscovery.rst names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Consul`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/features/servicediscovery.rst:54
  • docs/features/servicediscovery.rst names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Eureka`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/features/servicediscovery.rst:447
  • docs/features/tracing.rst names the project `Ocelot.Tracing.Butterfly`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/features/tracing.rst:82
  • docs/features/websockets.rst names Ocelot 24, but the manifest declares `Ocelot` 25.0.1. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/features/websockets.rst:24

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README.md names `src/Routing/`, but no file or folder `src/Routing` exists; README.md links to `[Ocelot`, but `[Ocelot` does not exist; README.md links to `Retry`, but `Retry` does not exist; README.md links to `See`, but `See` does not exist; REDACTED names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Kubernetes`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 1260/1422 types (89%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/ApiGateway.cs` reports through `Console.Write…` at line 28 although other files in its project log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, category or structured properties and never reach the log pipeline or its exporters. — samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/ApiGateway.cs:28

What to do

  • Replace `Console.Write…` in service code with the project's injected `ILogger<T>` (message templates with named properties), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level and a category.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 22818 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `builder.Services // Learn more about configuring Swagger/OpenAPI at https://a...` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default). (×2) — samples/Kubernetes/DownstreamService/Program.cs:8, samples/ServiceDiscovery/DownstreamService/Program.cs:9
  • `new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default). (×2) — REDACTED:113, REDACTED:181

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 15 use(s) across 19,604 production line(s) (~0.8/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 15 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one). (×13) — src/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPoller.cs:138, src/Infrastructure/InMemoryBus.cs:33, src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:87, …
  • `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one). (×2) — REDACTED:218, REDACTED:224
  • Only 2/165 awaits in library code use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
  • `await _repo.GetAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:31
  • `await _setter.SetAsync(configuration, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:48
  • `await _next(context)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:29
  • `await AuthenticateAsync(context, route)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:35
  • `await _next.Invoke(context)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×3) — src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:46, src/Authorization/AuthorizationMiddleware.cs:69, src/Authorization/AuthorizationMiddleware.cs:85
  • `await context.AuthenticateAsync(scheme)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:70
  • `await downstreamRequest.Request.Content.ReadAsStringAsync()` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Cache/DefaultCacheKeyGenerator.cs:31
  • `await _next.Invoke(httpContext)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×3) — src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:30, src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:51, src/Claims/Middleware/ClaimsToClaimsMiddleware.cs:40
  • `await _cacheGenerator.GenerateRequestCacheKey(downstreamRequest, downstreamRoute)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:36
  • `await CreateCachedResponse(downstreamResponse)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:60
  • `await response.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync()` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:95
  • `await _configurationValidator.IsValid(fileConfiguration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Configuration/Creator/FileInternalConfigurationCreator.cs:32
  • `await _semaphore.WaitAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. (×2) — src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:62, src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:102
  • `await FileIO.ReadAllTextAsync(_environmentFile.FullName, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:65
  • `await FileIO.WriteAllTextAsync(_environmentFile.FullName, json, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:108
  • `await FileIO.WriteAllTextAsync(_ocelotFile.FullName, json, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:113
  • `await _repo.SetAsync(configuration, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Configuration/Repository/FileAndInternalConfigurationSetter.cs:33
  • `await _configCreator.Create(configuration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`. — src/Configuration/Repository/FileAndInternalConfigurationSetter.cs:35

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult().
  • In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
S1 · Web-Security Posture0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • `RemoteCertificateValidationCallback` is assigned a callback that returns `true` unconditionally, so every TLS peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Delete the override and let the platform validate. If a specific self-signed or internally-issued certificate genuinely has to be trusted, pin THAT one — compare the presented certificate's public key or thumbprint against the expected value and return `false` for everything else — and scope it to the single handler that talks to that host rather than to the whole process. If the override exists only to get past a development certificate, gate it on a build configuration or an explicit opt-in setting so it cannot ship. — src/Requester/MessageInvokerPool.cs:112
  • MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. — src/Cache/MD5Helper.cs:10
  • The value is the token-signing key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. — REDACTED:91
  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — REDACTED:49
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×30) — manual/Actions/Basic.cs:11, samples/Basic/Program.cs:4, samples/Configuration/Program.cs:11, …
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.) — src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:75

What to do

  • Stop accepting every TLS certificate: remove the always-true validation callback so the platform verifies the chain, hostname and expiry. If one self-signed certificate must be trusted, pin it by public key or thumbprint on the single handler that needs it and reject all others — never process-wide.
  • Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (`System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32`) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key or a mutex name.
  • Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations.
  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×14) — src/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPoller.cs:138, src/Infrastructure/InMemoryBus.cs:33, testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:149, …
  • This blocks on a Task **while holding a `lock`**, which is worse than an ordinary sync-over-async in two ways. `await` is illegal inside a `lock` body, so the usual fix — make the caller `async` and await it — cannot be applied where this block stands. And the thread parks while still holding the lock, so it occupies the critical section doing no work: every other caller serialises behind an operation that is only waiting, and if the awaited task itself needs a thread the pool has run out of, they wait forever. Do the async work OUTSIDE the critical section: take the lock only to read the shared state, release it, await the call, then re-take the lock to publish the result — re-checking on re-entry whether another caller won the race and, if so, discarding your result rather than overwriting theirs. Where the critical section genuinely has to span the async call, `lock` is the wrong primitive: use an async-aware one (`SemaphoreSlim` with `await WaitAsync()`) so waiters yield their thread instead of parking it. — src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:87
  • `Task.WaitAll` blocks this thread until the tasks complete — sync-over-async: it can deadlock under a synchronization context and it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await Task.WhenAll(…)` instead. — testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs:173
  • Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout. (×2) — testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs:197, testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs:214

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `md5` is a `MD5`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 10). Every use of it in `GenerateMd5` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var md5 = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — src/Cache/MD5Helper.cs:10

What to do

  • Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 35/86 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×16) — manual/Actions/Basic.cs:8, src/Cache/DefaultCacheKeyGenerator.cs:10, src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:82, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `context.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `context.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken. — src/Multiplexer/MultiplexingMiddleware.cs:121
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×20) — src/Multiplexer/MultiplexingMiddleware.cs:204, src/Requester/MessageInvokerHttpRequester.cs:28, src/Responder/HttpContextResponder.cs:79, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `originalContext.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `originalContext.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken. (×2) — src/Multiplexer/SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.cs:16, src/Multiplexer/UserDefinedResponseAggregator.cs:16

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `LogDebug` at line 44 is called with an argument built by `string.Join(", ", response.Data.DownstreamRoute.Select(r => r.DownstreamPathTemplate.Value))` (line 44), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because LogDebug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `IsEnabled` test, no debug flag, no conditional-compilation region. — src/DownstreamRouteFinder/DownstreamRouteFinderMiddleware.cs:44

What to do

  • Each finding names the diagnostic call and the expression inside its argument whose cost scales with a collection. Confirm from the two that the argument is built before the call — that is C#'s evaluation order, not a guess — then put the construction behind the same level check the sink applies: `if (logger.IsEnabled(LogLevel.Trace))` for Microsoft.Extensions.Logging, the repository's own debug flag where it has one, or a message template whose ARGUMENTS the logging framework only formats when the level is on. Moving the call is not the fix: it is the join/projection in the argument that is paid, wherever the call sits.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `htmlContent` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `HttpResponse.WriteAsync` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — samples/WebSocket/Program.cs:31

What to do

  • Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — samples/ServiceFabric/ApiGateway/WebCommunicationListener.cs:85

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — src/Logging/OcelotLogger.cs:87

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • This method contradicts itself about `services`: line 35 writes `services?.Count`, which says `services` can be null, but line 48 then dereferences it directly as `services.FindIndex` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `?.` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for; if `services` truly cannot be null here, the `?.` is misleading. Settle it one way — test `services` once before the first use and handle the null case, or drop the `?.` — rather than leaving the two readings side by side. — src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/LeastConnection.cs:48
  • This method contradicts itself about `route`: line 68 writes `route?.`, which says `route` can be null, but line 71 then dereferences it directly as `route.MetadataOptions` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `?.` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for; if `route` truly cannot be null here, the `?.` is misleading. Settle it one way — test `route` once before the first use and handle the null case, or drop the `?.` — rather than leaving the two readings side by side. — src/Metadata/DownstreamRouteExtensions.cs:71
  • This method contradicts itself about `route`: line 23 writes `route?.`, which says `route` can be null, but line 35 then dereferences it directly as `route.GetMetadata` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `?.` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for; if `route` truly cannot be null here, the `?.` is misleading. Settle it one way — test `route` once before the first use and handle the null case, or drop the `?.` — rather than leaving the two readings side by side. — samples/Metadata/MetadataResponder.cs:35
  • 15/18 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~1.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 32 suppression(s) across the 24381 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Where a method uses `?.` on a symbol and then dereferences it directly, settle the question once: test it before the first use and handle null, or drop the `?.`.
  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health60%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Architecture84%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity65%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness43%Weak — gated by D13, P3, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security37%Weak — gated by D29, D31, C1, S1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance54%Adequate — gated by PF3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Unscored — 4 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 4 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — 2 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 8 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 35 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref 05cbeb4d-68f0-46d5-887c-4f5de26a7f12::mudmmtuwgap1vmeja7t3dakpg: "/unit": not found; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (18,297 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 3 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — IL not measured — the target did not build
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — Not assessed, and this one is on us: 3 of the 3 handler(s) found here write to persistent state through an entry point this check does not yet recognise (an explicitly-implemented interface method, or a static handler method). Idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out for them — this is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 78 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×15
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField acceptance/Core/LoadTests.cs:15 — private string _downstreamQuery — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField acceptance/QualityOfService/FakeQualityOfServiceDelegatingHandler.cs:10 — private IHttpContextAccessor _contextAccessor — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField acceptance/Requester/MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs:49 — private Mock<IOcelotLogger> _ocelotLogger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField REDACTED:16 — private ILogger<WeatherForecastController> _logger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField samples/ServiceDiscovery/DownstreamService/Controllers/WeatherForecastController.cs:14 — private ILogger<WeatherForecastController> _logger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField samples/ServiceDiscovery/ApiGateway/ServiceDiscovery/MyServiceDiscoveryProvider.cs:10 — private IServiceProvider _serviceProvider — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField testing/Steps/DiscoverySteps.cs:78 — private IServiceProvider _serviceProvider — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField samples/ServiceDiscovery/ApiGateway/ServiceDiscovery/MyServiceDiscoveryProvider.cs:11 — private ServiceProviderConfiguration _config — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField testing/Steps/DiscoverySteps.cs:79 — private ServiceProviderConfiguration _config — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField samples/ServiceDiscovery/ApiGateway/ServiceDiscovery/MyServiceDiscoveryProviderFactory.cs:11 — private IOcelotLoggerFactory _factory — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField src/Configuration/Builder/DownstreamRouteBuilder.cs:13 — private HashSet<HttpMethod> _upstreamHttpMethod — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField src/Requester/DelegatingHandlerFactory.cs:13 — private IOcelotLogger _logger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField src/Requester/MessageInvokerHttpRequester.cs:10 — private IOcelotLogger _logger — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField src/WebSockets/WebSocketsProxyMiddleware.cs:32 — private RequestDelegate _next — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField unit/DependencyInjection/ConfigurationBuilderExtensionsTests.cs:14 — private ITestOutputHelper _output — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×10
  • NoWarnInCsproj unit/Ocelot.UnitTests.csproj:17 — CS0618 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj manual/Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj:10 — CS0618 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj benchmark/Ocelot.Benchmarks.csproj:16 — CS0618 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj acceptance/Ocelot.Acceptance.csproj:19 — CS0618 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj unit/Ocelot.UnitTests.csproj:17 — CS1591 — this project generates an XML documentation file as a build output, so its documentation is something it PUBLISHES to whoever consumes the assembly, and this entry switches off a rule whose only job is to report that documentation missing or malformed. The two decisions sit in the same file and the quiet one wins: the documentation this project ships has holes exactly where the rule would have pointed, no build says so, and the people who meet the gap are downstream — in their editor, at the moment they are trying to use the member. Write the documentation the rule is asking for and drop the code from the list; where only some elements genuinely cannot carry it, narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rest of the API stays covered. If the documentation was never meant to be consumed, the honest fix is the other line — stop generating the file, so the project no longer publishes something it is choosing not to check.
  • NoWarnInCsproj manual/Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj:10 — CS1591 — this project generates an XML documentation file as a build output, so its documentation is something it PUBLISHES to whoever consumes the assembly, and this entry switches off a rule whose only job is to report that documentation missing or malformed. The two decisions sit in the same file and the quiet one wins: the documentation this project ships has holes exactly where the rule would have pointed, no build says so, and the people who meet the gap are downstream — in their editor, at the moment they are trying to use the member. Write the documentation the rule is asking for and drop the code from the list; where only some elements genuinely cannot carry it, narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rest of the API stays covered. If the documentation was never meant to be consumed, the honest fix is the other line — stop generating the file, so the project no longer publishes something it is choosing not to check.
  • NoWarnInCsproj benchmark/Ocelot.Benchmarks.csproj:16 — CS1591 — this project generates an XML documentation file as a build output, so its documentation is something it PUBLISHES to whoever consumes the assembly, and this entry switches off a rule whose only job is to report that documentation missing or malformed. The two decisions sit in the same file and the quiet one wins: the documentation this project ships has holes exactly where the rule would have pointed, no build says so, and the people who meet the gap are downstream — in their editor, at the moment they are trying to use the member. Write the documentation the rule is asking for and drop the code from the list; where only some elements genuinely cannot carry it, narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rest of the API stays covered. If the documentation was never meant to be consumed, the honest fix is the other line — stop generating the file, so the project no longer publishes something it is choosing not to check.
  • NoWarnInCsproj acceptance/Ocelot.Acceptance.csproj:19 — CS1591 — this project generates an XML documentation file as a build output, so its documentation is something it PUBLISHES to whoever consumes the assembly, and this entry switches off a rule whose only job is to report that documentation missing or malformed. The two decisions sit in the same file and the quiet one wins: the documentation this project ships has holes exactly where the rule would have pointed, no build says so, and the people who meet the gap are downstream — in their editor, at the moment they are trying to use the member. Write the documentation the rule is asking for and drop the code from the list; where only some elements genuinely cannot carry it, narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rest of the API stays covered. If the documentation was never meant to be consumed, the honest fix is the other line — stop generating the file, so the project no longer publishes something it is choosing not to check.
  • NoWarnInCsproj src/Ocelot.csproj:21 — 1591 — this project generates an XML documentation file as a build output, so its documentation is something it PUBLISHES to whoever consumes the assembly, and this entry switches off a rule whose only job is to report that documentation missing or malformed. The two decisions sit in the same file and the quiet one wins: the documentation this project ships has holes exactly where the rule would have pointed, no build says so, and the people who meet the gap are downstream — in their editor, at the moment they are trying to use the member. Write the documentation the rule is asking for and drop the code from the list; where only some elements genuinely cannot carry it, narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rest of the API stays covered. If the documentation was never meant to be consumed, the honest fix is the other line — stop generating the file, so the project no longer publishes something it is choosing not to check.
  • NoWarnInCsproj src/Ocelot.csproj:47 — NU1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, including builds years from now. It is raised by the build itself — the packaging, restore or SDK step — about the project as a whole, not by the compiler or an analyzer at a line of code, so there is no call site to narrow it to and no per-site directive that could carry a reason: this element is the only place the decision can be recorded. Say WHY here, in a comment on the entry, or fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×10
  • REDACTED
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · Critical IaC · ×8
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
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D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×4
  • REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
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D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×3
  • REDACTED
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D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×2
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles · Namespace dependency cycle · ×1
  • Namespace dependency cycle src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:4 — The namespaces Ocelot.Administration ↔ Ocelot.Cache ↔ Ocelot.Configuration ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.ChangeTracking ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Creator ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.File ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Parser ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Repository ↔ Ocelot.Configuration.Validator ↔ Ocelot.DownstreamRouteFinder.UrlMatcher ↔ Ocelot.Errors ↔ Ocelot.Infrastructure ↔ Ocelot.Infrastructure.RequestData ↔ Ocelot.Logging ↔ Ocelot.Middleware ↔ Ocelot.Request.Creator ↔ Ocelot.Request.Mapper ↔ Ocelot.Request.Middleware ↔ Ocelot.Responses ↔ Ocelot.ServiceDiscovery depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Ocelot.Administration → Ocelot.Configuration.File (Ocelot.Administration.FileConfigurationController → Ocelot.Configuration.File.FileConfiguration, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.
D17 · Explicit Debt · FileScopedPragmaDisable · ×1
  • FileScopedPragmaDisable src/RateLimiting/RateLimiting.cs:13 — #pragma warning disable IDE0079 // Remove unnecessary suppression — the disable has no matching restore anywhere in this file, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later that nobody weighed against it. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers — that alone turns a standing exemption into a scoped one — or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×1
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs ↔ ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs src/Requester/HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs:1 — `src/Requester/HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs` (context Requester) and `src/Responder/ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs` (context Responder) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 5 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `8646f482` #1687 Return 504 Gateway Timeout for downstream request timeouts acco…; `e881c975` #2375 #2376 Map non-ASCII header `HttpRequestException` to 400 Bad Re… (at that commit the files were still `src/Ocelot/Requester/HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs` and `src/Ocelot/Responder/ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs`); `42ac3ca5` #749 Bad error handling for `IOException` while reading incoming requ… (at that commit the files were still `src/Ocelot/Requester/HttpExceptionToErrorMapper.cs` and `src/Ocelot/Responder/ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs`) — run `git show` on any of them.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · TLS certificate validation disabled · ×1
  • TLS certificate validation disabled src/Requester/MessageInvokerPool.cs:112 — `RemoteCertificateValidationCallback` is assigned a callback that returns `true` unconditionally, so every TLS peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Delete the override and let the platform validate. If a specific self-signed or internally-issued certificate genuinely has to be trusted, pin THAT one — compare the presented certificate's public key or thumbprint against the expected value and return `false` for everything else — and scope it to the single handler that talks to that host rather than to the whole process. If the override exists only to get past a development certificate, gate it on a build configuration or an explicit opt-in setting so it cannot ship.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant · ×1
  • Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant REDACTED:91 — The value is the token-signing key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash.
X1 · Async correctness · Blocking wait while holding a `lock` · ×1
  • Blocking wait while holding a `lock` src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:87 — This blocks on a Task **while holding a `lock`**, which is worse than an ordinary sync-over-async in two ways. `await` is illegal inside a `lock` body, so the usual fix — make the caller `async` and await it — cannot be applied where this block stands. And the thread parks while still holding the lock, so it occupies the critical section doing no work: every other caller serialises behind an operation that is only waiting, and if the awaited task itself needs a thread the pool has run out of, they wait forever. Do the async work OUTSIDE the critical section: take the lock only to read the shared state, release it, await the call, then re-take the lock to publish the result — re-checking on re-entry whether another caller won the race and, if so, discarding your result rather than overwriting theirs. Where the critical section genuinely has to span the async call, `lock` is the wrong primitive: use an async-aware one (`SemaphoreSlim` with `await WaitAsync()`) so waiters yield their thread instead of parking it.
Serious — 325 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×93
  • TodoComment acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:143 — //todo - refactor naming.. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:150 — //todo - refactor so calls method? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Authentication/MultipleAuthSchemesFeatureTests.cs:42 — //, validScope: "api2"); // TODO Need further dev — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Authentication/MultipleAuthSchemesFeatureTests.cs:106 — // TODO TokenRetriever ? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:73 — // TODO Actual status must be HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:74 — // TODO Actual status must be HttpStatusCode.OK — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:134 — // GivenOcelotIsRunning(); // TODO Configuring HTTP.sys is quite a challenging task — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Authorization/AuthorizationTests.cs:144 — // TODO this is dictionary which doesn't support multiple keys of the same value -> separated tests — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Configuration/DownstreamHttpVersionTests.cs:83 — //TODO: does this test make any sense? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/QualityOfService/QualityOfServiceTests.cs:222 — // TODO: If failed in parallel execution mode, switch to SequentialTests — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/QualityOfService/QualityOfServiceTests.cs:542 — // TODO: Add acceptance steps that are more parallelism-friendly. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Request/StreamContentTests.cs:11 — // TODO Require fixing for net10.0 TFM or streaming feature review. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Request/StreamContentTests.cs:41 — // TODO Require fixing for net10.0 TFM or streaming feature review. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/Routing/RoutingWithQueryStringTests.cs:396 — // || _downstreamQuery != queryString; // TODO this is strict assertion, it can be without query string — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/ServiceDiscovery/DynamicRoutingTests.cs:629 — // TODO As the first cold request, it sends 10 requests to a SD provider to return a service instance. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketTests.cs:72 — // TODO Makes sense to log in console — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketTests.cs:144 — // TODO System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketException : The server returned status code '500' when status code '200' was expected. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment acceptance/WebSockets/DiscoveryWebSocketTests.cs:31 — // TODO Add more load balancers and convert to Theory — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment samples/Metadata/MyMiddlewares.cs:36 — // TODO Refactor Ocelot Metadata helpers and Ocelot Core to support propagation of the JsonElement and JsonNode — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:25 — // TODO Add more standard Ocelot setup — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs:25 — // TODO Add more standard Ocelot setup — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:10 — // [ApiController] // TODO: Make it ApiController — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Administration/OutputCacheController.cs:7 — // [ApiController] // TODO: Make it ApiController — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Authorization/AuthorizationMiddleware.cs:42 — // TODO: Looks like this is never called due to the current ScopesAuthorizer design :D Definitely a good reason to refactor — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Cache/MD5Helper.cs:5 — // TODO: Consider moving to Infrastructure — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • + 68 more in this group — see findings.md.
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×26
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:95 — 6 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:106 — 6 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:126 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Aggregation/AggregateTests.cs:1 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Properties/BddfyConfig.cs:10 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/RateLimiting/ClientHeaderRateLimitingTests.cs:243 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/RateLimiting/ClientHeaderRateLimitingTests.cs:310 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode samples/Metadata/MetadataResponder.cs:146 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:144 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Authentication/AuthenticationTests.cs:27 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode manual/Actions/Basic.cs:39 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Authentication/AuthenticationTests.cs:10 — 10 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:134 — 10 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Properties/BddfyConfig.cs:52 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/WebSockets/WebSocketsSecurityTests.cs:86 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode unit/Requester/MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs:127 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode unit/Requester/MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs:334 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode acceptance/Request/StreamContentTests.cs:59 — 7 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:49 — 11 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode REDACTED:72 — commented-out configuration entry `CAKE_RELEASE_MYVAR`
  • CommentedOutCode REDACTED:73 — commented-out configuration entry `TEMP_KEY`
  • CommentedOutCode REDACTED:7 — commented-out configuration block `build-linux` (48 lines)
  • CommentedOutCode REDACTED:56 — commented-out configuration block `build-macos` (43 lines)
  • CommentedOutCode REDACTED:100 — commented-out configuration block `build-windows` (39 lines)
  • CommentedOutCode REDACTED:140 — commented-out configuration block `build-success` (16 lines)
  • + 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) · ×24
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) — Only 2/165 awaits in library code use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:31 — `await _repo.GetAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Administration/FileConfigurationController.cs:48 — `await _setter.SetAsync(configuration, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:29 — `await _next(context)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:35 — `await AuthenticateAsync(context, route)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:46 — `await _next.Invoke(context)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Authentication/AuthenticationMiddleware.cs:70 — `await context.AuthenticateAsync(scheme)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Authorization/AuthorizationMiddleware.cs:69 — `await _next.Invoke(context)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Authorization/AuthorizationMiddleware.cs:85 — `await _next.Invoke(context)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Cache/DefaultCacheKeyGenerator.cs:31 — `await downstreamRequest.Request.Content.ReadAsStringAsync()` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:30 — `await _next.Invoke(httpContext)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:36 — `await _cacheGenerator.GenerateRequestCacheKey(downstreamRequest, downstreamRoute)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:51 — `await _next.Invoke(httpContext)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:60 — `await CreateCachedResponse(downstreamResponse)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:95 — `await response.Content.ReadAsByteArrayAsync()` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Claims/Middleware/ClaimsToClaimsMiddleware.cs:40 — `await _next.Invoke(httpContext)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Creator/FileInternalConfigurationCreator.cs:32 — `await _configurationValidator.IsValid(fileConfiguration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:62 — `await _semaphore.WaitAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:65 — `await FileIO.ReadAllTextAsync(_environmentFile.FullName, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:102 — `await _semaphore.WaitAsync(cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:108 — `await FileIO.WriteAllTextAsync(_environmentFile.FullName, json, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/DiskFileConfigurationRepository.cs:113 — `await FileIO.WriteAllTextAsync(_ocelotFile.FullName, json, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/FileAndInternalConfigurationSetter.cs:33 — `await _repo.SetAsync(configuration, cancellationToken)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
  • Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false) src/Configuration/Repository/FileAndInternalConfigurationSetter.cs:35 — `await _configCreator.Create(configuration)` resumes on the caller's captured context. In library code that context belongs to the host application, so a host that blocks on this call (or runs on a UI thread) can stall or deadlock — append `.ConfigureAwait(false)`.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×19
  • Dead code: GivenThereIsOcelotInternalJwtAuthServiceRunning acceptance/Administration/AdministrationSteps.cs:8 — Method GivenThereIsOcelotInternalJwtAuthServiceRunning — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: GetIdentityServerConfiguration acceptance/Administration/OcelotBuilderExtensions.cs:78 — Method GetIdentityServerConfiguration — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: WindowsAuthMessageInvokerPool acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthMessageInvokerPool.cs:8 — NamedType WindowsAuthMessageInvokerPool — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: IISExpressAuthApp acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:344 — Method IISExpressAuthApp — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ConfigureIISExpress acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:348 — Method ConfigureIISExpress — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: AndIf acceptance/IFluentStepBuilderExtensions.cs:7 — Method AndIf — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: AndIfNot acceptance/IFluentStepBuilderExtensions.cs:10 — Method AndIfNot — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Usings acceptance/Usings.cs:24 — NamedType Usings — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Bug930_StepsToReproduce acceptance/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketTests.cs:204 — Method Bug930_StepsToReproduce — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Acceptance(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: GetMetadataNode src/Metadata/DownstreamRouteExtensions.cs:75 — Method GetMetadataNode — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: SetBaseUrl testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:244 — Method SetBaseUrl — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Testing(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: HttpContentStub unit/Cache/DefaultCacheKeyGeneratorTests.cs:117 — NamedType HttpContentStub — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.UnitTests(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: UpstreamPathTemplate unit/DependencyInjection/ConfigurationBuilderExtensionsTests.cs:1318 — Field UpstreamPathTemplate — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.UnitTests(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: TestRetry unit/TestRetry.cs:6 — NamedType TestRetry — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.UnitTests(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Usings unit/Usings.cs:23 — NamedType Usings — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.UnitTests(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: MockWebSocket unit/WebSockets/MockWebSocket.cs:11 — NamedType MockWebSocket — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.UnitTests(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: MockMiddleware unit/WebSockets/WebSocketsProxyMiddlewareTests.cs:426 — Method MockMiddleware — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.UnitTests(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: CompressBrotliAsync samples/Metadata/MetadataResponder.cs:167 — Method CompressBrotliAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Samples.Metadata(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: DecompressDeflateAsync samples/Metadata/MetadataResponder.cs:195 — Method DecompressDeflateAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Ocelot.Samples.Metadata(net8.0), and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×19
  • Async method without CancellationToken: RunAsync manual/Actions/Basic.cs:8 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GenerateRequestCacheKey src/Cache/DefaultCacheKeyGenerator.cs:10 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: CreateCachedResponse src/Cache/OutputCacheMiddleware.cs:82 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Create src/Configuration/Creator/FileInternalConfigurationCreator.cs:30 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: IsValid src/Configuration/Validator/FileConfigurationFluentValidator.cs:80 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: OperationAsync src/Infrastructure/DesignPatterns/Retry.cs:83 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: UseOcelot src/Middleware/OcelotMiddlewareExtensions.cs:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: UseOcelot src/Middleware/OcelotMiddlewareExtensions.cs:25 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: UseOcelot src/Middleware/OcelotMiddlewareExtensions.cs:32 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: UseOcelot src/Middleware/OcelotMiddlewareExtensions.cs:44 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: CreateConfiguration src/Middleware/OcelotMiddlewareExtensions.cs:72 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ProcessRoutesWithRouteKeysAsync src/Multiplexer/MultiplexingMiddleware.cs:121 — No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `context.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `context.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: MapAggregateContent src/Multiplexer/SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.cs:16 — No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `originalContext.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `originalContext.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Aggregate src/Multiplexer/UserDefinedResponseAggregator.cs:16 — No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `originalContext.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `originalContext.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GivenThereIsAConfigurationAsync testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:116 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GivenOcelotIsRunningAsync testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:198 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GivenOcelotHostIsRunning testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:249 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: WhenIGetUrlOnTheApiGatewayWithCookie testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:332 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: WhenIGetUrlOnTheApiGatewayWithCookie testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:334 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking · ×16
  • Sync-over-async blocking — 15 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking src/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPoller.cs:138 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking src/Infrastructure/InMemoryBus.cs:33 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:87 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:149 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:486 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:494 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/ServiceHandler.cs:104 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/ServiceHandler.cs:117 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/ServiceHandler.cs:130 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/ServiceHandler.cs:144 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/ServiceHandler.cs:161 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking testing/ServiceHandler.cs:225 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking REDACTED:218 — `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking REDACTED:224 — `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
  • Sync-over-async blocking samples/ServiceFabric/ApiGateway/WebCommunicationListener.cs:72 — `.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
D19 · Documentation Quality · Low XML-doc coverage · ×14
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.ManualTest(net8.0) manual/Ocelot.ManualTest.csproj — Ocelot.ManualTest(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/5).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot(net8.0) src/Ocelot.csproj — Ocelot(net8.0): 16 % XML-doc coverage (264/1618).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Testing(net8.0) testing/Ocelot.Testing.csproj — Ocelot.Testing(net8.0): 4 % XML-doc coverage (11/296).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.Web(net8.0) samples/Web/Ocelot.Samples.Web.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.Web(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/18).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.Configuration(net8.0) samples/Configuration/Ocelot.Samples.Configuration.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.Configuration(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.Eureka.DownstreamService(net8.0) samples/Eureka/DownstreamService/Ocelot.Samples.Eureka.DownstreamService.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.Eureka.DownstreamService(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.GraphQL(net8.0) samples/GraphQL/Ocelot.Samples.GraphQL.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.GraphQL(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.Kubernetes.DownstreamService(net8.0) samples/Kubernetes/DownstreamService/Ocelot.Samples.Kubernetes.DownstreamService.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.Kubernetes.DownstreamService(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/14).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.Metadata(net8.0) samples/Metadata/Ocelot.Samples.Metadata.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.Metadata(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/65).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.ServiceDiscovery.ApiGateway(net8.0) samples/ServiceDiscovery/ApiGateway/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceDiscovery.ApiGateway.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.ServiceDiscovery.ApiGateway(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/6).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.ServiceDiscovery.DownstreamService(net8.0) samples/ServiceDiscovery/DownstreamService/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceDiscovery.DownstreamService.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.ServiceDiscovery.DownstreamService(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/21).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.ApiGateway(net8.0) samples/ServiceFabric/ApiGateway/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.ApiGateway.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.ApiGateway(net8.0): 7 % XML-doc coverage (1/14).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.DownstreamService(net8.0) samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.DownstreamService.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.DownstreamService(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/18).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Ocelot.Samples.WebSocket(net8.0) samples/WebSocket/Ocelot.Samples.WebSocket.csproj — Ocelot.Samples.WebSocket(net8.0): 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
X1 · Async correctness · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) · ×14
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPoller.cs:138 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/Infrastructure/InMemoryBus.cs:33 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:149 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:485 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:493 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/ServiceHandler.cs:104 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/ServiceHandler.cs:117 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/ServiceHandler.cs:130 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/ServiceHandler.cs:144 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/ServiceHandler.cs:161 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) testing/ServiceHandler.cs:224 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) REDACTED:218 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) REDACTED:224 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) samples/ServiceFabric/ApiGateway/WebCommunicationListener.cs:72 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×12
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D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithCallers · ×11
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileAuthenticationOptions.cs:29 — [Obsolete] AuthenticationProviderKey
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileDynamicRoute.cs:8 — [Obsolete] RateLimitRule
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileQoSOptions.cs:36 — [Obsolete] DurationOfBreak
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileQoSOptions.cs:40 — [Obsolete] ExceptionsAllowedBeforeBreaking
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileQoSOptions.cs:56 — [Obsolete] TimeoutValue
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:77 — [Obsolete] DisableRateLimitHeaders
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:83 — [Obsolete] HttpStatusCode
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:91 — [Obsolete] QuotaExceededMessage
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:103 — [Obsolete] RateLimitCounterPrefix
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitRule.cs:46 — [Obsolete] PeriodTimespan
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/Configuration/File/FileRoute.cs:40 — [Obsolete] FileCacheOptions
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×10
  • No assertions: PostConfigure_NullOptions_DoesNothing unit/Authorization/RouteClaimsRequirementBindingTests.cs:22 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Should_dispose_cleanly_without_starting unit/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPollerTests.cs:217 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Should_set_up_services unit/DependencyInjection/OcelotBuilderTests.cs:150 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Should_set_up_without_passing_in_config unit/DependencyInjection/OcelotBuilderTests.cs:181 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Should_release unit/LoadBalancer/CookieStickySessionsTests.cs:136 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Should_be_able_to_lease_and_release_concurrently unit/LoadBalancer/LeastConnectionTests.cs:22 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Release unit/LoadBalancer/NoLoadBalancerTests.cs:82 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Release unit/LoadBalancer/RoundRobinTests.cs:150 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Middleware_Multi_Parameters_Invoke unit/Middleware/OcelotPiplineBuilderTests.cs:79 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: Should_call_without_exception unit/Responder/HttpContextResponderTests.cs:110 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure* — so verification routed through a helper of your own naming, through a base-class or callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D17 · Explicit Debt · BareSuppressMessage · ×4
  • BareSuppressMessage acceptance/Caching/CachingTests.cs:239 — System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
  • BareSuppressMessage acceptance/Caching/CachingTests.cs:240 — System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
  • BareSuppressMessage acceptance/Usings.cs:22 — SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
  • BareSuppressMessage unit/Usings.cs:21 — SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×4
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Skipped test marks a known-real bug · ×4
  • Skipped test marks a known-real bug acceptance/Administration/CacheManagerTests.cs:19 — A test is skipped with reason "TODO: Requires redevelopment after deprecation of Ocelot.Administration.IdentityServer4 package." — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten.
  • Skipped test marks a known-real bug acceptance/Aggregation/AggregateTests.cs:246 — A test is skipped with reason "TODO Require redevelopment and cleaning up old Auth code" — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten.
  • Skipped test marks a known-real bug acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:72 — A test is skipped with reason "TODO Actually testing the Kestrel web server requires setting up a Windows user to run under using "setspn" command." — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten.
  • Skipped test marks a known-real bug acceptance/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketTests.cs:122 — A test is skipped with reason "TODO: HTTP/2 (SSL) vs WebSocket is unsupported scenario by Ocelot Core currently, unfortunately..." — the behavior it asserts is UNVERIFIED and this skip is likely the only marker of a real bug. It ages invisibly: fix the flakiness or track the bug somewhere that can't be forgotten.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×4
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience samples/Kubernetes/DownstreamService/Program.cs:8 — `builder.Services // Learn more about configuring Swagger/OpenAPI at https://a...` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience samples/ServiceDiscovery/DownstreamService/Program.cs:9 — `builder.Services // Learn more about configuring Swagger/OpenAPI at https://a...` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience REDACTED:113 — `new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience REDACTED:181 — `new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×3
  • TooManyMethods: AcceptanceSteps testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs — TooManyMethods — 353 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 92 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 62 over it, 3.07× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: DownstreamRouteBuilder src/Configuration/Builder/DownstreamRouteBuilder.cs — TooManyMethods — 177 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 36 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 6 over it, 1.20× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ConcurrentSteps testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs — TooManyMethods — 180 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 33 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 3 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Symbol treated as nullable, then dereferenced unguarded · ×3
  • Symbol treated as nullable, then dereferenced unguarded src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/LeastConnection.cs:48 — This method contradicts itself about `services`: line 35 writes `services?.Count`, which says `services` can be null, but line 48 then dereferences it directly as `services.FindIndex` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `?.` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for; if `services` truly cannot be null here, the `?.` is misleading. Settle it one way — test `services` once before the first use and handle the null case, or drop the `?.` — rather than leaving the two readings side by side.
  • Symbol treated as nullable, then dereferenced unguarded src/Metadata/DownstreamRouteExtensions.cs:71 — This method contradicts itself about `route`: line 68 writes `route?.`, which says `route` can be null, but line 71 then dereferences it directly as `route.MetadataOptions` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `?.` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for; if `route` truly cannot be null here, the `?.` is misleading. Settle it one way — test `route` once before the first use and handle the null case, or drop the `?.` — rather than leaving the two readings side by side.
  • Symbol treated as nullable, then dereferenced unguarded samples/Metadata/MetadataResponder.cs:35 — This method contradicts itself about `route`: line 23 writes `route?.`, which says `route` can be null, but line 35 then dereferences it directly as `route.GetMetadata` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `?.` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for; if `route` truly cannot be null here, the `?.` is misleading. Settle it one way — test `route` once before the first use and handle the null case, or drop the `?.` — rather than leaving the two readings side by side.
AX2 · Stateful singletons · Stateful singleton · ×2
  • Stateful singleton: QualityOfServiceFactory src/QualityOfService/QualityOfServiceFactory.cs:10 — `QualityOfServiceFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_logger; e.g. `_logger` at line 71).
  • Stateful singleton: Placeholders src/Infrastructure/Placeholders.cs:12 — `Placeholders` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_placeholders; e.g. `_placeholders` at line 65).
D10 · Test Quality · Depends on a live external host · ×2
  • Depends on a live external host: If_two_delegating_handlers_are_defined_then_these_should_be_call_in_order unit/Requester/MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs:57 — This test fetches `http://www.bbc.co.uk` while it runs, so it passes only while www.bbc.co.uk is up, reachable from the build machine, and still serving what this test expects — none of which this repository controls. It goes red on an aeroplane, behind a corporate proxy, in a sealed CI network, and on the day the third party edits that document. Serve the payload from the repository instead (a checked-in fixture file), or stub the transport; if the point really is to check the remote contract, move it out of the unit suite into a separately-scheduled integration job that is allowed to fail for someone else's reasons.
  • Depends on a live external host: Should_log_if_ignoring_ssl_errors unit/Requester/MessageInvokerPoolTests.cs:79 — This test fetches `http://www.google.com/` while it runs, so it passes only while www.google.com is up, reachable from the build machine, and still serving what this test expects — none of which this repository controls. It goes red on an aeroplane, behind a corporate proxy, in a sealed CI network, and on the day the third party edits that document. Serve the payload from the repository instead (a checked-in fixture file), or stub the transport; if the point really is to check the remote contract, move it out of the unit suite into a separately-scheduled integration job that is allowed to fail for someone else's reasons.
D18 · Solution Shape · Solution references a project that does not exist · ×2
  • Solution references a project that does not exist samples/ServiceFabric/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln — `samples/ServiceFabric/Ocelot.Samples.ServiceFabric.sln` declares 1 project file(s) that are missing from the tree (`src/Ocelot/Ocelot.csproj`). A solution-level restore or build fails on a dangling reference, so anyone building the solution rather than an individual project is blocked. Delete the stale entry from the solution, or restore the missing project file.
  • Solution references a project that does not exist samples/GraphQL/OcelotGraphQL.sln — `samples/GraphQL/OcelotGraphQL.sln` declares 1 project file(s) that are missing from the tree (`samples/GraphQL/OcelotGraphQL.csproj`). A solution-level restore or build fails on a dangling reference, so anyone building the solution rather than an individual project is blocked. Delete the stale entry from the solution, or restore the missing project file.
D18 · Solution Shape · Solution references 2 projects that do not exist · ×2
  • Solution references 2 projects that do not exist samples/Kubernetes/OcelotKube.sln — `samples/Kubernetes/OcelotKube.sln` declares 2 project file(s) that are missing from the tree (`samples/Kubernetes/ApiGateway/ApiGateway.csproj`, `samples/Kubernetes/DownstreamService/DownstreamService.csproj`). A solution-level restore or build fails on a dangling reference, so anyone building the solution rather than an individual project is blocked. Delete the stale entry from the solution, or restore the missing project file.
  • Solution references 2 projects that do not exist samples/Eureka/OcelotEureka.sln — `samples/Eureka/OcelotEureka.sln` declares 2 project file(s) that are missing from the tree (`samples/Eureka/ApiGateway/ApiGateway.csproj`, `samples/Eureka/DownstreamService/DownstreamService.csproj`). A solution-level restore or build fails on a dangling reference, so anyone building the solution rather than an individual project is blocked. Delete the stale entry from the solution, or restore the missing project file.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Empty method body · ×2
  • Empty method body — does nothing with its inputs testing/ServiceHandler.cs:148 — `WithDefaultKestrelServerOptions` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it.
  • Empty method body — does nothing with its inputs REDACTED:29 — `WithoutServices` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it.
X1 · Async correctness · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` · ×2
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs:197 — Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout.
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs:214 — Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout.
C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1
  • No data-protection/encryption — No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.Map (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.Map (cyclomatic 18) src/Responder/ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.cs:8 — ErrorsToHttpStatusCodeMapper.Map has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 11 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D10 · Test Quality · Fixed-sleep synchronisation · ×1
  • Fixed-sleep synchronisation: StopAsync_Should_wait_for_running_timer_callback_to_complete unit/Configuration/Repository/FileConfigurationPollerTests.cs:182 — This test starts a background task and then orders itself against it with `Task.Delay(50)` — a fixed wait, not a signal that the work is done. Whether it passes depends on how loaded the machine is, which is why a test written this way is green on a developer's box and random in CI. Wait for the event itself instead: the process's own exit or output, a completion handle, or a condition polled to a timeout.
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×1
  • BarePragmaDisable acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:25 — #pragma warning disable IDE0079 // Remove unnecessary suppression — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.
D17 · Explicit Debt · HackComment · ×1
  • HackComment src/Configuration/Creator/UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.cs:37 — // Hack to handle /{url} case — a workaround marked in source: record what it is compensating for and what would allow its removal (the upstream fix, the API it is waiting on, the invariant it restores), so the next reader can judge whether it is still needed rather than rediscovering why it is there.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ClaimsAuthorizer.Authorize (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • ClaimsAuthorizer.Authorize (cognitive 30) src/Authorization/ClaimsAuthorizer.cs:24 — ClaimsAuthorizer.Authorize has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.MapAggregateContent (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.MapAggregateContent (cognitive 24) src/Multiplexer/SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.cs:16 — SimpleJsonResponseAggregator.MapAggregateContent has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.Create (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.Create (cognitive 20) src/Configuration/Creator/UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.cs:23 — UpstreamTemplatePatternCreator.Create has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StreamHttpContent.CopyAsync (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • StreamHttpContent.CopyAsync (cognitive 19) src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:38 — StreamHttpContent.CopyAsync has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:7 — samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:7-26 | samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs:7-26 — before extracting anything, compare `samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs` and `samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 84% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: AcceptanceSteps (LCOM4 4) testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:30 — AcceptanceSteps's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code · Unfinished stub · ×1
  • Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:32 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Hollow method · ×1
  • Hollow method — returns a constant without doing the work src/Configuration/Creator/UpstreamHeaderTemplatePatternCreator.cs:23 — `Create` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Unfinished stub · ×1
  • Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:32 — `CreateContentReadStreamAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty · Coverage collected but not gated · ×1
  • Coverage collected but not gated — CI collects a coverage report but no step enforces a minimum — coverage could halve and CI stays green. Add a step that fails the build when coverage drops below a floor (your coverage tool's minimum-threshold flag, or a coverage-gate action) so the number guards something. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files AND its coverage configuration — the well-known coverage and test-runner config files, read at the repository root and inside workspace package directories two levels down, so a floor declared beside the tests rather than in the pipeline is credited — matched against the threshold settings this check knows by name. A floor set in your coverage service's web UI rather than in a committed file, or under a setting whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Weak hash algorithm · ×1
  • Weak hash algorithm src/Cache/MD5Helper.cs:10 — MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses.
X1 · Async correctness · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `Task.WaitAll` · ×1
  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `Task.WaitAll` testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs:173 — `Task.WaitAll` blocks this thread until the tasks complete — sync-over-async: it can deadlock under a synchronization context and it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await Task.WhenAll(…)` instead.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it · ×1
  • Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it src/Cache/MD5Helper.cs:10 — `md5` is a `MD5`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 10). Every use of it in `GenerateMd5` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var md5 = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped · Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×1
  • Untrusted text written into markup unescaped samples/WebSocket/Program.cs:31 — `htmlContent` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `HttpResponse.WriteAsync` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) · ×1
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) samples/ServiceFabric/ApiGateway/WebCommunicationListener.cs:85 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Minor — 118 finding(s)
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×31
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No security response headers detected manual/Actions/Basic.cs:11 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Basic/Program.cs:4 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Configuration/Program.cs:11 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Eureka/ApiGateway/Program.cs:8 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Eureka/DownstreamService/Program.cs:1 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/GraphQL/Program.cs:23 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Kubernetes/ApiGateway/Program.cs:8 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Kubernetes/DownstreamService/Program.cs:6 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Metadata/Program.cs:7 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/OpenTracing/Program.cs:10 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/ServiceDiscovery/ApiGateway/Program.cs:10 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/ServiceDiscovery/DownstreamService/Program.cs:7 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/ServiceFabric/ApiGateway/WebCommunicationListener.cs:48 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/ApiGateway.cs:32 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:7 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:10 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:14 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/DownstreamHostBuilder.cs:18 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs:7 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs:10 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs:14 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/Web/OcelotHostBuilder.cs:18 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected samples/WebSocket/Program.cs:7 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:273 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • + 6 more in this group — see findings.md.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×30
  • Orphaned file testing/ServiceHandler.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Infrastructure/DesignPatterns/CircuitBreaker.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/DependencyInjection/ConfigurationExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/QualityOfService/CircuitBreakerDelegatingHandler.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/RateLimiting/RateLimiting.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/DownstreamRouteFinder/UrlMatcher/UrlPathPlaceholderNameAndValueFinder.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/RateLimiting/RateLimitingMiddleware.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Metadata/DownstreamRouteExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Infrastructure/DesignPatterns/Retry.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Middleware/OcelotMiddlewareExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Request/Mapper/StreamHttpContent.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/RoundRobin.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/DependencyInjection/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Authorization/ClaimsAuthorizer.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Request/Mapper/RequestMapper.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Configuration/Creator/RateLimitOptionsCreator.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Responder/HttpContextResponder.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/RateLimiting/IRateLimiting.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/Errors/ExceptionHandlerMiddleware.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/RequestId/Middleware/RequestIdMiddleware.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/LeastConnection.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • + 5 more in this group — see findings.md.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Commented-out code · ×15
  • Commented-out code manual/Actions/Basic.cs:21 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code manual/Actions/Basic.cs:22 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code manual/Actions/Basic.cs:41 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code src/Configuration/File/FileRateLimitByHeaderRule.cs:49 — 11 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/RoundRobin.cs:121 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code src/RateLimiting/RateLimiting.cs:138 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:279 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:22 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:38 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:55 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:69 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:79 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:99 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/Boxing/FileRouteBox.cs:107 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code testing/PortFinder.cs:48 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×11
  • README/code drift README.md:210 — README.md names `src/Routing/`, but no file or folder `src/Routing` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:258 — README.md links to `[Ocelot`, but `[Ocelot` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:259 — README.md links to `Retry`, but `Retry` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:263 — README.md links to `See`, but `See` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift REDACTED:70 — REDACTED names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Kubernetes`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/features/qualityofservice.rst:318 — docs/features/qualityofservice.rst names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Polly`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/features/servicediscovery.rst:24 — docs/features/servicediscovery.rst names the project `Ocelot.Discovery.Consul`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/features/servicediscovery.rst:54 — docs/features/servicediscovery.rst names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Consul`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/features/servicediscovery.rst:447 — docs/features/servicediscovery.rst names the project `Ocelot.Provider.Eureka`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/features/tracing.rst:82 — docs/features/tracing.rst names the project `Ocelot.Tracing.Butterfly`, but no project, folder or namespace of that name exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/features/websockets.rst:24 — docs/features/websockets.rst names Ocelot 24, but the manifest declares `Ocelot` 25.0.1. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×8
  • Duplicated predicate testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs:582 — `f.Exists && f.FullName != AppContext.BaseDirectory` appears character-identically in 2 files — testing/AcceptanceSteps.cs, testing/FileUnit.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs:29 — `globalOptions?.RouteKeys is null // undefined section or array option -> is global || globalOptions.RouteKeys.Count == 0 // empty collection…` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/QoSOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs:29 — `group?.RouteKeys is null || // undefined section or array option -> is global group.RouteKeys.Count == 0 || // empty collection -> is global…` appears character-identically in 3 files — src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/HttpHandlerOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/LoadBalancerOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs:43 — `options != null && globalOptions != null` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/QoSOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs:42 — `options != null && globalOptions != null && !isGlobal` appears character-identically in 3 files — src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/HttpHandlerOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/LoadBalancerOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs:47 — `options != null && globalOptions != null && isGlobal` appears character-identically in 3 files — src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/HttpHandlerOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/LoadBalancerOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs:38 — `options != null && globalOptions == null` appears character-identically in 5 files — src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/HttpHandlerOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/LoadBalancerOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs:33 — `options == null && globalOptions != null && isGlobal` appears character-identically in 5 files — src/Configuration/Creator/AuthenticationOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/CacheOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/HttpHandlerOptionsCreator.cs, src/Configuration/Creator/LoadBalancerOptionsCreator.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
AX6 · Interface segregation · Fat interface · ×1
  • Fat interface: IOcelotBuilder (19 members) src/DependencyInjection/IOcelotBuilder.cs:15 — `IOcelotBuilder` declares 19 members under just 12 distinct name(s): `Services`, `Configuration`, `MvcCoreBuilder`, `AddConfigurationDelegate`, `AddConfigurationPoller`, `AddConfigurationDiscoveryPoller`, `AddConfigurationPoller`, `AddDelegatingHandler`, `AddDelegatingHandler`, `AddSingletonDefinedAggregator`, `AddTransientDefinedAggregator`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddCustomLoadBalancer`, `AddConfigPlaceholders`, `AddQualityOfService`, `AddQualityOfService`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. That is an OVERLOAD SET, not 19 separate responsibilities: a caller binds to 12 operation(s) and uses the overload it selected, so the Interface-Segregation harm does NOT apply on the caller's side and splitting this into role-interfaces would scatter one operation without relieving anything. The burden that does remain is the IMPLEMENTER's — all 19 signatures must be written and kept in step. Reduce it by collapsing overloads (optional or default parameters, or an options object) rather than by segregating the interface.
C4 · Data Retention · Partial data-retention evidence · ×1
  • Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 2 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: testing/Steps/ConcurrentSteps.cs, testing/Steps/DiscoverySteps.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
  • Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 21 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 9.0/10. The most over is `Ocelot(net8.0)` (13716 LoC, 383 public types across 58 namespaces). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the assembly first (group each responsibility into its own namespace/folder and keep the cross-boundary members internal), since splitting a published assembly moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
D27 · Navigability · Pass-through layer · ×1
  • Pass-through layer src/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketOptionsProxy.cs:7 — ClientWebSocketOptionsProxy: all 4 public methods forward their arguments unchanged to _real and add no behaviour — an extra hop (and usually an extra interface) to trace through. Call _real directly, or give the layer a job.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 30 of 92 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 92 of the 415 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: testing/ServiceHandler.cs, REDACTED, src/DependencyInjection/ConfigurationExtensions.cs, src/QualityOfService/CircuitBreakerDelegatingHandler.cs, src/RateLimiting/RateLimiting.cs, src/DownstreamRouteFinder/UrlMatcher/UrlPathPlaceholderNameAndValueFinder.cs, src/Infrastructure/DesignPatterns/CircuitBreaker.cs, src/RateLimiting/RateLimitingMiddleware.cs (and 22 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
P10 · Library API & versioning · Large public API surface · ×1
  • Large public API surface — 1260/1422 types (89%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty · Sleep-based test synchronization · ×1
  • Sleep-based test synchronization — 38 Task.Delay/Thread.Sleep call(s) in test code synchronize with background work by sleeping — a known flakiness precursor on slow runners. Prefer polling with a deadline or completion signals.
P2 · Observability · Console output used as the logging channel · ×1
  • Console output used as the logging channel samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/ApiGateway.cs:28 — `samples/ServiceFabric/DownstreamService/ApiGateway.cs` reports through `Console.Write…` at line 28 although other files in its project log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, category or structured properties and never reach the log pipeline or its exporters.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 22818 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1
  • No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP · ×1
  • OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP REDACTED:49 — `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Secure cookie flags not detected · ×1
  • Secure cookie flags not detected src/LoadBalancer/Balancers/CookieStickySessions.cs:75 — No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 35/86 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation · Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted · ×1
  • Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted src/DownstreamRouteFinder/DownstreamRouteFinderMiddleware.cs:44 — `LogDebug` at line 44 is called with an argument built by `string.Join(", ", response.Data.DownstreamRoute.Select(r => r.DownstreamPathTemplate.Value))` (line 44), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because LogDebug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `IsEnabled` test, no debug flag, no conditional-compilation region.
X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×1
  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging src/Logging/OcelotLogger.cs:87 — Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere · ×1
  • Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere — 15/18 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1
  • Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~1.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 32 suppression(s) across the 24381 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
X7 · Silent fallback defaults · Silent fallback default on parse failure · ×1
  • Silent fallback default on parse failure src/Middleware/HttpItemsExtensions.cs:78 — `Get` falls back to `default` when `input.TryGetValue(key, out var value)` is false, with no log or throw — a malformed value silently becomes that default. Log the input or fail validation. If that constant is the correct answer to the test rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, this is not a silent default: say so in a comment on the member and the row stops firing.
Minor — 5 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped (documented) · ×4
  • Skipped (documented): ShouldClearCacheRegionViaAdministrationAPI acceptance/Administration/CacheManagerTests.cs:19 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: TODO: Requires redevelopment after deprecation of Ocelot.Administration.IdentityServer4 package.
  • Skipped (documented): Should_return_response_200_with_user_forwarding acceptance/Aggregation/AggregateTests.cs:246 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: TODO Require redevelopment and cleaning up old Auth code
  • Skipped (documented): ShouldUseDefaultCredentialsForKestrelServer acceptance/Authentication/WindowsAuthTests.cs:72 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: TODO Actually testing the Kestrel web server requires setting up a Windows user to run under using "setspn" command.
  • Skipped (documented): Http20ClientWhenOcelotInTheMiddleThenShouldConnect acceptance/WebSockets/ClientWebSocketTests.cs:122 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: TODO: HTTP/2 (SSL) vs WebSocket is unsupported scenario by Ocelot Core currently, unfortunately...
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — Ocelot.Testing(net8.0) references Moq.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-186e7505e93d44a4b59e7f914a893854/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .18artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-186e7505e93d44a4b59e7f914a893854/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .33artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnuget—nuget: not applicable — nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .31artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 3 file(s) — `src/Configuration/File/AggregateRouteConfig.cs`, `src/DownstreamRouteFinder/UrlMatcher/PlaceholderNameAndValue.cs`, `src/Errors/RequestTimedOutError.cs` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a16806-a7d9-7d1b-ae6d-4a97530c09ca · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 78 · Warnings: 325 · Recommendations: 118 · Info: 5 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 23-10-2026 @ 09:10 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md