Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
UbiquitousLanguage/WorkshopEventSourcing is in a workable but fragile state (63%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Architecture (89%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Maturity (88%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (51%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (68%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like… (Observability).
For scale: Hobby (~1,769 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (89%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
74%
Strong
Architecture
89% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
88% ★
Exemplary
Readiness
51%
Adequate · gated by P7
Security
68%
Adequate · gated by D30
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 51% · 47% weightSecurity 68% · 26% weightCode Health 74% · 14% weightMaturity 88% · 8% weightArchitecture 89% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 51 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 63 → ~72.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 25%Plumbing 51%Tests 24%
New since the last scan (1+)
- SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €960–€4,800
| Cost to rebuild | €960–€4,800 |
| Domain complexity | Low |
| Quality factor | 0.9× (at 63% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 46% boilerplate · 21% straight-line · 33% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 51% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
2
Resolve the 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
3
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. The rest can wait behind it.
Improving trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+2.3 pts/run over 9 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Trajectory
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurity
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
8.6
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
10.0
D39 · .NET / C#
IL Efficiency
9.8
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
8.5
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
6.3
AX2 · Repo
Stateful singletons
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 44 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically; Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down; Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +10.5 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +10.5 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +12.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down. | +12.2 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
| Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production. | +12.0 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Resolve the 2 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Marketplace.csproj (2). | +2.4 pts | Low | Explicit Debt |
| Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization. | +4.0 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Resolve the 25 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. | +3.4 pts | Medium | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj | 7.6 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj |
| starthere/src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj | 7.6 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj |
| src/Marketplace/Infrastructure/EventStore/ProjectionManager.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/Marketplace.Framework/Value.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 43 of 43 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8C2GD1IC1M1M3P2P4P7X1X2X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 8 of 106 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | — | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
4 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 10 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D9 · Test Distribution
3 test methods: 3 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 6 tests.
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D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
16 outdated, 6 vulnerable, 6 deprecated packages.
Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App
Deprecated: EventStore.ClientAPI.NetCore
Outdated: EventStore.ClientAPI.NetCore
What to do
- Resolve the 6 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 16 packages use a banned license.
Licenses scanned
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
4 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1769 LoC (0.7/KLoC) → score 8.6.
NoWarnInCsproj src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj:39
TodoCommentsrc/Marketplace/Infrastructure/EventStore/ProjectionManager.cs:96
BareSuppressMessagesrc/Marketplace.Framework/Value.cs:12
What to do
- Resolve the 2 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Marketplace.csproj (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ProjectionManager.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 BareSuppressMessage finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Value.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D18 · Solution Shape
4 projects, 45 .cs files, 2053 hand-written lines of code (1769 production / 284 test), 6 inter-project edges.
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
Marketplace (Production)src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj
Marketplace.Domain (Production)src/Marketplace.Domain/Marketplace.Domain.csproj
Marketplace.Framework (Production)src/Marketplace.Framework/Marketplace.Framework.csproj
Marketplace.Tests (Test)tests/Marketplace.Tests/Marketplace.Tests.csproj
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 4 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
84 % of calls cross a namespace and 19 % go through an interface, but 88 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
- Improve Navigability — currently 8.5/10. — 84 % of calls cross a namespace and 19 % go through an interface, but 88 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
44 vulnerable package(s): 3 critical, 25 high, 16 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.1.1
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
What to do
- Resolve the 25 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 issue-level).
- Resolve the 16 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D39 · IL Efficiency
5 of 503 methods have an oversized IL body.
Oversized method: Marketplace.Modules.ClassifiedAds.Projections.AvailableClassifiedAdsProjection/<Handle>d__4.MoveNext
IL measured
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX2 · Stateful singletons
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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AX8 · Test isolation
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C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
What to do
- Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — ProjectionManager.cs:43
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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P2 · Observability
- Only 1/2 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
- Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
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X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×3) — ProjectionManager.cs:84, ProjectionManager.cs:90, Startup.cs:42
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 4/20 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×16) — ProjectionManager.cs:37, ProjectionManager.cs:46, ProjectionManagerBuilder.cs:70, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 74% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 89% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 88% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Readiness | 51% | Adequate — gated by P7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 68% | Adequate — gated by D30 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 51 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM dimension skipped
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — LLM dimension skipped
- D22 Internal API Consistency — LLM dimension skipped
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (1,769 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size
- D24 Comment Value — LLM dimension skipped
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — Not applicable
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — Not applicable
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
- D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 1 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 1 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds
- M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM not available — accuracy is the Tier-2 layer and needs a reachable model.
- P1 CI/CD gates — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. Automated CI/CD gates are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Partial workspace load — the web/host project 'Marketplace' present on disk did not load into the C# workspace (it failed to build/restore and was silently dropped), so its web-security (transport / headers / input validation) signals were never scanned. The surviving documents carry no evidence for this control, but absence of evidence in an INCOMPLETE document set is not evidence the control is missing — the relevant middleware/attributes most plausibly live in the dropped project. This dimension is therefore Not-evidenced (excluded from the score) rather than asserting a confident negative. Restore/build that project (see diagnostics.md) so it loads and the dimension can be scored.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 36 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Connections 1.0.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Sockets 2.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.WebSockets 2.1.1
- High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.1
- High CVE: System.IO.Pipelines 4.5.0
- High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketProtocol 4.5.1
- High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App
- Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Vulnerable: Newtonsoft.Json
- Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.1.1
- Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
- Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0
D17 · Explicit Debt
- NoWarnInCsproj src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj:39
- NoWarnInCsproj starthere/src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj:39
Warning — 26 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.App 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.1.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Connections 1.0.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.HttpSys 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.SpaServices 2.1.1
- Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 4.0.1
- Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.5.1
- Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.2.0
- Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Deprecated: EventStore.ClientAPI.NetCore
- Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App
- Deprecated: xunit
D17 · Explicit Debt
- TodoComment src/Marketplace/Infrastructure/EventStore/ProjectionManager.cs:96
D17 · Explicit Debt
- BareSuppressMessage src/Marketplace.Framework/Value.cs:12
D18 · Solution Shape
- Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured
Recommendation — 18 finding(s)
D39 · IL Efficiency
- Oversized method: Marketplace.Modules.ClassifiedAds.Projections.AvailableClassifiedAdsProjection/<Handle>d__4.MoveNext
- Oversized method: Marketplace.Modules.ClassifiedAds.ClassifiedAdsQueryService/<GetAvailableAds>d__4.MoveNext
- Oversized method: Marketplace.Modules.ClassifiedAds.Projections.SoldClassifiedAdsProjection/<Handle>d__4.MoveNext
- Oversized method: Marketplace.Infrastructure.EventStore.GesAggregateStore/<Save>d__9`1.MoveNext
- Oversized method: Marketplace.Startup/<ConfigureServicesAsync>d__9.MoveNext
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM dimension skipped
D21 · Naming Consistency
- LLM dimension skipped
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- LLM dimension skipped
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- small single-context codebase (1,769 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size
D24 · Comment Value
- LLM dimension skipped
D25 · ADR Conformance
- no ADRs to check
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Not applicable
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)
- Not applicable
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Not applicable
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Not applicable
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
- Not applicable
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Not applicable
D7 · Architectural Integrity
- No checkable ADRs to assess
Info — 26 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: EventStore.ClientAPI.NetCore
- Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json
- Outdated: RavenDB.Client
- Outdated: Serilog
- Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Environment
- Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Process
- Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Thread
- Outdated: Serilog.Settings.Configuration
- Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console
- Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore
- Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Annotations
- Outdated: AutoFixture.Xunit2
- Outdated: FluentAssertions
- Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk
- Outdated: xunit
- Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio
D14 · License Compliance
- Licenses scanned
D18 · Solution Shape
- Marketplace (Production) src/Marketplace/Marketplace.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- Marketplace.Domain (Production) src/Marketplace.Domain/Marketplace.Domain.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- Marketplace.Framework (Production) src/Marketplace.Framework/Marketplace.Framework.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- Marketplace.Tests (Test) tests/Marketplace.Tests/Marketplace.Tests.csproj
D39 · IL Efficiency
- IL measured
D9 · Test Distribution
- Unit tests
D9 · Test Distribution
- Integration tests
D9 · Test Distribution
- BDD tests
D9 · Test Distribution
- E2E tests
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list Marketplace.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 44 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |