Public report — Jinget, published 29 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
168findings with an exact file:lineof 214 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
53/97dimensions across the health lenses12924 LoC · 12 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
VahidFarahmandian/Jinget is in a workable but fragile state (53%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Architecture (96%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (43%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (55%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like… (Observability).
For scale: Small (~12,924 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (96%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€30,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 43% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.1) — service/app, transaction-script/CRUD, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 43%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
6
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, integrate a security analysis step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on detected vulnerabilities. Next, implement HTTP client resilience policies to prevent external service failures from taking down the application. Then, extend structured logging across all service-like projects to ensure full production diagnosability. Finally, address the four deprecated dependencies and the sixty-seven low-coverage areas, prioritizing the specified service handler and builder files.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 50 of 53 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 53 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 168 of 214 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
7 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Where.Recurse at 29. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being Where.NodeTypeToString at 20 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Where.Recurse (cyclomatic 29) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Where.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.IsSimpleType (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ExpressionUtility.TryParseExpression (cyclomatic 20) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ExpressionUtility.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 13 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 ObjectExtensions.ToType (cognitive 58) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ObjectExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Where.Recurse (cognitive 56) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Where.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 IPUtility.IsIPInRange (cognitive 40) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with IPUtility.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 67 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with JingetServiceHandler.cs, JingetServiceHandlerBase.cs, BindingBuilder.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (67 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 CRAP 420 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with Where.cs, ExpressionUtility.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 CRAP 306 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ObjectExtensions.cs, ExpressionUtility.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
427 test methods: 427 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 427 tests.
Mock framework: Moq · ×2
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
17 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/BindingBuilder.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 21 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Jinget.Logger.csproj (3), Jinget.ExceptionHandler.csproj (3), Jinget.Handlers.ExternalServiceHandlers.csproj (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with BooleanExpressionExtensions.cs, SyntaxNodeExtensions.cs, ReadModelGenerator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 13 BarePragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with TypeSourceSelector.cs, Where.cs, AssemblyExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
The class `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` implements a method `ConvertName`. The test method name `ConvertName_AllUpperCase_ReturnsLowerCase` implies a transformation from PascalCase to LowerCase, which contradicts the class name `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` (which implies it handles PascalCase). This suggests a potential mismatch between the class name and its actual behavior or test expectations.
Inconsistent naming for reflection helpers: some use 'Call' (verb), others use 'Get' (verb), and others use 'Is' (predicate). While these are different operations, the test methods for `IsCollectionType` use the 'ShouldReturn' pattern which is consistent with other tests, but the main API mixes imperative verbs ('Call', 'Get') with predicate verbs ('Is').
Test method names use 'ReturnsTrue' and 'ReturnsFalse' which is consistent, but the underlying method `IsIPInRange` is a predicate. The test naming is consistent within itself but differs from the 'Should' prefix used in other tests like `should_decompress...`.
What to do
Resolve the 1 The class `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` implements a method `ConvertName`.… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for reflection helpers finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Test method names use 'ReturnsTrue' and 'ReturnsFalse' which is… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
99 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×6.github/workflows/build-ci.yml:22detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 6 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-ci.yml (2), release-ci.yml (2), release-preview-ci.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
31 of 72 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is 01-Core/Jinget.Core.DiScanner/ServiceCollectionExtensions.Decoration.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IImplementationTypeFilter` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IImplementationTypeFilter.cs:3
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
What to do
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — Select.cs:85
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×13) — SyntaxNodeExtensions.cs:41, ReadModelGenerator.cs:174, ReadModelGenerator.cs:305, …
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 6 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 27/52 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×22) — DbConnectionExtensions.cs:13, DbConnectionExtensions.cs:77, DbConnectionExtensions.cs:108, …
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×3) — ZipUtility.cs:14, ZipUtility.cs:148, BatchingLoggerProvider.cs:69
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×3) — BooleanExpressionExtensions.cs:267, ReadModelGenerator.cs:400, SyntaxNodeExtensions.cs:211
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 44 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-ci.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-ci.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-ci.yml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-ci.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-preview-ci.yml:13— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-preview-ci.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.7.5
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Table.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/IOptionTypes/ConnectionString/BaseDBConnectionString.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/IOptionTypes/Log/BlackListHeader.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/IOptionTypes/Log/WhiteListHeader.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Security/Hashing/Model/HashModel.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Types/AESModel.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Types/FilterCriteria.cs:6— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Types/HealthCheckModel.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
BarePragmaDisable 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Types/JwtModel.cs:3— #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field must contain a non-null value when exiting constructor. Consider declaring as nullable.
Dead code: IsIgnoreMapping 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common/Extensions/ISymbolExtensions.cs:20— Method IsIgnoreMapping — no references found in solution.
Dead code: RemoveEmptyLines 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common/Extensions/SyntaxNodeExtensions.cs:263— Method RemoveEmptyLines — no references found in solution.
Off the main sequence: Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common — Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Jinget.Core — Jinget.Core: abstractness 0.10, instability 0.00, distance 0.90 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
CRAP 420: Where.NodeTypeToString 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Where.cs:168— Cyclomatic 20 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 420: ExpressionUtility.TryParseExpression 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Expressions/ExpressionUtility.cs:58— Cyclomatic 20 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 306: ObjectExtensions.ToType 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/ObjectExtensions.cs:89— Cyclomatic 17 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 306: ExpressionUtility.Transform 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Expressions/ExpressionUtility.cs:10— Cyclomatic 17 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 240: ObjectExtensions.ToDictionary 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/ObjectExtensions.cs:39— Cyclomatic 15 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 240: TypeExtensions.Call 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/Reflection/TypeExtensions.cs:42— Cyclomatic 15 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Where.Recurse (cyclomatic 29) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Where.cs:29— Where.Recurse has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.IsSimpleType (cyclomatic 22) 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common/Extensions/INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.cs:17— INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.IsSimpleType has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
ExpressionUtility.TryParseExpression (cyclomatic 20) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Expressions/ExpressionUtility.cs:58— ExpressionUtility.TryParseExpression has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
IPUtility.IsIPInRange (cyclomatic 19) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/IP/IPUtility.cs:10— IPUtility.IsIPInRange has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
ObjectExtensions.ToType (cyclomatic 17) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/ObjectExtensions.cs:89— ObjectExtensions.ToType has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
ExpressionUtility.Transform (cyclomatic 17) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Expressions/ExpressionUtility.cs:10— ExpressionUtility.Transform has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
ElasticSearchLoggerProvider.WriteMessagesAsync (cyclomatic 17) 03-Infrastructure/Jinget.Logger/Providers/ElasticSearchProvider/ElasticSearchLoggerProvider.cs:13— ElasticSearchLoggerProvider.WriteMessagesAsync has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
XxxComment 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Where.cs:87— // xxx% LIKE queries: — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected start of a property name or value, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1174.
ObjectExtensions.ToType (cognitive 58) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/ObjectExtensions.cs:89— ObjectExtensions.ToType has cognitive complexity 58 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Where.Recurse (cognitive 56) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Where.cs:29— Where.Recurse has cognitive complexity 56 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
IPUtility.IsIPInRange (cognitive 40) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/IP/IPUtility.cs:10— IPUtility.IsIPInRange has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ExpressionUtility.TryParseExpression (cognitive 39) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Expressions/ExpressionUtility.cs:58— ExpressionUtility.TryParseExpression has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ElasticSearchLoggerProvider.WriteMessagesAsync (cognitive 38) 03-Infrastructure/Jinget.Logger/Providers/ElasticSearchProvider/ElasticSearchLoggerProvider.cs:13— ElasticSearchLoggerProvider.WriteMessagesAsync has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
DynamicParametersExtensions.GetSQLValues (cognitive 32) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/Dapper/DynamicParametersExtensions.cs:15— DynamicParametersExtensions.GetSQLValues has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.IsSimpleType (cognitive 29) 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common/Extensions/INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.cs:17— INamedTypeSymbolExtensions.IsSimpleType has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
DbConnectionExtensions.PrepareQuery (cognitive 26) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/Database/SqlClient/DbConnectionExtensions.cs:20— DbConnectionExtensions.PrepareQuery has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
JsonExtensions.Deserialize (cognitive 26) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/JsonExtensions.cs:15— JsonExtensions.Deserialize has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
PropertiesExtensions.IsSimpleType (cognitive 23) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/Reflection/PropertiesExtensions.cs:35— PropertiesExtensions.IsSimpleType has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
IgnorePropertiesResolver.Read (cognitive 21) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Json/IgnorePropertiesResolver.cs:17— IgnorePropertiesResolver.Read has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
JingetValueObject.AreEqual (cognitive 18) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Types/ValueObject/JingetValueObject.cs:60— JingetValueObject.AreEqual has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
BindingBuilder.BuildNestedElementInitialization (cognitive 18) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/BindingBuilder.cs:516— BindingBuilder.BuildNestedElementInitialization has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ObjectExtensions.ToDictionary (cognitive 17) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/ObjectExtensions.cs:39— ObjectExtensions.ToDictionary has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
TypeExtensions.Call (cognitive 17) 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/Reflection/TypeExtensions.cs:42— TypeExtensions.Call has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
JingetHttpClientFactory.PostAsync (cognitive 16) 02-Handlers/Jinget.Handlers.ExternalServiceHandlers/ServiceHandler/Factory/JingetHttpClientFactory.cs:111— JingetHttpClientFactory.PostAsync has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
TypeNameHelper.ProcessGenericType (cognitive 16) 01-Core/Jinget.Core.DiScanner/Internal/TypeNameHelper.cs:117— TypeNameHelper.ProcessGenericType has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ReadModelGenerator.GetInheritanceString (cognitive 16) 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator/Generators/ReadModelGenerator.cs:104— ReadModelGenerator.GetInheritanceString has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Change coupling: IHostBuilderExtensions.cs ↔ BatchingLoggerProvider.cs 03-Infrastructure/Jinget.Logger/Extensions/IHostBuilderExtensions.cs— `03-Infrastructure/Jinget.Logger/Extensions/IHostBuilderExtensions.cs` and `03-Infrastructure/Jinget.Logger/Providers/BatchingLoggerProvider.cs` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (3 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
Secret passed as a command-line argument — 2 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): release-preview-ci.yml: dotnet nuget push ./artifacts/**.${VERSION}.nupkg --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json --api-key ${{secrets.NUGET_GITHUB_API_KEY}} --skip-duplicate; release-ci.yml: dotnet nuget push ./artifacts/**.${VERSION}.nupkg --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json --api-key ${{secrets.NUGET_GITHUB_API_KEY}} --skip-duplicate. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
CRAP 870: Where.Recurse 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Where.cs:29— Cyclomatic 29 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 380: IPUtility.IsIPInRange 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/IP/IPUtility.cs:10— Cyclomatic 19 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 17 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/BindingBuilder.cs, 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator/Generators/ReadModelGenerator.cs, 02-Handlers/Jinget.Handlers.ExternalServiceHandlers/DefaultServiceHandler/JingetServiceHandlerBase.cs, 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator/Generators/WebAPIGenerator.cs, 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator.Common/Extensions/SyntaxNodeExtensions.cs, 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExtensionMethods/Expressions/BooleanExpressionExtensions.cs, 01-Miscellaneous/SourceGenerator/Jinget.SourceGenerator/Generators/ReadModelMappingConfigurationGenerator.cs, 02-Handlers/Jinget.Handlers.ExternalServiceHandlers/ServiceHandler/Factory/JingetHttpClientFactory.cs (+9 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D21 · Naming Consistency· The class `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` implements a method `ConvertName`. The test method name `ConvertName_AllUpperCase_ReturnsLowerCase` implies a transformation from PascalCase to LowerCase, which contradicts the class name `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` (which implies it handles PascalCase). This suggests a potential mismatch between the class name and its actual behavior or test expectations. · ×1
The class `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` implements a method `ConvertName`. The test method name `ConvertName_AllUpperCase_ReturnsLowerCase` implies a transformation from PascalCase to LowerCase, which contradicts the class name `PascalCaseNamingPolicy` (which implies it handles PascalCase). This suggests a potential mismatch between the class name and its actual behavior or test expectations. — Verify if the class should be renamed to `LowerCaseNamingPolicy` or if the test description is misleading. (symbols: Jinget.Core.Utilities.Json.PascalCaseNamingPolicy.ConvertName, Jinget.Core.Tests.Utilities.Json.PascalCaseNamingPolicyTests.ConvertName_AllUpperCase_ReturnsLowerCase)
Inconsistent naming for reflection helpers: some use 'Call' (verb), others use 'Get' (verb), and others use 'Is' (predicate). While these are different operations, the test methods for `IsCollectionType` use the 'ShouldReturn' pattern which is consistent with other tests, but the main API mixes imperative verbs ('Call', 'Get') with predicate verbs ('Is'). — Consider standardizing on 'Get' for retrieval and 'Is' for boolean checks, or 'Call' for invocation. (symbols: Jinget.Core.ExtensionMethods.Reflection.TypeExtensions.Call, Jinget.Core.ExtensionMethods.Reflection.TypeExtensions.GetReferenceTypeProperties, Jinget.Core.ExtensionMethods.Reflection.TypeExtensions.IsCollectionType, Jinget.Core.ExtensionMethods.Reflection.TypeExtensions.IsCollectionType_ShouldReturnTrue_ForGenericList, Jinget.Core.ExtensionMethods.Reflection.TypeExtensions.IsCollectionType_ShouldReturnTrue_ForCustomGenericCollection, Jinget.Core.ExtensionMethods.Reflection.TypeExtensions.IsCollectionType_ShouldReturnFalse_ForString)
D21 · Naming Consistency· Test method names use 'ReturnsTrue' and 'ReturnsFalse' which is consistent, but the underlying method `IsIPInRange` is a predicate. The test naming is consistent within itself but differs from the 'Should' prefix used in other tests like `should_decompress...`. · ×1
Test method names use 'ReturnsTrue' and 'ReturnsFalse' which is consistent, but the underlying method `IsIPInRange` is a predicate. The test naming is consistent within itself but differs from the 'Should' prefix used in other tests like `should_decompress...`. — Standardize test method prefixes to either 'Should' or 'Returns' consistently across the codebase. (symbols: Jinget.Core.Tests.Utilities.IP.IPUtilityTests.IsIPInRange_IPv4_InvalidIP_ReturnsFalse, Jinget.Core.Tests.Utilities.IP.IPUtilityTests.IsIPInRange_IPv4_ValidRange_ReturnsTrue, Jinget.Core.Tests.Utilities.IP.IPUtilityTests.IsIPInRange_IPv4_ExactMatch_ReturnsTrue)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 12924 LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
redundant comment 01-Core/Jinget.Core/CodeDom/JingetDynamicCode.cs:81— "Add default using: using System;" — trim - duplicate of prior comment; keep only one
Split Jinget.Core — A generic catch-all name that is huge (7k LoC) and sprawls over 43 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: Jinget.Text, Jinget.Collections, Jinget.Validation
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 31 of 72 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: 01-Core/Jinget.Core.DiScanner/ServiceCollectionExtensions.Decoration.cs, 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Compression/ZipUtility.cs, 01-Core/Jinget.Core/ExpressionToSql/Internal/Where.cs (and 28 more).
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`dotnet sbom-tool generate` (or the CycloneDX .NET tool) over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
IL efficiency: 4 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Http/MimeTypeMap.cs:12— 4 of 866 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Jinget.Core.Utilities.Http.MimeTypeMap.BuildMappings @ 01-Core/Jinget.Core/Utilities/Http/MimeTypeMap.cs:12, 2828 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.9/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019faf5a-7e92-74e9-995a-242c0b4a362e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 1 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 32 · Warnings: 146 · Recommendations: 12 · Info: 24 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 19:29 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.