Executive summary
Valian/live_vue is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 73 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 65, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is putting upper bounds on the open-ended dependency requirements, worth about 4 points. Recording design decisions comes next, worth about 5 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 75.
Twenty-seven known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Eleven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Updating the vulnerable packages and pinning each tool to an exact version would close both risks.
The product code is 5,224 lines, about €20,000 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 65 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 73 to about 75.
New since the last survey: 3 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €20,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €6,600 to €33,000, for 111 to 351 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×1.1 at a score of 73. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 5,224 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 LiveVue | 3 LiveVue.InjectedSSR | 4 Mix.Tasks.LiveVue | 5 Phoenix.HTML.Safe.LiveVue.InjectedSSR | 6 assets.jsonPatch | 7 assets.phoenixFallbackTypes | 8 assets.use | 9 assets.useLiveForm | 10 LiveVue.Encoder | 11 LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML | 12 LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView | 13 LiveVue.SSR | 14 assets.types | 15 assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||
| 2 LiveVue | |||||||||||||||
| 3 LiveVue.InjectedSSR | |||||||||||||||
| 4 Mix.Tasks.LiveVue | |||||||||||||||
| 5 Phoenix.HTML.Safe.LiveVue.InjectedSSR | |||||||||||||||
| 6 assets.jsonPatch | |||||||||||||||
| 7 assets.phoenixFallbackTypes | |||||||||||||||
| 8 assets.use | |||||||||||||||
| 9 assets.useLiveForm | |||||||||||||||
| 10 LiveVue.Encoder | 8 | ||||||||||||||
| 11 LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| 12 LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView | 3 | ||||||||||||||
| 13 LiveVue.SSR | 3 | ||||||||||||||
| 14 assets.types | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| 15 assets | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
10→2 LiveVue.Encoder uses LiveVue✕
- Connections
- 8 pairs of types, where a type in LiveVue.Encoder uses a type in LiveVue.
- The types involved
LiveVue.Encoder.Any→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Atom→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.BitString→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Date→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Float→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Integer→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.List→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Map→LiveVue.Encoder
- Direction
- LiveVue.Encoder uses LiveVue, so a change to LiveVue can break LiveVue.Encoder, while a change to LiveVue.Encoder can't break LiveVue.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveVue.Encoder uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→2 LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML uses LiveVue✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML uses a type in LiveVue.
- The types involved
LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML.Form→LiveVue.Encoder
- Direction
- LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML uses LiveVue, so a change to LiveVue can break LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML, while a change to LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML can't break LiveVue.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.HTML uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→2 LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView uses LiveVue✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView uses a type in LiveVue.
- The types involved
LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView.AsyncResult→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView.UploadConfig→LiveVue.EncoderLiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView.UploadEntry→LiveVue.Encoder
- Direction
- LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView uses LiveVue, so a change to LiveVue can break LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView, while a change to LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView can't break LiveVue.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveVue.Encoder.Phoenix.LiveView uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→2 LiveVue.SSR uses LiveVue✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in LiveVue.SSR uses a type in LiveVue.
- The types involved
LiveVue.SSR.NodeJS→LiveVue.SSRLiveVue.SSR.QuickBEAM→LiveVue.SSRLiveVue.SSR.ViteJS→LiveVue.SSR
- Direction
- LiveVue.SSR uses LiveVue, so a change to LiveVue can break LiveVue.SSR, while a change to LiveVue.SSR can't break LiveVue.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveVue.SSR uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→7 assets.types uses assets.phoenixFallbackTypes✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in assets.types uses a type in assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.
- The types involved
assets.types.LiveVue→assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.ViewHook
- Direction
- assets.types uses assets.phoenixFallbackTypes, so a change to assets.phoenixFallbackTypes can break assets.types, while a change to assets.types can't break assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets.types uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→6 assets uses assets.jsonPatch✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in assets uses a type in assets.jsonPatch.
- The types involved
assets.jsonPatch→assets.jsonPatch.Operation
- Direction
- assets uses assets.jsonPatch, so a change to assets.jsonPatch can break assets, while a change to assets can't break assets.jsonPatch.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→7 assets uses assets.phoenixFallbackTypes✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in assets uses a type in assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.
- The types involved
assets.attrs→assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.HTMLElementassets.hooks→assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.HTMLElementassets.hooks→assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.Hook
- Direction
- assets uses assets.phoenixFallbackTypes, so a change to assets.phoenixFallbackTypes can break assets, while a change to assets can't break assets.phoenixFallbackTypes.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→8 assets uses assets.use✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in assets uses a type in assets.use.
- The types involved
assets.use→assets.use.UseEventReplyOptionsassets.use→assets.use.UseEventReplyReturnassets.use→assets.use.UseLiveConnectionReturnassets.use→assets.use.UseLiveUploadReturn
- Direction
- assets uses assets.use, so a change to assets.use can break assets, while a change to assets can't break assets.use.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→9 assets uses assets.useLiveForm✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in assets uses a type in assets.useLiveForm.
- The types involved
assets.useLiveForm→assets.useLiveForm.FieldOptionsassets.useLiveForm→assets.useLiveForm.Formassets.useLiveForm→assets.useLiveForm.FormFieldassets.useLiveForm→assets.useLiveForm.FormFieldArrayassets.useLiveForm→assets.useLiveForm.FormOptionsassets.useLiveForm→assets.useLiveForm.UseLiveFormReturn
- Direction
- assets uses assets.useLiveForm, so a change to assets.useLiveForm can break assets, while a change to assets can't break assets.useLiveForm.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→14 assets uses assets.types✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in assets uses a type in assets.types.
- The types involved
assets.app→assets.types.ComponentOrComponentModuleassets.app→assets.types.SetupContextassets.use→assets.types.UploadConfigassets.utils→assets.types.ComponentOrComponentPromise
- Direction
- assets uses assets.types, so a change to assets.types can break assets, while a change to assets can't break assets.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 49 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 11 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 2 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene; Add eslint as REDACTED scripts and run them in CI.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +3.7 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +4.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 9 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with form.spec.js (4), hooks.test.ts, use.test.ts. | +1.8 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Add eslint as REDACTED scripts and run them in CI. | +2.3 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Resolve the 1 finding(s) in Type Safety. | +0.9 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with jsonPatch.ts, use.ts. | +0.6 pts | Medium | God Classes |
| Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package. | +0.6 pts | Medium | Large Files |
| Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation (cognitive 71), useLiveForm.useLiveForm (cognitive 48). | +0.4 pts | Medium | Cognitive Complexity |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.0 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
| assets/useLiveForm.ts | 7.3 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: useLiveForm.useLiveForm (cyclomatic 44) |
| assets/jsonPatch.ts | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation (cyclomatic 50) |
| assets/vitePlugin.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: liveVuePlugin (cyclomatic 19) |
| lib/live_vue.ex | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: LiveVue.vue (cyclomatic 16) |
| assets/utils.ts | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: utils.parsePath (cognitive 25) |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
| assets/use.test.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: should handle cancel after execution completes |
| lib/live_vue/reload.ex | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| assets/server.ts | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/mix/tasks/live_vue.install.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: tasks/live_vue.install.ex |
| assets/use.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FunctionTooLong: use.useLiveUpload |
| test/e2e/features/form/form.spec.js | 9.1 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| assets/hooks.test.ts | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| test/e2e/features/stream/stream.spec.js | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| test/e2e/js/app.js | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 45 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 98 of 119 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 355 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 28 test source file(s) (.exs, .ex) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT SCORED: this repository's production source includes .ex, and the built-in reliability runner cannot re-run the .ex test suite(s) — so reliability was not measured for the repository as a whole. The JavaScript/TypeScript (vitest via `npm ci --ignore-scripts` in the repository root (261 tests)): measured (0 flaky) suite(s) did re-run, and came back with 0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s) — but that is a figure for one half of the product, and we do not publish a partial one as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test reliability is excluded from the score rather than counted.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares REDACTED, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (22 contributor(s) across 308 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 92% of the history; the other 21 hold 0.4% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 2 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation at 50.
What to do
- Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation (cyclomatic 50), useLiveForm.useLiveForm (cyclomatic 44), liveVuePlugin (cyclomatic 19). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
6 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation at 71.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation (cognitive 71), useLiveForm.useLiveForm (cognitive 48). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 7.9 to about 8.8/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
D3 · God Classes
3 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with jsonPatch.ts, use.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with live_vue.install.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
2 production modules (npm+OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 1 of the 2 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 355 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 28 test source file(s) (.exs, .ex) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with use.test.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
12 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 2 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 48 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares REDACTED, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted task-comment markers across 5224 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with reload.ex, server.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D24 · Comment Value
9 of 622 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (1.4 %). 1 comment(s) in another language or script were not judged.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with form.spec.js (4), hooks.test.ts, use.test.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 11 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 11 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
49 finding(s): 3 critical, 24 high, 17 medium, 5 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 23 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (23). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 20 of the 32 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `removeHandleEvent` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. — assets/server.ts:28
- `upload` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. — assets/server.ts:29
- `uploadTo` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. — assets/server.ts:30
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete skipped tests, decide whether each empty function is a deliberate no-op (and say so in a comment), and replace blanket `eslint-disable` / `@ts-nocheck` with targeted, justified suppressions.
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 3 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:6
- `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:24
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF1 · Benchmark discipline
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
- 40 typed · 20 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/vitePlugin.js, assets/vitePlugin.test.js, test/e2e/features/basic/basic.spec.js, test/e2e/features/dead-view/dead-view.spec.js, test/e2e/features/event-reply/event_reply.spec.js, test/e2e/features/event/event.spec.js (+14 more). 0 production file(s) opt out entirely with @ts-nocheck · 1 @ts-ignore suppression(s).
R10 · Code Duplication
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- applyPatchOperation has cyclomatic complexity 48 and cognitive complexity 71; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/jsonPatch.ts:160
- parsePath has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/utils.ts:248
- syncSlots has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 15; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/inject.ts:28
- mounted has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — assets/hooks.ts:15
R3 · Large Files
- assets/useLiveForm.ts has 549 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — assets/useLiveForm.ts:1
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
R5 · Dependency Freshness
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's REDACTED scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add eslint as REDACTED scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~0.7 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 2 assertion(s) across the 2917 source line(s) of the 15 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: assets/inject.ts (1), assets/useLiveForm.ts (1). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce. Many are correct: each is a claim the checker could not verify, and it is wrong only where the value can in fact be missing, so review the densest places first.
What to do
- The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 82% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 69% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 65% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Performance | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 3 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 80 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — AX6 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository starts no server another machine can reach (no Phoenix.Endpoint, Plug.Cowboy or Bandit child). Access control is therefore N/A here — a library or OTP application is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (Ecto, Postgrex, MyXQL, Mongo, EventStore, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not scored — polyglot repository, one half has no runner
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (910 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed JavaScript, TypeScript surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (5164 LoC, 77 module-visible types across 5 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D27 Navigability — D27 reads resolved call sites in the languages it reads only — this repository's production source is .exs, .ts, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.ts) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured: of the 28 type(s) found, none both holds instance state and has two or more methods whose shared use of it could be read (16 with fewer than two methods, 12 stateless), so LCOM4 is undefined for every type in this repository. Not scored — the metric does not apply here, and this is not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the repository root runs vitest but declares no coverage provider, so the suite can run and still produce no lcov — add `@vitest/coverage-v8` (or `@vitest/coverage-istanbul`) as a devDependency. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (2 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Elixir source (2 module(s), 33 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface: 14 Elixir file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. This repository builds on an HTTP-server library (lib/live_vue.ex:57 — `Phoenix.LiveView`) but serves no HTTP of its own: its production source starts no server (no `use Phoenix.Endpoint`, `{Plug.Cowboy, …}`, `{Bandit, …}`, `:cowboy.start_clear` or `:ranch.start_listener`), so it is a library whose server controls belong to the application that serves it — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags and input validation are N/A here, as they are for a C# library. If this codebase starts serving HTTP, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — X1 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — X16 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — X17 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — X21 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — X24 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — X29 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X3 Exception handling — X3 reached only 50% of this repository's production lines — elixir (2,694 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 38 finding(s)
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Serious — 47 finding(s)
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- Unbounded dependency requirement: phoenix
- Unbounded dependency requirement: phoenix_live_view
- TodoComment lib/live_vue/reload.ex:20
- TodoComment assets/server.ts:137
- FunctionTooLong: jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation assets/jsonPatch.ts:160
- FunctionTooLong: use.useLiveUpload assets/use.ts:116
- jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation (cyclomatic 50) assets/jsonPatch.ts:160
- useLiveForm.useLiveForm (cyclomatic 44) assets/useLiveForm.ts:223
- liveVuePlugin (cyclomatic 19) assets/vitePlugin.js:70
- LiveVue.vue (cyclomatic 16) lib/live_vue.ex:92
- No assertions: should handle cancel after execution completes assets/use.test.ts:521
- jsonPatch.applyPatchOperation (cognitive 71) assets/jsonPatch.ts:160
- useLiveForm.useLiveForm (cognitive 48) assets/useLiveForm.ts:223
- utils.parsePath (cognitive 25) assets/utils.ts:248
- liveVuePlugin (cognitive 23) assets/vitePlugin.js:70
- LiveVue.vue (cognitive 19) lib/live_vue.ex:92
- utils.findComponent (cognitive 18) assets/utils.ts:35
- FileTooLong: tasks/live_vue.install.ex lib/mix/tasks/live_vue.install.ex
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- Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- Coverage collected but not gated
- Type Safety
- Complex function applyPatchOperation (cyclomatic 48, cognitive 71) assets/jsonPatch.ts:160
- Complex function parsePath (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 25) assets/utils.ts:248
- Complex function syncSlots (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 15) assets/inject.ts:28
- Complex function mounted (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 9) assets/hooks.ts:15
- assets/useLiveForm.ts: 549 lines of code assets/useLiveForm.ts:1
- No lint script
Minor — 22 finding(s)
- redundant comment assets/hooks.test.ts:254
- redundant comment assets/use.test.ts:413
- redundant comment assets/useLiveForm.ts:301
- redundant comment test/e2e/features/form/form.spec.js:75
- redundant comment test/e2e/features/form/form.spec.js:131
- redundant comment test/e2e/features/form/form.spec.js:147
- redundant comment test/e2e/features/form/form.spec.js:417
- redundant comment test/e2e/features/stream/stream.spec.js:267
- redundant comment test/e2e/js/app.js:12
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- Empty method body assets/server.ts:28
- Empty method body assets/server.ts:29
- Empty method body assets/server.ts:30
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- No ADRs
- No SAST REDACTED:6
- No dependency-update automation REDACTED:24
- Null assertions (`!`) override strict null checking
Minor — 12 finding(s)
- Outdated: bandit
- Outdated: ecto
- Outdated: ex_doc
- Outdated: igniter
- Outdated: lazy_html
- Outdated: nodejs
- Outdated: phoenix
- Outdated: phoenix_live_reload
- Outdated: phoenix_live_view
- Outdated: phoenix_vite
- Outdated: quickbeam
- Outdated: styler
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-575c939b7fb045028599bf30e9ba193a/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-575c939b7fb045028599bf30e9ba193a/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 11 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 49 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |