Public report — MinasPhone, published 4 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 04-08-2026 @ 02:10 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Varagos/MinasPhone

single-maintainer
39% At Risk
Domain Modelling 100% Exemplary Code Health 91% Exemplary Maturity 69% Adequate Security 54% Adequate Accessibility 46% Adequate Architecture 43% Weak Readiness 26% Weak

Medium · 30,988 LoC · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (26%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

39/40dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 1 LLM-assisted, advisory
59findings with an exact file:lineof 70 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
40/113dimensions across the health lenses30988 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.

Varagos/MinasPhone carries serious gaps (39%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (91%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Architecture (43%) is the next concern — the code resists change, so features cost more over time.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Point at where production persistence is operated (DR & Backup); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).

For scale: Medium (~30,988 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 91% ★ Exemplary Architecture 43% Weak · gated by R9 Maturity 69% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 26% Weak · gated by R8, P3, P5 Security 54% Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 46% Adequate · gated by AC2, AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 26% · 46% weightArchitecture 43% · 25% weightAccessibility 46% · 14% weightSecurity 54% · 8% weightMaturity 69% · 4% weightCode Health 91% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 39 → ~50.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (32+)

32 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-30) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 server/Dockerfile
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
  • R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) admin/src/resources/products/components/AttributesSubform.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/ui/select.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 3 locations) server/src/api/controllers/attributes.http.controller.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) server/src/api/controllers/attributes.http.controller.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) server/src/modules/product-catalog/application/categories/commands/update-category/update-category.request.dto.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) client/src/api/mock/categories.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/ui/tabs.tsx
  • R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 5 locations) server/src/api/controllers/categories.http.controller.ts
  • R9 · Import cycle (3 files) server/src/libs/ddd/entity.base.ts
  • R9 · Import cycle (2 files) server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/product-type.repository.ts
  • R9 · Import cycle (2 files) server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/product.repository.ts

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €9,400–€47,000
Cost to rebuild€9,400–€47,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (156–496 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 39% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code~198 LoC unreachable (16 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€28,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+11.8 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
2
Point at where production persistence is operated — a link from this repo to the ops/platform repo that holds its backup, geo-recovery and RTO/RPO controls — so the DR posture is reviewable from here; the dev-stack volume is not the thing to protect.
+11.8 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup
3
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
+11.8 pts · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 26%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (30,988 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 26%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

At a glance — Code Health · 91% · Exemplary

The Good
D3 · TypeScript God Classes 10.0 D4 · TypeScript Code Duplication 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 7.8 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 9.8 R3 · React / TS Large Files 9.7 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.3

At a glance — Architecture · 43% · Weak · gated by R9

The Good
D35 · TypeScript Change Coupling 10.0
The Ugly
R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 0.0

At a glance — Maturity · 69% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · TypeScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · TypeScript Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · TypeScript Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 9.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.7
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 26% · Weak · gated by R8, P3, P5

The Good
D13 · TypeScript Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5 P11 · Repo BDD / executable specs 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7
The Bad
P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 5.7
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 54% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38

The Good
D28 · TypeScript Secrets (history) 9.0 D31 · TypeScript IaC & Container Security 9.6 D33 · TypeScript JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · TypeScript Static Analysis (SAST) 3.8 D36 · TypeScript Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · TypeScript OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 46% · Adequate · gated by AC2, AC4

The Good
AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 10.0 AC3 · Repo Page structure 7.2 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0
The Ugly
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 3.0 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection7High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate static security scanning into the CI pipeline to fail the build on regressions. Next, link to the operations repository to clarify backup and disaster recovery controls. Then, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports. After that, ensure the build manifest includes a version stamp for traceable releases. Finally, expand test coverage to include all production modules.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+11.8 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Point at where production persistence is operated — a link from this repo to the ops/platform repo that holds its backup, geo-recovery and RTO/RPO controls — so the DR posture is reviewable from here; the dev-stack volume is not the thing to protect.+11.8 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+11.8 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+11.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+10.7 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+9.9 ptsMediumTooling
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.+8.5 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.+6.9 ptsMediumCI/CD gates

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 6 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 0% slop · 100% mixed · 0% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
admin/yarn.lock4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
server/yarn.lock4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
client/yarn.lock4.5MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
server/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
client/src/app/[locale]/products/[productId]/page.tsx6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 39 of 40 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 40 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D15D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P11P3P4P5P6R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 59 of 70 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fca89-91ad-7792-bde5-79ba6341531a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)3.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×5.github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml:14detected by semgrep finding
Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml · ×2client/src/app/[locale]/products/[productId]/page.tsx:171detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-and-publish-docker-image.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with page.tsx (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002server/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3server/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

138 finding(s): 11 critical, 69 high, 43 medium, 15 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×38admin/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×11admin/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]server/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 38 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (38). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

AC2 · Forms & labels3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id / name — and neither does anything it renders — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label htmlFor> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. (×15) — categories.tsx:43, MobileGrid.tsx:48, MobileGrid.tsx:53, …
  • This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id / name, and nothing it renders carries one either. The text inside it does not stand in for one: these compound APIs render a trigger with role="combobox" (or role="button"), and those roles take their name from the AUTHOR, not from their content — so the words on screen never reach the accessibility tree as a name. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label htmlFor> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. (×2) — LanguageSelector.tsx:48, PriceFilter.tsx:134

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — page.tsx:157, page.tsx:25

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. — CookieSettings.tsx:23

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

M1 · Documentation (README)9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.7 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • Order processing saga choreography described but no saga/compensation code shown

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: Order processing saga choreography described but no saga/compensation code shown.
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
P11 · BDD / executable specs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether behaviour is captured as executable Gherkin specifications (a plus for shared understanding) — only assessed when a BDD framework is present.

Method: Filesystem scan: BDD framework presence (SpecFlow, Gherkin files) when a project references a BDD tool. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • The only persistence guard found is a data volume in a stack this repo names a DEVELOPER stack, and no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced anywhere. A dev volume holds no production data, so there may be nothing here to recover — if this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that is where the DR evidence belongs, and this row is about what this repository can show rather than about that volume.

What to do

  • Point at where production persistence is operated — a link from this repo to the ops/platform repo that holds its backup, geo-recovery and RTO/RPO controls — so the DR posture is reviewable from here; the dev-stack volume is not the thing to protect.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • admin/src/resources/products/components/AttributesSubform.tsx:124 · admin/src/resources/products/components/AttributesSubformEdit.tsx:137 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — AttributesSubform.tsx:124
  • client/src/components/ui/select.tsx:134 · client/src/components/ui/select.tsx:152 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — select.tsx:134
  • server/src/api/controllers/attributes.http.controller.ts:97 · server/src/api/controllers/attributes.http.controller.ts:242 · server/src/api/controllers/product-types.http.controller.ts:182 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — attributes.http.controller.ts:97
  • server/src/api/controllers/attributes.http.controller.ts:241 · server/src/api/controllers/product-types.http.controller.ts:181 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — attributes.http.controller.ts:241
  • server/src/modules/product-catalog/application/categories/commands/update-category/update-category.request.dto.ts:2 · server/src/modules/product-catalog/application/products/commands/update-product/update-product.request.dto.ts:2 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — update-category.request.dto.ts:2
  • client/src/api/mock/categories.ts:46 · client/src/api/mock/products.ts:92 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — categories.ts:46
  • client/src/components/ui/tabs.tsx:59 · client/src/components/ui/tabs.tsx:95 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — tabs.tsx:59
  • server/src/api/controllers/categories.http.controller.ts:92 · server/src/api/controllers/categories.http.controller.ts:133 · server/src/api/controllers/orders.http.controller.ts:335 · server/src/api/controllers/products.http.controller.ts:127 · +1 more site(s) not listed — the 5 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — categories.http.controller.ts:92

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — stepper.tsx:62, find-products.handler.ts:1, update-product.handler.ts:48, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — page.tsx, page.tsx, AttributesSubformEdit.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 24 application, 12 tooling and 31 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (24 application, 12 tooling, 31 test roots considered) (×7) — MobileGrid.tsx, find-product-image.request.dto.ts, cart.ts, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — App.tsx:4, AppBar.tsx:4, Dashboard.tsx:3
  • Declared in admin/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)
  • Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • server/src/libs/ddd/entity.base.ts → server/src/libs/utils/index.ts → server/src/libs/utils/convert-props-to-object.util.ts → server/src/libs/ddd/entity.base.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 4 files) — entity.base.ts
  • server/src/libs/exceptions/exceptions.ts → server/src/libs/exceptions/index.ts → server/src/libs/exceptions/exceptions.ts — exceptions.ts
  • server/src/modules/orders/infra/database/order.repository.ts → server/src/modules/orders/infra/mappers/order.mapper.ts → server/src/modules/orders/infra/database/order.repository.ts — order.repository.ts
  • server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/attribute.repository.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/mappers/attribute.mapper.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/attribute.repository.ts — attribute.repository.ts
  • server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/category.repository.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/mappers/category.mapper.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/category.repository.ts — category.repository.ts
  • server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/product-type.repository.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/mappers/product-type.mapper.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/product-type.repository.ts — product-type.repository.ts
  • server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/product.repository.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/mappers/product.mapper.ts → server/src/modules/product-catalog/infra/database/product.repository.ts — product.repository.ts

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health91%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture43%Weak — gated by R9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity69%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness26%Weak — gated by R8, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security54%Adequate — gated by D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility46%Adequate — gated by AC2, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~2202 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 56 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×38
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.18.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — @isaacs/brace-expansion 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @isaacs/brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @isaacs/brace-expansion to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — axios 1.17.0: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 1.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 10 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.17.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — body-parser 1.20.0: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock — brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 3 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — cross-spawn 6.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 6.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 3 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — defu 6.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — defu is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin defu to 6.1.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). (in 3 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — dompurify 2.4.5: [GHSA redacted] — dompurify is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin dompurify to 2.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 16 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against dompurify 2.4.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 17 advisories this scan raises against dompurify 2.4.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — glob 11.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 11.1.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — json5 1.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 1.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — json5 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 2.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — jws 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — jws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin jws to 3.2.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • + 13 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×11
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — @babel/traverse 7.18.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — @babel/traverse 7.21.4: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — @babel/traverse 7.22.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — form-data 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 3.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 3.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: admin/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock — form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.0.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: client/yarn.lock, server/yarn.lock) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — loader-utils 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 2.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against loader-utils 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — protobufjs 6.11.4: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.11.4, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.11.4; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 11 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against protobufjs 6.11.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.6.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.6.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 11 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 6.11.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock — tar 7.4.3: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tar to 7.5.19 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tar 7.4.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against tar 7.4.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — webpack 5.72.1: [GHSA redacted] — webpack is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin webpack to 5.76.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against webpack 5.72.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.104.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.104.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against webpack 5.72.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] admin/yarn.lock — websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×5
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml:38 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-and-publish-docker-image.yml:45 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: appleboy/ssh-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `appleboy/ssh-action@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/appleboy/ssh-action/commits/master --jq .sha`.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 server/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock — nodemailer 6.9.1: [GHSA redacted] — nodemailer is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 9.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.9.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.9.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 9 advisories this scan raises against nodemailer 6.9.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 7 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×2
  • Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml client/src/app/[locale]/products/[productId]/page.tsx:171 — Detection of dangerouslySetInnerHTML from non-constant definition. This can inadvertently expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks if this comes from user-provided input. If you have to use dangerouslySetInnerHTML, consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize your HTML. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml client/src/app/[locale]/products/[productId]/page.tsx:218 — Detection of dangerouslySetInnerHTML from non-constant definition. This can inadvertently expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks if this comes from user-provided input. If you have to use dangerouslySetInnerHTML, consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize your HTML. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 184 commit(s) sampled).
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 993.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 server/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 5 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s), 1 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (1 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .7artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .2artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .138artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fca89-91ad-7792-bde5-79ba6341531a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 56 · Warnings: 7 · Recommendations: 5 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 02:10 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md