Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
VenomAV/EventSourcingCQRS is in a workable but fragile state (46%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Architecture (99%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
The area that most needs attention is Maturity (33%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Readiness (54%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map… (Documentation (README)); README describing the system (Documentation accuracy).
For scale: Hobby (~1,420 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
75%
Healthy
Architecture
99% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
33%
Fair · gated by M1, M4
Readiness
54%
Fair · gated by P5
Security
57%
Fair · gated by S1
Domain Modelling
60%
Fair · gated by DM2, DM4
Accessibility
54%
Fair
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 60%Tests 30%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €760–€3,800
| Cost to rebuild | €760–€3,800 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 46% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · 51% boilerplate · 35% straight-line · 14% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
2
Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects.
3
Add a README describing the system, how to build/run it, and keep it current.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
10.0
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
10.0
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
6.4
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
9.3
D22 · .NET / C#
Internal API Consistency
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
8.0
AX2 · Repo
Stateful singletons
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them; Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects; Add a README describing the system, how to build/run it, and keep it current.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. | +5.4 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects. | +3.6 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Add a README describing the system, how to build/run it, and keep it current. | +2.9 pts | Medium | Documentation accuracy |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +2.4 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI. | +2.1 pts | Medium | A11y enforcement |
| Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Page structure |
| Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Strongly-typed ids |
| Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Rich vs anemic model |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| EventSourcingCQRS/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.Tests/EventStoreTest.cs | 8.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: TestPerformance |
| EventSourcingCQRS.Application/PubSub/TransientDomainEventPubSub.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: TransientDomainEventPubSub (LCOM4 4) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 51 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 51 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D22D26D28D29D31D35AC2AC3AC5AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED5GD1IC1M1M3M4P4P5S1X1X2X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 14 of 41 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.300 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.300 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | openai-compatible | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider was unreachable or errored, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — LLM provider failed — The model provider was unreachable or errored, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider was unreachable or errored, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct, and component-wrapped fields (e.g. a <TextField>) are skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is ADVISORY: an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being unhealthy.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
9 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
1 of 17 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
Low cohesion: TransientDomainEventPubSub (LCOM4 4)EventSourcingCQRS.Application/PubSub/TransientDomainEventPubSub.cs:9
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D9 · Test Distribution
33 test methods: 33 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 33 tests.
No assertions: TestPerformanceEventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.Tests/EventStoreTest.cs:41
Mock framework: Moq
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 9 packages use a banned license.
Licenses scanned
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
git history depth insufficient
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D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1420 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
Justified suppressionEventSourcingCQRS.Application/PubSub/TransientDomainEventPubSub.cs:59
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D18 · Solution Shape
9 projects, 60 .cs files, 2039 hand-written lines of code (1420 production / 619 test), 13 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).
Build status unknown
EventSourcingCQRS (Production)EventSourcingCQRS/EventSourcingCQRS.csproj
EventSourcingCQRS.Domain (Production)EventSourcingCQRS.Domain/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.csproj
EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.Tests (Test)EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.Tests/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.Tests.csproj
EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore (Production)EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.csproj
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D22 · Internal API Consistency
No public API surface exposed; nothing to be inconsistent.
No exposed public API
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 9 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
High IaC: DS-0002EventSourcingCQRS/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026EventSourcingCQRS/Dockerfile
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
git history depth insufficient
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — DetailsAsync.cshtml:82
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — DetailsAsync.cshtml:52, IndexAsync.cshtml:45
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — _Layout.cshtml:2
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — _Layout.cshtml:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC5 · ARIA correctness
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
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AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX2 · Stateful singletons
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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AX8 · Test isolation
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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `DomainEventBase.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EventId { Guid Value }`). — DomainEventBase.cs:23
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `AggregateBase` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AggregateBase.cs:7
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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ED5 · Idempotency
- `Handlers.CartUpdater.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) (×2) — CartUpdater.cs:32, CartUpdater.cs:45
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
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M1 · Documentation (README)
- No README at the repository root — newcomers have no entry point.
What to do
- Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects.
- Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- There is no README, so nothing documents what the system is or how it works.
What to do
- Add a README describing the system, how to build/run it, and keep it current.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Do you agree with this assessment?
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
- Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
- Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. — Startup.cs:88
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
Do you agree with this assessment?
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 0/23 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×23) — CartsController.cs:29, CartsController.cs:38, CartsController.cs:45, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 75% | Healthy | Solid. |
| Architecture | 99% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 33% | Fair — gated by M1, M4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 54% | Fair — gated by P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 57% | Fair — gated by S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 60% | Fair — gated by DM2, DM4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 54% | Fair | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included — 47 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No styled element found in the parsed markup — AC6 not applicable here.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — This is a dotnet-new template — authorization is deferred to the application you build from it. Add [Authorize]/policies (or imperative guards) when you wire up real users; until then there are no real endpoints to protect.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — LLM evaluation failed
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Dimension evaluation failed
- D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — Navigability unmeasured — symbol resolution incomplete
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — Not applicable
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
- D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 2/3 markers (1 event handler(s); 1 CQRS handler(s))
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 2/3 markers (an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 1 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds)
- M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
- P1 CI/CD gates — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. Automated CI/CD gates are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. Structured logging, tracing/metrics and health checks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 3 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality
- No assertions: TestPerformance EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.Tests/EventStoreTest.cs:41
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Dimension evaluation failed
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 EventSourcingCQRS/Dockerfile
Warning — 7 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- git history depth insufficient
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D21 · Naming Consistency
- LLM evaluation failed
D24 · Comment Value
- LLM evaluation failed
D35 · Change Coupling
- git history depth insufficient
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
- Low cohesion: TransientDomainEventPubSub (LCOM4 4) EventSourcingCQRS.Application/PubSub/TransientDomainEventPubSub.cs:9
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D25 · ADR Conformance
- no ADRs to check
D27 · Navigability
- Navigability unmeasured — symbol resolution incomplete
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Not applicable
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 EventSourcingCQRS/Dockerfile
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)
- Not applicable
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Not applicable
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Not applicable
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
- Not applicable
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Not applicable
D7 · Architectural Integrity
- No checkable ADRs to assess
Info — 18 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality
- Mock framework: Moq
D14 · License Compliance
- Licenses scanned
D17 · Explicit Debt
- Justified suppression EventSourcingCQRS.Application/PubSub/TransientDomainEventPubSub.cs:59
D18 · Solution Shape
- Build status unknown
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS (Production) EventSourcingCQRS/EventSourcingCQRS.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.Domain (Production) EventSourcingCQRS.Domain/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.Tests (Test) EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.Tests/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.Tests.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore (Production) EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.Tests (Test) EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.Tests/EventSourcingCQRS.Domain.EventStore.Tests.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.ReadModel (Production) EventSourcingCQRS.ReadModel/EventSourcingCQRS.ReadModel.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.ReadModel.Tests (Test) EventSourcingCQRS.ReadModel.Tests/EventSourcingCQRS.ReadModel.Tests.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.Application (Production) EventSourcingCQRS.Application/EventSourcingCQRS.Application.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- EventSourcingCQRS.Application.Tests (Test) EventSourcingCQRS.Application.Tests/EventSourcingCQRS.Application.Tests.csproj
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
D9 · Test Distribution
- Unit tests
D9 · Test Distribution
- Integration tests
D9 · Test Distribution
- BDD tests
D9 · Test Distribution
- E2E tests
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 2 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |