Public report — Unity3DTraining, published 5 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 05-08-2026 @ 14:04 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

XINCGer/Unity3DTraining

47% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Small · 3,944 LoC · 3 projects · rebuild ~0.8 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (35%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

33/36dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
32findings with an exact file:lineof 44 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
36/97dimensions across the health lenses3944 LoC · 3 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

XINCGer/Unity3DTraining carries serious gaps (47%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (95%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (35%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (47%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped… (Release Hygiene).

For scale: Small (~3,944 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.8 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (95%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 35% · 47% weightSecurity 47% · 26% weightMaturity 62% · 14% weightCode Health 70% · 8% weightArchitecture 95% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 35 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 47 → ~58.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 2%Plumbing 2%Tests 96%
New since the last scan (2+)

2 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-01) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D32 · High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log HotUpdate/uLuaDemo/Assets/ToLua/Editor/ToLuaExport.cs
  • D32 · High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log HotUpdate/uLuaDemo/Assets/ToLua/Editor/ToLuaExport.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €38,000–€190,000
Cost to rebuild€38,000–€190,000 (0.4–1.2 person-years (627–1,990 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 47% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 34% boilerplate · 26% straight-line · 40% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.8 person-years of build effort (about ~€110,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — desktop/game, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Client.cs.
+9.0 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
+12.8 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates
3
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+12.8 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.8 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.8 person-years rebuild (3,944 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 35%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch ctx:Assembly-CSharp (Minecraft) Assembly-CSharp (Minecraft) 1 project ctx:Minecraft Minecraft 1 project ctx:Assembly-CSharp (Minecraft)->ctx:Minecraft __more__ +29 more contexts

Architecture — module dependency matrix

11 modules, 3 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…haracters.ThirdPerson…ts.CrossPlatformInput…atformInput.Inspector…tandardAssets.Utility…ets.Utility.Inspector…dAssets.Vehicles.Ball…xTools.xls2json.Toolscom.mx.sdkbase…haracters.FirstPerson…nput.PlatformSpecific(global)…haracters.ThirdPerson1…ts.CrossPlatformInput2…atformInput.Inspector3…tandardAssets.Utility4…ets.Utility.Inspector5…dAssets.Vehicles.Ball6…xTools.xls2json.Tools7com.mx.sdkbase8…haracters.FirstPerson9…nput.PlatformSpecific10(global)11521

At a glance — Code Health · 70% · Adequate · gated by D17

At a glance — Architecture · 95% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 62% · Adequate

At a glance — Readiness · 35% · Weak · gated by P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 47% · Weak · gated by D28

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures23High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection2Medium
A04:2021 — Insecure Design2High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration pipeline that builds the code and runs the test suite on every push or pull request. Next, integrate a security analyzer, such as CodeQL or Semgrep, into this workflow to fail the build on security regressions. Additionally, maintain a changelog to track release history and address the identified secret scanning findings, starting with Client.cs and the specified asset files.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Client.cs.+9.0 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+12.8 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+12.8 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+11.8 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with ToLuaExport.cs (2).+4.2 ptsLowData Compliance (PII/GDPR)
Resolve the 21 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with ProjectSettings.asset (15), Orc Skin (Diffuse).psd (2), 06 Character.psd (2).+5.8 ptsMediumSecrets (history)
Resolve the 1 NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 20 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Assembly-CSharp.csproj.+2.2 ptsLowExplicit Debt
Grow the ADR log (currently 1) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.+3.3 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 26 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 92% mixed · 8% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Effective C#/Delegate_EventTraining/Assets/NGUI/Examples/Models/Orc/Orc Skin (Diffuse).psd5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
UGUITraining/UGUIDemo02/Assets/UI/Source/06 Character.psd5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
UGUITraining/UGUIDemo02/Assets/UI/Source/05 Window Frame.psd5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
HotUpdate/uLuaDemo/Assets/ToLua/Editor/ToLuaExport.cs5.8MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log
NetWorkAndResources/SampleSocket/Socket/Assets/Scripts/Client.cs7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
SDK/XinGeSDK_Demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
SDK/PullUpQQGroupDemo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
2DPlatformer/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
UnityEditorExtension/MultiEditorWindow/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
MVP_Demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
UnityEditorExtension/NodeEditor/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
HotUpdate/AssetBundleFramework/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
ChangeCharacter/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
HotUpdate/UnityTechnologiesAssetbundleDemo/demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
HotUpdate/AssetBundleDemo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
GuideSystem/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
SDK/XinGeSDK/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
HighScore/HighScore/Library/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
HighScore/HighScore/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
UnityEditorExtension/NodeEditorCollection/NodeEditor/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 33 of 36 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 36 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D5D6D7D9D10D12D13D14D17D18D20D21D24D26D28D29D32D34D35AX10AX3AX4AX5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P3P6X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 32 of 44 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd23d-7d03-7bb3-89ce-a8ed9b8ac529.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:142
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:118
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/CrossPlatformInput/Scripts/Joystick.cs:58
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:176

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Assembly-CSharp-firstpass

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 35 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

No mechanizable ADR was identified, so enforcement is not measured (scan coverage 100 %). Cycles found: 0.

What to do

  1. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Architectural Integrity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 test methods: 4 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Tests co-located / outside the solution

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 4 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialNetWorkAndResources/SampleSocket/Socket/Assets/Scripts/Client.cs:68

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Client.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 5 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

40 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 3944 LoC (6.7/KLoC) → score 0.0.

NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 20 filesMinecraft/Assembly-CSharp.csproj:25

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 20 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Assembly-CSharp.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 projects, 228 source files, 52943 hand-written lines of code (52943 production / 0 test), 1 inter-project edges (build failed).

Monorepo: only 1 of 71 solutions was scored
Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository
Build did not complete in the analyzer

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 2.0/10 (frequently incomplete). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

What to do

  1. Improve ADR Quality — currently 2.0/10. — Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 2.0/10 (frequently incomplete). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 valuable / 1 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentMinecraft/Assets/Scripts/LifeManager.cs:19

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 3 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

21 finding(s): 0 critical, 21 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×21SDK/XinGeSDK_Demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:526detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 21 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with ProjectSettings.asset (15), Orc Skin (Diffuse).psd (2), 06 Character.psd (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

Medium: use-defused-xml · ×2UnityEditorExtension/Python/unpack_plist.py.py:3detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.

Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log · ×2HotUpdate/uLuaDemo/Assets/ToLua/Editor/ToLuaExport.cs:2724detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with ToLuaExport.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A placeholder string ("Replacement") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:106
  • A placeholder string ("replacement") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:107

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×5) — HeadBob.cs:25, HeadBob.cs:31, HeadBob.cs:52, …

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 1) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
  • Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
  • Only 1/3 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health70%Adequate — gated by D17Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture95%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity62%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Readiness35%Weak — gated by P1, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security47%Weak — gated by D28Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .java, .py) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .java, .py) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 65k LoC the codebase is small despite three projects, so its size alone makes it not need boundaries.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — none of 1 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .java, .py) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 25 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×21
  • Secret: generic-api-key SDK/XinGeSDK_Demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:526 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key SDK/PullUpQQGroupDemo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:589 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key 2DPlatformer/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:527 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key UnityEditorExtension/MultiEditorWindow/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key MVP_Demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:507 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key UnityEditorExtension/NodeEditor/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key HotUpdate/AssetBundleFramework/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key ChangeCharacter/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:527 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key HotUpdate/UnityTechnologiesAssetbundleDemo/demo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:523 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key HotUpdate/AssetBundleDemo/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key GuideSystem/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key SDK/XinGeSDK/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:507 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key HighScore/HighScore/Library/ProjectSettings.asset:286 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key HighScore/HighScore/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:286 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: aws-access-token Effective C#/Delegate_EventTraining/Assets/NGUI/Examples/Models/Orc/Orc Skin (Diffuse).psd:5669 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token Effective C#/Delegate_EventTraining/Assets/NGUI/Examples/Models/Orc/Orc Skin (Diffuse).psd:7856 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: generic-api-key UnityEditorExtension/NodeEditorCollection/NodeEditor/ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset:506 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: aws-access-token UGUITraining/UGUIDemo02/Assets/UI/Source/06 Character.psd:13872 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: facebook-page-access-token UGUITraining/UGUIDemo02/Assets/UI/Source/06 Character.psd:19840 — matched rule 'facebook-page-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token UGUITraining/UGUIDemo02/Assets/UI/Source/05 Window Frame.psd:18124 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: facebook-page-access-token UGUITraining/UGUIDemo02/Assets/UI/Source/05 Window Frame.psd:24092 — matched rule 'facebook-page-access-token'
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · High · ×2
  • High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log HotUpdate/uLuaDemo/Assets/ToLua/Editor/ToLuaExport.cs:2724 — Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
  • High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log HotUpdate/uLuaDemo/Assets/ToLua/Editor/ToLuaExport.cs:2731 — Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential NetWorkAndResources/SampleSocket/Socket/Assets/Scripts/Client.cs:68 — hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 20 files · ×1
  • NoWarnInCsproj repeated across 20 files Minecraft/Assembly-CSharp.csproj:25 — The identical NoWarnInCsproj (`0169`) appears in 20 files (40 occurrences) — a single repo-wide policy (e.g. a Directory.Build.props decision or an idiomatic suppression), not 40 independent debts. Decide it once centrally rather than file-by-file. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
Warning — 13 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×2
  • Medium: use-defused-xml UnityEditorExtension/Python/unpack_plist.py.py:3 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: unsafe-path-combine XlsxTools/Xls2Lua/Xls2Lua/FileExporter.cs:112 — String argument outDir is used to read or write data from a file via Path.Combine without direct sanitization via Path.GetFileName. If the path is user-supplied data this can lead to path traversal.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1
  • Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — Every one of the 165 significant source file(s) was last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains, so there is no concentration to measure — the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D18 · Solution Shape · Monorepo · ×1
  • Monorepo: only 1 of 71 solutions was scored — This repository contains 71 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `Effective C#/Delegate_EventTraining/Delegate_EventTraining.sln` — the other 70 (`DesignPatterns/AdapterPattern/AdapterPattern.sln`, `DesignPatterns/BridgePattern/BridgePattern.sln`, `DesignPatterns/BuilderPattern/BuilderPattern/BuilderPattern.sln`, `DesignPatterns/ChainofResponsibilityPattern/ChainofResponsibilityPattern.sln`, `DesignPatterns/CommandPattern/CommandPattern.sln`, `DesignPatterns/CompositePattern/CompositePattern.sln`, +64 more) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D18 · Solution Shape · Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository · ×1
  • Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository — The scored solution `Effective C#/Delegate_EventTraining/Delegate_EventTraining.sln` is not representative of this repository — it references only 228 of 1136 discovered C# files (20 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1049.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:142 — Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:142-158 | Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/WaypointCircuit.cs:287-303 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:142` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:118 — Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:118-133 | Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/WaypointCircuit.cs:260-274 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:118` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/CrossPlatformInput/Scripts/Joystick.cs:58 — Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/CrossPlatformInput/Scripts/Joystick.cs:58-71 | Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/CrossPlatformInput/Scripts/TouchPad.cs:71-84 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/CrossPlatformInput/Scripts/Joystick.cs:58` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:176 — Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/AutoMobileShaderSwitch.cs:176-183 | Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/WaypointCircuit.cs:317-324 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Assembly-CSharp-firstpass — Assembly-CSharp-firstpass: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.00, distance 0.98 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read.
Recommendation — 3 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .java, .py · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (76 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, .fs, .java, .py, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment Minecraft/Assets/Scripts/LifeManager.cs:19 — "Use this for initialization" — delete - Start/Update comments restating the 'use this' boilerplate
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) These 21 location(s) do not all need the same action: 3 sit inside a test/fixture/sample tree and 18 do not. Rotate the ones outside those trees as stated above. For the fixture ones there may be no live credential to revoke — confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), then generate that material at test time instead of committing it, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it.
Info — 3 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape · Build did not complete in the analyzer · ×1
  • Build did not complete in the analyzer — `dotnet build` reported 2 error(s) but no C# compiler diagnostic, so this is a build-environment gap rather than a code defect. The usual causes are a project that targets a platform this run cannot build (a Windows-only target framework on a Linux worker) or a build step that shells out to a tool the image does not carry. Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped. Semantic analysis is independent of this build and covers every project that loaded — but a project whose restore did not complete has no resolved references, so treat its results as absent rather than clean. Worth checking on your side too: a build that needs undeclared host tooling, or that cannot run off its own platform, is the same wall a new contributor hits.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution · Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
  • Tests co-located / outside the solution — 4 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .21artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/gdpr.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep-gdpr.json
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fd23d-7d03-7bb3-89ce-a8ed9b8ac529 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 3 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Phone — 3 field(s)
  • CrossPlatformInitialize.mobileBuildTargetGroups Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Editor/CrossPlatformInput/CrossPlatformInputInitialize.cs:91
  • SimpleMouseRotator.autoZeroVerticalOnMobile Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/SimpleMouseRotator.cs:21
  • SimpleMouseRotator.autoZeroHorizontalOnMobile Minecraft/Assets/Standard Assets/Utility/SimpleMouseRotator.cs:22

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md