Public report — Xer.Cqrs, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 03-08-2026 @ 16:25 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

XerProjects/Xer.Cqrs

no automated tests
36% At Risk
Code Health 82% Strong Architecture 69% Adequate Domain Modelling 60% Adequate Maturity 49% Weak Security 29% Weak Readiness 26% Weak

Hobby · 1,431 LoC · 6 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (26%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

52/55dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
17findings with an exact file:lineof 62 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
55/103dimensions across the health lenses1431 LoC · 6 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

XerProjects/Xer.Cqrs carries serious risk (36%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (29%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).

For scale: Hobby (~1,431 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 82% Strong Architecture 69% Adequate · gated by AX2 Maturity 49% Weak · gated by M2 Readiness 26% Weak · gated by D8, D9, P2, P3 Security 29% Weak · gated by D30, C2 Domain Modelling 60% Adequate · gated by DM2, DM4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 26% · 46% weightSecurity 29% · 25% weightMaturity 49% · 14% weightDomain Modelling 60% · 8% weightArchitecture 69% · 4% weightCode Health 82% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~44.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 11%Plumbing 89%
New since the last scan (10+)

10 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.2
  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.2
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7
  • D30 · Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €440–€2,100
Cost to rebuild€440–€2,100 (0.1 person-years (7–22 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 36% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeHobby · 55% boilerplate · 34% straight-line · 11% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+8.9 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+8.9 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+5.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch AspNetCore AspNetCore Domain Domain AspNetCore->Domain Infrastructure Infrastructure AspNetCore->Infrastructure ReadSide ReadSide AspNetCore->ReadSide ConsoleApp ConsoleApp ConsoleApp->Domain ConsoleApp->Infrastructure ConsoleApp->ReadSide Xer.Cqrs Cqrs ConsoleApp->Xer.Cqrs Domain->Xer.Cqrs Infrastructure->Domain Infrastructure->ReadSide

At a glance — Code Health · 82% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.7 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.1 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.6 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.8 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
X1 · Repo Async correctness 6.1

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Adequate · gated by AX2

The Good
D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 8.9 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9 AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.3
The Ugly
AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 3.5

At a glance — Maturity · 49% · Weak · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0
The Bad
D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 5.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 3.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 26% · Weak · gated by D8, D9, P2, P3

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 7.3 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 7.7 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 29% · Weak · gated by D30, C2

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 9.5
The Ugly
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 60% · Adequate · gated by DM2, DM4

The Good
DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0
The Ugly
DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components30High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection1Medium

Roadmap

First, implement comprehensive logging using ILogger or Serilog across all service-like projects to establish baseline observability. Next, integrate a static analysis tool such as CodeQL or Semgrep into the CI pipeline to automatically fail builds on security regressions. Then, address the single gap in automated testing by resolving the missing test coverage. After that, ensure all tests are correctly discovered and distributed within the test suite. Finally, enhance deployment reliability by adding readiness and liveness probes along with a rolling update strategy to enable automatic rollback of bad releases.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+8.9 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+8.9 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+5.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+9.6 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+9.6 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+8.9 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.+8.3 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+8.0 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 9 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 22% mixed · 78% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Samples/AspNetCore/Controllers/ProductsController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithMixedRegistration.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithContainerRegistration.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 3)
Samples/ConsoleApp/ConsoleApp.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: ConsoleApp
Samples/Domain/Domain.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: Domain
Samples/ReadSide/ReadSide.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: ReadSide
Samples/AspNetCore/AspNetCore.csproj8.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: Low XML-doc coverage: AspNetCore
README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The Getting Started section describes registration options but does not explain how to register command/event handlers with the hosted-command/event-handler abstraction.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 52 of 55 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 55 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX9C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4S1X1X2X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 17 of 62 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc872-453d-7c4f-b010-fd83e3f6bf28.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithMixedRegistration.cs:47
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3)Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithContainerRegistration.cs:64

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 outdated, 2 vulnerable, 2 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App · ×2
Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App · ×2
Outdated: SimpleInjector · ×4

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1431 LoC (0.4/KLoC) → score 9.1.

CommentedOutCode · ×6Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 31 source files, 1431 hand-written lines of code (1431 production / 0 test), 12 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README for the Xer.Cqrs project is a solid overview that states what it does (a convenience package grouping Domain Driven, Command Stack, and Event Stack libraries), shows build status for Master and Dev branches, lists a table of contents including Overview, Features, Installation, Getting Started with command/event handling registration options, and ends before the outline sections are shown. It is clear but thin on installation/configuration details (e.g., how to add it as a dependency) and architecture-level guidance compared to an ideal CQRS library README.

Low XML-doc coverage: ConsoleApp · ×4Samples/ConsoleApp/ConsoleApp.csproj
The Getting Started section describes registration options but does not explain how to register command/event handlers with the hosted-command/event-handler abstraction.README.md
XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure · ×2Samples/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with ConsoleApp.csproj, Domain.csproj, ReadSide.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The Getting Started section describes registration options but does not… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 192 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 1 redundant across 145 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentSamples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:37

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

91 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 85 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.9/10. — 91 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 85 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

Medium: missing-or-broken-authorizationSamples/AspNetCore/Controllers/ProductsController.cs:18detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

30 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 15 high, 13 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.0.0 · ×15detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 · ×13detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 13 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 96 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `InMemoryProductReadSideRepository` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_products; e.g. `_products` at line 20). — InMemoryProductReadSideRepository.cs:9

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `ProductActivatedEvent.AggregateRootId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — ProductActivatedEvent.cs:8
  • `ProductDeactivatedEvent.AggregateRootId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — ProductDeactivatedEvent.cs:8
  • `ProductRegisteredEvent.AggregateRootId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — ProductRegisteredEvent.cs:11

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `Product` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Product.cs:8

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED5 · Idempotency7.7 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `Commands.RegisterProductCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — RegisterProductCommand.cs:36

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
  • Only 1/6 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
  • Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
X1 · Async correctness6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — Program.cs:26

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 10/16 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — Program.cs:28
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×5) — ProductsController.cs:39, ProductsController.cs:52, ProductsController.cs:69, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health82%StrongStrongest area.
Architecture69%Adequate — gated by AX2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity49%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness26%Weak — gated by D8, D9, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security29%Weak — gated by D30, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling60%Adequate — gated by DM2, DM4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 48 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D16 Bus Factor — no production source files with tracked history to analyse
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — single shared-core project — no cross-context coupling to assess
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — no production source files with tracked history to analyse
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (6 CQRS handler(s))
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 20 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×15
  • High CVE: Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.0.0 — Microsoft.NETCore.App 2.0.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.OData 5.8.2 — Microsoft.Data.OData 5.8.2 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.4.3 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.4.3 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×2
  • Vulnerable: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.0.0, — ) severity. 2.0.0
  • Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 (transitive) has a Critical advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 28 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×13
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.0.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Abstractions 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Abstractions 2.0.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Libuv 2.0.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.8 — Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.8 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 2.4.0 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 2.4.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.4.3 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.4.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.1.4 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.Net.Security 4.3.0 — System.Net.Security 4.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.4.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×6
  • CommentedOutCode Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:1 — 18 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:37 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:44 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:77 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:55 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:99 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
D19 · Documentation Quality · Low XML-doc coverage · ×4
  • Low XML-doc coverage: ConsoleApp Samples/ConsoleApp/ConsoleApp.csproj — ConsoleApp: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/34).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: Domain Samples/Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 7 % XML-doc coverage (3/41).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: ReadSide Samples/ReadSide/ReadSide.csproj — ReadSide: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/22).
  • Low XML-doc coverage: AspNetCore Samples/AspNetCore/AspNetCore.csproj — AspNetCore: 37 % XML-doc coverage (10/27).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.NETCore.App — Microsoft.NETCore.App [2.0.0, — ) — the publisher's replacement is `2.0.0` Other,Legacy; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 — Other,Legacy
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization Samples/AspNetCore/Controllers/ProductsController.cs:18 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithMixedRegistration.cs:47 — Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithMixedRegistration.cs:47-60 | Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithSimpleRegistration.cs:45-58 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithMixedRegistration.cs:47` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithContainerRegistration.cs:64 — Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithContainerRegistration.cs:64-75 | Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithMixedRegistration.cs:48-60 | Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithSimpleRegistration.cs:46-58 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithContainerRegistration.cs:64` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · no production source files with tracked history to analyse · ×1
  • no production source files with tracked history to analyse — No production source file with tracked git history was found to analyse, so knowledge concentration is not scored for this run.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Infrastructure` with 39 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 94 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.44 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The Getting Started section describes registration options but does not explain how to register command/event handlers with the hosted-command/event-handler abstraction. · ×1
  • The Getting Started section describes registration options but does not explain how to register command/event handlers with the hosted-command/event-handler abstraction. README.md — Expand on the hosted-command-event-registration example so readers can instantiate a CommandBus or EventBus and add handlers.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment Samples/AspNetCore/Startup/StartupWithAttributeRegistration.cs:37 — "services.AddSwaggerGen(c =>" — trim - Swagger configuration line; the c.SwaggerDoc/IncludeXmlComments comments already say this
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · no production source files with tracked history to analyse · ×1
  • no production source files with tracked history to analyse — No production source file with tracked git history was found to analyse, so knowledge freshness is not scored for this run. This is not a clean bill: no file's freshness was measured.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 7 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×4
  • Outdated: SimpleInjector — SimpleInjector 4.2.2 → 5.6.0 available (referenced by ConsoleApp).
  • Outdated: Xer.DomainDriven — Xer.DomainDriven 4.0.0 → 5.0.0 available (referenced by Xer.Cqrs).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.All — Microsoft.AspNetCore.All 2.0.7 → 2.2.8 available (referenced by AspNetCore).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 2.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by AspNetCore).
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×2
  • XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure Samples/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — Infrastructure: 100 % XML-doc coverage (5/5).
  • XML-doc coverage: Xer.Cqrs Src/Xer.Cqrs/Xer.Cqrs.csproj — Xer.Cqrs: 67 % XML-doc coverage (2/3).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list Xer.Cqrs.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json30artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fc872-453d-7c4f-b010-fd83e3f6bf28 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 20 · Warnings: 28 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 7 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 16:25 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md